Codacy/CppCheck warns about this. Consistently use parentheses as we
already do in some places to silence the warning.
Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/3866
Due to limitations in Curl_resolver_wait_resolv(), it doesn't work for
DOH resolves. This fix disables DOH for those.
Limitation added to KNOWN_BUGS.
Fixes#3850Closes#3857
This reverts commit b0972bc.
- No longer show verbose output for the conncache closure handle.
The offending commit was added so that the conncache closure handle
would inherit verbose mode from the user's easy handle. (Note there is
no way for the user to set options for the closure handle which is why
that was necessary.) Other debug settings such as the debug function
were not also inherited since we determined that could lead to crashes
if the user's per-handle private data was used on an unexpected handle.
The reporter here says he has a debug function to capture the verbose
output, and does not expect or want any output to stderr; however
because the conncache closure handle does not inherit the debug function
the verbose output for that handle does go to stderr.
There are other plausible scenarios as well such as the user redirects
stderr on their handle, which is also not inherited since it could lead
to crashes when used on an unexpected handle.
Short of allowing the user to set options for the conncache closure
handle I don't think there's much we can safely do except no longer
inherit the verbose setting.
Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2019-05/0021.html
Reported-by: Kristoffer Gleditsch
Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/3598
Ref: https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/3618
Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/3856
Older versions of OpenSSL report FIPS availabilty via an OPENSSL_FIPS
define. It uses this define to determine whether to publish -fips at
the end of the version displayed. Applications that utilize the version
reported by OpenSSL will see a mismatch if they compare it to what curl
reports, as curl is not modifying the version in the same way. This
change simply adds a check to see if OPENSSL_FIPS is defined, and will
alter the reported version to match what OpenSSL itself provides. This
only appears to be applicable in versions of OpenSSL <1.1.1
Closes#3771
Currently you can do things like --cert <(cat ./cert.crt) with (at least) the
openssl backend, but that doesn't work for nss because is_file rejects fifos.
I don't actually know if this is sufficient, nss might do things internally
(like seeking back) that make this not work, so actual testing is needed.
Closes#3807
The time field in the curl_fileinfo struct will always be zero. No code
was ever implemented to actually convert the date string to a time_t.
Fixes#3829Closes#3835
... to make the host name "usable". Store the scope id and put it back
when extracting a URL out of it.
Also makes curl_url_set() syntax check CURLUPART_HOST.
Fixes#3817Closes#3822
As soon as a TLS backend gets ALPN conformation about the specific HTTP
version it can now set the multiplex situation for the "bundle" and
trigger moving potentially queued up transfers to the CONNECT state.
With transfers being queued up, we only move one at a a time back to the
CONNECT state but now we mark moved transfers so that when a moved
transfer is confirmed "successful" (it connected) it will trigger the
move of another pending transfer. Previously, it would otherwise wait
until the transfer was done before doing this. This makes queued up
pending transfers get processed (much) faster.
In case the name pointer isn't set (due to memory pressure most likely)
we need to skip the prefix matching and reject with a badcookie to avoid
a possible NULL pointer dereference.
Closes#3820#3821
Reported-by: Jonathan Moerman
Reviewed-by: Daniel Stenberg <daniel@haxx.se>
This limits all accepted input strings passed to libcurl to be less than
CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH (8000000) bytes, for these API calls:
curl_easy_setopt() and curl_url_set().
The 8000000 number is arbitrary picked and is meant to detect mistakes
or abuse, not to limit actual practical use cases. By limiting the
acceptable string lengths we also reduce the risk of integer overflows
all over.
NOTE: This does not apply to `CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS`.
Test 1559 verifies.
Closes#3805
