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Jingle Encrypted Transports - OMEMO Extension for JET introducing OMEMO End-to-End Encrypted Jingle Transports. &LEGALNOTICE; 0396 Deferred Standards Track Standards Council XEP-0391 XEP-0234 XEP-0384 jet-omemo jingle http://xmpp.org/schemas/jingle.xsd jingle:errors http://xmpp.org/schemas/jingle-errors.xsd jingle &paulschaub; 0.2.0 2018-12-06 XEP Editor (jsc) Defer due to lack of activity. 0.1 2017-11-29 XEP Editor (jwi)

Accepted by Council as Expremental XEP

0.0.1 2017-10-06 vv

First draft

&xep0391; can be used to utilize different end-to-end encryption methods to secure Jingle Transports, eg. in the context of &xep0234;. This document aims to extend &xep0391; to allow the use of OMEMO encryption with Jingle transports. To achieve this goal, this protocol extension makes use of OMEMOs KeyTransportElements.

Conveniently the OMEMO protocol already provides a way to transport key material to another entity. So called KeyTransportElements are basically normal OMEMO MessageElements, but without a payload, so the contained key can be used for something else (see Section 4.6 of XEP-0384). This extension uses the key encrypted in the KeyTransportMessages <key> attribute and initialization vector from the <iv> attribute to secure Jingle Transports. The key corresponds to the Transport Key of XEP-0391, while the iv corresponds to the Initialization Vector. The KeyTransportMessage is the equivalent to the Envelope Element. Note that within the Envelope Element, the Transport Key is encrypted with the OMEMO ratchet.

Unfortunately &xep0384; determines the type of the transported key to be AES-128-GCM-NoPadding, so no other configuration can be used in the context of this extension.

Since OMEMO deviceIds are not bound to XMPP resources, the initiator MUST encrypt the Transport Key for every device of the recipient.

In order to transport a key to the responder, the initiator creates a fresh AES-128-GCM-NoPadding Transport Key and Initialization Vector and generates an OMEMO KeyTransportElement from it as described in XEP-0384. This is then added as a child of the JET <security> element. The 'cipher' attribute MUST be set to 'aes-128-gcm-nopadding:0' (see the ciphers section of XEP-0391). The value of the 'type' attribute must be set to the namespace of the used version of XEP-0384 &VNOTE;.

1969-07-21T02:56:15Z This is a test. If this were a real file... text/plain test.txt 6144 w0mcJylzCn+AfvuGdqkty2+KP48=
BASE64ENCODED... BASE64ENCODED... BASE64ENCODED...
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The recipient decrypts the OMEMO KeyTransportElement to retrieve the Transport Secret. Transport Key and Initialization Vector are later used to encrypt/decrypt data as described in &xep0391;.

To advertise its support for JET-OMEMO, when replying to service discovery information ("disco#info") requests an entity MUST return URNs for any version of this extension, as well as of the JET extension that the entity supports -- e.g., "urn:xmpp:jingle:jet-omemo:0" for this version, or "urn:xmpp:jingle:jet:0" for &xep0391; &VNOTE;.

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In order for an application to determine whether an entity supports this protocol, where possible it SHOULD use the dynamic, presence-based profile of service discovery defined in &xep0115;. However, if an application has not received entity capabilities information from an entity, it SHOULD use explicit service discovery instead.