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Code Issues Releases Wiki Activity

Merge branch 'feature/xep-0420' into main

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Jonas Schäfer 2020-07-07 18:34:04 +02:00
commit c0ced625da
1 changed files with 46 additions and 23 deletions
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xep-0420.xml
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@ -29,12 +29,19 @@
<supersedes/>
<supersededby/>
<shortname>SCE</shortname>
<author>
<firstname>Paul</firstname>
<surname>Schaub</surname>
<email>vanitasvitae@fsfe.org</email>
<jid>vanitasvitae@jabberhead.tk</jid>
</author>
&paulschaub;
<revision>
<version>0.3.0</version>
<date>2020-07-03</date>
<initials>ps</initials>
<remark>
<p>Allow origin-id elements, disallow stanza-id and extended stanza addressing elements inside the payload element</p>
<p>Clarify wording on stanza processed elements and improve XEP formatting</p>
<p>Remove limitation of random padding content to base64 characters alone</p>
<p>Chat messages MUST contain message processing store hint</p>
<p>Credit where credit is due</p>
</remark>
</revision>
<revision>
<version>0.2.0</version>
<date>2019-10-04</date>
@ -99,7 +106,7 @@
<tr>
<td>&rpad;</td>
<td>Random-length random-content padding</td>
<td>Prevent known ciphertext and message length correlation attacks. The content of this element is a randomly generated sequence of base64 characters of random length between 0 and 200 characters. TODO: sane boundaries?</td>
<td>Prevent known ciphertext and message length correlation attacks. The content of this element is a randomly generated sequence of random length between 0 and 200 characters. TODO: sane boundaries?</td>
<td>None. This element is only used to change the length of the ciphertext and doesn't need to be verified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
@ -320,23 +327,30 @@
<p>As a last step, the original unencrypted stanza is recreated by replacing the &envelope; element of the stanza with the contents of the &payload; element.</p>
</section1>
<section1 topic='Blacklist' anchor='blacklist'>
<p>The receiving client MUST ignore certain elements that may allow for attacks to take place.</p>
<p>Since it is hard to come up with a complete list of blacklisted elements, a general rule of thumb would be the following:</p>
<p>Blacklisted are all elements that need to be read by the server at some point.</p>
<p>Below is an additional list of elements that are definitely forbidden inside the &content; element and MUST instead be placed in the message unencrypted.</p>
<table caption='Examples for elements that MUST be ignored by the recipient'>
<section1 topic='Server-processed Elements' anchor='server-processed'>
<p>There are certain extension elements which are required to be available to the server in order to do message routing and processing.
Additionally there are some elements that MUST be filtered by the server.
Allowing for those elements to be included in, and parsed from the encrypted payload would allow a malicious client to perform a number of attacks.</p>
<p>Contrary to this, other elements are considered sensitive and MUST NOT be available in plaintext outside the &content; element.</p>
<p>It is hard to come up with a complete list of exceptional elements at this point, as there is no practical implementation experience.</p>
<p>Below is a non-exhaustive list of elements that are definitely blacklisted inside the &content; element and whitelisted as direct child elements of the message.</p>
<table caption='Examples for exceptional elements that MUST NOT be included in, or read from the &content; element and MUST instead be sent traditionally as direct child elements of the stanza.'>
<tr>
<th>Element</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of &xep0334;</td>
<td>Those elements are addressed to the server and of no interest for the client</td>
<td>Message Processing Hints are addressed to the server and MUST therefore be accessible in plaintext. A receiving client MUST ignore any message processing hints encountered inside the encrypted &content; element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin-ID elements of &xep0359;</td>
<td>These IDs may be used to identify a message even though it cannot be decrypted.</td>
<td>Stanza-ID elements of &xep0359;</td>
<td>Sending clients MUST NOT include Stanza-ID elements inside the &content; element, as this would prevent the server from filtering it.
A client MUST ignore Stanza-ID elements encountered inside &content; element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elements of &xep0033;</td>
<td>The server MUST be able to access the &lt;addresses/&gt; and &lt;address/&gt; elements in order to do message routing, so they MUST NOT be encrypted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TODO: Other elements?</td>
@ -348,17 +362,21 @@
<section1 topic='Business Rules' anchor='rules'>
<p>Unencrypted &content; elements are NOT ALLOWED as child elements of the stanza and MUST be dropped.</p>
<p>Elements in the &content; elements &payload; element MUST be identified using an element name and namespace. Notably the &lt;body/&gt; element MUST contain a valid namespace (i.e. "jabber:client").</p>
<p>Elements in the &content; elements &payload; element MUST be identified using an element name and namespace.
Notably the &lt;body/&gt; element MUST contain a valid namespace (i.e. "jabber:client").</p>
<p>The recipient must verify that the decrypted &content; element contains valid XML before processing it any further. Invalid XML must be rejected.</p>
<p>After verifying the integrity of the &content; element, the recipient needs to make sure that no blacklisted elements are found within the payload. Any forbidden elements MUST be dropped before the message is processed any further.</p>
<p>Furthermore the receiving client MUST ignore any extension elements considered as sensitive which are found outside of the &content; element, especially as direct unencrypted child elements of the enclosing stanza.</p>
<p>Duplicate elements within the &content; element MUST be dropped.</p>
<p>Elements in the &content; element override elements in the enclosing stanza. TODO: Maybe we want to remove this rule by disallowing duplicate elements all together?</p>
<p>Since a message encrypted with SCE MUST NOT contain a &lt;body/&gt; element, it is not eligible for MAM message storage (&xep0313;). Therefore sending entities MUST append an unencrypted &xep0334; &lt;store/&gt; hint as a direct child element to the message.</p>
<p>After verifying the integrity of the &content; element, the recipient needs to make sure that no server-processed elements are found within the payload.
Any forbidden elements MUST be dropped before the message is processed any further.</p>
<p>Furthermore the receiving client MUST ignore any extension elements considered as sensitive which are found outside of the &content; element,
especially as direct unencrypted child elements of the enclosing stanza.</p>
<p>Since a chat message encrypted with SCE MUST NOT contain a &lt;body/&gt; element, it is not eligible for MAM message storage (&xep0313;).
Therefore sending entities MUST append an unencrypted &xep0334; &lt;store/&gt; hint as a direct child element to the message.</p>
</section1>
<section1 topic='Implementation Notes' anchor='impl'>
<p>As a first, naïve approach a recipient of a message containing an &envelope; element could simply reinject the reassambled unencrypted stanza into the XML stream. This might introduce some security issues. Most notably, there is no way to distinguish end-to-end encrypted elements from unencrypted elements.</p>
<p>As a first, naïve approach a recipient of a message containing an &envelope; element could simply reinject the reassambled unencrypted stanza into the XML stream.
This might introduce some security issues.
Most notably, depending on the clients implementation it may become ambiguous which elements were received end-to-end encrypted and which were received unencrypted.</p>
<p>Implementations should rather handle encrypted elements explicitly.</p>
</section1>
@ -377,4 +395,9 @@
<section1 topic='XML Schema' anchor='schema'>
<p>TODO.</p>
</section1>
<section1 topic='Acknowledgements' anchor='acknowledgements'>
<p>Big thanks to the authors of &xep0373; (Florian Schmaus, Dominik Schürmann and Vincent Breitmoser) which heavily inspired the idea of this protocol.</p>
<p>Also thanks to Marvin Wißfeld, Tim Henkes, Daniel Gultsch, Melvin Keskin and Andreas Straub for their feedback.</p>
</section1>
</xep>