From b6089b68d6112273a9fdf7fcf1540f703436fabb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Peter Saint-Andre Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2009 19:23:00 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] 1.1rc1 git-svn-id: file:///home/ksmith/gitmigration/svn/xmpp/trunk@3645 4b5297f7-1745-476d-ba37-a9c6900126ab --- xep-0249.xml | 19 ++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/xep-0249.xml b/xep-0249.xml index 67858244..b49b6da4 100644 --- a/xep-0249.xml +++ b/xep-0249.xml @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ &LEGALNOTICE; 0249 Draft + Standards Track Standards Council @@ -25,6 +26,12 @@ http://xmpp.org/schemas/x-conference.xsd &stpeter; + + 1.1rc1 + in progress, last updated 2009-11-18 + psa +

Added password attribute for feature parity with mediated invitations.

+
1.0 2009-06-25 @@ -93,11 +100,13 @@ to='hecate@shakespeare.lit'> reason='Hey Hecate, this is the place for all good witches!'/> ]]> -

The 'jid' attribute, which is REQUIRED, specifies the address of the groupchat room.

-

The 'reason' attribute, which is OPTIONAL, specifies a human-readable purpose for the invitation.

+

The 'jid' attribute, which is REQUIRED, specifies the address of the groupchat room to be joined.

+

The 'password' attribute, which is OPTIONAL, specifies a password needed for entry into a password-protected room and maps to the <password/> element in a mediated invitation.

+

The 'reason' attribute, which is OPTIONAL, specifies a human-readable purpose for the invitation and maps to the <reason/> element in a mediated invitation.

Upon receiving a direct invitation, the contact's client SHOULD present the invitation to the contact so that the contact can accept it or decline it. If the contact accepts the invitation, the contact's client shall join the room as described in XEP-0045. If the contact declines the invitation, it shall silently discard the invitation.

@@ -135,7 +144,7 @@
  • The sender of an invitation could overload the 'reason' attribute with malicious or offensive text. The recipient can mitigate this attack by blocking the sender using technologies such as &xep0016; and &xep0191;.

  • A passive attacker could flood the recipient with a large number of chatroom invitations. This attack, too, can be mitigated with Privacy Lists or Simple Communications Blocking.

  • A passive attacker could use a mimicked JID to fool the recipient into thinking that the sender is a known or trusted contact. This attack requires knowledge of the recipient's known or trusted contacts, and can be mitigated by following the recommendations in &xep0165;.

  • -
  • In the absence of end-to-end encryption, a passive attacker could eavesdrop on the chatroom invitations that a user sends or receives.

  • +
  • In the absence of end-to-end encryption, a passive attacker could eavesdrop on the chatroom invitations that a user sends or receives. This is especially threatening if the invitation includes a 'password' attribute for a password-protected room.

  • In the absence of end-to-end encryption or signing, an active attacker could modify the invitation in transit so that the recipient is directed to a different room than intended by the sender.

  • @@ -175,6 +184,10 @@ name='jid' type='xs:string' use='required'/> +