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XEP-0434: Release version 0.2.0

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Improve explanations, descriptions and examples, introduce new attribute and complete all sections:

* Remove link to encryption protocol namespaces
* Add short name
* Shorten and improve introduction
* Use emphasizing text formatting instead of quotation marks
* Add new section for explaining the core properties of trust messages
* Add examples comparing trust messages to public key certificates
* Improve description of trust message structure
* Introduce 'usage' attribute for 'trust-message' element
* Focus on XEP-0420 and adjust examples accordingly
* Complete sections 'IANA Considerations', 'XMPP Registrar Considerations' and 'XML Schema'
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Melvin Keskin 2020-10-31 18:42:45 +01:00
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@ -1,13 +1,16 @@
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<!DOCTYPE xep SYSTEM 'xep.dtd' [
<!ENTITY % ents SYSTEM 'xep.ent'>
<!ENTITY encryption-protocols "<span class='ref'><link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0380.html#table-1'>encryption protocols</link></span><note>Explicit Message Encryption - Encryption Protocols &lt;<link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0380.html#table-1'>https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0380.html#table-1</link>&gt;.</note>">
<!ENTITY ns "urn:xmpp:trust-messages:0">
<!ENTITY ns-example-usage "urn:xmpp:example-usage:0">
<!ENTITY ns-omemo "urn:xmpp:omemo:1">
<!ENTITY ns-sce "urn:xmpp:sce:0">
%ents;
]>
<?xml-stylesheet type='text/xsl' href='xep.xsl'?>
<xep>
<header>
<title>Trust Messages</title>
<title>Trust Messages (TM)</title>
<abstract>
This document specifies a way to communicate the trust in public long-term keys used by end-to-end encryption protocols from one endpoint to another.
</abstract>
@ -26,48 +29,58 @@
</dependencies>
<supersedes/>
<supersededby/>
<shortname>NOT_YET_ASSIGNED</shortname>
<shortname>TM</shortname>
<author>
<firstname>Melvin</firstname>
<surname>Keskin</surname>
<email>melvo@olomono.de</email>
<jid>melvo@olomono.de</jid>
</author>
<revision>
<version>0.1.0</version>
<date>2020-02-27</date>
<initials>XEP Editor (jsc)</initials>
<remark>Accepted by vote of Council on 2020-02-19.</remark>
</revision>
<revision>
<revision>
<version>0.2.0</version>
<date>2020-11-05</date>
<initials>melvo</initials>
<remark>
<p>Improve explanations, descriptions and examples, introduce new attribute and complete all sections:</p>
<ul>
<li>Remove link to encryption protocol namespaces.</li>
<li>Add short name</li>
<li>Shorten and improve introduction.</li>
<li>Use emphasizing text formatting instead of quotation marks.</li>
<li>Add new section for explaining the core properties of trust messages.</li>
<li>Add examples comparing trust messages to public key certificates.</li>
<li>Improve description of trust message structure.</li>
<li>Introduce 'usage' attribute for 'trust-message' element.</li>
<li>Focus on &xep0420; and adjust examples accordingly.</li>
<li>Complete sections 'IANA Considerations', 'XMPP Registrar Considerations' and 'XML Schema'.</li>
</ul>
</remark>
</revision>
<revision>
<version>0.1.0</version>
<date>2020-02-27</date>
<initials>XEP Editor (jsc)</initials>
<remark>Accepted by vote of Council on 2020-02-19.</remark>
</revision>
<revision>
<version>0.0.1</version>
<date>2020-02-15</date>
<initials>mk</initials>
<initials>melvo</initials>
<remark><p>First draft.</p></remark>
</revision>
</header>
<section1 topic='Introduction' anchor='intro'>
<section1 topic='Introduction' anchor='introduction'>
<p>
End-to-end encryption without verifying the authenticity of the exchanged public long-term keys only enables the endpoints to protect their communication against passive attacks.
This means an attacker cannot read encrypted messages in transit without actively intervening in the key exchange.
However, without any other precautions active attacks are still possible.
If an attacker replaces the exchanged keys with malicious ones or introduces a new malicious endpoint with an own key, the end-to-end encrypted messages can be read and manipulated by the attacker.
However, without any other precautions, active attacks are still possible.
If an attacker replaces the exchanged keys with malicious ones or introduces an additional malicious endpoint, the end-to-end encrypted messages can be read and manipulated by the attacker.
</p>
<p>
When using end-to-end encryption where public long-term keys are transmitted over a channel which is not protected against active attacks, the authenticity of those keys is not guaranteed.
Such a key has to be authenticated by the receiving endpoint over a channel which is protected against active attacks to maintain the confidentiality of sent messages and ensure the authenticity and integrity of received messages.
</p>
<p>
A trust message is an XMPP message that contains the information of whether the sending endpoint trusts a specific public long-term key.
The authenticity and integrity of the message is ensured by a signing mechanism.
Trust messages can be used in conjunction with an end-to-end encryption protocol like &xep0373; or &xep0384; e.g. to automatically or semi-automatically establish secure channels protected against active attacks.
</p>
<p>
Furthermore, the fact that an endpoint trusts a key or not can be kept confidential toward an attacker by encrypting those messages and sending them only to endpoints with authenticated keys.
That means particularly that an attacker cannot detect by the content of a trust message whether an authentication of a key took place.
An authentication will therefore stay anonymous toward an attacker.
The encryption protects against passive attacks since an attacker cannot read the content of the trust message.
The restriction to send trust messages only to endpoints with authenticated keys in addition to the encryption protects against active attacks since the attacker will not, after introducing a malicious key, receive a trust message encrypted with that key.
Such a key has to be authenticated by the receiving endpoint over another channel which is already protected against active attacks to maintain the confidentiality of sent messages and ensure the authenticity and integrity of received messages.
Trust messages can be used to transfer the needed data via XMPP for performing such an authentication.
Furthermore, they can transmit the data used for distrusting a key.
</p>
</section1>
<section1 topic='Glossary' anchor='glossary'>
@ -77,142 +90,247 @@
<dd>
Communication endpoint owning exactly one public long-term key.
In most cases that is an XMPP client instance.
In the terminology of &xep0384;, that is a "device".
To cover also the possibility for using multiple endpoints on the same physical device and via the same client instance, the general term "endpoint" is used.
In the terminology of &xep0384;, that is a <em>device</em>.
To cover also the possibility for using multiple endpoints on the same physical device and via the same client instance, the general term <em>endpoint</em> is used.
</dd>
</di>
<di>
<dt>Key authentication</dt>
<dd>Verification that a key received over an insecure channel is actually the one of the assumed endpoint</dd>
<dd>
Verification that a key received over an insecure channel is actually the one of the assumed endpoint
</dd>
</di>
<di>
<dt>Key identifier</dt>
<dd>Identifier of a key (e.g., a fingerprint or the key itself)</dd>
<dd>
Identifier of a key (e.g., a fingerprint or the key itself)
</dd>
</di>
<di>
<dt>Public key certificate</dt>
<dd>
Electronic document used to prove the authenticity of a public key
</dd>
</di>
<di>
<dt>Trust message</dt>
<dd>
XMPP message which indicates that specific keys are trusted or not trusted by the sender.
XMPP message which indicates that specific keys are trusted or untrusted by the sending endpoint.
A trust message for an endpoint's key contains the key identifier of the given key.
</dd>
</di>
</dl>
</section1>
<section1 topic='Why Trust Messages?' anchor='why-trust-messages'>
<p>
Trust messages can be used in conjunction with an end-to-end encryption protocol such as &xep0373; or &xep0384; to automatically or semi-automatically establish secure channels protected against active attacks.
</p>
<section2 topic='General Advantages' anchor='why-trust-messages-general-advantages'>
<p>
Trust messages have the following advantages:
</p>
<section3 topic='No Permanent Storage' anchor='why-trust-messages-general-advantages-no-permanent-storage'>
<p>
A permanent storage is not needed.
Cached data can be be removed as soon as the recipient made use of them.
E.g., a server-side storage holding available data because it does not know when a client needs to access them, as for certificate-based approaches, is unnecessary.
</p>
</section3>
<section3 topic='No Additional Infrastructure' anchor='why-trust-messages-general-advantages-no-additional-infrastructure'>
<p>
An infrastructure in additional to the one used for messages is not needed because trust messages are ordinary messages.
E.g., a server-side storage and a mechanism for accessing it other than those used for messages is unnecessary.
</p>
</section3>
</section2>
<section2 topic='Advantages with Encryption' anchor='why-trust-messages-advantages-with-encryption'>
<p>
The authenticity and integrity of trust messages are ensured by a signing mechanism.
If trust messages are additionally encrypted, they have the following advantages:
</p>
<section3 topic='Same Cryptographic Properties' anchor='why-trust-messages-advantages-with-encryption-same-cryptographic-properties'>
<p>
The cryptographic properties of the encryption protocol are applied to the trust messages.
Properties such as confidentiality, forward secrecy and deniability can have a positive impact on the authentication of keys.
Hence, trust messages, in contrast to certificates, can e.g. be deniable toward a third party if the encryption protocol provides that kind of deniability.
</p>
</section3>
<section3 topic='Confidential Communication of Trust' anchor='why-trust-messages-advantages-with-encryption-confidential-communication-of-trust'>
<p>
The fact that an endpoint trusts a key or not can be kept confidential toward an attacker by encrypting those messages and sending them only to endpoints with authenticated keys.
This means that an attacker cannot detect by the content of a trust message whether a specific key is trusted by the sender.
If the trust message is sent for an authentication of a key, the involved parties of that authentication will therefore stay anonymous toward an attacker.
</p>
<p>
The encryption protects against passive attacks on the transmission of the trust messages.
That way, an attacker cannot read the content of the trust messages.
</p>
<p>
The restriction to send trust messages only to endpoints with authenticated keys in addition to the encryption protects against active attacks on the transmission of the trust messages.
An attacker will even after introducing a malicious key not receive a trust message encrypted with that key.
</p>
</section3>
<section3 topic='No Selective Blocking' anchor='why-trust-messages-advantages-with-encryption-no-selective-blocking'>
<p>
Blocking data used to trust or distrust keys in transit is made more difficult.
In particular, an attacker is not able to selectively block transmitted data used to distrust the attacker's key.
</p>
<p>
If an attacker cannot distinguish whether the data sent from a client is used for trusting or distrusting a key, the attacker can only randomly block some messages or the whole communication.
If the communication is already compromised by an active attack, the attacker does not want to stop the whole communication.
During that state, the attacker has the possibility to keep on e.g. eavesdropping or altering messages.
Therefore, the attacker wants to block data which can lead to excluding the attacker.
But the attacker does not want to block the communication itself.
</p>
<p>
Data which is used by the recipient to distrust the attacker's key would make it impossible for the attacker to continue to encroach on the communication.
Thus, it is important to prevent an attacker from blocking data used for making trust decisions.
E.g., an approach using certificates permanently stored on a server cannot prevent an attacker from specifically blocking such data because certificates have to be discoverable and identifiable as such.
</p>
<p>
It might be possible to distinguish an encrypted trust message from other encrypted messages by analyzing the network traffic over a period of time.
However, the mitigation of that issue is out of scope.
</p>
</section3>
</section2>
</section1>
<section1 topic='Trust Message Structure' anchor='trust-message-structure'>
<p>
A trust message MUST be signed in a way to ensure its authenticity and integrity.
A trust message (i.e., the root <![CDATA[<message/>]]> element)
</p>
<ul>
<li>
MUST contain exactly one <![CDATA[<trust-message/>]]> direct child element which
<ul>
<li>
MUST be signed in a way to ensure its authenticity and integrity.
</li>
<li>
SHOULD be encrypted to ensure its confidentiality.
</li>
<li>
MUST have an <em>xmlns</em> attribute specifying its namespace <em>&ns;</em>.
</li>
<li>
MUST have a <em>usage</em> attribute specifying the namespace of the protocol which uses the trust message for a specific purpose.
</li>
<li>
MUST have an <em>encryption</em> attribute specifying the namespace of the encryption protocol for which the keys are used.
</li>
<li>
MUST contain at least one <![CDATA[<key-owner/>]]> direct child element which
<ul>
<li>
MUST have a <em>JID</em> attribute specifying the owner of the keys.
</li>
<li>
MUST contain at least one <![CDATA[<trust/>]]> or <![CDATA[<distrust/>]]> direct child element which indicates the trust respectively distrust in a key.
Each <![CDATA[<trust/>]]> and <![CDATA[<distrust/>]]> element MUST contain exactly one key identifier.
</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li>
SHOULD have a <![CDATA[type='chat']]> attribute which is needed to deliver the trust message to all endpoints (see <link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0280.html#recommended-rules'>XEP-0280: Message Carbons</link>).
</li>
<li>
SHOULD contain a <![CDATA[<store xmlns='urn:xmpp:hints'/>]]> direct child element which is needed to deliver the trust message to each offline endpoint after it went online (see <link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0313.html#business-storeret-user-archives'>XEP-0313: Message Archive Management</link> and <link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0334.html#sect-idm45856619663120'>XEP-0334: Message Processing Hints</link>).
</li>
</ul>
<p>
The last two points are needed to achieve their mentioned goals because a trust message does not contain a <![CDATA[<body>]]> element which would automatically lead to the desired result.
</p>
<p>
The part specific for a trust message begins with the <![CDATA[<trust-message>]]> element.
Its encryption attribute MUST specify the encryption protocol that uses the keys denoted by their identifiers.
To send a trust message for keys of &xep0373; the attribute <![CDATA[encryption='urn:xmpp:openpgp:0']]> or for keys of &xep0384; the attribute <![CDATA[encryption='eu.siacs.conversations.axolotl']]> MUST be used.
For other values there is an overview of possible &encryption-protocols;.
A trust message MUST contain at least one <![CDATA[<key-owner>]]> element and each element MUST contain at least one <![CDATA[<trust>]]> or <![CDATA[<distrust>]]> element.
Inside of each <![CDATA[<trust>]]> or <![CDATA[<distrust>]]> element there MUST be exactly one key identifier.
Those elements are used for the following purposes:
In the following example, two &xep0384; keys of Alice are indicated as trusted, one key of Bob is indicated as trusted and two other ones of Bob are indicated as untrusted.
</p>
<p>
In the following example the keys of the later given identifiers are used by the encryption protocol &xep0384; specified by eu.siacs.conversations.axolotl.
</p>
<example caption='Specifying the Encryption Protocol of the Keys'><![CDATA[<trust-message xmlns='urn:xmpp:trust-messages:0' encryption='eu.siacs.conversations.axolotl'>]]></example>
<p>
In the following example the keys of the later given identifiers belong to alice@example.org.
</p>
<example caption='Specifying the JID Owning the Keys'><![CDATA[<key-owner jid='alice@example.org'>]]></example>
<p>
In the following example the key corresponding to the identifier inside <![CDATA[<trust>]]> and <![CDATA[</trust>]]> is trusted by the sending endpoint.
</p>
<example caption='Indicating the Trust in a Specific Key'><![CDATA[<trust>6850019d7ed0feb6d3823072498ceb4f616c6025586f8f666dc6b9c81ef7e0a4</trust>]]></example>
<p>
In the following example the key corresponding to the identifier inside the <![CDATA[<distrust>]]> and <![CDATA[</distrust>]]> is not trusted by the sending endpoint.
</p>
<example caption='Indicating the Distrust in a Specific Key'><![CDATA[<distrust>b423f5088de9a924d51b31581723d850c7cc67d0a4fe6b267c3d301ff56d2413</distrust>]]></example>
<example caption='Trust Message Element for Alice&apos;s and Bob&apos;s OMEMO Keys'><![CDATA[
<trust-message xmlns=']]>&ns;<![CDATA[' usage=']]>&ns-example-usage;<![CDATA[' encryption=']]>&ns-omemo;<![CDATA['>
<key-owner jid='alice@example.org'>
<trust>6850019d7ed0feb6d3823072498ceb4f616c6025586f8f666dc6b9c81ef7e0a4</trust>
<trust>221a4f8e228b72182b006e5ca527d3bddccf8d9e6feaf4ce96e1c451e8648020</trust>
</key-owner>
<key-owner jid='bob@example.com'>
<trust>623548d3835c6d33ef5cb680f7944ef381cf712bf23a0119dabe5c4f252cd02f</trust>
<distrust>b423f5088de9a924d51b31581723d850c7cc67d0a4fe6b267c3d301ff56d2413</distrust>
<distrust>d9f849b6b828309c5f2c8df4f38fd891887da5aaa24a22c50d52f69b4a80817e</distrust>
</key-owner>
</trust-message>
]]></example>
</section1>
<section1 topic='Use Cases' anchor='usecases'>
<section1 topic='Use Cases' anchor='use-cases'>
<p>
An endpoint of alice@example.org MAY send a trust message to other endpoints of alice@example.org, to contacts like bob@example.com or to a specific resource like carol@example.net/phone.
Trust messages MAY be sent unencrypted to solely communicate the trust in specific keys without any other protection.
But as described before, the strength of trust messages is the possibility to encrypt their content and choose to which endpoints they are sent according to the trust in the endpoints' keys.
</p>
<section2 topic='Unencrypted Trust Message' anchor='use-cases-unencrypted-trust-message'>
<p>
The <![CDATA[<trust-message/>]]> element MUST be signed before sending for ensuring the authenticity and integrity.
</p>
</section2>
<section2 topic='Encrypted Trust Message' anchor='use-cases-encrypted-trust-message'>
<p>
The <![CDATA[<trust-message/>]]> element SHOULD be signed and encrypted before sending for applying all advantages the encryption provides.
That protects against passive attacks on the transmission of the trust message.
The trust message SHOULD only be sent to endpoints whose keys have already been authenticated for also preventing active attacks on the transmission of the trust message.
</p>
<p>
Describing how the <![CDATA[<trust-message/>]]> element has to be used by each existing encryption protocol is out of scope.
&xep0420; specifies a common method for encrypting arbitrary elements which can be used by different encryption protocols.
When using an encryption protocol such as &xep0384; which uses &xep0420; (SCE), the SCE <![CDATA[<payload/>]]> element MUST contain the <![CDATA[<trust-message/>]]> element as a direct child.
</p>
<section3 topic='SCE Profile' anchor='use-cases-encrypted-trust-message-sce-profile'>
<p>
A trust message SCE <![CDATA[<content/>]]> element
</p>
<ul>
<li>
MUST contain an <![CDATA[<rpad/>]]> affix element.
This prevents an attacker from finding out the trust message's content by its length and distinguishing a trust message from another kind of SCE message.
</li>
<li>
MUST contain a <![CDATA[<time/>]]> affix element.
This prevents an attacker from delivering trust messages in the wrong order or delivering a former trust message again.
If the trust messages are used by the recipient for making trust decisions, it protects the recipient from setting the opposite of the intended trust state by applying trust changes in the wrong order or reapplying a former change.
</li>
<li>
SHOULD contain a <![CDATA[<from/>]]> affix element.
This prevents an attacker from spoofing the sender.
</li>
<li>
SHOULD contain a <![CDATA[<to/>]]> affix element.
This prevents an attacker from spoofing the recipient.
</li>
</ul>
</section3>
<example caption='SCE Content Element Used for a Trust Message from Alice&apos;s Endpoint to Carol'><![CDATA[
<content xmlns=']]>&ns-sce;<![CDATA['>
<rpad>QHqW2arWFewoERL1a43wonBKpTmsrBWnc1d66HSDq85NgMLmjrDJV9lV</rpad>
<time stamp='2020-01-01T00:00:00'/>
<from jid='alice@example.org/notebook'/>
<to jid='carol@example.com'/>
<payload>
<trust-message xmlns=']]>&ns;<![CDATA[' usage=']]>&ns-example-usage;<![CDATA[' encryption=']]>&ns-omemo;<![CDATA['>
<key-owner jid='alice@example.org'>
<trust>6850019d7ed0feb6d3823072498ceb4f616c6025586f8f666dc6b9c81ef7e0a4</trust>
<trust>221a4f8e228b72182b006e5ca527d3bddccf8d9e6feaf4ce96e1c451e8648020</trust>
</key-owner>
<key-owner jid='bob@example.com'>
<trust>623548d3835c6d33ef5cb680f7944ef381cf712bf23a0119dabe5c4f252cd02f</trust>
<distrust>b423f5088de9a924d51b31581723d850c7cc67d0a4fe6b267c3d301ff56d2413</distrust>
<distrust>d9f849b6b828309c5f2c8df4f38fd891887da5aaa24a22c50d52f69b4a80817e</distrust>
</key-owner>
</trust-message>
</payload>
</content>
]]></example>
</section2>
</section1>
<section1 topic='Implementation Notes' anchor='implementation-notes'>
<p>
The usage of &xep0280; for trust messages is RECOMMENDED.
It minimizes the number of trust messages to be sent while having the same payload because trust messages with the same payload do not have to be sent for each endpoint.
&xep0280; minimizes the number of trust messages to be sent while having the same payload because trust messages with the same payload do not have to be sent for each endpoint.
In combination with the usage of &xep0313;, the delivery of trust messages to temporarily offline endpoints is ensured even if they are available under a different resource after going online than the last known one before going offline.
Additionally, using &xep0280; for every encrypted trust message will lead to send trust messages which are less distinguishable by analyzing their content from other encrypted messages using &xep0420;.
However, it may be possible to distinguish an encrypted trust message from other encrypted messages and therefore detect the fact that a specific authentication took place by analyzing the network traffic over a period of time but that is out of scope for this specification.
</p>
<p> TODO: Move this paragraph to &xep0420;.
The following message attribute and element are RECOMMENDED because without having <![CDATA[<body>]]>, the goals of them would not be achieved.
<![CDATA[type='chat']]> is needed to deliver the trust message to all endpoints (see <link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0280.html#recommended-rules'>XEP-0280: Message Carbons</link>).
<![CDATA[<store xmlns='urn:xmpp:hints'/>]]> is needed to deliver the trust message to each offline endpoint after it went online (see <link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0313.html#business-storeret-user-archives'>XEP-0313: Message Archive Management</link> and <link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0334.html#sect-idm45856619663120'>XEP-0334: Message Processing Hints</link>).
</p>
<p>
In the following examples Alice's endpoint sends a trust message for &xep0384; (eu.siacs.conversations.axolotl) keys of own endpoints and Bob's endpoints to Carol's resource "phone".
Alice's keys corresponding to the identifiers starting with "68" and "22" are trusted by Alice's endpoint connected via resource "laptop".
Bob's key corresponding to the identifiers starting with "68" and "22" are trusted by Alice's endpoint connected via resource "laptop".
Bob's key corresponding to the identifier starting with "62" is trusted by Alice's endpoint connected via resource "laptop" but not Bob's keys corresponding to the identifiers starting with "b4" and "d9".
</p>
<section2 topic='Unencrypted Trust Message' anchor='usecase-unencrypted-trust-message'>
<p>
A trust message before encryption or without any encryption could look like the following example.
Keep in mind, like said before, that the authenticity and integrity of the message MUST be ensured by a signing mechanism even if the message is not encrypted.
However, the strength of trust messages is the possibility to encrypt them and to choose its recipients.
</p>
<example caption='Alice&apos;s endpoint sends an unencrypted trust message to Carol'><![CDATA[
<message from='alice@example.org/laptop' to='carol@example.org' type='chat'>
<store xmlns='urn:xmpp:hints'/>
<trust-message xmlns='urn:xmpp:trust-messages:0' encryption='eu.siacs.conversations.axolotl'>
<key-owner jid='alice@example.org'>
<trust>6850019d7ed0feb6d3823072498ceb4f616c6025586f8f666dc6b9c81ef7e0a4</trust>
<trust>221a4f8e228b72182b006e5ca527d3bddccf8d9e6feaf4ce96e1c451e8648020</trust>
</key-owner>
<key-owner jid='bob@example.com'>
<trust>623548d3835c6d33ef5cb680f7944ef381cf712bf23a0119dabe5c4f252cd02f</trust>
<distrust>b423f5088de9a924d51b31581723d850c7cc67d0a4fe6b267c3d301ff56d2413</distrust>
<distrust>d9f849b6b828309c5f2c8df4f38fd891887da5aaa24a22c50d52f69b4a80817e</distrust>
</key-owner>
</trust-message>
</message>
]]></example>
</section2>
<section2 topic='Encrypted Trust Message' anchor='usecase-encrypted-trust-message'>
<p>
Like described in the introduction, it is possible to encrypt a trust message and send it only to endpoints whose keys have already been authenticated.
Both actions are RECOMMENDED, especially for concealing the fact that an endpoint authenticated another endpoint's key.
When using an end-to-end encryption like &xep0384; which cannot encrypt arbitrary elements, &xep0420; is needed to encrypt a trust message.
The following example shows how such a message could look like.
For encrypting with &xep0373;, the element <![CDATA[<encrypted xmlns='eu.siacs.conversations.axolotl'>]]> MUST be replaced by <![CDATA[<openpgp xmlns='urn:xmpp:openpgp:0'>]]>, the element <![CDATA[<envelope xmlns='urn:xmpp:sce:0'>]]> by <![CDATA[<signcrypt xmlns='urn:xmpp:openpgp:0'>]]> and <![CDATA[<header sid='27183'>...</header>]]> MUST be removed.
</p>
<example caption='Alice&apos;s endpoint sends an encrypted trust message to Carol'><![CDATA[
<message from='alice@example.org/laptop' to='carol@example.org' type='chat'>
<store xmlns='urn:xmpp:hints'/>
<encrypted xmlns='eu.siacs.conversations.axolotl'>
<header sid='17183'>
...
</header>
<envelope xmlns='urn:xmpp:sce:0'>
<rpad>QHqW2arWFewoERL1a43wonBKpTmsrBWnc1d66HSDq85NgMLmjrDJV9lV</rpad>
<time stamp='2020-01-01T00:00:00'/>
<from jid='alice@example.org/laptop'/>
<to jid='carol@example.org'/>
<payload>
<trust-message xmlns='urn:xmpp:trust-messages:0' encryption='eu.siacs.conversations.axolotl'>
<key-owner jid='alice@example.org'>
<trust>6850019d7ed0feb6d3823072498ceb4f616c6025586f8f666dc6b9c81ef7e0a4</trust>
<trust>221a4f8e228b72182b006e5ca527d3bddccf8d9e6feaf4ce96e1c451e8648020</trust>
</key-owner>
<key-owner jid='bob@example.com'>
<trust>623548d3835c6d33ef5cb680f7944ef381cf712bf23a0119dabe5c4f252cd02f</trust>
<distrust>b423f5088de9a924d51b31581723d850c7cc67d0a4fe6b267c3d301ff56d2413</distrust>
<distrust>d9f849b6b828309c5f2c8df4f38fd891887da5aaa24a22c50d52f69b4a80817e</distrust>
</key-owner>
</trust-message>
</payload>
</envelope>
</encrypted>
</message>
]]></example>
</section2>
</section1>
<section1 topic='Implementation Notes' anchor='impl'>
<p>
This specification uses &xep0280; for sending a trust message to all endpoints of a contact or to all own endpoints at once.
By sending a trust message to the contact, each endpoint of the contact and each own endpoint receives the same trust message by the server.
@ -235,13 +353,48 @@
Keep in mind that a trust message SHOULD only be encrypted for endpoints with authenticated keys.
</p>
</section1>
<section1 topic='IANA Considerations' anchor='iana'>
<p>REQUIRED.</p>
<section1 topic='IANA Considerations' anchor='iana-considerations'>
<p>This document requires no interaction with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</p>
</section1>
<section1 topic='XMPP Registrar Considerations' anchor='registrar'>
<p>REQUIRED.</p>
<section1 topic='XMPP Registrar Considerations' anchor='xmpp-registrar-considerations'>
<section2 topic='Protocol Namespaces' anchor='xmpp-registrar-considerations-protocol-namespaces'>
<p>This specification defines the following XMPP namespaces:</p>
<ul>
<li>&ns;</li>
</ul>
</section2>
<section2 topic='Protocol Versioning' anchor='xmpp-registrar-considerations-protocol-versioning'>
&NSVER;
</section2>
</section1>
<section1 topic='XML Schema' anchor='schema'>
<p>REQUIRED for protocol specifications.</p>
<section1 topic='XML Schema' anchor='xml-schema'>
<code><![CDATA[
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<xs:schema xmlns:xs='http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema'
targetNamespace=']]>&ns;<![CDATA['
xmlns=']]>&ns;<![CDATA['
elementFormDefault='qualified'>
<xs:element name='trust-message'>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name='usage' type='xs:string' use='required'/>
<xs:attribute name='encryption' type='xs:string' use='required'/>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element ref='key-owner' minOccurs='1' maxOccurs='unbounded'/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name='key-owner'>
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name='jid' type='xs:string' use='required'/>
<xs:sequence>
<xs:element name='trust' type='xs:string' minOccurs='0' maxOccurs='unbounded'/>
<xs:element name='distrust' type='xs:string' minOccurs='0' maxOccurs='unbounded'/>
</xs:sequence>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
</xs:schema>
]]></code>
</section1>
</xep>