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improve introduction
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<section1 topic='Introduction' anchor='intro'>
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<section1 topic='Introduction' anchor='intro'>
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<p>
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<p>
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ATT is used for automatically establishing secure channels protected against active attacks between a new device and existing ones after a single mutual manual authentication between the new device and one of the existing ones.
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ATT is used in conjunction with &xep0384; for automatically establishing secure channels protected against active attacks between a new device and existing ones after a single mutual manual authentication between the new device and one of the existing ones.
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It preserves the security level as if all devices had authenticated their keys manually.
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It preserves the security level as if all devices had authenticated their keys manually.
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A trusted third party is not required since a usual OMEMO message is used for transferring the information needed to authenticate a key or revoke the trust in that key.
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A trusted third party is not required since an ordinary OMEMO message is used for transferring the information needed to authenticate a public identity key or revoke the trust in that key.
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Additionally, it preserves the anonymity of the authentication and revocation since those messages are only sent to devices with authenticated keys.
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Additionally, it preserves the anonymity of the authentication and revocation since those messages are only sent to devices with authenticated public identity keys.
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That means an attacker cannot detect whether an authentication or revocation took place.
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That means an attacker cannot detect whether an authentication or revocation took place.
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</p>
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</p>
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<p>
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<p>
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End-to-end encryption without verifying the authenticity of the keys enables users to protect their communication against passive attacks.
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End-to-end encryption without verifying the authenticity of the exchanged public identity keys only enables users to protect their communication against passive attacks.
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This means an attacker cannot read the transferred messages without manipulating the exchanged keys.
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This means an attacker cannot read encrypted messages in transit without actively intervening in the key exchange.
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But without any other precautions active attacks are still possible.
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However, without any other precautions active attacks are still possible.
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If an attacker replaces the exchanged keys with a malicious key, the end-to-end encrypted messages can be read and manipulated by the attacker.
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If an attacker replaces the exchanged keys with malicious ones, the end-to-end encrypted messages can be read and manipulated by the attacker.
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</p>
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</p>
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<p>
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<p>
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When using &xep0384;, a public identity key is transmitted over a channel which is not protected against active attacks.
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When using OMEMO, a public identity key is transmitted over a channel which is not protected against active attacks.
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That key has to be authenticated by the receiving device over a channel which is protected against active attacks to maintain the confidentiality of sent OMEMO messages and ensuring the authenticity and integrity of received OMEMO messages.
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That key has to be authenticated by the receiving device over a channel which is protected against active attacks to maintain the confidentiality of sent OMEMO messages and ensuring the authenticity and integrity of received OMEMO messages.
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</p>
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</p>
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<p>
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<p>
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When using OMEMO, each device has a different identity key.
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When using OMEMO, each device has a unique identity key.
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That makes it possible for new devices to use end-to-end encryption protecting against passive attacks without transmitting the private key over a secure channel from an existing device to the new one.
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For that reason it is not necessary to copy an existing private identity key to a new device enabling it to use end-to-end encryption.
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However, the downside of this approach is that it increases the number of authentications.
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Additionally, it can be used to stop encrypting for a specific device.
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Without ATT all authentications have to be done manually.
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For example, that could be done automatically after a given number of sent messages without any reaction from the receiving device that would forward the double ratchet to ensure forward and backward secrecy.
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With ATT though, only one mutal manual authentication per new key is required.
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</p>
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<p>
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However, the downside of that approach is that it increases the number of key authentications users need to do for each new device to be protected against active attacks.
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Without ATT all n-1 mutual authentications per new key have to be done manually.
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With ATT though, only one mutual manual authentication per new key is required.
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</p>
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</p>
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</section1>
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</section1>
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<section1 topic='Glossary' anchor='glossary'>
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<section1 topic='Glossary' anchor='glossary'>
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