diff --git a/xep-0115.xml b/xep-0115.xml index a86b8ff1..922422b4 100644 --- a/xep-0115.xml +++ b/xep-0115.xml @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ %ents; +Note: If the four characters '&', 'l', 't', ';' appear consecutively in any of the factors of the verification string S (e.g., a service discovery identity of 'SomeClient<http://jabber.org/protocol/muc') then that string of characters MUST be treated as literally '<' and MUST NOT be converted to the character '<', because completing such a conversion would open the protocol to trivial attacks.
"> ]>Consider an entity whose category is "client", whose service discovery type is "pc", whose service discovery name is "Exodus 0.9.1", and whose supported features are "http://jabber.org/protocol/disco#info", "http://jabber.org/protocol/disco#items", and "http://jabber.org/protocol/muc". Using the SHA-1 algorithm, the verification string would be generated as follows (note: line breaks in the verification string are included only for the purposes of readability):
@@ -422,6 +424,7 @@ + <warning;It currently seems extremely unlikely that an attacker could meet all of the foregoing conditions in the foreseeable future. However, the XMPP Council shall continue to monitor the state of cryptanalysis regarding the mandatory-to-implement hash function as well as the possibility that any vulnerabilities in that function might lead to practical threats against the entity capabilities protocol. If and when it becomes practical (or even possible) to launch effective preimage attacks against the entity capabilities protocol, the XMPP Council shall consider updating this specification to change the mandatory-to-implement hashing algorithm to a safer technology.
+ <warning;Adherence to the method defined in the Verification String section of this document for both generation and processing of the 'ver' attribute helps to guard against poisoning of entity capabilities information by malicious or improperly implemented entities.