mirror of
https://github.com/moparisthebest/xeps
synced 2024-12-22 07:38:52 -05:00
A lot of smaller improvements
This commit is contained in:
Tim Henkes
parent
74577e9adc
commit
0ab5532af1
57
xep-0384.xml
57
xep-0384.xml
@ -172,7 +172,7 @@
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
While in the future a dedicated key server component could be used to distribute
|
||||
key material for session creation, the current specification relies on PEP to publish
|
||||
key material for session creation, the current specification relies on &xep0163; to publish
|
||||
and acquire key bundles.
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
</section2>
|
||||
@ -182,15 +182,15 @@
|
||||
<p>OMEMO is an end-to-end encryption protocol based on the Double Ratchet specified in section <link url="#protocol-double_ratchet">Double Ratchet</link>. It provides the following guarantees under the threat model described in the next section:</p>
|
||||
<ul>
|
||||
<li>Confidentiality: Nobody else except sender and receiver is able to read the content of a message.</li>
|
||||
<li>Perfect forward secrecy: A compromised long-term key does not compromise any previous message exchange.</li>
|
||||
<li>Perfect forward secrecy: Compromised key material does not compromise previous or future message exchanges.</li>
|
||||
<li>Authentication: Every peer is able to authenticate the sender or receiver of a message, even if the details of the authentication process is out-of-scope for this specification.</li>
|
||||
<li>Immutability: Every peer can ensure that a message was not changed by any intermediate node.</li>
|
||||
<li>Plausible deniability: No participant can prove who created a specific message.</li>
|
||||
<li>Asynchronicity: The usability of the protocol does not depend on the online status of any participant.</li>
|
||||
</ul>
|
||||
<p>Omemo is not intended to protect against the following use cases:</p>
|
||||
<p>OMEMO is not intended to protect against the following use cases:</p>
|
||||
<ul>
|
||||
<li>An attacker has access to your device.</li>
|
||||
<li>An attacker has permanent access to your device. Temporary access is covered by perfect forward secrecy.</li>
|
||||
<li>You lost your device and an attacker can read messages on your notification screen.</li>
|
||||
<li>Any kind of denial-of-service attack.</li>
|
||||
<li>tbc</li>
|
||||
@ -227,11 +227,11 @@
|
||||
<di><dt>hash function</dt><dd>SHA-256</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>info string</dt><dd>"OMEMO X3DH"</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>byte-encoding of the public keys</dt><dd>The little-endian encoding of the u-coordinate as specified <link url="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc7748.txt">here</link> (this is the default way most crypto-libraries encode the public key).</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>signed pre-key rotation period</dt><dd>Signed pre-keys SHOULD be rotated periodically once a week to once a month. A faster or slower rotation period should not be required.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>time to keep the private key of the old signed pre-key after rotating it</dt><dd>The private key of the old signed pre-key SHOULD be kept for another rotation period as defined above, to account for delayed messages using the old signed pre-key.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>number of pre-keys to provide in the bundle</dt><dd>The bundle SHOULD always contain around 100 pre-keys.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>minimum number of pre-keys to provide in the bundle</dt><dd>The bundle MUST always contain at least 25 pre-keys.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>associated data</dt><dd>The associated data is created by concatenating the identity keys of Alice and Bob: <tt>AD = Encode(IK_A) || Encode(IK_B)</tt></dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>signed PreKey rotation period</dt><dd>Signed PreKeys SHOULD be rotated periodically once a week to once a month. A faster or slower rotation period should not be required.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>time to keep the private key of the old signed PreKey after rotating it</dt><dd>The private key of the old signed PreKey SHOULD be kept for another rotation period as defined above, to account for delayed messages using the old signed PreKey.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>number of PreKeys to provide in the bundle</dt><dd>The bundle SHOULD always contain around 100 PreKeys.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>minimum number of PreKeys to provide in the bundle</dt><dd>The bundle MUST always contain at least 25 PreKeys.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>associated data</dt><dd>The associated data is created by concatenating the IdentityKeys of Alice and Bob: <tt>AD = Encode(IK_A) || Encode(IK_B)</tt></dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>XEdDSA</dt><dd>To reduce the amount of bytes that have to be transferred, the key exchange uses <link url="https://signal.org/docs/specifications/xeddsa/">XEdDSA</link> on curves X25519/Ed25519 (aka XEd25519) to build and verify signatures using encryption key pairs.</dd></di>
|
||||
</dl>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
|
||||
<dl>
|
||||
<di><dt>ratchet initialization</dt><dd>The Double Ratchet is initialized using the shared secret, ad and public keys as yielded by the X3DH key exchange, as explained in the Double Ratchet specification.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>MAX_SKIP</dt><dd>It is RECOMMENDED to keep around 1000 skipped message keys.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>deletion policy for skipped message keys</dt><dd>Skipped message keys MUST be stored until MAX_SKIP message keys are stored. At that point, keys are discarded on a LRU basis to make space for new message keys. Implementations SHOULD not keep skipped message keys around forever, but discard old keys on a different implementation-defined policy. It is RECOMMENDED to base this policy on deterministic events rather than time.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>deletion policy for skipped message keys</dt><dd>Skipped message keys MUST be stored until MAX_SKIP message keys are stored. At that point, keys are discarded on a FIFO basis to make space for new message keys. Implementations SHOULD not keep skipped message keys around forever, but discard old keys on a different implementation-defined policy. It is RECOMMENDED to base this policy on deterministic events rather than time.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>authentication tag truncation</dt><dd>Authentication tags are truncated to 16 bytes/128 bits.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>CONCAT(ad, header)</dt><dd><tt>CONCAT(ad, header) = ad || OMEMOMessage.proto(header)</tt> NOTE: the <tt>OMEMOMessage.proto</tt> is initialized without the ciphertext, which is optional. NOTE: Implementations are not strictly required to return a parseable byte array here, as the unpacked/parsed data is required later in the protocol.</dd></di>
|
||||
<di><dt>KDF_RK(rk, dh_out)</dt><dd>HKDF-SHA-256 using the rk as HKDF salt, dh_out as HKDF input material and "OMEMO Root Chain" as HKDF info.</dd></di>
|
||||
@ -256,7 +256,7 @@
|
||||
<ol>
|
||||
<li>Use HKDF-SHA-256 to generate 80 bytes of output from the message key by providing mk as HKDF input, 256 zero-bits as HKDF salt and "OMEMO Message Key Material" as HKDF info.</li>
|
||||
<li>Divide the HKDF output into a 32-byte encryption key, a 32-byte authentication key and a 16 byte IV.</li>
|
||||
<li>Encrypt the plaintext (which is a 32 bytes key as specified <link url="#protocol-message_encryption">here</link>) using AES-256-CBC with PKCS#7 padding, using the encryption key and IV derived in the previous step.</li>
|
||||
<li>Encrypt the plaintext (which consists of a 32 bytes key and a 32 bytes HMAC as specified <link url="#protocol-message_encryption">here</link>) using AES-256-CBC with PKCS#7 padding, using the encryption key and IV derived in the previous step.</li>
|
||||
<li>Split the associated data as returned by <tt>CONCAT</tt> into the original ad and the <tt>OMEMOMessage.proto</tt> structure.</li>
|
||||
<li>Add the ciphertext to the <tt>OMEMOMessage.proto</tt> structure.</li>
|
||||
<li>Serialize the ad and the <tt>OMEMOMessage.proto</tt> structure into a parseable byte array by concatenating ad and the serialized protobuf structure.</li>
|
||||
@ -330,7 +330,7 @@
|
||||
<section2 topic='Announcing support' anchor='usecases-announcing'>
|
||||
<section3 topic='Device list' anchor='devices'>
|
||||
<p>In order for other devices to be able to initiate a session with a given device, it first has to announce itself by adding its device id to the devices PEP node.</p>
|
||||
<p>It is RECOMMENDED to set the access model of the <tt>&nsdevices;</tt> node to ‘open’ to give entities without presence subscription read access to the devices and allow them to establish an OMEMO session. Not having presence subscription is a common occurrence on the first few messages between two contacts and can also happen fairly frequently in group chats as not every participant had prior communication with every other participant.</p>
|
||||
<p>It is REQUIRED to set the access model of the <tt>&nsdevices;</tt> node to ‘open’ to give entities without presence subscription read access to the devices and allow them to establish an OMEMO session. Not having presence subscription is a common occurrence on the first few messages between two contacts and can also happen fairly frequently in group chats as not every participant had prior communication with every other participant.</p>
|
||||
<p>The access model can be changed efficiently by using publish-options.</p>
|
||||
<p>The device element MAY contain an attribute called label, which is a user defined string describing the device that published that bundle. It is RECOMMENDED to keep the length of the label under 53 Unicode code points.</p>
|
||||
<example caption='Adding the own device id to the list'><![CDATA[
|
||||
@ -362,7 +362,7 @@
|
||||
</section3>
|
||||
<section3 topic='Bundles' anchor='bundles'>
|
||||
<p>Furthermore, a device MUST publish its IdentityKey, a signed PreKey, and a list of PreKeys. This tuple is called a bundle and is provided by OMEMO libraries. Bundles are maintained as multiple items in a PEP node called <tt>&nsbundles;</tt>. Each bundle MUST be stored in a seperate item. The item id MUST be set to the device id.</p>
|
||||
<p>A bundle is an element called 'bundle' in the <tt>&ns;</tt> namespace. It has a child element called ‘spk’ that contains the public part of the signed PreKey as base64 encoded data, a child element called ‘spks’ that contains the signed PreKey signature as base64 encoded data and a child element called ‘ik’ that contains the public part of the identity key as base64 encoded data. PreKeys are multiple elements called ‘pk’ that each contain the public part of one PreKey as base64 encoded data. PreKeys are wrapped in an element called ‘prekeys’ which is a child of the bundle element.</p>
|
||||
<p>A bundle is an element called 'bundle' in the <tt>&ns;</tt> namespace. It has a child element called ‘spk’ that contains the public part of the signed PreKey as base64 encoded data, a child element called ‘spks’ that contains the signed PreKey signature as base64 encoded data and a child element called ‘ik’ that contains the public part of the IdentityKey as base64 encoded data. PreKeys are multiple elements called ‘pk’ that each contain the public part of one PreKey as base64 encoded data. PreKeys are wrapped in an element called ‘prekeys’ which is a child of the bundle element. The ‘spk’ and the ‘pk’s are tagged with an ‘id’-attribute which is a positive integer that uniquely identifies the keys. The ‘spk’ and the ‘pk’s are considered separate, which means that an ‘spk’ can have the same ‘id’ as a ‘pk’. These ids are used to save bandwidth during key exchanges, which refer to the keys using their id instead of their full public parts.</p>
|
||||
<p>When publishing bundles a client MUST make sure that the <tt>&nsbundles;</tt> node is configured to store multiple items. This is not the default with &xep0163;. If the node doesn’t exist yet it can be configured on the fly by using publish-options as described in <link url="https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0060.html#publisher-publish-options"><cite>XEP-0060</cite> §7.1.5</link>. The value for 'pubsub#max_items' in publish_options MUST be set to 'max'. If the node did exist and was configured differently the bundle publication will fail. Clients MUST then reconfigure the node as described in <link url="https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0060.html#owner-configure"><cite>XEP-0060</cite> §8.2</link>.</p>
|
||||
<example caption='Publishing bundle information'><![CDATA[
|
||||
<iq from='juliet@capulet.lit' type='set' id='annouce2'>
|
||||
@ -394,7 +394,7 @@
|
||||
</publish-options>
|
||||
</pubsub>
|
||||
</iq>]]></example>
|
||||
<p>As with the <tt>&nsdevices;</tt> node it is RECOMMENDED to set the access model of the <tt>&nsbundles;</tt> to open. Clients that do not adhere to the recommended access model (and for example want to stick to the default 'presence') are highly encouraged to configure the same access model for <tt>&nsdevices;</tt> and <tt>&nsbundles;</tt> otherwise remote entities might end up in a situation where they are able to retrieve the device list but not the bundle or vice versa.</p>
|
||||
<p>As with the <tt>&nsdevices;</tt> node it is REQUIRED to set the access model of the <tt>&nsbundles;</tt> to open.</p>
|
||||
<p>The access model can be changed efficiently by using publish-options.</p>
|
||||
<example caption='Publishing bundle information with an open access model'><![CDATA[
|
||||
<iq from='juliet@capulet.lit' type='set' id='annouce2'>
|
||||
@ -440,7 +440,7 @@
|
||||
</section2>
|
||||
<section2 topic='Sending a message' anchor='usecases-messagesend'>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
In order to send a chat message, extension elements that are deemed sensible first have to be
|
||||
In order to send a message, extension elements that are deemed sensible first have to be
|
||||
encrypted. For this purpose, extensions that are only intended to be accessible to the recipient
|
||||
are placed inside a &xep0420; &content; element, which is then encrypted using a message key.
|
||||
For this reason OMEMO defines its own SCE profile.
|
||||
@ -473,14 +473,14 @@
|
||||
The &content; element is encrypted as described in the section about <link url="#protocol-message_encryption">Message Encryption</link>.
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
Clients SHOULD only consider the devices on the <tt>&nsdevices;</tt> node of each recipient (i.e. including their own devices node, but excluding itself).
|
||||
Clients MUST only consider the devices on the <tt>&nsdevices;</tt> node of each recipient (i.e. including their own devices node, but excluding itself).
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
</section3>
|
||||
<section3 topic='Message structure description' anchor='message-structure-description'>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
An OMEMO encrypted message is specified to include an the <encrypted> element in the 'urn:xmpp:omemo:1' namespace. It always contains two child nodes, the <header> and the &payload; element.
|
||||
The <header> element has an attribute named 'sid' referencing the device id of the sending device and contains one or multiple <keys> elements, each with an attribute 'jid' of one recipient JID as well as one or multiple <key> elements.
|
||||
A <key> element has an attribute named 'rid' referencing the device id of the recipient device, and an attribute named 'kex' which defaults to 'false' and indicates if the enclosed encrypted message includes a key exchange. The ciphertext that is the key and HMAC encrypted using the long-standing OMEMO session for that recipient device is encoded using base64 and places as text content into the <key> element.
|
||||
An OMEMO encrypted message is specified to include an <encrypted> element in the 'urn:xmpp:omemo:1' namespace. It always contains two child nodes, the <header> and the &payload; element.
|
||||
The <header> element has an attribute named 'sid' referencing the device id of the sending device and contains one or multiple <keys> elements, each with an attribute 'jid' of one of the recipients bare JIDs as well as one or multiple <key> elements.
|
||||
A <key> element has an attribute named 'rid' referencing the device id of the recipient device, and an attribute named 'kex' which defaults to 'false' and indicates if the enclosed encrypted message includes a key exchange. The ciphertext that is the key and HMAC encrypted using the long-standing OMEMO session for that recipient device is encoded using base64 and placed as text content into the <key> element.
|
||||
The ciphertext that is the encrypted &content; element is encoded using base64 and placed as text content into the &payload; element.
|
||||
</p>
|
||||
<example caption="Sending a message"><![CDATA[
|
||||
@ -505,7 +505,7 @@
|
||||
</section3>
|
||||
</section2>
|
||||
<section2 topic='Receiving a message' anchor='usecases-receiving'>
|
||||
<p>When an OMEMO element is received, the client MUST check whether there is a <keys> element with a jid attribute matching its own bare jid and an inner <key> element with an rid attribute matching its own device id. If this is not the case the message was not encrypted for this particular device and a warning message SHOULD be displayed instead. If such an element exists, the client checks whether the element's contents are an OMEMOKeyExchange.</p>
|
||||
<p>When an OMEMO element is received, the client MUST check whether there is a <keys> element with a jid attribute matching its own bare jid and an inner <key> element with a rid attribute matching its own device id. If this is not the case the message was not encrypted for this particular device and a warning message SHOULD be displayed instead. If such an element exists, the client checks whether the element's contents are an OMEMOKeyExchange.</p>
|
||||
<p>If this is the case, a new session is built from this received element. The client MUST then republish their bundle information, replacing the used PreKey, such that it won't be used again by a different client. If the client already has a session with the sender's device, it MUST replace this session with the newly built session. The client MUST eventually delete the private key belonging to the PreKey after use (this is subject to the <link url="#business-rules">Business rules</link>).</p>
|
||||
<p>If the element's contents are a OMEMOAuthenticatedMessage, and the client has a session with the sender's device, it tries to decrypt the OMEMOAuthenticatedMessage using this session. If the decryption fails or there is no session with the sending device, a warning message SHOULD be displayed instead. Also refer to the section about recovering from broken sessions in the <link url="#business-rules">Business Rules</link>.</p>
|
||||
<p>
|
||||
@ -540,12 +540,12 @@
|
||||
<section2 topic='Group Chats' anchor='group-chats'>
|
||||
<p>Note: OMEMO encrypted group chats are currently specified to work with &xep0045;. This XEP might be updated in the future to specify the usage of OMEMO in conjunction with &xep0369;.</p>
|
||||
<p>A Multi-User Chat room that supports OMEMO MUST be configured non-anonymous and SHOULD be configured members-only.</p>
|
||||
<p>A participant wanting to send a message to a group chat MUST first retrieve the members list and then fetch the device list for each member (via pubsub and to their real JIDs) and then subsequently fetch all active bundles.</p>
|
||||
<p>A participant wanting to send a message to a group chat MUST first retrieve the members list and then fetch the device list for each member (via pubsub and to their real JIDs) and then subsequently fetch all bundles referenced by the device lists.</p>
|
||||
<section3 topic='Retrieving and maintaining members list' anchor='members-list'>
|
||||
<p>On join a participant MUST request the member list, the admin list and the owner list as described in <link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0045.html#modifymember'><cite>XEP-0045</cite> §9.5</link>, <link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0045.html#modifyadmin'><cite>XEP-0045</cite> §10.8</link>, and <link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0045.html#modifyowner'><cite>XEP-0045</cite> §10.5</link> respectively. Those three lists MUST be combined as the recipients of OMEMO encrypted messages. Once joined a participant MUST keep track of affiliation changes that occur in the room. This is both for removals (users getting banned or have their affiliation set to none) and users becoming members, admins or owners.</p>
|
||||
</section3>
|
||||
<section3 topic='Fetching devices and bundles' anchor='group-fetch'>
|
||||
<p>Before sending a message a participant SHOULD explicitly fetch device lists for all other participant if the list isn’t already cached..</p>
|
||||
<p>Before sending a message a participant MUST explicitly fetch device lists (if not already cached) for each of the members.</p>
|
||||
<example caption='Juliet fetching devices for Remeo and Mercutio'><![CDATA[
|
||||
<iq type='get' from='juliet@capulet.lit' to='romeo@montague.lit' id='gfetch0'>
|
||||
<pubsub xmlns='http://jabber.org/protocol/pubsub'>
|
||||
@ -606,11 +606,10 @@
|
||||
<p>Before publishing a freshly generated device id for the first time, a device MUST check whether that device id already exists, and if so, generate a new one.</p>
|
||||
<p>Clients SHOULD NOT immediately fetch the bundle and build a session as soon as a new device is announced. Before the first message is exchanged, the contact does not know which PreKey has been used (or, in fact, that any PreKey was used at all). As they have not had a chance to remove the used PreKey from their bundle announcement, this could lead to collisions where both Alice and Bob pick the same PreKey to build a session with a specific device. As each PreKey SHOULD only be used once, the party that sends their initial OMEMOKeyExchange later loses this race condition. This means that they think they have a valid session with the contact, when in reality their messages MAY be ignored by the other end. By postponing building sessions, the chance of such issues occurring can be drastically reduced. It is RECOMMENDED to construct sessions only immediately before sending a message.</p>
|
||||
<p>There are various reasons why decryption of an OMEMOKeyExchange or an OMEMOAuthenticatedMessage could fail. One reason is if the message was received twice and already decrypted once, in this case the client MUST ignore the decryption failure and not show any warnings/errors. In all other cases of decryption failure, clients SHOULD respond by forcibly doing a new key exchange and sending a new OMEMOKeyExchange with a potentially empty SCE payload. By building a new session with the original sender this way, the invalid session of the original sender will get overwritten with this newly created, valid session. This does NOT apply to the actual SCE content. If decrypting the SCE content fails, e.g. because the HMAC does not verify, this is not a reason to forcibly initiate a new key exchange.</p>
|
||||
<p>If a OMEMOKeyExchange is received as part of a message catch-up mechanism (like &xep0313;) and used to establish a new session with the sender, the client SHOULD postpone deletion of the private key corresponding to the used PreKey until after the catch-up is completed. If this is done, the client MUST then also send a normal OMEMO encrypted message with an empty SCE payload before sending any payloads using this session, to trigger re-keying. (as above) This practice can mitigate the previously mentioned race condition by preventing message loss.</p>
|
||||
<p>As the asynchronous nature of OMEMO allows decryption at a later time to currently offline devices client SHOULD include a &xep0334; <store /> hint in their OMEMO messages. Otherwise, server implementations of &xep0313; will generally not retain OMEMO messages, since they do not contain a <body /></p>
|
||||
<p>If an OMEMOKeyExchange is received as part of a message catch-up mechanism (like &xep0313;) and used to establish a new session with the sender, the client SHOULD postpone deletion of the private key corresponding to the used PreKey until after the catch-up is completed. If this is done, the client MUST send an OMEMO encrypted message with empty SCE payload right after the key exchange is completed, to forward the ratchet and to move away from the possibly double-used PreKey. This practice can mitigate the previously mentioned race condition by preventing message loss.</p>
|
||||
<p>When a client receives the first message for a given ratchet key with a counter of 53 or higher, it MUST send a heartbeat message. Heartbeat messages are normal OMEMO encrypted messages where the SCE payload does not include any elements. These heartbeat messages cause the ratchet to forward, thus consequent messages will have the counter restarted from 0.</p>
|
||||
<p>When a client receives the message from a device id that is not on the device list, it SHOULD try to retrieve that user's devices node directly to ensure their local cached version of the devices list is up-to-date.</p>
|
||||
<p>When the user of a client deactivates OMEMO for an account or globally, the client SHOULD delete the corresponding bundles and device ids from the PEP nodes. That way other clients should stop encrypting for that device.</p>
|
||||
<p>When a client receives a message from a device id that is not on the device list, it SHOULD try to retrieve that user's devices node directly to ensure their local cached version of the devices list is up-to-date.</p>
|
||||
<p>When the user of a client deactivates OMEMO for an account or globally, the client SHOULD delete the corresponding bundles and device ids from the PEP nodes. That way other clients should stop encrypting for that account.</p>
|
||||
</section1>
|
||||
<section1 topic='Implementation Notes' anchor='impl'>
|
||||
<section2 topic='Server side requirements' anchor='server-side'>
|
||||
@ -619,14 +618,14 @@
|
||||
<li>The pubsub service MUST persist node items.</li>
|
||||
<li>The pubsub service MUST support publishing options as defined in <link url='https://xmpp.org/extensions/xep-0060.html#publisher-publish-options'><cite>XEP-0060</cite> §7.1.5</link>.</li>
|
||||
<li>The pubsub service MUST support 'max' as a value for the 'pubsub#persist_items' node configuration.</li>
|
||||
<li>The pubsub service SHOULD support the 'open' access model for node configuration and 'pubsub#access_model' as a publish option.</li>
|
||||
<li>The pubsub service MUST support the 'open' access model for node configuration and 'pubsub#access_model' as a publish option.</li>
|
||||
</ul>
|
||||
</section2>
|
||||
</section1>
|
||||
<section1 topic='Security Considerations' anchor='security'>
|
||||
<p>Clients MUST NOT use a newly built session to transmit data without user intervention. If a client were to opportunistically start using sessions for sending without asking the user whether to trust a device first, an attacker could publish a fake device for this user, which would then receive copies of all messages sent by/to this user. A client MAY use such "not (yet) trusted" sessions for decryption of received messages, but in that case it SHOULD indicate the untrusted nature of such messages to the user.</p>
|
||||
<p>When prompting the user for a trust decision regarding a key, the client SHOULD present the user with a fingerprint in the form of a hex string, QR code, or other unique representation, such that it can be compared by the user. When displaying the fingerprint as a hex string, one way to make it easier to compare the fingerprint is to split the hex string into 8 substrings of 8 chars each, then coloring each 8-char group using &xep0392;. Lowercase letters are recommended when displaying the fingerprint as a hex string.</p>
|
||||
<p>While it is RECOMMENDED that clients postpone private key deletion until after message catch-up, the standards mandates that clients MUST NOT use duplicate-PreKey sessions for sending, so clients MAY delete such keys immediately for security reasons. For additional information on potential security impacts of this decision, refer to <note>Menezes, Alfred, and Berkant Ustaoglu. "On reusing ephemeral keys in Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols." International Journal of Applied Cryptography 2, no. 2 (2010): 154-158.</note>.</p>
|
||||
<p>When prompting the user for a trust decision regarding a key, the client SHOULD present the user with a fingerprint in the form of a hex string, QR code, or other unique representation, such that it can be compared by the user. The fingerprint is often chosen to be the public part of the device's IdentityKey, but could also be a different combination data that guarantees absence of a man-in-the-middle when verified. When displaying the fingerprint as a hex string, one way to make it easier to compare the fingerprint is to split the hex string into 8 substrings of 8 chars each, then coloring each 8-char group using &xep0392;. Lowercase letters are recommended when displaying the fingerprint as a hex string.</p>
|
||||
<p>While it is RECOMMENDED that clients postpone private key deletion until after message catch-up, the X3DH standard mandates that clients should not use duplicate-PreKey sessions for sending, so clients MAY delete such keys immediately for security reasons. For additional information on potential security impacts of this decision, refer to <note>Menezes, Alfred, and Berkant Ustaoglu. "On reusing ephemeral keys in Diffie-Hellman key agreement protocols." International Journal of Applied Cryptography 2, no. 2 (2010): 154-158.</note>.</p>
|
||||
</section1>
|
||||
<section1 topic='IANA Considerations' anchor='iana'>
|
||||
<p>This document requires no interaction with the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA).</p>
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user