<title>Use of DTLS-SRTP in Jingle Sessions</title>
<abstract>This specification defines how to use DTLS-SRTP (RFC 5763) in the Jingle application type for the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) as a way to negotiate media path key agreement for secure RTP in one-to-one media sessions.</abstract>
<remark><p>Second draft, rewrite no longer based on XEP-0262.</p></remark>
</revision>
<revision>
<version>0.0.1</version>
<date>2012-12-13</date>
<initials>ph</initials>
<remark><p>First draft, copied from XEP-0262.</p></remark>
</revision>
</header>
<section1topic='Protocol'anchor='protocol'>
<p>&xep0167; recommends the use of the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) for end-to-end encryption of RTP sessions negotiated using &xep0166;. &rfc5763; provides an approach to establish a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) security context using the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) protocol. A mechanism of transporting the fingerprint attribute that identifies the key that will be presented during the DTLS handshake in Jingle is defined herein. Inclusion of this information is OPTIONAL in both SIP/SDP and Jingle.</p>
<p>Note that while this specification only describes the use in the context of DTLS-SRTP, the fingerprint transported can be used in other contexts like for example establishing connections using SCTP over DTLS.</p>
<p>The SDP format (defined in &rfc4572;) is shown below.</p>
<p>This SDP attribute can be translated into Jingle as a <fingerprint/> element qualified by the 'urn:xmpp:tmp:jingle:apps:dtls:0' namespace, as shown below.</p>
<p>Note: since DTLS can be used to protect non-RTP sessions like SCTP including the fingerprint in the <encryption/> element defined in &xep0167; was deemed inappropriate. Also, the <encryption/> element defined there only applies to the encryption of the RTP data part, whereas DTLS (and DTLS-SRTP) protects the whole message.</p>
<p>If the Jingle initiator wishes to use DTLS-SRTP, it includes the <fingerprint/> element in its session invitation. If the initiator requires the use of DTLS, the <fingerprint/> element MUST include a 'required' attribute whose logical value is TRUE and whose lexical value is "true" or "1" &BOOLEANNOTE;, where this attribute defaults to a logical value of FALSE (i.e., a lexical value of "false" or "0").</p>
<examplecaption="Initiator sends session invitation with DTLS fingerprint"><![CDATA[
<p>Alternatively, if the receiving party wishes to expedite with ICE and DTLS negotiation without accepting the session, it MAY include the <fingerprint/> element when sending a transport-info message:</p>
<examplecaption="A transport-info containing a DTLS fingerprint"><![CDATA[
<p>If an entity supports establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol security context using the Datagram Transport Layer Security protocol, it MUST advertise that fact in its responses to &xep0030; information ("disco#info") requests by returning a feature of "urn:xmpp:jingle:apps:dtls:0":</p>
<p>In order for an application to determine whether an entity supports this protocol, where possible it SHOULD use the dynamic, presence-based profile of service discovery defined in &xep0115;. However, if an application has not received entity capabilities information from an entity, it SHOULD use explicit service discovery instead.</p>
<p>Security considerations for DTLS-SRTP itself are provided in <cite>RFC 5763</cite>.</p>
<p>XMPP stanzas such as Jingle messages and service discovery exchanges are not encrypted or signed. As a result, it is possible for an attacker to intercept these stanzas and modify them, thus convincing one party that the other party does not support DTLS-SRTP and therefore denying the parties an opportunity to use DTLS-SRTP.</p>