/* SSL support via OpenSSL library.
   Copyright (C) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 Free
   Software Foundation, Inc.
   Originally contributed by Christian Fraenkel.

This file is part of GNU Wget.

GNU Wget is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.

GNU Wget is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
GNU General Public License for more details.

You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with Wget.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

In addition, as a special exception, the Free Software Foundation
gives permission to link the code of its release of Wget with the
OpenSSL project's "OpenSSL" library (or with modified versions of it
that use the same license as the "OpenSSL" library), and distribute
the linked executables.  You must obey the GNU General Public License
in all respects for all of the code used other than "OpenSSL".  If you
modify this file, you may extend this exception to your version of the
file, but you are not obligated to do so.  If you do not wish to do
so, delete this exception statement from your version.  */

#include <config.h>

#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif
#include <string.h>

#include <openssl/ssl.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>

#include "wget.h"
#include "utils.h"
#include "connect.h"
#include "url.h"
#include "ssl.h"

/* Application-wide SSL context.  This is common to all SSL
   connections.  */
static SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx;

/* Initialize the SSL's PRNG using various methods. */

static void
init_prng (void)
{
  char namebuf[256];
  const char *random_file;

  if (RAND_status ())
    /* The PRNG has been seeded; no further action is necessary. */
    return;

  /* Seed from a file specified by the user.  This will be the file
     specified with --random-file, $RANDFILE, if set, or ~/.rnd, if it
     exists.  */
  if (opt.random_file)
    random_file = opt.random_file;
  else
    {
      /* Get the random file name using RAND_file_name. */
      namebuf[0] = '\0';
      random_file = RAND_file_name (namebuf, sizeof (namebuf));
    }

  if (random_file && *random_file)
    /* Seed at most 16k (apparently arbitrary value borrowed from
       curl) from random file. */
    RAND_load_file (random_file, 16384);

  if (RAND_status ())
    return;

  /* Get random data from EGD if opt.egd_file was used.  */
  if (opt.egd_file && *opt.egd_file)
    RAND_egd (opt.egd_file);

  if (RAND_status ())
    return;

#ifdef WINDOWS
  /* Under Windows, we can try to seed the PRNG using screen content.
     This may or may not work, depending on whether we'll calling Wget
     interactively.  */

  RAND_screen ();
  if (RAND_status ())
    return;
#endif

#if 0 /* don't do this by default */
  {
    int maxrand = 500;

    /* Still not random enough, presumably because neither /dev/random
       nor EGD were available.  Try to seed OpenSSL's PRNG with libc
       PRNG.  This is cryptographically weak and defeats the purpose
       of using OpenSSL, which is why it is highly discouraged.  */

    logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("WARNING: using a weak random seed.\n"));

    while (RAND_status () == 0 && maxrand-- > 0)
      {
        unsigned char rnd = random_number (256);
        RAND_seed (&rnd, sizeof (rnd));
      }
  }
#endif
}

/* Print errors in the OpenSSL error stack. */

static void
print_errors (void) 
{
  unsigned long err;
  while ((err = ERR_get_error ()) != 0)
    logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "OpenSSL: %s\n", ERR_error_string (err, NULL));
}

/* Convert keyfile type as used by options.h to a type as accepted by
   SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file and SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file.

   (options.h intentionally doesn't use values from openssl/ssl.h so
   it doesn't depend specifically on OpenSSL for SSL functionality.)  */

static int
key_type_to_ssl_type (enum keyfile_type type)
{
  switch (type)
    {
    case keyfile_pem:
      return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
    case keyfile_asn1:
      return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
    default:
      abort ();
    }
}

/* Create an SSL Context and set default paths etc.  Called the first
   time an HTTP download is attempted.

   Returns true on success, false otherwise.  */

bool
ssl_init ()
{
  SSL_METHOD *meth;

  if (ssl_ctx)
    /* The SSL has already been initialized. */
    return true;

  /* Init the PRNG.  If that fails, bail out.  */
  init_prng ();
  if (RAND_status () != 1)
    {
      logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
                 _("Could not seed PRNG; consider using --random-file.\n"));
      goto error;
    }

  SSL_library_init ();
  SSL_load_error_strings ();
  SSLeay_add_all_algorithms ();
  SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms ();

  switch (opt.secure_protocol)
    {
    case secure_protocol_auto:
      meth = SSLv23_client_method ();
      break;
    case secure_protocol_sslv2:
      meth = SSLv2_client_method ();
      break;
    case secure_protocol_sslv3:
      meth = SSLv3_client_method ();
      break;
    case secure_protocol_tlsv1:
      meth = TLSv1_client_method ();
      break;
    default:
      abort ();
    }

  ssl_ctx = SSL_CTX_new (meth);
  if (!ssl_ctx)
    goto error;

  SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths (ssl_ctx);
  SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations (ssl_ctx, opt.ca_cert, opt.ca_directory);

  /* SSL_VERIFY_NONE instructs OpenSSL not to abort SSL_connect if the
     certificate is invalid.  We verify the certificate separately in
     ssl_check_certificate, which provides much better diagnostics
     than examining the error stack after a failed SSL_connect.  */
  SSL_CTX_set_verify (ssl_ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);

  if (opt.cert_file)
    if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file (ssl_ctx, opt.cert_file,
                                      key_type_to_ssl_type (opt.cert_type))
        != 1)
      goto error;
  if (opt.private_key)
    if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file (ssl_ctx, opt.private_key,
                                     key_type_to_ssl_type (opt.private_key_type))
        != 1)
      goto error;

  /* Since fd_write unconditionally assumes partial writes (and
     handles them correctly), allow them in OpenSSL.  */
  SSL_CTX_set_mode (ssl_ctx, SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE);

  /* The OpenSSL library can handle renegotiations automatically, so
     tell it to do so.  */
  SSL_CTX_set_mode (ssl_ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY);

  return true;

 error:
  if (ssl_ctx)
    SSL_CTX_free (ssl_ctx);
  print_errors ();
  return false;
}

struct openssl_transport_context {
  SSL *conn;                    /* SSL connection handle */
  char *last_error;             /* last error printed with openssl_errstr */
};

static int
openssl_read (int fd, char *buf, int bufsize, void *arg)
{
  int ret;
  struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = arg;
  SSL *conn = ctx->conn;
  do
    ret = SSL_read (conn, buf, bufsize);
  while (ret == -1
         && SSL_get_error (conn, ret) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
         && errno == EINTR);
  return ret;
}

static int
openssl_write (int fd, char *buf, int bufsize, void *arg)
{
  int ret = 0;
  struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = arg;
  SSL *conn = ctx->conn;
  do
    ret = SSL_write (conn, buf, bufsize);
  while (ret == -1
         && SSL_get_error (conn, ret) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
         && errno == EINTR);
  return ret;
}

static int
openssl_poll (int fd, double timeout, int wait_for, void *arg)
{
  struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = arg;
  SSL *conn = ctx->conn;
  if (timeout == 0)
    return 1;
  if (SSL_pending (conn))
    return 1;
  return select_fd (fd, timeout, wait_for);
}

static int
openssl_peek (int fd, char *buf, int bufsize, void *arg)
{
  int ret;
  struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = arg;
  SSL *conn = ctx->conn;
  do
    ret = SSL_peek (conn, buf, bufsize);
  while (ret == -1
         && SSL_get_error (conn, ret) == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL
         && errno == EINTR);
  return ret;
}

static const char *
openssl_errstr (int fd, void *arg)
{
  struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = arg;
  unsigned long errcode;
  char *errmsg = NULL;
  int msglen = 0;

  /* If there are no SSL-specific errors, just return NULL. */
  if ((errcode = ERR_get_error ()) == 0)
    return NULL;

  /* Get rid of previous contents of ctx->last_error, if any.  */
  xfree_null (ctx->last_error);

  /* Iterate over OpenSSL's error stack and accumulate errors in the
     last_error buffer, separated by "; ".  This is better than using
     a static buffer, which *always* takes up space (and has to be
     large, to fit more than one error message), whereas these
     allocations are only performed when there is an actual error.  */

  for (;;)
    {
      const char *str = ERR_error_string (errcode, NULL);
      int len = strlen (str);

      /* Allocate space for the existing message, plus two more chars
         for the "; " separator and one for the terminating \0.  */
      errmsg = xrealloc (errmsg, msglen + len + 2 + 1);
      memcpy (errmsg + msglen, str, len);
      msglen += len;

      /* Get next error and bail out if there are no more. */
      errcode = ERR_get_error ();
      if (errcode == 0)
        break;

      errmsg[msglen++] = ';';
      errmsg[msglen++] = ' ';
    }
  errmsg[msglen] = '\0';

  /* Store the error in ctx->last_error where openssl_close will
     eventually find it and free it.  */
  ctx->last_error = errmsg;

  return errmsg;
}

static void
openssl_close (int fd, void *arg)
{
  struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = arg;
  SSL *conn = ctx->conn;

  SSL_shutdown (conn);
  SSL_free (conn);
  xfree_null (ctx->last_error);
  xfree (ctx);

#if defined(WINDOWS) || defined(MSDOS)
  closesocket (fd);
#else
  close (fd);
#endif

  DEBUGP (("Closed %d/SSL 0x%0*lx\n", fd, PTR_FORMAT (conn)));
}

/* openssl_transport is the singleton that describes the SSL transport
   methods provided by this file.  */

static struct transport_implementation openssl_transport = {
  openssl_read, openssl_write, openssl_poll,
  openssl_peek, openssl_errstr, openssl_close
};

/* Perform the SSL handshake on file descriptor FD, which is assumed
   to be connected to an SSL server.  The SSL handle provided by
   OpenSSL is registered with the file descriptor FD using
   fd_register_transport, so that subsequent calls to fd_read,
   fd_write, etc., will use the corresponding SSL functions.

   Returns true on success, false on failure.  */

bool
ssl_connect (int fd) 
{
  SSL *conn;
  struct openssl_transport_context *ctx;

  DEBUGP (("Initiating SSL handshake.\n"));

  assert (ssl_ctx != NULL);
  conn = SSL_new (ssl_ctx);
  if (!conn)
    goto error;
  if (!SSL_set_fd (conn, fd))
    goto error;
  SSL_set_connect_state (conn);
  if (SSL_connect (conn) <= 0 || conn->state != SSL_ST_OK)
    goto error;

  ctx = xnew0 (struct openssl_transport_context);
  ctx->conn = conn;

  /* Register FD with Wget's transport layer, i.e. arrange that our
     functions are used for reading, writing, and polling.  */
  fd_register_transport (fd, &openssl_transport, ctx);
  DEBUGP (("Handshake successful; connected socket %d to SSL handle 0x%0*lx\n",
           fd, PTR_FORMAT (conn)));
  return true;

 error:
  DEBUGP (("SSL handshake failed.\n"));
  print_errors ();
  if (conn)
    SSL_free (conn);
  return false;
}

#define ASTERISK_EXCLUDES_DOT   /* mandated by rfc2818 */

/* Return true is STRING (case-insensitively) matches PATTERN, false
   otherwise.  The recognized wildcard character is "*", which matches
   any character in STRING except ".".  Any number of the "*" wildcard
   may be present in the pattern.

   This is used to match of hosts as indicated in rfc2818: "Names may
   contain the wildcard character * which is considered to match any
   single domain name component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com
   matches foo.a.com but not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but
   not bar.com [or foo.bar.com]."

   If the pattern contain no wildcards, pattern_match(a, b) is
   equivalent to !strcasecmp(a, b).  */

static bool
pattern_match (const char *pattern, const char *string)
{
  const char *p = pattern, *n = string;
  char c;
  for (; (c = TOLOWER (*p++)) != '\0'; n++)
    if (c == '*')
      {
        for (c = TOLOWER (*p); c == '*'; c = TOLOWER (*++p))
          ;
        for (; *n != '\0'; n++)
          if (TOLOWER (*n) == c && pattern_match (p, n))
            return true;
#ifdef ASTERISK_EXCLUDES_DOT
          else if (*n == '.')
            return false;
#endif
        return c == '\0';
      }
    else
      {
        if (c != TOLOWER (*n))
          return false;
      }
  return *n == '\0';
}

/* Verify the validity of the certificate presented by the server.
   Also check that the "common name" of the server, as presented by
   its certificate, corresponds to HOST.  (HOST typically comes from
   the URL and is what the user thinks he's connecting to.)

   This assumes that ssl_connect has successfully finished, i.e. that
   the SSL handshake has been performed and that FD is connected to an
   SSL handle.

   If opt.check_cert is true (the default), this returns 1 if the
   certificate is valid, 0 otherwise.  If opt.check_cert is 0, the
   function always returns 1, but should still be called because it
   warns the user about any problems with the certificate.  */

bool
ssl_check_certificate (int fd, const char *host)
{
  X509 *cert;
  char common_name[256];
  long vresult;
  bool success = true;

  /* If the user has specified --no-check-cert, we still want to warn
     him about problems with the server's certificate.  */
  const char *severity = opt.check_cert ? _("ERROR") : _("WARNING");

  struct openssl_transport_context *ctx = fd_transport_context (fd);
  SSL *conn = ctx->conn;
  assert (conn != NULL);

  cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate (conn);
  if (!cert)
    {
      logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%s: No certificate presented by %s.\n"),
                 severity, escnonprint (host));
      success = false;
      goto no_cert;             /* must bail out since CERT is NULL */
    }

  IF_DEBUG
    {
      char *subject = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_subject_name (cert), 0, 0);
      char *issuer = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (cert), 0, 0);
      DEBUGP (("certificate:\n  subject: %s\n  issuer:  %s\n",
               escnonprint (subject), escnonprint (issuer)));
      OPENSSL_free (subject);
      OPENSSL_free (issuer);
    }

  vresult = SSL_get_verify_result (conn);
  if (vresult != X509_V_OK)
    {
      char *issuer = X509_NAME_oneline (X509_get_issuer_name (cert), 0, 0);
      logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
                 _("%s: cannot verify %s's certificate, issued by `%s':\n"),
                 severity, escnonprint (host), escnonprint (issuer));
      /* Try to print more user-friendly (and translated) messages for
         the frequent verification errors.  */
      switch (vresult)
        {
        case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY:
          logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
                     _("  Unable to locally verify the issuer's authority.\n"));
          break;
        case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN:
        case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT:
          logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("  Self-signed certificate encountered.\n"));
          break;
        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID:
          logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("  Issued certificate not yet valid.\n"));
          break;
        case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED:
          logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("  Issued certificate has expired.\n"));
          break;
        default:
          /* For the less frequent error strings, simply provide the
             OpenSSL error message.  */
          logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "  %s\n",
                     X509_verify_cert_error_string (vresult));
        }
      success = false;
      /* Fall through, so that the user is warned about *all* issues
         with the cert (important with --no-check-certificate.)  */
    }

  /* Check that HOST matches the common name in the certificate.
     #### The following remains to be done:

     - It should use dNSName/ipAddress subjectAltName extensions if
       available; according to rfc2818: "If a subjectAltName extension
       of type dNSName is present, that MUST be used as the identity."

     - When matching against common names, it should loop over all
       common names and choose the most specific one, i.e. the last
       one, not the first one, which the current code picks.

     - Ensure that ASN1 strings from the certificate are encoded as
       UTF-8 which can be meaningfully compared to HOST.  */

  common_name[0] = '\0';
  X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (X509_get_subject_name (cert),
                             NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof (common_name));
  if (!pattern_match (common_name, host))
    {
      logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
%s: certificate common name `%s' doesn't match requested host name `%s'.\n"),
                 severity, escnonprint (common_name), escnonprint (host));
      success = false;
    }

  if (success)
    DEBUGP (("X509 certificate successfully verified and matches host %s\n",
             escnonprint (host)));
  X509_free (cert);

 no_cert:
  if (opt.check_cert && !success)
    logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
To connect to %s insecurely, use `--no-check-certificate'.\n"),
               escnonprint (host));

  /* Allow --no-check-cert to disable certificate checking. */
  return opt.check_cert ? success : true;
}