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[svn] wget.texi: Mentioned that .listing symlinked to /etc/passwd is not a security
hole, but that other files could be, so root shouldn't run wget in user dirs.
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@ -3,7 +3,9 @@
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* wget.texi: Corrections, clarifications, and English fixes to
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* wget.texi: Corrections, clarifications, and English fixes to
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time-stamping documentation. Also moved -nr from "Recursive
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time-stamping documentation. Also moved -nr from "Recursive
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Retrieval Options" to "FTP Options" and gave it a @cindex entry.
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Retrieval Options" to "FTP Options" and gave it a @cindex entry.
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Alphabetized FTP options by long option name.
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Alphabetized FTP options by long option name. Mentioned that
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.listing symlinked to /etc/passwd is not a security hole, but that
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other files could be, so root shouldn't run wget in user dirs.
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2001-02-22 Dan Harkless <wget@harkless.org>
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2001-02-22 Dan Harkless <wget@harkless.org>
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@ -919,9 +919,26 @@ discouraged, unless you really know what you are doing.
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@itemx --dont-remove-listing
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@itemx --dont-remove-listing
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Don't remove the temporary @file{.listing} files generated by @sc{ftp}
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Don't remove the temporary @file{.listing} files generated by @sc{ftp}
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retrievals. Normally, these files contain the raw directory listings
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retrievals. Normally, these files contain the raw directory listings
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received from @sc{ftp} servers. Not removing them can be useful to
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received from @sc{ftp} servers. Not removing them can be useful for
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access the full remote file list when running a mirror, or for debugging
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debugging purposes, or when you want to be able to easily check on the
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purposes.
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contents of remote server directories (e.g. to verify that a mirror
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you're running is complete).
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Note that even though Wget writes to a known filename for this file,
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this is not a security hole in the scenario of a user making
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@file{.listing} a symbolic link to @file{/etc/passwd} or something and
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asking @code{root} to run Wget in his or her directory. Depending on
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the options used, either Wget will refuse to write to @file{.listing},
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making the globbing/recursion/time-stamping operation fail, or the
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symbolic link will be deleted and replaced with the actual
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@file{.listing} file, or the listing will be written to a
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@file{.listing.@var{number}} file.
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Even though this situation isn't a problem, though, @code{root} should
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never run Wget in a non-trusted user's directory. A user could do
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something as simple as linking @file{index.html} to @file{/etc/passwd}
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and asking @code{root} to run Wget with @samp{-N} or @samp{-r} so the file
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will be overwritten.
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@cindex globbing, toggle
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@cindex globbing, toggle
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@item -g on/off
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@item -g on/off
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