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Only warn of attack if the hostname would have matched.
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@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
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2009-08-19 Micah Cowan <micah@cowan.name>
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* openssl.c (ssl_check_certificate): Only warn about an attack if
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the hostname would otherwise have matched. Also some formatting
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cleanup.
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2009-08-19 Joao Ferreira <joao@joaoff.com>
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* openssl.c (ssl_check_certificate): Detect embedded NUL
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@ -571,32 +571,8 @@ ssl_check_certificate (int fd, const char *host)
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X509_NAME *xname = X509_get_subject_name(cert);
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common_name[0] = '\0';
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X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (xname,
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NID_commonName, common_name, sizeof (common_name));
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/* We now determine the length of the ASN1 string. If it differs from
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* common_name's length, then there is a \0 before the string terminates.
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* This can be an instance of a null-prefix attack [0].
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*
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* [0] https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike
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* */
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int i=-1,j;
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if(xname) {
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for(;(j=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, i))!=-1;i=j);
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}
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X509_NAME_ENTRY *xentry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname,i);
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ASN1_STRING *sdata = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(xentry);
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if (strlen(common_name) != ASN1_STRING_length(sdata))
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{
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logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
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%s: certificate common name is invalid. It is possible that someone is \
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eavesdropping on you (man-in-the-middle attack)!\n"),
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severity);
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success = false;
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}
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X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, common_name,
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sizeof (common_name));
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if (!pattern_match (common_name, host))
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{
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@ -605,6 +581,41 @@ eavesdropping on you (man-in-the-middle attack)!\n"),
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severity, quote (common_name), quote (host));
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success = false;
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}
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else
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{
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/* We now determine the length of the ASN1 string. If it differs from
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* common_name's length, then there is a \0 before the string terminates.
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* This can be an instance of a null-prefix attack.
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*
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* https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike
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* */
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int i = -1, j;
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X509_NAME_ENTRY *xentry;
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ASN1_STRING *sdata;
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if (xname) {
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for (;;)
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{
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j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID (xname, NID_commonName, i);
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if (j == -1) break;
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i = j;
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}
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}
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xentry = X509_NAME_get_entry(xname,i);
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sdata = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(xentry);
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if (strlen (common_name) != ASN1_STRING_length (sdata))
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{
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logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
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%s: certificate common name is invalid (contains a NUL character).\n\
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This may be an indication that the host is not who it claims to be\n\
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(that is, it is not the real %s).\n"),
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severity, quote (host));
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success = false;
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}
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}
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if (success)
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DEBUGP (("X509 certificate successfully verified and matches host %s\n",
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