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wget/src/http.c

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/* HTTP support.
Copyright (C) 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
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This file is part of Wget.
This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
GNU General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA. */
#include <config.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# include <string.h>
#else
# include <strings.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif
#include <assert.h>
#include <errno.h>
#if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
# include <sys/time.h>
# include <time.h>
#else
# if HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
# else
# include <time.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef WINDOWS
# include <winsock.h>
#else
# include <netdb.h> /* for h_errno */
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#endif
#include "wget.h"
#include "utils.h"
#include "url.h"
#include "host.h"
#include "rbuf.h"
#include "retr.h"
#include "headers.h"
#include "connect.h"
#include "fnmatch.h"
#include "netrc.h"
#if USE_DIGEST
# include "md5.h"
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
# include "gen_sslfunc.h"
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
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#include "cookies.h"
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extern char *version_string;
#ifndef errno
extern int errno;
#endif
#ifndef h_errno
# ifndef __CYGWIN__
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extern int h_errno;
# endif
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#endif
static int cookies_loaded_p;
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#define TEXTHTML_S "text/html"
#define HTTP_ACCEPT "*/*"
/* Some status code validation macros: */
#define H_20X(x) (((x) >= 200) && ((x) < 300))
#define H_PARTIAL(x) ((x) == HTTP_STATUS_PARTIAL_CONTENTS)
#define H_REDIRECTED(x) (((x) == HTTP_STATUS_MOVED_PERMANENTLY) \
|| ((x) == HTTP_STATUS_MOVED_TEMPORARILY))
/* HTTP/1.0 status codes from RFC1945, provided for reference. */
/* Successful 2xx. */
#define HTTP_STATUS_OK 200
#define HTTP_STATUS_CREATED 201
#define HTTP_STATUS_ACCEPTED 202
#define HTTP_STATUS_NO_CONTENT 204
#define HTTP_STATUS_PARTIAL_CONTENTS 206
/* Redirection 3xx. */
#define HTTP_STATUS_MULTIPLE_CHOICES 300
#define HTTP_STATUS_MOVED_PERMANENTLY 301
#define HTTP_STATUS_MOVED_TEMPORARILY 302
#define HTTP_STATUS_NOT_MODIFIED 304
/* Client error 4xx. */
#define HTTP_STATUS_BAD_REQUEST 400
#define HTTP_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED 401
#define HTTP_STATUS_FORBIDDEN 403
#define HTTP_STATUS_NOT_FOUND 404
/* Server errors 5xx. */
#define HTTP_STATUS_INTERNAL 500
#define HTTP_STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED 501
#define HTTP_STATUS_BAD_GATEWAY 502
#define HTTP_STATUS_UNAVAILABLE 503
/* Parse the HTTP status line, which is of format:
HTTP-Version SP Status-Code SP Reason-Phrase
The function returns the status-code, or -1 if the status line is
malformed. The pointer to reason-phrase is returned in RP. */
static int
parse_http_status_line (const char *line, const char **reason_phrase_ptr)
{
/* (the variables must not be named `major' and `minor', because
that breaks compilation with SunOS4 cc.) */
int mjr, mnr, statcode;
const char *p;
*reason_phrase_ptr = NULL;
/* The standard format of HTTP-Version is: `HTTP/X.Y', where X is
major version, and Y is minor version. */
if (strncmp (line, "HTTP/", 5) != 0)
return -1;
line += 5;
/* Calculate major HTTP version. */
p = line;
for (mjr = 0; ISDIGIT (*line); line++)
mjr = 10 * mjr + (*line - '0');
if (*line != '.' || p == line)
return -1;
++line;
/* Calculate minor HTTP version. */
p = line;
for (mnr = 0; ISDIGIT (*line); line++)
mnr = 10 * mnr + (*line - '0');
if (*line != ' ' || p == line)
return -1;
/* Wget will accept only 1.0 and higher HTTP-versions. The value of
minor version can be safely ignored. */
if (mjr < 1)
return -1;
++line;
/* Calculate status code. */
if (!(ISDIGIT (*line) && ISDIGIT (line[1]) && ISDIGIT (line[2])))
return -1;
statcode = 100 * (*line - '0') + 10 * (line[1] - '0') + (line[2] - '0');
/* Set up the reason phrase pointer. */
line += 3;
/* RFC2068 requires SPC here, but we allow the string to finish
here, in case no reason-phrase is present. */
if (*line != ' ')
{
if (!*line)
*reason_phrase_ptr = line;
else
return -1;
}
else
*reason_phrase_ptr = line + 1;
return statcode;
}
/* Functions to be used as arguments to header_process(): */
struct http_process_range_closure {
long first_byte_pos;
long last_byte_pos;
long entity_length;
};
/* Parse the `Content-Range' header and extract the information it
contains. Returns 1 if successful, -1 otherwise. */
static int
http_process_range (const char *hdr, void *arg)
{
struct http_process_range_closure *closure
= (struct http_process_range_closure *)arg;
long num;
/* Certain versions of Nutscape proxy server send out
`Content-Length' without "bytes" specifier, which is a breach of
RFC2068 (as well as the HTTP/1.1 draft which was current at the
time). But hell, I must support it... */
if (!strncasecmp (hdr, "bytes", 5))
{
hdr += 5;
hdr += skip_lws (hdr);
if (!*hdr)
return 0;
}
if (!ISDIGIT (*hdr))
return 0;
for (num = 0; ISDIGIT (*hdr); hdr++)
num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0');
if (*hdr != '-' || !ISDIGIT (*(hdr + 1)))
return 0;
closure->first_byte_pos = num;
++hdr;
for (num = 0; ISDIGIT (*hdr); hdr++)
num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0');
if (*hdr != '/' || !ISDIGIT (*(hdr + 1)))
return 0;
closure->last_byte_pos = num;
++hdr;
for (num = 0; ISDIGIT (*hdr); hdr++)
num = 10 * num + (*hdr - '0');
closure->entity_length = num;
return 1;
}
/* Place 1 to ARG if the HDR contains the word "none", 0 otherwise.
Used for `Accept-Ranges'. */
static int
http_process_none (const char *hdr, void *arg)
{
int *where = (int *)arg;
if (strstr (hdr, "none"))
*where = 1;
else
*where = 0;
return 1;
}
/* Place the malloc-ed copy of HDR hdr, to the first `;' to ARG. */
static int
http_process_type (const char *hdr, void *arg)
{
char **result = (char **)arg;
/* Locate P on `;' or the terminating zero, whichever comes first. */
const char *p = strchr (hdr, ';');
if (!p)
p = hdr + strlen (hdr);
while (p > hdr && ISSPACE (*(p - 1)))
--p;
*result = strdupdelim (hdr, p);
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return 1;
}
/* Check whether the `Connection' header is set to "keep-alive". */
static int
http_process_connection (const char *hdr, void *arg)
{
int *flag = (int *)arg;
if (!strcasecmp (hdr, "Keep-Alive"))
*flag = 1;
return 1;
}
/* Persistent connections. Currently, we cache the most recently used
connection as persistent, provided that the HTTP server agrees to
make it such. The persistence data is stored in the variables
below. Ideally, it would be in a structure, and it should be
possible to cache an arbitrary fixed number of these connections.
I think the code is quite easy to extend in that direction. */
/* Whether a persistent connection is active. */
static int pc_active_p;
/* Host and port of currently active persistent connection. */
static unsigned char pc_last_host[4];
static unsigned short pc_last_port;
/* File descriptor of the currently active persistent connection. */
static int pc_last_fd;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
/* Whether a ssl handshake has occoured on this connection */
static int pc_active_ssl;
/* SSL connection of the currently active persistent connection. */
static SSL *pc_last_ssl;
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
/* Mark the persistent connection as invalid. This is used by the
CLOSE_* macros after they forcefully close a registered persistent
connection. This does not close the file descriptor -- it is left
to the caller to do that. (Maybe it should, though.) */
static void
invalidate_persistent (void)
{
pc_active_p = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
pc_active_ssl = 0;
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
DEBUGP (("Invalidating fd %d from further reuse.\n", pc_last_fd));
}
/* Register FD, which should be a TCP/IP connection to HOST:PORT, as
persistent. This will enable someone to use the same connection
later. In the context of HTTP, this must be called only AFTER the
response has been received and the server has promised that the
connection will remain alive.
If a previous connection was persistent, it is closed. */
static void
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register_persistent (const char *host, unsigned short port, int fd
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
, SSL *ssl
#endif
)
{
int success;
if (pc_active_p)
{
if (pc_last_fd == fd)
{
/* The connection FD is already registered. Nothing to
do. */
return;
}
else
{
/* The old persistent connection is still active; let's
close it first. This situation arises whenever a
persistent connection exists, but we then connect to a
different host, and try to register a persistent
connection to that one. */
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
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/* The ssl disconnect has to take place before the closing
of pc_last_fd. */
if (pc_last_ssl)
shutdown_ssl(pc_last_ssl);
#endif
CLOSE (pc_last_fd);
invalidate_persistent ();
}
}
/* This store_hostaddress may not fail, because it has the results
in the cache. */
success = store_hostaddress (pc_last_host, host);
assert (success);
pc_last_port = port;
pc_last_fd = fd;
pc_active_p = 1;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
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pc_last_ssl = ssl;
pc_active_ssl = ssl ? 1 : 0;
#endif
DEBUGP (("Registered fd %d for persistent reuse.\n", fd));
}
/* Return non-zero if a persistent connection is available for
connecting to HOST:PORT. */
static int
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persistent_available_p (const char *host, unsigned short port
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
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, int ssl
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#endif
)
{
unsigned char this_host[4];
/* First, check whether a persistent connection is active at all. */
if (!pc_active_p)
return 0;
/* Second, check if the active connection pertains to the correct
(HOST, PORT) ordered pair. */
if (port != pc_last_port)
return 0;
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#ifdef HAVE_SSL
/* Second, a): check if current connection is (not) ssl, too. This
test is unlikely to fail because HTTP and HTTPS typicaly use
different ports. Yet it is possible, or so I [Christian
Fraenkel] have been told, to run HTTPS and HTTP simultaneus on
the same port. */
if (ssl != pc_active_ssl)
return 0;
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
if (!store_hostaddress (this_host, host))
return 0;
if (memcmp (pc_last_host, this_host, 4))
return 0;
/* Third: check whether the connection is still open. This is
important because most server implement a liberal (short) timeout
on persistent connections. Wget can of course always reconnect
if the connection doesn't work out, but it's nicer to know in
advance. This test is a logical followup of the first test, but
is "expensive" and therefore placed at the end of the list. */
if (!test_socket_open (pc_last_fd))
{
/* Oops, the socket is no longer open. Now that we know that,
let's invalidate the persistent connection before returning
0. */
CLOSE (pc_last_fd);
invalidate_persistent ();
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
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#ifdef HAVE_SSL
# define SHUTDOWN_SSL(ssl) do { \
if (ssl) \
shutdown_ssl (ssl); \
} while (0)
#else
# define SHUTDOWN_SSL(ssl)
#endif
/* The idea behind these two CLOSE macros is to distinguish between
two cases: one when the job we've been doing is finished, and we
want to close the connection and leave, and two when something is
seriously wrong and we're closing the connection as part of
cleanup.
In case of keep_alive, CLOSE_FINISH should leave the connection
open, while CLOSE_INVALIDATE should still close it.
Note that the semantics of the flag `keep_alive' is "this
connection *will* be reused (the server has promised not to close
the connection once we're done)", while the semantics of
`pc_active_p && (fd) == pc_last_fd' is "we're *now* using an
active, registered connection". */
#define CLOSE_FINISH(fd) do { \
if (!keep_alive) \
{ \
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SHUTDOWN_SSL (ssl); \
CLOSE (fd); \
if (pc_active_p && (fd) == pc_last_fd) \
invalidate_persistent (); \
} \
} while (0)
#define CLOSE_INVALIDATE(fd) do { \
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SHUTDOWN_SSL (ssl); \
CLOSE (fd); \
if (pc_active_p && (fd) == pc_last_fd) \
invalidate_persistent (); \
} while (0)
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struct http_stat
{
long len; /* received length */
long contlen; /* expected length */
long restval; /* the restart value */
int res; /* the result of last read */
char *newloc; /* new location (redirection) */
char *remote_time; /* remote time-stamp string */
char *error; /* textual HTTP error */
int statcode; /* status code */
long dltime; /* time of the download */
int no_truncate; /* whether truncating the file is
forbidden. */
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};
/* Free the elements of hstat X. */
#define FREEHSTAT(x) do \
{ \
FREE_MAYBE ((x).newloc); \
FREE_MAYBE ((x).remote_time); \
FREE_MAYBE ((x).error); \
(x).newloc = (x).remote_time = (x).error = NULL; \
} while (0)
static char *create_authorization_line PARAMS ((const char *, const char *,
const char *, const char *,
const char *));
static char *basic_authentication_encode PARAMS ((const char *, const char *,
const char *));
static int known_authentication_scheme_p PARAMS ((const char *));
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time_t http_atotm PARAMS ((char *));
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#define BEGINS_WITH(line, string_constant) \
(!strncasecmp (line, string_constant, sizeof (string_constant) - 1) \
&& (ISSPACE (line[sizeof (string_constant) - 1]) \
|| !line[sizeof (string_constant) - 1]))
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/* Retrieve a document through HTTP protocol. It recognizes status
code, and correctly handles redirections. It closes the network
socket. If it receives an error from the functions below it, it
will print it if there is enough information to do so (almost
always), returning the error to the caller (i.e. http_loop).
Various HTTP parameters are stored to hs. Although it parses the
response code correctly, it is not used in a sane way. The caller
can do that, though.
If u->proxy is non-NULL, the URL u will be taken as a proxy URL,
and u->proxy->url will be given to the proxy server (bad naming,
I'm afraid). */
static uerr_t
gethttp (struct urlinfo *u, struct http_stat *hs, int *dt)
{
char *request, *type, *command, *path;
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char *user, *passwd;
char *pragma_h, *referer, *useragent, *range, *wwwauth, *remhost;
char *authenticate_h;
char *proxyauth;
char *all_headers;
char *port_maybe;
char *request_keep_alive;
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int sock, hcount, num_written, all_length, remport, statcode;
long contlen, contrange;
struct urlinfo *ou;
uerr_t err;
FILE *fp;
int auth_tried_already;
struct rbuf rbuf;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
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static SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx = NULL;
SSL *ssl = NULL;
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
struct wget_timer *timer;
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char *cookies = NULL;
/* Whether this connection will be kept alive after the HTTP request
is done. */
int keep_alive;
/* Flags that detect the two ways of specifying HTTP keep-alive
response. */
int http_keep_alive_1, http_keep_alive_2;
/* Whether keep-alive should be inhibited. */
int inhibit_keep_alive;
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#ifdef HAVE_SSL
/* initialize ssl_ctx on first run */
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if (!ssl_ctx)
{
err=init_ssl (&ssl_ctx);
if (err != 0)
{
switch (err)
{
case SSLERRCTXCREATE:
/* this is fatal */
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Failed to set up an SSL context\n"));
ssl_printerrors ();
return err;
case SSLERRCERTFILE:
/* try without certfile */
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Failed to load certificates from %s\n"),
opt.sslcertfile);
ssl_printerrors ();
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Trying without the specified certificate\n"));
break;
case SSLERRCERTKEY:
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Failed to get certificate key from %s\n"),
opt.sslcertkey);
ssl_printerrors ();
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Trying without the specified certificate\n"));
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
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if (!(*dt & HEAD_ONLY))
/* If we're doing a GET on the URL, as opposed to just a HEAD, we need to
know the local filename so we can save to it. */
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assert (u->local != NULL);
authenticate_h = 0;
auth_tried_already = 0;
inhibit_keep_alive = (!opt.http_keep_alive || u->proxy != NULL);
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again:
/* We need to come back here when the initial attempt to retrieve
without authorization header fails. (Expected to happen at least
for the Digest authorization scheme.) */
keep_alive = 0;
http_keep_alive_1 = http_keep_alive_2 = 0;
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if (opt.cookies)
cookies = build_cookies_request (u->host, u->port, u->path,
u->proto == URLHTTPS);
/* Initialize certain elements of struct http_stat. */
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hs->len = 0L;
hs->contlen = -1;
hs->res = -1;
hs->newloc = NULL;
hs->remote_time = NULL;
hs->error = NULL;
/* Which structure to use to retrieve the original URL data. */
if (u->proxy)
ou = u->proxy;
else
ou = u;
/* First: establish the connection. */
if (inhibit_keep_alive
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||
#ifndef HAVE_SSL
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!persistent_available_p (u->host, u->port)
#else
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!persistent_available_p (u->host, u->port, (u->proto==URLHTTPS ? 1 : 0))
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
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)
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{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Connecting to %s:%hu... "), u->host, u->port);
err = make_connection (&sock, u->host, u->port);
switch (err)
{
case HOSTERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s.\n", u->host, herrmsg (h_errno));
return HOSTERR;
break;
case CONSOCKERR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "socket: %s\n", strerror (errno));
return CONSOCKERR;
break;
case CONREFUSED:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("Connection to %s:%hu refused.\n"), u->host, u->port);
CLOSE (sock);
return CONREFUSED;
case CONERROR:
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "connect: %s\n", strerror (errno));
CLOSE (sock);
return CONERROR;
break;
case NOCONERROR:
/* Everything is fine! */
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("connected!\n"));
break;
default:
abort ();
break;
}
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
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if (u->proto == URLHTTPS)
if (connect_ssl (&ssl, ssl_ctx,sock) != 0)
{
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unable to establish SSL connection.\n"));
CLOSE (sock);
return CONSSLERR;
}
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
}
else
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Reusing connection to %s:%hu.\n"), u->host, u->port);
/* #### pc_last_fd should be accessed through an accessor
function. */
sock = pc_last_fd;
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
ssl = pc_last_ssl;
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
DEBUGP (("Reusing fd %d.\n", sock));
}
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if (u->proxy)
path = u->proxy->url;
else
path = u->path;
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command = (*dt & HEAD_ONLY) ? "HEAD" : "GET";
referer = NULL;
if (ou->referer)
{
referer = (char *)alloca (9 + strlen (ou->referer) + 3);
sprintf (referer, "Referer: %s\r\n", ou->referer);
}
if (*dt & SEND_NOCACHE)
pragma_h = "Pragma: no-cache\r\n";
else
pragma_h = "";
if (hs->restval)
{
range = (char *)alloca (13 + numdigit (hs->restval) + 4);
/* Gag me! Some servers (e.g. WebSitePro) have been known to
respond to the following `Range' format by generating a
multipart/x-byte-ranges MIME document! This MIME type was
present in an old draft of the byteranges specification.
HTTP/1.1 specifies a multipart/byte-ranges MIME type, but
only if multiple non-overlapping ranges are requested --
which Wget never does. */
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sprintf (range, "Range: bytes=%ld-\r\n", hs->restval);
}
else
range = NULL;
if (opt.useragent)
STRDUP_ALLOCA (useragent, opt.useragent);
else
{
useragent = (char *)alloca (10 + strlen (version_string));
sprintf (useragent, "Wget/%s", version_string);
}
/* Construct the authentication, if userid is present. */
user = ou->user;
passwd = ou->passwd;
search_netrc (u->host, (const char **)&user, (const char **)&passwd, 0);
user = user ? user : opt.http_user;
passwd = passwd ? passwd : opt.http_passwd;
wwwauth = NULL;
if (user && passwd)
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{
if (!authenticate_h)
{
/* We have the username and the password, but haven't tried
any authorization yet. Let's see if the "Basic" method
works. If not, we'll come back here and construct a
proper authorization method with the right challenges.
If we didn't employ this kind of logic, every URL that
requires authorization would have to be processed twice,
which is very suboptimal and generates a bunch of false
"unauthorized" errors in the server log.
#### But this logic also has a serious problem when used
with stronger authentications: we *first* transmit the
username and the password in clear text, and *then*
attempt a stronger authentication scheme. That cannot be
right! We are only fortunate that almost everyone still
uses the `Basic' scheme anyway.
There should be an option to prevent this from happening,
for those who use strong authentication schemes and value
their passwords. */
wwwauth = basic_authentication_encode (user, passwd, "Authorization");
}
else
{
wwwauth = create_authorization_line (authenticate_h, user, passwd,
command, ou->path);
}
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}
proxyauth = NULL;
if (u->proxy)
{
char *proxy_user, *proxy_passwd;
/* For normal username and password, URL components override
command-line/wgetrc parameters. With proxy authentication,
it's the reverse, because proxy URLs are normally the
"permanent" ones, so command-line args should take
precedence. */
if (opt.proxy_user && opt.proxy_passwd)
{
proxy_user = opt.proxy_user;
proxy_passwd = opt.proxy_passwd;
}
else
{
proxy_user = u->user;
proxy_passwd = u->passwd;
}
/* #### This is junky. Can't the proxy request, say, `Digest'
authentication? */
if (proxy_user && proxy_passwd)
proxyauth = basic_authentication_encode (proxy_user, proxy_passwd,
"Proxy-Authorization");
}
remhost = ou->host;
remport = ou->port;
2000-03-02 08:34:05 -05:00
/* String of the form :PORT. Used only for non-standard ports. */
port_maybe = NULL;
if (1
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
&& remport != (u->proto == URLHTTPS
? DEFAULT_HTTPS_PORT : DEFAULT_HTTP_PORT)
#else
&& remport != DEFAULT_HTTP_PORT
#endif
)
2000-03-31 09:14:58 -05:00
{
port_maybe = (char *)alloca (numdigit (remport) + 2);
sprintf (port_maybe, ":%d", remport);
2000-03-31 09:14:58 -05:00
}
2000-03-02 08:34:05 -05:00
if (!inhibit_keep_alive)
request_keep_alive = "Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n";
else
request_keep_alive = NULL;
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
/* Allocate the memory for the request. */
request = (char *)alloca (strlen (command) + strlen (path)
+ strlen (useragent)
+ strlen (remhost)
+ (port_maybe ? strlen (port_maybe) : 0)
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
+ strlen (HTTP_ACCEPT)
+ (request_keep_alive
? strlen (request_keep_alive) : 0)
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
+ (referer ? strlen (referer) : 0)
2001-04-08 18:25:24 -04:00
+ (cookies ? strlen (cookies) : 0)
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
+ (wwwauth ? strlen (wwwauth) : 0)
+ (proxyauth ? strlen (proxyauth) : 0)
+ (range ? strlen (range) : 0)
+ strlen (pragma_h)
+ (opt.user_header ? strlen (opt.user_header) : 0)
+ 64);
/* Construct the request. */
sprintf (request, "\
%s %s HTTP/1.0\r\n\
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
User-Agent: %s\r\n\
2000-03-02 08:34:05 -05:00
Host: %s%s\r\n\
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
Accept: %s\r\n\
2001-04-08 18:25:24 -04:00
%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\r\n",
command, path, useragent, remhost,
port_maybe ? port_maybe : "",
HTTP_ACCEPT,
request_keep_alive ? request_keep_alive : "",
referer ? referer : "",
2001-04-08 18:25:24 -04:00
cookies ? cookies : "",
wwwauth ? wwwauth : "",
proxyauth ? proxyauth : "",
range ? range : "",
pragma_h,
opt.user_header ? opt.user_header : "");
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
DEBUGP (("---request begin---\n%s---request end---\n", request));
/* Free the temporary memory. */
FREE_MAYBE (wwwauth);
FREE_MAYBE (proxyauth);
2001-04-08 18:25:24 -04:00
FREE_MAYBE (cookies);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
/* Send the request to server. */
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
2000-12-05 18:35:56 -05:00
if (u->proto == URLHTTPS)
num_written = ssl_iwrite (ssl, request, strlen (request));
else
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
2000-12-05 18:35:56 -05:00
num_written = iwrite (sock, request, strlen (request));
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
if (num_written < 0)
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Failed writing HTTP request: %s.\n"),
strerror (errno));
2000-12-05 18:35:56 -05:00
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return WRITEFAILED;
}
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("%s request sent, awaiting response... "),
u->proxy ? "Proxy" : "HTTP");
contlen = contrange = -1;
type = NULL;
statcode = -1;
*dt &= ~RETROKF;
/* Before reading anything, initialize the rbuf. */
rbuf_initialize (&rbuf, sock);
#ifdef HAVE_SSL
2000-12-05 18:35:56 -05:00
if (u->proto == URLHTTPS)
rbuf.ssl = ssl;
else
rbuf.ssl = NULL;
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
all_headers = NULL;
all_length = 0;
/* Header-fetching loop. */
hcount = 0;
while (1)
{
char *hdr;
int status;
++hcount;
/* Get the header. */
status = header_get (&rbuf, &hdr,
/* Disallow continuations for status line. */
(hcount == 1 ? HG_NO_CONTINUATIONS : HG_NONE));
/* Check for errors. */
if (status == HG_EOF && *hdr)
{
/* This used to be an unconditional error, but that was
somewhat controversial, because of a large number of
broken CGI's that happily "forget" to send the second EOL
before closing the connection of a HEAD request.
So, the deal is to check whether the header is empty
(*hdr is zero if it is); if yes, it means that the
previous header was fully retrieved, and that -- most
probably -- the request is complete. "...be liberal in
what you accept." Oh boy. */
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("End of file while parsing headers.\n"));
xfree (hdr);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
FREE_MAYBE (type);
FREE_MAYBE (hs->newloc);
FREE_MAYBE (all_headers);
2000-12-05 18:35:56 -05:00
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return HEOF;
}
else if (status == HG_ERROR)
{
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Read error (%s) in headers.\n"),
strerror (errno));
xfree (hdr);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
FREE_MAYBE (type);
FREE_MAYBE (hs->newloc);
FREE_MAYBE (all_headers);
2000-12-05 18:35:56 -05:00
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return HERR;
}
/* If the headers are to be saved to a file later, save them to
memory now. */
if (opt.save_headers)
{
int lh = strlen (hdr);
all_headers = (char *)xrealloc (all_headers, all_length + lh + 2);
memcpy (all_headers + all_length, hdr, lh);
all_length += lh;
all_headers[all_length++] = '\n';
all_headers[all_length] = '\0';
}
/* Print the header if requested. */
if (opt.server_response && hcount != 1)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n%d %s", hcount, hdr);
/* Check for status line. */
if (hcount == 1)
{
const char *error;
/* Parse the first line of server response. */
statcode = parse_http_status_line (hdr, &error);
hs->statcode = statcode;
/* Store the descriptive response. */
if (statcode == -1) /* malformed response */
{
/* A common reason for "malformed response" error is the
case when no data was actually received. Handle this
special case. */
if (!*hdr)
hs->error = xstrdup (_("No data received"));
else
hs->error = xstrdup (_("Malformed status line"));
xfree (hdr);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
break;
}
else if (!*error)
hs->error = xstrdup (_("(no description)"));
else
hs->error = xstrdup (error);
if ((statcode != -1)
#ifdef DEBUG
&& !opt.debug
#endif
)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "%d %s", statcode, error);
goto done_header;
}
/* Exit on empty header. */
if (!*hdr)
{
xfree (hdr);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
break;
}
/* Try getting content-length. */
if (contlen == -1 && !opt.ignore_length)
if (header_process (hdr, "Content-Length", header_extract_number,
&contlen))
goto done_header;
/* Try getting content-type. */
if (!type)
if (header_process (hdr, "Content-Type", http_process_type, &type))
goto done_header;
/* Try getting location. */
if (!hs->newloc)
if (header_process (hdr, "Location", header_strdup, &hs->newloc))
goto done_header;
/* Try getting last-modified. */
if (!hs->remote_time)
if (header_process (hdr, "Last-Modified", header_strdup,
&hs->remote_time))
goto done_header;
2001-04-08 18:25:24 -04:00
/* Try getting cookies. */
if (opt.cookies)
if (header_process (hdr, "Set-Cookie", set_cookie_header_cb, u))
goto done_header;
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
/* Try getting www-authentication. */
if (!authenticate_h)
if (header_process (hdr, "WWW-Authenticate", header_strdup,
&authenticate_h))
goto done_header;
/* Check for accept-ranges header. If it contains the word
`none', disable the ranges. */
if (*dt & ACCEPTRANGES)
{
int nonep;
if (header_process (hdr, "Accept-Ranges", http_process_none, &nonep))
{
if (nonep)
*dt &= ~ACCEPTRANGES;
goto done_header;
}
}
/* Try getting content-range. */
if (contrange == -1)
{
struct http_process_range_closure closure;
if (header_process (hdr, "Content-Range", http_process_range, &closure))
{
contrange = closure.first_byte_pos;
goto done_header;
}
}
/* Check for keep-alive related responses. */
if (!inhibit_keep_alive)
{
/* Check for the `Keep-Alive' header. */
if (!http_keep_alive_1)
{
if (header_process (hdr, "Keep-Alive", header_exists,
&http_keep_alive_1))
goto done_header;
}
/* Check for `Connection: Keep-Alive'. */
if (!http_keep_alive_2)
{
if (header_process (hdr, "Connection", http_process_connection,
&http_keep_alive_2))
goto done_header;
}
}
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
done_header:
xfree (hdr);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
}
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
if (contlen != -1
&& (http_keep_alive_1 || http_keep_alive_2))
{
assert (inhibit_keep_alive == 0);
keep_alive = 1;
}
if (keep_alive)
/* The server has promised that it will not close the connection
when we're done. This means that we can register it. */
#ifndef HAVE_SSL
register_persistent (u->host, u->port, sock);
#else
register_persistent (u->host, u->port, sock, ssl);
#endif /* HAVE_SSL */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
if ((statcode == HTTP_STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED)
&& authenticate_h)
{
/* Authorization is required. */
FREE_MAYBE (type);
type = NULL;
FREEHSTAT (*hs);
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); /* would be CLOSE_FINISH, but there
might be more bytes in the body. */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
if (auth_tried_already)
{
/* If we have tried it already, then there is not point
retrying it. */
failed:
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Authorization failed.\n"));
xfree (authenticate_h);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return AUTHFAILED;
}
else if (!known_authentication_scheme_p (authenticate_h))
{
xfree (authenticate_h);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unknown authentication scheme.\n"));
return AUTHFAILED;
}
else if (BEGINS_WITH (authenticate_h, "Basic"))
{
/* The authentication scheme is basic, the one we try by
default, and it failed. There's no sense in trying
again. */
goto failed;
}
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
else
{
auth_tried_already = 1;
goto again;
}
}
/* We do not need this anymore. */
if (authenticate_h)
{
xfree (authenticate_h);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
authenticate_h = NULL;
}
/* 20x responses are counted among successful by default. */
if (H_20X (statcode))
*dt |= RETROKF;
if (type && !strncasecmp (type, TEXTHTML_S, strlen (TEXTHTML_S)))
*dt |= TEXTHTML;
else
/* We don't assume text/html by default. */
*dt &= ~TEXTHTML;
if (opt.html_extension && (*dt & TEXTHTML))
/* -E / --html-extension / html_extension = on was specified, and this is a
text/html file. If some case-insensitive variation on ".htm[l]" isn't
already the file's suffix, tack on ".html". */
{
char* last_period_in_local_filename = strrchr(u->local, '.');
if (last_period_in_local_filename == NULL ||
!(strcasecmp(last_period_in_local_filename, ".htm") == EQ ||
strcasecmp(last_period_in_local_filename, ".html") == EQ))
{
size_t local_filename_len = strlen(u->local);
u->local = xrealloc(u->local, local_filename_len + sizeof(".html"));
strcpy(u->local + local_filename_len, ".html");
*dt |= ADDED_HTML_EXTENSION;
}
}
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
if (contrange == -1)
{
/* We did not get a content-range header. This means that the
server did not honor our `Range' request. Normally, this
means we should reset hs->restval and continue normally. */
/* However, if `-c' is used, we need to be a bit more careful:
1. If `-c' is specified and the file already existed when
Wget was started, it would be a bad idea for us to start
downloading it from scratch, effectively truncating it. I
believe this cannot happen unless `-c' was specified.
2. If `-c' is used on a file that is already fully
downloaded, we're requesting bytes after the end of file,
which can result in server not honoring `Range'. If this is
the case, `Content-Length' will be equal to the length of the
file. */
if (opt.always_rest)
{
/* Check for condition #2. */
if (hs->restval == contlen)
{
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\
\n The file is already fully retrieved; nothing to do.\n\n"));
/* In case the caller inspects. */
hs->len = contlen;
hs->res = 0;
FREE_MAYBE (type);
FREE_MAYBE (hs->newloc);
FREE_MAYBE (all_headers);
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); /* would be CLOSE_FINISH, but there
might be more bytes in the body. */
return RETRFINISHED;
}
/* Check for condition #1. */
if (hs->no_truncate)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("\
\n\
The server does not support continued download;\n\
refusing to truncate `%s'.\n\n"), u->local);
return CONTNOTSUPPORTED;
}
/* Fallthrough */
}
hs->restval = 0;
}
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
else if (contrange != hs->restval ||
(H_PARTIAL (statcode) && contrange == -1))
{
/* This means the whole request was somehow misunderstood by the
server. Bail out. */
FREE_MAYBE (type);
FREE_MAYBE (hs->newloc);
FREE_MAYBE (all_headers);
2000-12-05 18:35:56 -05:00
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return RANGEERR;
}
if (hs->restval)
{
if (contlen != -1)
contlen += contrange;
else
contrange = -1; /* If conent-length was not sent,
content-range will be ignored. */
}
hs->contlen = contlen;
/* Return if redirected. */
if (H_REDIRECTED (statcode) || statcode == HTTP_STATUS_MULTIPLE_CHOICES)
{
/* RFC2068 says that in case of the 300 (multiple choices)
response, the server can output a preferred URL through
`Location' header; otherwise, the request should be treated
like GET. So, if the location is set, it will be a
redirection; otherwise, just proceed normally. */
if (statcode == HTTP_STATUS_MULTIPLE_CHOICES && !hs->newloc)
*dt |= RETROKF;
else
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE,
_("Location: %s%s\n"),
hs->newloc ? hs->newloc : _("unspecified"),
hs->newloc ? _(" [following]") : "");
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); /* would be CLOSE_FINISH, but there
might be more bytes in the body. */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
FREE_MAYBE (type);
FREE_MAYBE (all_headers);
return NEWLOCATION;
}
}
if (opt.verbose)
{
if ((*dt & RETROKF) && !opt.server_response)
{
/* No need to print this output if the body won't be
downloaded at all, or if the original server response is
printed. */
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Length: "));
if (contlen != -1)
{
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, legible (contlen));
if (contrange != -1)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _(" (%s to go)"),
legible (contlen - contrange));
}
else
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE,
opt.ignore_length ? _("ignored") : _("unspecified"));
if (type)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, " [%s]\n", type);
else
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
}
}
FREE_MAYBE (type);
type = NULL; /* We don't need it any more. */
/* Return if we have no intention of further downloading. */
if (!(*dt & RETROKF) || (*dt & HEAD_ONLY))
{
/* In case the caller cares to look... */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
hs->len = 0L;
hs->res = 0;
FREE_MAYBE (type);
FREE_MAYBE (all_headers);
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); /* would be CLOSE_FINISH, but there
might be more bytes in the body. */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return RETRFINISHED;
}
/* Open the local file. */
if (!opt.dfp)
{
mkalldirs (u->local);
if (opt.backups)
rotate_backups (u->local);
fp = fopen (u->local, hs->restval ? "ab" : "wb");
if (!fp)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%s: %s\n", u->local, strerror (errno));
CLOSE_INVALIDATE (sock); /* would be CLOSE_FINISH, but there
might be more bytes in the body. */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
FREE_MAYBE (all_headers);
return FOPENERR;
}
}
else /* opt.dfp */
{
extern int global_download_count;
fp = opt.dfp;
/* To ensure that repeated "from scratch" downloads work for -O
files, we rewind the file pointer, unless restval is
non-zero. (This works only when -O is used on regular files,
but it's still a valuable feature.)
However, this loses when more than one URL is specified on
the command line the second rewinds eradicates the contents
of the first download. Thus we disable the above trick for
all the downloads except the very first one.
#### A possible solution to this would be to remember the
file position in the output document and to seek to that
position, instead of rewinding. */
if (!hs->restval && global_download_count == 0)
{
/* This will silently fail for streams that don't correspond
to regular files, but that's OK. */
rewind (fp);
/* ftruncate is needed because opt.dfp is opened in append
mode if opt.always_rest is set. */
ftruncate (fileno (fp), 0);
clearerr (fp);
}
}
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
/* #### This confuses the code that checks for file size. There
should be some overhead information. */
if (opt.save_headers)
fwrite (all_headers, 1, all_length, fp);
timer = wtimer_new ();
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
/* Get the contents of the document. */
hs->res = get_contents (sock, fp, &hs->len, hs->restval,
(contlen != -1 ? contlen : 0),
&rbuf, keep_alive);
hs->dltime = wtimer_elapsed (timer);
wtimer_delete (timer);
{
/* Close or flush the file. We have to be careful to check for
error here. Checking the result of fwrite() is not enough --
errors could go unnoticed! */
int flush_res;
if (!opt.dfp)
flush_res = fclose (fp);
else
flush_res = fflush (fp);
if (flush_res == EOF)
hs->res = -2;
}
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
FREE_MAYBE (all_headers);
2000-12-05 18:35:56 -05:00
CLOSE_FINISH (sock);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
if (hs->res == -2)
return FWRITEERR;
return RETRFINISHED;
}
/* The genuine HTTP loop! This is the part where the retrieval is
retried, and retried, and retried, and... */
uerr_t
http_loop (struct urlinfo *u, char **newloc, int *dt)
{
int count;
int use_ts, got_head = 0; /* time-stamping info */
char *filename_plus_orig_suffix;
char *local_filename = NULL;
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
char *tms, *suf, *locf, *tmrate;
uerr_t err;
time_t tml = -1, tmr = -1; /* local and remote time-stamps */
long local_size = 0; /* the size of the local file */
size_t filename_len;
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
struct http_stat hstat; /* HTTP status */
struct stat st;
/* This used to be done in main(), but it's a better idea to do it
here so that we don't go through the hoops if we're just using
FTP or whatever. */
if (opt.cookies && opt.cookies_input && !cookies_loaded_p)
load_cookies (opt.cookies_input);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
*newloc = NULL;
/* Warn on (likely bogus) wildcard usage in HTTP. Don't use
has_wildcards_p because it would also warn on `?', and we know that
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
shows up in CGI paths a *lot*. */
if (strchr (u->url, '*'))
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("Warning: wildcards not supported in HTTP.\n"));
/* Determine the local filename. */
if (!u->local)
u->local = url_filename (u->proxy ? u->proxy : u);
if (!opt.output_document)
locf = u->local;
else
locf = opt.output_document;
/* Yuck. Multiple returns suck. We need to remember to free() the space we
xmalloc() here before EACH return. This is one reason it's better to set
flags that influence flow control and then return once at the end. */
filename_len = strlen(u->local);
filename_plus_orig_suffix = xmalloc(filename_len + sizeof(".orig"));
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
if (opt.noclobber && file_exists_p (u->local))
{
/* If opt.noclobber is turned on and file already exists, do not
retrieve the file */
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\
File `%s' already there, will not retrieve.\n"), u->local);
/* If the file is there, we suppose it's retrieved OK. */
*dt |= RETROKF;
/* #### Bogusness alert. */
/* If its suffix is "html" or (yuck!) "htm", we suppose it's
text/html, a harmless lie. */
if (((suf = suffix (u->local)) != NULL)
&& (!strcmp (suf, "html") || !strcmp (suf, "htm")))
*dt |= TEXTHTML;
xfree (suf);
xfree (filename_plus_orig_suffix); /* must precede every return! */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
/* Another harmless lie: */
return RETROK;
}
use_ts = 0;
if (opt.timestamping)
{
boolean local_dot_orig_file_exists = FALSE;
if (opt.backup_converted)
/* If -K is specified, we'll act on the assumption that it was specified
last time these files were downloaded as well, and instead of just
comparing local file X against server file X, we'll compare local
file X.orig (if extant, else X) against server file X. If -K
_wasn't_ specified last time, or the server contains files called
*.orig, -N will be back to not operating correctly with -k. */
{
2000-11-06 16:24:57 -05:00
/* Would a single s[n]printf() call be faster? --dan
Definitely not. sprintf() is horribly slow. It's a
different question whether the difference between the two
affects a program. Usually I'd say "no", but at one
point I profiled Wget, and found that a measurable and
2000-11-06 16:24:57 -05:00
non-negligible amount of time was lost calling sprintf()
in url.c. Replacing sprintf with inline calls to
strcpy() and long_to_string() made a difference.
--hniksic */
strcpy(filename_plus_orig_suffix, u->local);
strcpy(filename_plus_orig_suffix + filename_len, ".orig");
/* Try to stat() the .orig file. */
if (stat(filename_plus_orig_suffix, &st) == 0)
{
local_dot_orig_file_exists = TRUE;
local_filename = filename_plus_orig_suffix;
}
}
if (!local_dot_orig_file_exists)
/* Couldn't stat() <file>.orig, so try to stat() <file>. */
if (stat (u->local, &st) == 0)
local_filename = u->local;
if (local_filename != NULL)
/* There was a local file, so we'll check later to see if the version
the server has is the same version we already have, allowing us to
skip a download. */
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{
use_ts = 1;
tml = st.st_mtime;
local_size = st.st_size;
got_head = 0;
}
}
/* Reset the counter. */
count = 0;
*dt = 0 | ACCEPTRANGES;
/* THE loop */
do
{
/* Increment the pass counter. */
++count;
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sleep_between_retrievals (count);
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/* Get the current time string. */
tms = time_str (NULL);
/* Print fetch message, if opt.verbose. */
if (opt.verbose)
{
char *hurl = str_url (u->proxy ? u->proxy : u, 1);
char tmp[15];
strcpy (tmp, " ");
if (count > 1)
sprintf (tmp, _("(try:%2d)"), count);
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, "--%s-- %s\n %s => `%s'\n",
tms, hurl, tmp, locf);
#ifdef WINDOWS
ws_changetitle (hurl, 1);
#endif
xfree (hurl);
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}
/* Default document type is empty. However, if spider mode is
on or time-stamping is employed, HEAD_ONLY commands is
encoded within *dt. */
if (opt.spider || (use_ts && !got_head))
*dt |= HEAD_ONLY;
else
*dt &= ~HEAD_ONLY;
/* Assume no restarting. */
hstat.restval = 0L;
/* Decide whether or not to restart. */
if (((count > 1 && (*dt & ACCEPTRANGES)) || opt.always_rest)
&& file_exists_p (locf))
if (stat (locf, &st) == 0 && S_ISREG (st.st_mode))
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hstat.restval = st.st_size;
/* Decide whether to send the no-cache directive. */
if (u->proxy && (count > 1 || (opt.proxy_cache == 0)))
*dt |= SEND_NOCACHE;
else
*dt &= ~SEND_NOCACHE;
/* Try fetching the document, or at least its head. :-) */
err = gethttp (u, &hstat, dt);
/* It's unfortunate that wget determines the local filename before finding
out the Content-Type of the file. Barring a major restructuring of the
code, we need to re-set locf here, since gethttp() may have xrealloc()d
u->local to tack on ".html". */
if (!opt.output_document)
locf = u->local;
else
locf = opt.output_document;
/* In `-c' is used, check whether the file we're writing to
exists before we've done anything. If so, we'll refuse to
truncate it if the server doesn't support continued
downloads. */
if (opt.always_rest)
hstat.no_truncate = file_exists_p (locf);
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/* Time? */
tms = time_str (NULL);
/* Get the new location (with or without the redirection). */
if (hstat.newloc)
*newloc = xstrdup (hstat.newloc);
switch (err)
{
case HERR: case HEOF: case CONSOCKERR: case CONCLOSED:
case CONERROR: case READERR: case WRITEFAILED:
case RANGEERR:
/* Non-fatal errors continue executing the loop, which will
bring them to "while" statement at the end, to judge
whether the number of tries was exceeded. */
FREEHSTAT (hstat);
printwhat (count, opt.ntry);
continue;
break;
case HOSTERR: case CONREFUSED: case PROXERR: case AUTHFAILED:
case SSLERRCTXCREATE: case CONTNOTSUPPORTED:
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/* Fatal errors just return from the function. */
FREEHSTAT (hstat);
xfree (filename_plus_orig_suffix); /* must precede every return! */
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return err;
break;
case FWRITEERR: case FOPENERR:
/* Another fatal error. */
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Cannot write to `%s' (%s).\n"),
u->local, strerror (errno));
FREEHSTAT (hstat);
return err;
break;
case CONSSLERR:
/* Another fatal error. */
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("Unable to establish SSL connection.\n"));
FREEHSTAT (hstat);
xfree (filename_plus_orig_suffix); /* must precede every return! */
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return err;
break;
case NEWLOCATION:
/* Return the new location to the caller. */
if (!hstat.newloc)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET,
_("ERROR: Redirection (%d) without location.\n"),
hstat.statcode);
xfree (filename_plus_orig_suffix); /* must precede every return! */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return WRONGCODE;
}
FREEHSTAT (hstat);
xfree (filename_plus_orig_suffix); /* must precede every return! */
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return NEWLOCATION;
break;
case RETRFINISHED:
/* Deal with you later. */
break;
default:
/* All possibilities should have been exhausted. */
abort ();
}
if (!(*dt & RETROKF))
{
if (!opt.verbose)
{
/* #### Ugly ugly ugly! */
char *hurl = str_url (u->proxy ? u->proxy : u, 1);
logprintf (LOG_NONVERBOSE, "%s:\n", hurl);
xfree (hurl);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
}
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("%s ERROR %d: %s.\n"),
tms, hstat.statcode, hstat.error);
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, "\n");
FREEHSTAT (hstat);
xfree (filename_plus_orig_suffix); /* must precede every return! */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return WRONGCODE;
}
/* Did we get the time-stamp? */
if (!got_head)
{
if (opt.timestamping && !hstat.remote_time)
{
logputs (LOG_NOTQUIET, _("\
Last-modified header missing -- time-stamps turned off.\n"));
}
else if (hstat.remote_time)
{
/* Convert the date-string into struct tm. */
tmr = http_atotm (hstat.remote_time);
if (tmr == (time_t) (-1))
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\
Last-modified header invalid -- time-stamp ignored.\n"));
}
}
/* The time-stamping section. */
if (use_ts)
{
got_head = 1;
*dt &= ~HEAD_ONLY;
use_ts = 0; /* no more time-stamping */
count = 0; /* the retrieve count for HEAD is
reset */
if (hstat.remote_time && tmr != (time_t) (-1))
{
/* Now time-stamping can be used validly. Time-stamping
means that if the sizes of the local and remote file
match, and local file is newer than the remote file,
it will not be retrieved. Otherwise, the normal
download procedure is resumed. */
if (tml >= tmr &&
(hstat.contlen == -1 || local_size == hstat.contlen))
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\
Server file no newer than local file `%s' -- not retrieving.\n\n"),
local_filename);
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FREEHSTAT (hstat);
xfree (filename_plus_orig_suffix); /*must precede every return!*/
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return RETROK;
}
else if (tml >= tmr)
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE, _("\
The sizes do not match (local %ld) -- retrieving.\n"), local_size);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
else
logputs (LOG_VERBOSE,
_("Remote file is newer, retrieving.\n"));
}
FREEHSTAT (hstat);
continue;
}
if ((tmr != (time_t) (-1))
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&& !opt.spider
&& ((hstat.len == hstat.contlen) ||
((hstat.res == 0) &&
((hstat.contlen == -1) ||
(hstat.len >= hstat.contlen && !opt.kill_longer)))))
{
/* #### This code repeats in http.c and ftp.c. Move it to a
function! */
const char *fl = NULL;
if (opt.output_document)
{
if (opt.od_known_regular)
fl = opt.output_document;
}
else
fl = u->local;
if (fl)
touch (fl, tmr);
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}
/* End of time-stamping section. */
if (opt.spider)
{
logprintf (LOG_NOTQUIET, "%d %s\n\n", hstat.statcode, hstat.error);
xfree (filename_plus_orig_suffix); /* must precede every return! */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return RETROK;
}
/* It is now safe to free the remainder of hstat, since the
strings within it will no longer be used. */
FREEHSTAT (hstat);
tmrate = rate (hstat.len - hstat.restval, hstat.dltime, 0);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
if (hstat.len == hstat.contlen)
{
if (*dt & RETROKF)
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE,
_("%s (%s) - `%s' saved [%ld/%ld]\n\n"),
tms, tmrate, locf, hstat.len, hstat.contlen);
logprintf (LOG_NONVERBOSE,
"%s URL:%s [%ld/%ld] -> \"%s\" [%d]\n",
tms, u->url, hstat.len, hstat.contlen, locf, count);
}
++opt.numurls;
downloaded_increase (hstat.len);
/* Remember that we downloaded the file for later ".orig" code. */
if (*dt & ADDED_HTML_EXTENSION)
downloaded_file(FILE_DOWNLOADED_AND_HTML_EXTENSION_ADDED, locf);
else
downloaded_file(FILE_DOWNLOADED_NORMALLY, locf);
xfree(filename_plus_orig_suffix); /* must precede every return! */
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return RETROK;
}
else if (hstat.res == 0) /* No read error */
{
if (hstat.contlen == -1) /* We don't know how much we were supposed
to get, so assume we succeeded. */
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{
if (*dt & RETROKF)
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE,
_("%s (%s) - `%s' saved [%ld]\n\n"),
tms, tmrate, locf, hstat.len);
logprintf (LOG_NONVERBOSE,
"%s URL:%s [%ld] -> \"%s\" [%d]\n",
tms, u->url, hstat.len, locf, count);
}
++opt.numurls;
downloaded_increase (hstat.len);
/* Remember that we downloaded the file for later ".orig" code. */
if (*dt & ADDED_HTML_EXTENSION)
downloaded_file(FILE_DOWNLOADED_AND_HTML_EXTENSION_ADDED, locf);
else
downloaded_file(FILE_DOWNLOADED_NORMALLY, locf);
xfree (filename_plus_orig_suffix); /* must precede every return! */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return RETROK;
}
else if (hstat.len < hstat.contlen) /* meaning we lost the
connection too soon */
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE,
_("%s (%s) - Connection closed at byte %ld. "),
tms, tmrate, hstat.len);
printwhat (count, opt.ntry);
continue;
}
else if (!opt.kill_longer) /* meaning we got more than expected */
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE,
_("%s (%s) - `%s' saved [%ld/%ld])\n\n"),
tms, tmrate, locf, hstat.len, hstat.contlen);
logprintf (LOG_NONVERBOSE,
"%s URL:%s [%ld/%ld] -> \"%s\" [%d]\n",
tms, u->url, hstat.len, hstat.contlen, locf, count);
++opt.numurls;
downloaded_increase (hstat.len);
/* Remember that we downloaded the file for later ".orig" code. */
if (*dt & ADDED_HTML_EXTENSION)
downloaded_file(FILE_DOWNLOADED_AND_HTML_EXTENSION_ADDED, locf);
else
downloaded_file(FILE_DOWNLOADED_NORMALLY, locf);
xfree (filename_plus_orig_suffix); /* must precede every return! */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return RETROK;
}
else /* the same, but not accepted */
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE,
_("%s (%s) - Connection closed at byte %ld/%ld. "),
tms, tmrate, hstat.len, hstat.contlen);
printwhat (count, opt.ntry);
continue;
}
}
else /* now hstat.res can only be -1 */
{
if (hstat.contlen == -1)
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE,
_("%s (%s) - Read error at byte %ld (%s)."),
tms, tmrate, hstat.len, strerror (errno));
printwhat (count, opt.ntry);
continue;
}
else /* hstat.res == -1 and contlen is given */
{
logprintf (LOG_VERBOSE,
_("%s (%s) - Read error at byte %ld/%ld (%s). "),
tms, tmrate, hstat.len, hstat.contlen,
strerror (errno));
printwhat (count, opt.ntry);
continue;
}
}
/* not reached */
break;
}
while (!opt.ntry || (count < opt.ntry));
xfree (filename_plus_orig_suffix); /* must precede every return! */
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return TRYLIMEXC;
}
/* Converts struct tm to time_t, assuming the data in tm is UTC rather
than local timezone (mktime assumes the latter).
Contributed by Roger Beeman <beeman@cisco.com>, with the help of
Mark Baushke <mdb@cisco.com> and the rest of the Gurus at CISCO. */
static time_t
mktime_from_utc (struct tm *t)
{
time_t tl, tb;
tl = mktime (t);
if (tl == -1)
return -1;
tb = mktime (gmtime (&tl));
return (tl <= tb ? (tl + (tl - tb)) : (tl - (tb - tl)));
}
/* Check whether the result of strptime() indicates success.
strptime() returns the pointer to how far it got to in the string.
The processing has been successful if the string is at `GMT' or
`+X', or at the end of the string.
In extended regexp parlance, the function returns 1 if P matches
"^ *(GMT|[+-][0-9]|$)", 0 otherwise. P being NULL (a valid result of
strptime()) is considered a failure and 0 is returned. */
static int
2000-11-20 05:25:28 -05:00
check_end (const char *p)
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{
if (!p)
return 0;
while (ISSPACE (*p))
++p;
if (!*p
|| (p[0] == 'G' && p[1] == 'M' && p[2] == 'T')
|| ((p[0] == '+' || p[0] == '-') && ISDIGIT (p[1])))
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return 1;
else
return 0;
}
/* Convert TIME_STRING time to time_t. TIME_STRING can be in any of
the three formats RFC2068 allows the HTTP servers to emit --
RFC1123-date, RFC850-date or asctime-date. Timezones are ignored,
and should be GMT.
We use strptime() to recognize various dates, which makes it a
little bit slacker than the RFC1123/RFC850/asctime (e.g. it always
allows shortened dates and months, one-digit days, etc.). It also
allows more than one space anywhere where the specs require one SP.
The routine should probably be even more forgiving (as recommended
by RFC2068), but I do not have the time to write one.
Return the computed time_t representation, or -1 if all the
schemes fail.
Needless to say, what we *really* need here is something like
Marcus Hennecke's atotm(), which is forgiving, fast, to-the-point,
and does not use strptime(). atotm() is to be found in the sources
of `phttpd', a little-known HTTP server written by Peter Erikson. */
2001-04-08 18:25:24 -04:00
time_t
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
http_atotm (char *time_string)
{
struct tm t;
/* Roger Beeman says: "This function dynamically allocates struct tm
t, but does no initialization. The only field that actually
needs initialization is tm_isdst, since the others will be set by
strptime. Since strptime does not set tm_isdst, it will return
the data structure with whatever data was in tm_isdst to begin
with. For those of us in timezones where DST can occur, there
can be a one hour shift depending on the previous contents of the
data area where the data structure is allocated." */
t.tm_isdst = -1;
/* Note that under foreign locales Solaris strptime() fails to
recognize English dates, which renders this function useless. I
assume that other non-GNU strptime's are plagued by the same
disease. We solve this by setting only LC_MESSAGES in
i18n_initialize(), instead of LC_ALL.
Another solution could be to temporarily set locale to C, invoke
strptime(), and restore it back. This is slow and dirty,
however, and locale support other than LC_MESSAGES can mess other
things, so I rather chose to stick with just setting LC_MESSAGES.
Also note that none of this is necessary under GNU strptime(),
because it recognizes both international and local dates. */
/* NOTE: We don't use `%n' for white space, as OSF's strptime uses
it to eat all white space up to (and including) a newline, and
the function fails if there is no newline (!).
Let's hope all strptime() implementations use ` ' to skip *all*
whitespace instead of just one (it works that way on all the
systems I've tested it on). */
/* RFC1123: Thu, 29 Jan 1998 22:12:57 */
if (check_end (strptime (time_string, "%a, %d %b %Y %T", &t)))
return mktime_from_utc (&t);
/* RFC850: Thursday, 29-Jan-98 22:12:57 */
if (check_end (strptime (time_string, "%A, %d-%b-%y %T", &t)))
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
return mktime_from_utc (&t);
2001-04-08 18:25:24 -04:00
/* pseudo-RFC850: Thu, 29-Jan-1998 22:12:57
(google.com uses this for their cookies.)*/
if (check_end (strptime (time_string, "%a, %d-%b-%Y %T", &t)))
return mktime_from_utc (&t);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
/* asctime: Thu Jan 29 22:12:57 1998 */
if (check_end (strptime (time_string, "%a %b %d %T %Y", &t)))
return mktime_from_utc (&t);
/* Failure. */
return -1;
}
/* Authorization support: We support two authorization schemes:
* `Basic' scheme, consisting of base64-ing USER:PASSWORD string;
* `Digest' scheme, added by Junio Hamano <junio@twinsun.com>,
consisting of answering to the server's challenge with the proper
MD5 digests. */
/* How many bytes it will take to store LEN bytes in base64. */
#define BASE64_LENGTH(len) (4 * (((len) + 2) / 3))
/* Encode the string S of length LENGTH to base64 format and place it
to STORE. STORE will be 0-terminated, and must point to a writable
buffer of at least 1+BASE64_LENGTH(length) bytes. */
static void
base64_encode (const char *s, char *store, int length)
{
/* Conversion table. */
static char tbl[64] = {
'A','B','C','D','E','F','G','H',
'I','J','K','L','M','N','O','P',
'Q','R','S','T','U','V','W','X',
'Y','Z','a','b','c','d','e','f',
'g','h','i','j','k','l','m','n',
'o','p','q','r','s','t','u','v',
'w','x','y','z','0','1','2','3',
'4','5','6','7','8','9','+','/'
};
int i;
unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)store;
/* Transform the 3x8 bits to 4x6 bits, as required by base64. */
for (i = 0; i < length; i += 3)
{
*p++ = tbl[s[0] >> 2];
*p++ = tbl[((s[0] & 3) << 4) + (s[1] >> 4)];
*p++ = tbl[((s[1] & 0xf) << 2) + (s[2] >> 6)];
*p++ = tbl[s[2] & 0x3f];
s += 3;
}
/* Pad the result if necessary... */
if (i == length + 1)
*(p - 1) = '=';
else if (i == length + 2)
*(p - 1) = *(p - 2) = '=';
/* ...and zero-terminate it. */
*p = '\0';
}
/* Create the authentication header contents for the `Basic' scheme.
This is done by encoding the string `USER:PASS' in base64 and
prepending `HEADER: Basic ' to it. */
static char *
basic_authentication_encode (const char *user, const char *passwd,
const char *header)
{
char *t1, *t2, *res;
int len1 = strlen (user) + 1 + strlen (passwd);
int len2 = BASE64_LENGTH (len1);
t1 = (char *)alloca (len1 + 1);
sprintf (t1, "%s:%s", user, passwd);
t2 = (char *)alloca (1 + len2);
base64_encode (t1, t2, len1);
res = (char *)xmalloc (len2 + 11 + strlen (header));
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
sprintf (res, "%s: Basic %s\r\n", header, t2);
return res;
}
#ifdef USE_DIGEST
/* Parse HTTP `WWW-Authenticate:' header. AU points to the beginning
of a field in such a header. If the field is the one specified by
ATTR_NAME ("realm", "opaque", and "nonce" are used by the current
digest authorization code), extract its value in the (char*)
variable pointed by RET. Returns negative on a malformed header,
or number of bytes that have been parsed by this call. */
static int
extract_header_attr (const char *au, const char *attr_name, char **ret)
{
const char *cp, *ep;
ep = cp = au;
if (strncmp (cp, attr_name, strlen (attr_name)) == 0)
{
cp += strlen (attr_name);
if (!*cp)
return -1;
cp += skip_lws (cp);
if (*cp != '=')
return -1;
if (!*++cp)
return -1;
cp += skip_lws (cp);
if (*cp != '\"')
return -1;
if (!*++cp)
return -1;
for (ep = cp; *ep && *ep != '\"'; ep++)
;
if (!*ep)
return -1;
FREE_MAYBE (*ret);
*ret = strdupdelim (cp, ep);
return ep - au + 1;
}
else
return 0;
}
/* Dump the hexadecimal representation of HASH to BUF. HASH should be
an array of 16 bytes containing the hash keys, and BUF should be a
buffer of 33 writable characters (32 for hex digits plus one for
zero termination). */
static void
dump_hash (unsigned char *buf, const unsigned char *hash)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < MD5_HASHLEN; i++, hash++)
{
*buf++ = XDIGIT_TO_xchar (*hash >> 4);
*buf++ = XDIGIT_TO_xchar (*hash & 0xf);
1999-12-02 02:42:23 -05:00
}
*buf = '\0';
}
/* Take the line apart to find the challenge, and compose a digest
authorization header. See RFC2069 section 2.1.2. */
char *
digest_authentication_encode (const char *au, const char *user,
const char *passwd, const char *method,
const char *path)
{
static char *realm, *opaque, *nonce;
static struct {
const char *name;
char **variable;
} options[] = {
{ "realm", &realm },
{ "opaque", &opaque },
{ "nonce", &nonce }
};
char *res;
realm = opaque = nonce = NULL;
au += 6; /* skip over `Digest' */
while (*au)
{
int i;
au += skip_lws (au);
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE (options); i++)
{
int skip = extract_header_attr (au, options[i].name,
options[i].variable);
if (skip < 0)
{
FREE_MAYBE (realm);
FREE_MAYBE (opaque);
FREE_MAYBE (nonce);
return NULL;
}
else if (skip)
{
au += skip;
break;
}
}
if (i == ARRAY_SIZE (options))
{
while (*au && *au != '=')
au++;
if (*au && *++au)
{
au += skip_lws (au);
if (*au == '\"')
{
au++;
while (*au && *au != '\"')
au++;
if (*au)
au++;
}
}
}
while (*au && *au != ',')
au++;
if (*au)
au++;
}
if (!realm || !nonce || !user || !passwd || !path || !method)
{
FREE_MAYBE (realm);
FREE_MAYBE (opaque);
FREE_MAYBE (nonce);
return NULL;
}
/* Calculate the digest value. */
{
struct md5_ctx ctx;
unsigned char hash[MD5_HASHLEN];
unsigned char a1buf[MD5_HASHLEN * 2 + 1], a2buf[MD5_HASHLEN * 2 + 1];
unsigned char response_digest[MD5_HASHLEN * 2 + 1];
/* A1BUF = H(user ":" realm ":" password) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes (user, strlen (user), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes (":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes (realm, strlen (realm), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes (":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes (passwd, strlen (passwd), &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (a1buf, hash);
/* A2BUF = H(method ":" path) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes (method, strlen (method), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes (":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes (path, strlen (path), &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (a2buf, hash);
/* RESPONSE_DIGEST = H(A1BUF ":" nonce ":" A2BUF) */
md5_init_ctx (&ctx);
md5_process_bytes (a1buf, MD5_HASHLEN * 2, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes (":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes (nonce, strlen (nonce), &ctx);
md5_process_bytes (":", 1, &ctx);
md5_process_bytes (a2buf, MD5_HASHLEN * 2, &ctx);
md5_finish_ctx (&ctx, hash);
dump_hash (response_digest, hash);
res = (char*) xmalloc (strlen (user)
+ strlen (user)
+ strlen (realm)
+ strlen (nonce)
+ strlen (path)
+ 2 * MD5_HASHLEN /*strlen (response_digest)*/
+ (opaque ? strlen (opaque) : 0)
+ 128);
sprintf (res, "Authorization: Digest \
username=\"%s\", realm=\"%s\", nonce=\"%s\", uri=\"%s\", response=\"%s\"",
user, realm, nonce, path, response_digest);
if (opaque)
{
char *p = res + strlen (res);
strcat (p, ", opaque=\"");
strcat (p, opaque);
strcat (p, "\"");
}
strcat (res, "\r\n");
}
return res;
}
#endif /* USE_DIGEST */
#define BEGINS_WITH(line, string_constant) \
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(!strncasecmp (line, string_constant, sizeof (string_constant) - 1) \
&& (ISSPACE (line[sizeof (string_constant) - 1]) \
|| !line[sizeof (string_constant) - 1]))
static int
known_authentication_scheme_p (const char *au)
{
return BEGINS_WITH (au, "Basic")
|| BEGINS_WITH (au, "Digest")
|| BEGINS_WITH (au, "NTLM");
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}
#undef BEGINS_WITH
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/* Create the HTTP authorization request header. When the
`WWW-Authenticate' response header is seen, according to the
authorization scheme specified in that header (`Basic' and `Digest'
are supported by the current implementation), produce an
appropriate HTTP authorization request header. */
static char *
create_authorization_line (const char *au, const char *user,
const char *passwd, const char *method,
const char *path)
{
char *wwwauth = NULL;
if (!strncasecmp (au, "Basic", 5))
wwwauth = basic_authentication_encode (user, passwd, "Authorization");
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if (!strncasecmp (au, "NTLM", 4))
wwwauth = basic_authentication_encode (user, passwd, "Authorization");
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#ifdef USE_DIGEST
else if (!strncasecmp (au, "Digest", 6))
wwwauth = digest_authentication_encode (au, user, passwd, method, path);
#endif /* USE_DIGEST */
return wwwauth;
}