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version 1.7.2.3 - CVE-2014-0019: fixed PROXY-CONNECT address overflow

This commit is contained in:
Gerhard Rieger 2014-01-25 17:44:55 +01:00
parent 022f0a46e6
commit 7a348bdfd5
4 changed files with 71 additions and 6 deletions

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@ -1,4 +1,11 @@
####################### V 1.7.2.3:
security:
CVE-2014-0019: socats PROXY-CONNECT address was vulnerable to a buffer
overflow with data from command line (see socat-secadv5.txt)
Credits to Florian Weimer of the Red Hat Product Security Team
####################### V 1.7.2.2:
security:

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@ -1 +1 @@
"1.7.2.2"
"1.7.2.3"

53
test.sh
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@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ withroot=0 # perform privileged tests even if not run by root
#SOCAT_EGD="egd=/dev/egd-pool"
MISCDELAY=1
[ -z "$SOCAT" ] && SOCAT="./socat"
if [ ! -x "$SOCAT" ]; then
echo "$SOCAT does not exist" >&2; exit 1;
fi
[ -z "$PROCAN" ] && PROCAN="./procan"
[ -z "$FILAN" ] && FILAN="./filan"
opts="$opt_t $OPTS"
@ -10876,6 +10879,56 @@ esac
PORT=$((PORT+1))
N=$((N+1))
if false; then # this overflow is not reliably reproducable
# socat up to 2.0.0-b6 did not check the length of the PROXY-CONNECT command line paramters when copying them into the HTTP request buffer. This could lead to a buffer overflow.
NAME=PROXY_ADDR_OVFL
case "$TESTS" in
*%functions%*|*%bugs%*|*%security%*|*%socket%*|*%$NAME%*)
TEST="$NAME: proxy address parameters overflow"
# invoke socat PROXY-CONNECT with long proxy server and target server names. If it terminates with exit code >= 128 it is vulnerable
# However, even if vulnerable it often does not crash. Therefore we try to use a boundary check program like ElectricFence; only with its help we can tell that clean run proofs absence of vulnerability
if ! eval $NUMCOND; then :; else
tf="$td/test$N.stdout"
te="$td/test$N.stderr"
tdiff="$td/test$N.diff"
da="test$N $(date) $RANDOM"
EF=; for p in ef; do
if type ef >/dev/null 2>&1; then
EF="ef "; break
fi
done
CMD0="$SOCAT $opts TCP-LISTEN:$PORT,reuseaddr FILE:/dev/null"
#CMD1="$EF $SOCAT $opts FILE:/dev/null PROXY-CONNECT:$(perl -e "print 'A' x 256"):$(perl -e "print 'A' x 256"):80"
CMD1="$EF $SOCAT $opts FILE:/dev/null PROXY-CONNECT:localhost:$(perl -e "print 'A' x 384"):80,proxyport=$PORT"
printf "test $F_n $TEST... " $N
$CMD0 >/dev/null 2>"${te}0" &
pid0=$!
waittcp4port $PORT 1
$CMD1 >/dev/null 2>"${te}1"
rc1=$?
if [ $rc1 -lt 128 ]; then
if [ "$EF" ]; then
$PRINTF "$OK\n"
numOK=$((numOK+1))
else
$PRINTF "$UNKNOWN $RED(install ElectricFEnce!)$NORMAL\n"
numCANT=$((num+1))
fi
else
$PRINTF "$FAILED\n"
echo "$CMD1"
cat "${te}"
numFAIL=$((numFAIL+1))
fi
fi # NUMCOND
;;
esac
PORT=$((PORT+1))
N=$((N+1))
fi # false
###############################################################################
# here come tests that might affect your systems integrity. Put normal tests
# before this paragraph.

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@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/* source: xio-proxy.c */
/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger 2002-2011 */
/* Copyright Gerhard Rieger */
/* Published under the GNU General Public License V.2, see file COPYING */
/* this file contains the source for opening addresses of HTTP proxy CONNECT
@ -275,8 +275,9 @@ int _xioopen_proxy_connect(struct single *xfd,
struct proxyvars *proxyvars,
int level) {
size_t offset;
char request[CONNLEN];
char buff[BUFLEN+1];
char request[CONNLEN]; /* HTTP connection request line */
int rv;
char buff[BUFLEN+1]; /* for receiving HTTP reply headers */
#if CONNLEN > BUFLEN
#error not enough buffer space
#endif
@ -286,8 +287,12 @@ int _xioopen_proxy_connect(struct single *xfd,
ssize_t sresult;
/* generate proxy request header - points to final target */
sprintf(request, "CONNECT %s:%u HTTP/1.0\r\n",
proxyvars->targetaddr, proxyvars->targetport);
rv = snprintf(request, CONNLEN, "CONNECT %s:%u HTTP/1.0\r\n",
proxyvars->targetaddr, proxyvars->targetport);
if (rv >= CONNLEN || rv < 0) {
Error("_xioopen_proxy_connect(): PROXY CONNECT buffer too small");
return -1;
}
/* send proxy CONNECT request (target addr+port) */
* xiosanitize(request, strlen(request), textbuff) = '\0';