Browse Source

Practically rewrite all of pegh.c to operate on streams supporting unlimited length files

ci
Travis Burtrum 2 years ago
parent
commit
3ada2a29dd
4 changed files with 381 additions and 184 deletions
  1. +1
    -0
      .gitignore
  2. +24
    -4
      README.md
  3. +325
    -174
      pegh.c
  4. +31
    -6
      test.sh

+ 1
- 0
.gitignore View File

@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
pegh
pegh.exe
bla.txt

+ 24
- 4
README.md View File

@ -14,6 +14,12 @@ pegh -e SUPER_SECRET_1942 <file.txt >file.txt.pegh
# decrypt file.txt.pegh to file.txt with password SUPER_SECRET_1942
pegh -d SUPER_SECRET_1942 <file.txt.pegh >file.txt
# make enrypted backup
tar czv -C /path/to/dir/ . | pegh SUPER_SECRET_1942 -o foo.tar.gz.pegh
# extract encrypted backup
pegh SUPER_SECRET_1942 -d -i foo.tar.gz.pegh | tar xzv
```
The easiest way to scale cost/time it takes for bruteforcing is simply to continue doubling -s, on both encryption and decryption commands.
@ -21,9 +27,18 @@ The easiest way to scale cost/time it takes for bruteforcing is simply to contin
full help:
```
$ pegh -h
usage: pegh [-demNrpshV] password
-e encrypt stdin to stdout, default mode
-d decrypt stdin to stdout
usage: pegh [options...] password
-e encrypt input to output, default mode
-d decrypt input to output
-i <filename> file to use for input, default stdin
-o <filename> file to use for output, if set and there is an error and append
is not set, we try to delete this file before exiting,
default stdout
-a append to -o instead of truncate
-b <max_mb> maximum megabytes of ram to use per read/write buffer, so while
decrypting/encrypting twice this will be used, but these are
only allocated after scrypt is finished so max usage will be
the highest of these only, not both combined, default: 16
-m <max_mb> maximum megabytes of ram to use when deriving key from password
with scrypt, applies for encryption AND decryption, must
almost linearly scale with -N, if too low operation will fail,
@ -34,8 +49,10 @@ usage: pegh [-demNrpshV] password
-p <num> scrypt parameter p, only applies for encryption, default 1
-s <num> multiplication factor to apply to both -N and -m for easy
work scaling, rounded up to the next highest power of 2,
BEWARE: -s 32 requires 2G ram, -s 64 requires 4G and so on,
default: 1
-h print this usage text
-q do not print error output to stderr
-V show version number and format version support then quit
For additional info on scrypt params refer to:
@ -63,4 +80,7 @@ Version 0, scrypt key derivation, aes-256-gcm encryption, 51 byte header, 16 byt
License
-------
AGPLv3 for now, message me if you have a problem with this
pegh.c: AGPLv3 for now, message me if you have a problem with this
documentation/file format: consider this your choice of MIT, Apache 2, or public domain

+ 325
- 174
pegh.c View File

@ -39,9 +39,8 @@
#define SCRYPT_P 1
#define SCRYPT_MAX_MEM_MB 64
/* tweak initial read buffer size/reads here */
#define BYTES_PER_READ (1024 * 32) /* 32kb */
#define INITIAL_BUFFER_SIZE (1024 * 256) /* 256kb, must be at least 2*BYTES_PER_READ */
/* tweak buffer sizes here, memory use will be twice this */
#define BUFFER_SIZE_MB 16
/*
* pegh file format, numbers are inclusive 0-based byte array indices
@ -68,7 +67,8 @@
#define PEGH_VERSION "1.0.0"
#define KEY_LEN 32 /* 256 bit key required for AES-256 */
/* 256 bit key required for AES-256 */
#define KEY_LEN 32
/* 1 for file format version, 4 for N, 1 for r, 1 for p */
#define PRE_SALT_LEN 7
@ -80,31 +80,43 @@
#define SALT_IV_LEN (SALT_LEN+IV_LEN)
#define OVERHEAD_LEN (PRE_SALT_LEN+SALT_IV_LEN+GCM_TAG_LEN)
/*
* reads buffer_size at a time from in, encrypts with AES-256-GCM, and writes them to out
*
* returns 1 on success, 0 on failure
*
* these will be read from:
* plaintext
* plaintext_len
* key must be length KEY_LEN
* iv must be length IV_LEN
*
* these will be written into:
* ciphertext must have the capacity of at least plaintext_len
* tag must have the capacity of at least GCM_TAG_LEN
* buffer_size must be non-zero, this function will allocate this twice
* in/out must be set
* err can be NULL in which case no messages are printed
*/
int gcm_encrypt(unsigned char *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len,
unsigned char *key,
unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *ciphertext,
unsigned char *tag)
int gcm_encrypt(const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, size_t buffer_size,
FILE *in, FILE *out, FILE *err
)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
int len, ret = 0;
/* these are actually mallocd and freed */
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
unsigned char *plaintext = NULL, *ciphertext = NULL;
int exit_code = 0, ciphertext_written;
size_t plaintext_read;
do {
plaintext = malloc(buffer_size);
if(!plaintext) {
if(NULL != err)
fprintf(err, "plaintext memory allocation failed\n");
break;
}
ciphertext = malloc(buffer_size);
if(!ciphertext) {
if(NULL != err)
fprintf(err, "ciphertext memory allocation failed\n");
break;
}
/* Create and initialise the context */
if(!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()))
break;
@ -114,7 +126,7 @@ int gcm_encrypt(unsigned char *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len,
break;
/* Setting IV length is not necessary because the default of 12 bytes (96 bits) will be used
if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, IV_LEN, NULL))
if(1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, IV_LEN, NULL))
break;
*/
@ -125,232 +137,312 @@ int gcm_encrypt(unsigned char *plaintext, size_t plaintext_len,
/*
* Provide the message to be encrypted, and obtain the encrypted output.
* EVP_EncryptUpdate can be called multiple times if necessary
*
*/
if(1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &len, plaintext, plaintext_len))
break;
while ((plaintext_read = fread(plaintext, 1, buffer_size, in)) > 0) {
if(1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertext, &ciphertext_written, plaintext, plaintext_read))
goto fail;
if(((size_t) ciphertext_written) != plaintext_read) {
if(NULL != err)
fprintf(err, "ciphertext_written (%d) != plaintext_read (%lu)\n", ciphertext_written, (unsigned long) plaintext_read);
goto fail;
}
fwrite(ciphertext, 1, ciphertext_written, out);
}
/*
* Finalise the encryption. Normally ciphertext bytes may be written at
* this stage, but this does not occur in GCM mode
*/
if(1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ciphertext + len, &len))
if(1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, NULL, &ciphertext_written))
break;
/* Get the tag, go ahead and re-use ciphertext as it's not needed anymore */
if(1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, GCM_TAG_LEN, ciphertext))
break;
/* Get the tag */
ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, GCM_TAG_LEN, tag);
fwrite(ciphertext, 1, GCM_TAG_LEN, out);
/* success! */
exit_code = 1;
} while(0);
fail:
if(plaintext)
free(plaintext);
if(ciphertext)
free(ciphertext);
/* Clean up */
if(ctx)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
if(NULL != err && exit_code != 1) {
/* print openssl errors */
ERR_print_errors_fp(err);
fprintf(err, "encryption failed\n");
}
return exit_code;
}
/*
* reads buffer_size at a time from out, decrypts with AES-256-GCM, and writes them to out
*
* assumes the GCM authentication tag is the last 16 bytes and checks that too, it's the
* responsibility of the calling function to then go back in time and not use the invalid
* bytes already written to out...
*
* returns 1 on success, 0 on failure
*
* these will be read from:
* ciphertext
* ciphertext_len
* key must be length KEY_LEN
* iv must be length IV_LEN
* tag must be length GCM_TAG_LEN
*
* these will be written into:
* plaintext must have the capacity of at least ciphertext_len
* buffer_size must be non-zero, this function will allocate this twice + 16 bytes for tag
* in/out must be set
* err can be NULL in which case no messages are printed
*/
int gcm_decrypt(unsigned char *ciphertext, size_t ciphertext_len,
unsigned char *key,
unsigned char *iv,
unsigned char *tag,
unsigned char *plaintext)
int gcm_decrypt(const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, size_t buffer_size,
FILE *in, FILE *out, FILE *err
)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
int len, ret = 0;
/* these are actually mallocd and freed */
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
unsigned char *plaintext = NULL, *ciphertext = NULL;
/* these are simply pointers into ciphertext */
unsigned char *tag, *ciphertext_read_zone;
int exit_code = 0, plaintext_written;
size_t ciphertext_read;
do {
plaintext = malloc(buffer_size);
if(!plaintext) {
if(NULL != err)
fprintf(err, "plaintext memory allocation failed\n");
break;
}
ciphertext = malloc(buffer_size + GCM_TAG_LEN);
if(!ciphertext) {
if(NULL != err)
fprintf(err, "ciphertext memory allocation failed\n");
break;
}
tag = ciphertext;
ciphertext_read_zone = ciphertext + GCM_TAG_LEN;
/* there must be *at least* 16 byte gcm tag / footer */
ciphertext_read = fread(tag, 1, GCM_TAG_LEN, in);
if(ciphertext_read != GCM_TAG_LEN) {
if(NULL != err)
fprintf(err, "File too small for decryption, no footer/tag?\n");
break;
}
/* Create and initialise the context */
if(!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()))
break;
/* Initialise the decryption operation. */
if(!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL))
if(1 != EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL))
break;
/* Setting IV length is not necessary because the default of 12 bytes (96 bits) will be used
if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, IV_LEN, NULL))
if(1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IVLEN, IV_LEN, NULL))
break;
*/
/* Initialise key and IV */
if(!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv))
if(1 != EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, iv))
break;
/*
* Provide the message to be decrypted, and obtain the plaintext output.
* EVP_DecryptUpdate can be called multiple times if necessary
*/
if(!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, plaintext, &len, ciphertext, ciphertext_len))
break;
do {
ciphertext_read = fread(ciphertext_read_zone, 1, buffer_size, in);
/* decrypt the bytes previously saved in tag plus ones currently read except the last 16 bytes */
if(1 != EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, plaintext, &plaintext_written, tag, ciphertext_read))
goto fail;
/* now save the unused last 16 bytes in tag */
memcpy(tag, ciphertext_read_zone + ciphertext_read - GCM_TAG_LEN, GCM_TAG_LEN);
if(((size_t) plaintext_written) != ciphertext_read) {
if(NULL != err)
fprintf(err, "plaintext_written (%d) != plaintext_read (%lu)\n", plaintext_written, (unsigned long) ciphertext_read);
goto fail;
}
fwrite(plaintext, 1, plaintext_written, out);
} while(buffer_size == ciphertext_read);
/* Set expected tag value. Works in OpenSSL 1.0.1d and later */
if(!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, GCM_TAG_LEN, tag))
if(1 != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, GCM_TAG_LEN, ciphertext))
break;
/*
* Finalise the decryption. A return value of 1 indicates success,
* return value of 0 is a failure - the plaintext is not trustworthy.
*/
ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, plaintext + len, &len);
if(1 != EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, NULL, &plaintext_written)) {
if(NULL != err)
fprintf(err, "integrity check failed\n");
break;
}
/* success! */
exit_code = 1;
} while(0);
fail:
if(plaintext)
free(plaintext);
if(ciphertext)
free(ciphertext);
/* Clean up */
if(ctx)
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
if(NULL != err && exit_code != 1) {
/* print openssl errors */
ERR_print_errors_fp(err);
fprintf(err, "decryption failed\n");
}
return exit_code;
}
/* returns 0 on success, 1 on openssl failure, 2 on other failure */
int pegh(char *password, int decrypt,
/* returns 1 on success, 0 on error */
int scrypt_derive_key(char *password,
uint32_t scrypt_max_mem_mb, uint32_t N,
uint8_t r, uint8_t p)
{
unsigned char key[KEY_LEN] = {0};
/* these are actually mallocd and freed */
unsigned char *in_buffer, *out_buffer = NULL;
/* these are simply pointers into the above */
unsigned char *salt, *iv, *ciphertext, *plaintext, *tag;
int exit_code = 2;
size_t read, in_buffer_len = 0, out_buffer_len, in_buffer_allocd_size = INITIAL_BUFFER_SIZE;
in_buffer = malloc(in_buffer_allocd_size);
if(!in_buffer) {
fprintf(stderr, "in_buffer memory allocation failed\n");
return exit_code;
uint8_t r, uint8_t p, unsigned char *salt, unsigned char *key, FILE *err) {
/* derive key using salt, password, and scrypt parameters */
if (EVP_PBE_scrypt(
password, strlen(password),
salt, SALT_LEN,
(uint64_t) N, (uint64_t) r, (uint64_t) p,
(uint64_t) scrypt_max_mem_mb * 1024 * 1024,
key, KEY_LEN
) <= 0) {
if(NULL != err) {
fprintf(err, "scrypt key derivation error\n");
ERR_print_errors_fp(err);
}
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
while ((read = fread(in_buffer + in_buffer_len, 1, BYTES_PER_READ, stdin)) > 0) {
in_buffer_len += read;
if ((in_buffer_len + BYTES_PER_READ) > in_buffer_allocd_size) {
in_buffer_allocd_size = in_buffer_allocd_size * 1.5;
in_buffer = realloc(in_buffer, in_buffer_allocd_size);
if(!in_buffer) {
fprintf(stderr, "in_buffer memory reallocation failed\n");
return exit_code;
}
/* returns 1 on success, 0 on failure */
int pegh_encrypt(char *password,
uint32_t scrypt_max_mem_mb, size_t buffer_size,
FILE *in, FILE *out, FILE *err,
uint32_t N, uint8_t r, uint8_t p)
{
unsigned char key[KEY_LEN] = {0}, salt[SALT_IV_LEN] = {0};
/* this is simply a pointer into salt */
const unsigned char *iv = salt + SALT_LEN;
/* first write the version and parameters */
salt[0] = 0;
salt[1] = (N >> 24) & 0xFF;
salt[2] = (N >> 16) & 0xFF;
salt[3] = (N >> 8) & 0xFF;
salt[4] = N & 0xFF;
salt[5] = r;
salt[6] = p;
fwrite(salt, 1, PRE_SALT_LEN, out);
/* generate random salt+iv, then write it out */
if (RAND_bytes(salt, SALT_IV_LEN) <= 0) {
if(NULL != err) {
fprintf(err, "random salt+iv generation error\n");
ERR_print_errors_fp(err);
}
return 0;
}
fwrite(salt, 1, SALT_IV_LEN, out);
do {
if (in_buffer_len <= (decrypt ? OVERHEAD_LEN : 0)) {
fprintf(stderr, "File too small for %scryption\n", decrypt ? "de" : "en");
break;
}
if(1 != scrypt_derive_key(password, scrypt_max_mem_mb, N, r, p, salt, key, err))
return 0;
out_buffer_len = decrypt ? (in_buffer_len - OVERHEAD_LEN) : (in_buffer_len + OVERHEAD_LEN);
out_buffer = malloc(out_buffer_len);
if(!out_buffer) {
fprintf(stderr, "out_buffer memory allocation failed\n");
break;
}
return gcm_encrypt(key, iv, buffer_size, in, out, err);
}
if(decrypt) {
if(in_buffer[0] != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "unsupported file format version %d, we only support version 0\n", in_buffer[0]);
break;
}
N = ((in_buffer[1] & 0xFF) << 24)
| ((in_buffer[2] & 0xFF) << 16)
| ((in_buffer[3] & 0xFF) << 8)
| (in_buffer[4] & 0xFF);
r = in_buffer[5];
p = in_buffer[6];
salt = in_buffer + PRE_SALT_LEN;
iv = salt + SALT_LEN;
ciphertext = iv + IV_LEN;
tag = ciphertext + out_buffer_len;
plaintext = out_buffer;
} else {
out_buffer[0] = 0;
out_buffer[1] = (N >> 24) & 0xFF;
out_buffer[2] = (N >> 16) & 0xFF;
out_buffer[3] = (N >> 8) & 0xFF;
out_buffer[4] = N & 0xFF;
out_buffer[5] = r;
out_buffer[6] = p;
salt = out_buffer + PRE_SALT_LEN;
/* generate random salt+iv */
if (RAND_bytes(salt, SALT_IV_LEN) <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "random salt+iv generation error\n");
exit_code = 1;
break;
}
iv = salt + SALT_LEN;
ciphertext = iv + IV_LEN;
tag = ciphertext + in_buffer_len;
plaintext = in_buffer;
}
/* returns 1 on success, 0 on failure */
int pegh_decrypt(char *password,
uint32_t scrypt_max_mem_mb, size_t buffer_size,
FILE *in, FILE *out, FILE *err)
{
unsigned char key[KEY_LEN] = {0}, salt[SALT_IV_LEN] = {0};
/* this is simply a pointer into salt */
const unsigned char *iv = salt + SALT_LEN;
/* https://commondatastorage.googleapis.com/chromium-boringssl-docs/evp.h.html#EVP_PBE_scrypt */
if (EVP_PBE_scrypt(
password, strlen(password),
salt, SALT_LEN,
(uint64_t) N, (uint64_t) r, (uint64_t) p,
(uint64_t) scrypt_max_mem_mb * 1024 * 1024,
key, KEY_LEN
) <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "scrypt key derivation error\n");
exit_code = 1;
break;
}
size_t header_read;
if(decrypt) {
if (1 != gcm_decrypt(ciphertext, out_buffer_len,
key, iv,
tag,
plaintext)) {
fprintf(stderr, "integrity check failed\n");
exit_code = 1;
break;
}
} else {
if (1 != gcm_encrypt(plaintext, in_buffer_len,
key, iv,
ciphertext, tag)) {
fprintf(stderr, "encryption failed\n");
exit_code = 1;
break;
}
}
/* success! */
fwrite(out_buffer, 1, out_buffer_len, stdout);
exit_code = 0;
} while(0);
uint32_t N;
uint8_t r, p;
if(in_buffer)
free(in_buffer);
if(out_buffer)
free(out_buffer);
/* first read the version and parameters */
header_read = fread(salt, 1, PRE_SALT_LEN, in);
if(header_read != PRE_SALT_LEN) {
if(NULL != err)
fprintf(err, "File too small for decryption, invalid header?\n");
return 0;
}
if(salt[0] != 0) {
if(NULL != err)
fprintf(err, "unsupported file format version %d, we only support version 0\n", salt[0]);
return 0;
}
N = ((salt[1] & 0xFF) << 24)
| ((salt[2] & 0xFF) << 16)
| ((salt[3] & 0xFF) << 8)
| (salt[4] & 0xFF);
r = salt[5];
p = salt[6];
/* next read salt+iv */
header_read = fread(salt, 1, SALT_IV_LEN, in);
if(header_read != SALT_IV_LEN) {
if(NULL != err)
fprintf(err, "File too small for decryption, invalid header?\n");
return 0;
}
/* print openssl errors */
if(exit_code == 1)
ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
if(1 != scrypt_derive_key(password, scrypt_max_mem_mb, N, r, p, salt, key, err))
return 0;
return exit_code;
return gcm_decrypt(key, iv, buffer_size, in, out, err);
}
int help(int exit_code) {
/* this ridiculous split is because C89 only supports strings of 509 characters */
fprintf(stderr, "\
usage: pegh [-demNrpshV] password\n\
-e encrypt stdin to stdout, default mode\n\
-d decrypt stdin to stdout\n\
usage: pegh [options...] password\n\
-e encrypt input to output, default mode\n\
-d decrypt input to output\n\
-i <filename> file to use for input, default stdin\n\
-o <filename> file to use for output, if set and there is an error and append\n\
is not set, we try to delete this file before exiting,\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\
default stdout\n\
-a append to -o instead of truncate\n\
-b <max_mb> maximum megabytes of ram to use per read/write buffer, so while\n\
decrypting/encrypting twice this will be used, but these are\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\
only allocated after scrypt is finished so max usage will be\n\
the highest of these only, not both combined, default: %d\n\
-m <max_mb> maximum megabytes of ram to use when deriving key from password\n\
with scrypt, applies for encryption AND decryption, must\n\
almost linearly scale with -N, if too low operation will fail,\n\
default: %d\n", SCRYPT_MAX_MEM_MB);
default: %d\n", BUFFER_SIZE_MB, SCRYPT_MAX_MEM_MB);
fprintf(stderr, "\
-N <num> scrypt parameter N, only applies for encryption, default %d\n\
this is rounded up to the next highest power of 2\n\
@ -362,6 +454,7 @@ usage: pegh [-demNrpshV] password\n\
BEWARE: -s 32 requires 2G ram, -s 64 requires 4G and so on,\n\
default: 1\n\
-h print this usage text\n\
-q do not print error output to stderr\n\
-V show version number and format version support then quit\n\
\nFor additional info on scrypt params refer to:\n\
https://blog.filippo.io/the-scrypt-parameters/\n\
@ -410,11 +503,14 @@ uint32_t next_highest_power_of_2(uint32_t v) {
/* returns 0 on success, 1 on openssl failure, 2 on other failure */
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int optind, decrypt = 0;
int optind, decrypt = 0, append = 0, exit_code = 2;
char *password = NULL;
uint32_t N = SCRYPT_N, scrypt_max_mem_mb = SCRYPT_MAX_MEM_MB, scale = 1;
uint32_t N = SCRYPT_N, scrypt_max_mem_mb = SCRYPT_MAX_MEM_MB, buffer_size_mb = BUFFER_SIZE_MB, scale = 1;
uint8_t r = SCRYPT_R, p = SCRYPT_P;
FILE *in = stdin, *out = stdout, *err = stderr;
char *in_filename = NULL, *out_filename = NULL;
for (optind = 1; optind < argc; ++optind) {
if(strlen(argv[optind]) == 2 && argv[optind][0] == '-') {
@ -431,6 +527,26 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
case 'd':
decrypt = 1;
break;
case 'a':
append = 1;
break;
case 'i':
if(++optind >= argc) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s requires an argument\n", argv[optind - 1]);
return help(2);
}
in_filename = argv[optind];
break;
case 'o':
if(++optind >= argc) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: %s requires an argument\n", argv[optind - 1]);
return help(2);
}
out_filename = argv[optind];
break;
case 'b':
buffer_size_mb = parse_int_arg(++optind, argc, argv);
break;
case 'm':
scrypt_max_mem_mb = parse_int_arg(++optind, argc, argv);
break;
@ -446,6 +562,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
case 'p':
p = parse_byte_arg(++optind, argc, argv);
break;
case 'q':
err = NULL;
break;
case 'V':
fprintf(stderr, "pegh %s\nformat versions supported: 0\n", PEGH_VERSION);
return 0;
@ -453,25 +572,25 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
return help(0);
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Error: invalid option %s\n", argv[optind]);
return help(2);
return help(exit_code);
}
} else if (password == NULL) {
password = argv[optind];
} else {
fprintf (stderr, "Error: more than one password provided\n");
return help(2);
return help(exit_code);
}
}
if(password == NULL) {
if(argc == optind) {
fprintf (stderr, "Error: no password provided\n");
return help(2);
return help(exit_code);
}
if((argc - optind) != 1) {
fprintf (stderr, "Error: more than one password provided\n");
return help(2);
return help(exit_code);
}
password = argv[optind];
}
@ -486,5 +605,37 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
return 0;
*/
return pegh(password, decrypt, scrypt_max_mem_mb, N, r, p);
if(NULL != in_filename) {
in = fopen(in_filename, "rb");
if(!in) {
fprintf (stderr, "Error: file '%s' cannot be opened for reading\n", in_filename);
return exit_code;
}
}
if(NULL != out_filename) {
out = fopen(out_filename, append ? "ab" : "wb");
if(!out) {
fprintf (stderr, "Error: file '%s' cannot be opened for writing\n", out_filename);
if(NULL != in_filename)
fclose(in);
return exit_code;
}
}
if(decrypt)
exit_code = pegh_decrypt(password, scrypt_max_mem_mb, 1024 * 1024 * buffer_size_mb, in, out, err);
else
exit_code = pegh_encrypt(password, scrypt_max_mem_mb, 1024 * 1024 * buffer_size_mb, in, out, err, N, r, p);
if(NULL != in_filename)
fclose(in);
if(NULL != out_filename) {
fclose(out);
/* attempt to stop programs from using incomplete/bad data */
if(exit_code != 1 && !append)
remove(out_filename);
}
/* to the OS, 0 means success, the above functions 1 means success */
return exit_code == 1 ? 0 : 1;
}

+ 31
- 6
test.sh View File

@ -1,20 +1,45 @@
#!/bin/bash
set -euo pipefail
# try different size files to encrypt/decrypt
[ -e /dev/shm/randombytes ] || dd if=/dev/urandom bs=1M count=100 of=/dev/shm/randombytes
# compile C and rust code this way
gcc pegh.c -lcrypto -O3 -o pegh
# try make if it's installed, otherwise fall back to cc
make || cc pegh.c -lcrypto -O3 -o pegh
#cargo build --release
export key=$(openssl rand -base64 20)
export key="$(openssl rand -base64 20)"
echo "key: $key"
test () {
bin=$1
tee >(md5sum 1>&2) < /dev/shm/randombytes | $bin -e $key | $bin -d $key | md5sum 1>&2
#$bin -e $key < /dev/shm/randombytes | $bin -d $key &>/dev/null
bin="$1"
echo 'encrypting then decrypting with the same key should succeed'
"$bin" -e "$key" < /dev/shm/randombytes | "$bin" -d "$key" | cmp - /dev/shm/randombytes
echo 'test with -s 32 requiring 2gb of ram should succeed'
# can send -s 32 or -m 2048 to decrypt command with identical effect
"$bin" -e "$key" -s 32 < /dev/shm/randombytes | "$bin" -d "$key" -m 2048 | cmp - /dev/shm/randombytes
set +e
# these should fail
echo 'encrypting with one key and decrypting with another should fail'
"$bin" -e "$key" -i /dev/shm/randombytes | "$bin" -d "$key-wrongkey" | cmp - /dev/shm/randombytes && echo "ERROR: appending -wrongkey to key somehow still worked" && exit 1
echo 'large values of N without enough memory should fail'
"$bin" -e "$key" -N 2000000 -i /dev/shm/randombytes >/dev/null && echo "ERROR: N of 2 million without extra memory worked" && exit 1
"$bin" -d "$key" -N 2000000 -i /dev/shm/randombytes >/dev/null && echo "ERROR: N of 2 million without extra memory worked" && exit 1
# todo: can we also make this the case for stdout? needs some buffering...
echo 'bad decryption should result in output file being deleted'
echo 'hopefully this doesnt make it to disk' | "$bin" "$key" | cat - <(echo -n a) | "$bin" -d "$key" -o bla.txt && exit 1
[ -e bla.txt ] && echo "ERROR: bla.txt should not exist" && exit 1
set -e
}
time test ./pegh
echo "successful test run!"

Loading…
Cancel
Save