Browse Source

Clean up documentation

ci
Travis Burtrum 2 years ago
parent
commit
355c05219e
2 changed files with 44 additions and 25 deletions
  1. +23
    -11
      README.md
  2. +21
    -14
      pegh.c

+ 23
- 11
README.md View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
pegh
----
pegh is a file encryption tool using passwords and authenticated encryption. It is simple, secure, and returns proper exit codes so you can tell whether encryption or decryption failed or not.
pegh is a file encryption tool using passwords with modern, standardized, and authenticated encryption. It is simple, secure, and returns proper exit codes so you can tell whether encryption or decryption failed or not.
[pegh](http://klingonska.org/dict/?q=tlh%3Apegh) is Klingon for secret
@ -33,14 +33,17 @@ usage: pegh [options...] password
-i <filename> file to use for input, default stdin
-o <filename> file to use for output, default stdout
-a append to -o instead of truncate
-c <max_mb> maximum megabytes of ram to use per encrypted chunk, so while
decrypting/encrypting twice this will be used, the same
amount will be needed for decryption as encryption and is
saved in the file format, so decryption will fail if this
isn't set high enough, these are
only allocated after scrypt is finished so max usage will be
the highest of these only, not both combined,
max: 2047, default: 16
-v pegh file format version to output,
either 0 (AES-256-GCM) or 1 (Chacha20-Poly1305),
default: 0 if AES is hardware accelerated, 1 otherwise
-c <mb> chunk size for encryption, while decrypting/encrypting twice
this ram will be used, the same amount will be needed for
decryption as encryption. This value is saved in the file
format, so decryption will fail if this isn't set high enough,
these are only allocated after scrypt is finished so max usage
will be the highest of these only, not both combined,
max: 65535 (AES-256-GCM) or 262143 (Chacha20-Poly1305),
default: 32
-m <max_mb> maximum megabytes of ram to use when deriving key from password
with scrypt, applies for encryption AND decryption, must
almost linearly scale with -N, if too low operation will fail,
@ -62,12 +65,19 @@ For additional info on scrypt params refer to:
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7914#section-2
```
Security
--------
Each chunk is fully decrypted and authenticated in memory before being written out as plaintext, so an attacker may be able to truncate a file, but NEVER flip any bytes or corrupt it. Order is enforced by the incrementing the IV, so re-ordered chunks would be decrypted with the wrong IV and would fail authentication.
Of course standard password bruteforcing is possible, but can be mitigated with increased scrypt parameters and longer password lengths.
pegh file format
----------------
pegh implements a simple versioned file format so encryption parameters can change in the future. Numbers here are inclusive 0-based byte array indices, 0th byte is always version number, everything else depends on version number, currently only version 0 exists.
pegh implements a simple versioned file format so encryption parameters can change in the future. Numbers here are inclusive 0-based byte array indices, 0th byte is always version number, everything else depends on version number, currently versions 0 and 1 exist.
Version 0, scrypt key derivation, aes-256-gcm encryption, 43 byte header, 16 byte auth tag per chunk. The 12-byte IV for the first chunk is 0, and is incremented by 1 for each successive chunk, if it ever rolls back over to 0 encryption should be aborted (chunk size should be increased).
Version 0, scrypt key derivation, AES-256-GCM encryption, 43 byte header, 16 byte auth tag per chunk. The 12-byte IV for the first chunk is 0, and is incremented by 1 for each successive chunk, if it ever rolls back over to 0 encryption should be aborted (chunk size should be increased).
| indices | format | value interpretation |
|--------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
@ -79,6 +89,8 @@ Version 0, scrypt key derivation, aes-256-gcm encryption, 43 byte header, 16 byt
| 11-42 | 32 randomly generated bytes | scrypt key derivation seed |
| 43+end | any number of chunks, chunk_size + 16 long | chunks followed by AES-256-GCM auth tag |
Version 1 has the exact same structure as version 0, except Chacha20-Poly1305 encryption instead of AES-256-GCM, key, IV, tag lengths are all the same.
License
-------


+ 21
- 14
pegh.c View File

@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ const uint32_t BUFFER_SIZE_MB = 32;
* 0th byte is always version number, everything else depends on version number
*
* |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
* | Version 0, scrypt key derivation, aes-256-gcm encryption, 43 byte header, 16 byte auth tag per chunk |
* | Version 0, scrypt key derivation, AES-256-GCM encryption, 43 byte header, 16 byte auth tag per chunk |
* | The 12-byte IV for the first chunk is 0, and is incremented by 1 for each successive chunk, if it |
* | ever rolls back over to 0 encryption should be aborted (chunk size should be increased).
* | ever rolls back over to 0 encryption should be aborted (chunk size should be increased). |
* |--------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
* | indices | format | value interpretation |
* |--------------|---------------------------------------------|-----------------------------------------|
@ -79,6 +79,9 @@ const uint32_t BUFFER_SIZE_MB = 32;
* | 11-42 | 32 randomly generated bytes | scrypt key derivation seed |
* | 43+end | any number of chunks, chunk_size + 16 long | chunks followed by AES-256-GCM auth tag |
* |------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
*
* Version 1 has the exact same structure as version 0, except Chacha20-Poly1305 encryption instead of AES-256-GCM,
* key, IV, tag lengths are all the same.
*/
/* don't touch below here unless you know what you are doing */
@ -845,18 +848,21 @@ usage: pegh [options...] password\n\
-e encrypt input to output, default mode\n\
-d decrypt input to output\n\
-i <filename> file to use for input, default stdin\n\
-o <filename> file to use for output, default stdout\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\
-o <filename> file to use for output, default stdout\n\
-a append to -o instead of truncate\n\
-c <max_mb> maximum megabytes of ram to use per encrypted chunk, so while\n\
decrypting/encrypting twice this will be used, the same\n\
amount will be needed for decryption as encryption and is\n\
saved in the file format, so decryption will fail if this\n\
isn't set high enough, these are\n");
-v pegh file format version to output,\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\
either 0 (AES-256-GCM) or 1 (Chacha20-Poly1305),\n\
default: 0 if AES is hardware accelerated, 1 otherwise\n\
-c <mb> chunk size for encryption, while decrypting/encrypting twice\n\
this ram will be used, the same amount will be needed for\n\
decryption as encryption. This value is saved in the file\n\
format, so decryption will fail if this isn't set high enough,\n");
fprintf(stderr, "\
only allocated after scrypt is finished so max usage will be\n\
the highest of these only, not both combined,\n\
max: %lu (AES-256-GCM) or %lu (Chacha20-Poly1305), default: %d\n\
these are only allocated after scrypt is finished so max usage\n\
will be the highest of these only, not both combined,\n\
max: %lu (AES-256-GCM) or %lu (Chacha20-Poly1305),\n\
default: %d\n\
-m <max_mb> maximum megabytes of ram to use when deriving key from password\n\
with scrypt, applies for encryption AND decryption, must\n\
almost linearly scale with -N, if too low operation will fail,\n\
@ -1095,7 +1101,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
/* small SIZE_MAX, Chacha20 */
version = 1;
#else
/* greated than 32gb SIZE_MAX, AES */
/* greater than 32gb SIZE_MAX, AES */
version = 0;
#endif
#endif /* PEGH_OPENSSL */
@ -1103,8 +1109,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
exit_code = pegh_encrypt(password, scrypt_max_mem, buffer_size, in, out, err, (uint8_t) version, N, r, p);
}
if(NULL != in_filename)
if(NULL != in_filename) {
fclose(in);
}
if(NULL != out_filename) {
fclose(out);
}


Loading…
Cancel
Save