mirror of
https://github.com/moparisthebest/curl
synced 2024-11-13 13:05:03 -05:00
3f25c01fce
Closes #7025
4543 lines
135 KiB
C
4543 lines
135 KiB
C
/***************************************************************************
|
|
* _ _ ____ _
|
|
* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
|
|
* / __| | | | |_) | |
|
|
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
|
|
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
|
|
*
|
|
* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2021, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
|
|
*
|
|
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
|
|
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
|
|
* are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html.
|
|
*
|
|
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
|
|
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
|
|
* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
|
|
*
|
|
* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
|
|
* KIND, either express or implied.
|
|
*
|
|
***************************************************************************/
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Source file for all OpenSSL-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
|
|
* but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#include "curl_setup.h"
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
|
|
|
|
#include <limits.h>
|
|
|
|
/* Wincrypt must be included before anything that could include OpenSSL. */
|
|
#if defined(USE_WIN32_CRYPTO)
|
|
#include <wincrypt.h>
|
|
/* Undefine wincrypt conflicting symbols for BoringSSL. */
|
|
#undef X509_NAME
|
|
#undef X509_EXTENSIONS
|
|
#undef PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL
|
|
#undef PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO
|
|
#undef OCSP_REQUEST
|
|
#undef OCSP_RESPONSE
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#include "urldata.h"
|
|
#include "sendf.h"
|
|
#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
|
|
#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
|
|
#include "inet_pton.h"
|
|
#include "openssl.h"
|
|
#include "connect.h"
|
|
#include "slist.h"
|
|
#include "select.h"
|
|
#include "vtls.h"
|
|
#include "keylog.h"
|
|
#include "strcase.h"
|
|
#include "hostcheck.h"
|
|
#include "multiif.h"
|
|
#include "strerror.h"
|
|
#include "curl_printf.h"
|
|
|
|
#include <openssl/ssl.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
#include <openssl/dh.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/md5.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/conf.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/bn.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/bio.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
|
|
#include <openssl/pkcs12.h>
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_AMISSL
|
|
#include "amigaos.h"
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
|
|
#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090700fL) && /* 0.9.7 or later */ \
|
|
!defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE)
|
|
#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
|
|
#include <openssl/engine.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#include "warnless.h"
|
|
#include "non-ascii.h" /* for Curl_convert_from_utf8 prototype */
|
|
|
|
/* The last #include files should be: */
|
|
#include "curl_memory.h"
|
|
#include "memdebug.h"
|
|
|
|
/* Uncomment the ALLOW_RENEG line to a real #define if you want to allow TLS
|
|
renegotiations when built with BoringSSL. Renegotiating is non-compliant
|
|
with HTTP/2 and "an extremely dangerous protocol feature". Beware.
|
|
|
|
#define ALLOW_RENEG 1
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
|
|
#error "OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER not defined"
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
|
|
#include <openssl/ui.h>
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
|
|
#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL const
|
|
#else
|
|
#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L)
|
|
#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE 1
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && /* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ */ \
|
|
!(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
|
|
LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
|
|
#define SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
|
|
#define HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS 1 /* added in 1.1.0 -pre1 */
|
|
#define HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre3 */
|
|
#define HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH 1 /* since 1.1.0 -pre5 */
|
|
#define CONST_EXTS const
|
|
#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE_DEPRECATED 1
|
|
|
|
/* funny typecast define due to difference in API */
|
|
#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
|
|
#define ARG2_X509_signature_print (X509_ALGOR *)
|
|
#else
|
|
#define ARG2_X509_signature_print
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
/* For OpenSSL before 1.1.0 */
|
|
#define ASN1_STRING_get0_data(x) ASN1_STRING_data(x)
|
|
#define X509_get0_notBefore(x) X509_get_notBefore(x)
|
|
#define X509_get0_notAfter(x) X509_get_notAfter(x)
|
|
#define CONST_EXTS /* nope */
|
|
#ifndef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
|
|
#define OpenSSL_version_num() SSLeay()
|
|
#endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) && /* 1.0.2 or later */ \
|
|
!(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
|
|
LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
|
|
#define HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE 1
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) /* 1.0.2 or later */
|
|
#define HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN 1
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002003L && \
|
|
OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x10002FFFL && \
|
|
!defined(OPENSSL_NO_COMP)
|
|
#define HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS 1
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090808fL)
|
|
/* not present in older OpenSSL */
|
|
#define OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(x)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Whether SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback is available.
|
|
* OpenSSL: supported since 1.1.1 https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2287
|
|
* BoringSSL: supported since d28f59c27bac (committed 2015-11-19)
|
|
* LibreSSL: unsupported in at least 2.7.2 (explicitly check for it since it
|
|
* lies and pretends to be OpenSSL 2.0.0).
|
|
*/
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && \
|
|
!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)) || \
|
|
defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
#define HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Whether SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites is available.
|
|
* OpenSSL: supported since 1.1.1 (commit a53b5be6a05)
|
|
* BoringSSL: no
|
|
* LibreSSL: no
|
|
*/
|
|
#if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) && \
|
|
!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
|
|
!defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL))
|
|
#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES
|
|
#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH
|
|
/* SET_EC_CURVES available under the same preconditions: see
|
|
* https://www.openssl.org/docs/manmaster/man3/SSL_CTX_set1_groups.html
|
|
*/
|
|
#define HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_EC_CURVES
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
|
#define OSSL_PACKAGE "LibreSSL"
|
|
#elif defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
#define OSSL_PACKAGE "BoringSSL"
|
|
#else
|
|
#define OSSL_PACKAGE "OpenSSL"
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
|
|
/* up2date versions of OpenSSL maintain the default reasonably secure without
|
|
* breaking compatibility, so it is better not to override the default by curl
|
|
*/
|
|
#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION NULL
|
|
#else
|
|
/* ... but it is not the case with old versions of OpenSSL */
|
|
#define DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION \
|
|
"ALL:!EXPORT:!EXPORT40:!EXPORT56:!aNULL:!LOW:!RC4:@STRENGTH"
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_SRP
|
|
/* the function exists */
|
|
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
|
|
/* the functionality is not disabled */
|
|
#define USE_OPENSSL_SRP
|
|
#endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data {
|
|
struct Curl_easy *logger; /* transfer handle to pass trace logs to, only
|
|
using sockindex 0 */
|
|
/* these ones requires specific SSL-types */
|
|
SSL_CTX* ctx;
|
|
SSL* handle;
|
|
X509* server_cert;
|
|
#ifndef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
|
|
/* Set to true once a valid keylog entry has been created to avoid dupes. */
|
|
bool keylog_done;
|
|
#endif
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Number of bytes to read from the random number seed file. This must be
|
|
* a finite value (because some entropy "files" like /dev/urandom have
|
|
* an infinite length), but must be large enough to provide enough
|
|
* entropy to properly seed OpenSSL's PRNG.
|
|
*/
|
|
#define RAND_LOAD_LENGTH 1024
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
|
|
static void ossl_keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line)
|
|
{
|
|
(void)ssl;
|
|
|
|
Curl_tls_keylog_write_line(line);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
/*
|
|
* ossl_log_tls12_secret is called by libcurl to make the CLIENT_RANDOMs if the
|
|
* OpenSSL being used doesn't have native support for doing that.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void
|
|
ossl_log_tls12_secret(const SSL *ssl, bool *keylog_done)
|
|
{
|
|
const SSL_SESSION *session = SSL_get_session(ssl);
|
|
unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
|
|
unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
|
|
int master_key_length = 0;
|
|
|
|
if(!session || *keylog_done)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L && \
|
|
!(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
|
|
LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x20700000L)
|
|
/* ssl->s3 is not checked in openssl 1.1.0-pre6, but let's assume that
|
|
* we have a valid SSL context if we have a non-NULL session. */
|
|
SSL_get_client_random(ssl, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
master_key_length = (int)
|
|
SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(session, master_key, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
|
|
#else
|
|
if(ssl->s3 && session->master_key_length > 0) {
|
|
master_key_length = session->master_key_length;
|
|
memcpy(master_key, session->master_key, session->master_key_length);
|
|
memcpy(client_random, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* The handshake has not progressed sufficiently yet, or this is a TLS 1.3
|
|
* session (when curl was built with older OpenSSL headers and running with
|
|
* newer OpenSSL runtime libraries). */
|
|
if(master_key_length <= 0)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
*keylog_done = true;
|
|
Curl_tls_keylog_write("CLIENT_RANDOM", client_random,
|
|
master_key, master_key_length);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* !HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK */
|
|
|
|
static const char *SSL_ERROR_to_str(int err)
|
|
{
|
|
switch(err) {
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_NONE:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_NONE";
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_SSL";
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ";
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE";
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP";
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL";
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN";
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT";
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT";
|
|
#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC)
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC";
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB)
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB";
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if defined(SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY)
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR_WANT_EARLY";
|
|
#endif
|
|
default:
|
|
return "SSL_ERROR unknown";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return error string for last OpenSSL error
|
|
*/
|
|
static char *ossl_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
if(size)
|
|
*buf = '\0';
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
ERR_error_string_n((uint32_t)error, buf, size);
|
|
#else
|
|
ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if(size > 1 && !*buf) {
|
|
strncpy(buf, (error ? "Unknown error" : "No error"), size);
|
|
buf[size - 1] = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return buf;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return an extra data index for the transfer data.
|
|
* This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ossl_get_ssl_data_index(void)
|
|
{
|
|
static int ssl_ex_data_data_index = -1;
|
|
if(ssl_ex_data_data_index < 0) {
|
|
ssl_ex_data_data_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
return ssl_ex_data_data_index;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return an extra data index for the connection data.
|
|
* This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ossl_get_ssl_conn_index(void)
|
|
{
|
|
static int ssl_ex_data_conn_index = -1;
|
|
if(ssl_ex_data_conn_index < 0) {
|
|
ssl_ex_data_conn_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
return ssl_ex_data_conn_index;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return an extra data index for the sockindex.
|
|
* This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index(void)
|
|
{
|
|
static int sockindex_index = -1;
|
|
if(sockindex_index < 0) {
|
|
sockindex_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
return sockindex_index;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return an extra data index for proxy boolean.
|
|
* This index can be used with SSL_get_ex_data() and SSL_set_ex_data().
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ossl_get_proxy_index(void)
|
|
{
|
|
static int proxy_index = -1;
|
|
if(proxy_index < 0) {
|
|
proxy_index = SSL_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
return proxy_index;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting,
|
|
void *global_passwd)
|
|
{
|
|
DEBUGASSERT(0 == encrypting);
|
|
|
|
if(!encrypting) {
|
|
int klen = curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)global_passwd));
|
|
if(num > klen) {
|
|
memcpy(buf, global_passwd, klen + 1);
|
|
return klen;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* rand_enough() returns TRUE if we have seeded the random engine properly.
|
|
*/
|
|
static bool rand_enough(void)
|
|
{
|
|
return (0 != RAND_status()) ? TRUE : FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_seed(struct Curl_easy *data)
|
|
{
|
|
/* we have the "SSL is seeded" boolean static to prevent multiple
|
|
time-consuming seedings in vain */
|
|
static bool ssl_seeded = FALSE;
|
|
char fname[256];
|
|
|
|
if(ssl_seeded)
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
|
|
if(rand_enough()) {
|
|
/* OpenSSL 1.1.0+ will return here */
|
|
ssl_seeded = TRUE;
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef RANDOM_FILE
|
|
/* if RANDOM_FILE isn't defined, we only perform this if an option tells
|
|
us to! */
|
|
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE])
|
|
#define RANDOM_FILE "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
/* let the option override the define */
|
|
RAND_load_file((data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]?
|
|
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]:
|
|
RANDOM_FILE),
|
|
RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
|
|
if(rand_enough())
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_RAND_EGD)
|
|
/* only available in OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later */
|
|
/* EGD_SOCKET is set at configure time or not at all */
|
|
#ifndef EGD_SOCKET
|
|
/* If we don't have the define set, we only do this if the egd-option
|
|
is set */
|
|
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET])
|
|
#define EGD_SOCKET "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
|
|
#endif
|
|
{
|
|
/* If there's an option and a define, the option overrides the
|
|
define */
|
|
int ret = RAND_egd(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]?
|
|
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]:EGD_SOCKET);
|
|
if(-1 != ret) {
|
|
if(rand_enough())
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* fallback to a custom seeding of the PRNG using a hash based on a current
|
|
time */
|
|
do {
|
|
unsigned char randb[64];
|
|
size_t len = sizeof(randb);
|
|
size_t i, i_max;
|
|
for(i = 0, i_max = len / sizeof(struct curltime); i < i_max; ++i) {
|
|
struct curltime tv = Curl_now();
|
|
Curl_wait_ms(1);
|
|
tv.tv_sec *= i + 1;
|
|
tv.tv_usec *= (unsigned int)i + 2;
|
|
tv.tv_sec ^= ((Curl_now().tv_sec + Curl_now().tv_usec) *
|
|
(i + 3)) << 8;
|
|
tv.tv_usec ^= (unsigned int) ((Curl_now().tv_sec +
|
|
Curl_now().tv_usec) *
|
|
(i + 4)) << 16;
|
|
memcpy(&randb[i * sizeof(struct curltime)], &tv,
|
|
sizeof(struct curltime));
|
|
}
|
|
RAND_add(randb, (int)len, (double)len/2);
|
|
} while(!rand_enough());
|
|
|
|
/* generates a default path for the random seed file */
|
|
fname[0] = 0; /* blank it first */
|
|
RAND_file_name(fname, sizeof(fname));
|
|
if(fname[0]) {
|
|
/* we got a file name to try */
|
|
RAND_load_file(fname, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
|
|
if(rand_enough())
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed!\n");
|
|
return (rand_enough() ? CURLE_OK :
|
|
CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR /* confusing error code */);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE
|
|
#define SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE 42
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12
|
|
#define SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12 43
|
|
#endif
|
|
static int do_file_type(const char *type)
|
|
{
|
|
if(!type || !type[0])
|
|
return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
|
|
if(strcasecompare(type, "PEM"))
|
|
return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
|
|
if(strcasecompare(type, "DER"))
|
|
return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
|
|
if(strcasecompare(type, "ENG"))
|
|
return SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE;
|
|
if(strcasecompare(type, "P12"))
|
|
return SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
|
|
/*
|
|
* Supply default password to the engine user interface conversation.
|
|
* The password is passed by OpenSSL engine from ENGINE_load_private_key()
|
|
* last argument to the ui and can be obtained by UI_get0_user_data(ui) here.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_ui_reader(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
|
|
{
|
|
const char *password;
|
|
switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
|
|
case UIT_PROMPT:
|
|
case UIT_VERIFY:
|
|
password = (const char *)UI_get0_user_data(ui);
|
|
if(password && (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) {
|
|
UI_set_result(ui, uis, password);
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return (UI_method_get_reader(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Suppress interactive request for a default password if available.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ssl_ui_writer(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis)
|
|
{
|
|
switch(UI_get_string_type(uis)) {
|
|
case UIT_PROMPT:
|
|
case UIT_VERIFY:
|
|
if(UI_get0_user_data(ui) &&
|
|
(UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD)) {
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
return (UI_method_get_writer(UI_OpenSSL()))(ui, uis);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Check if a given string is a PKCS#11 URI
|
|
*/
|
|
static bool is_pkcs11_uri(const char *string)
|
|
{
|
|
return (string && strncasecompare(string, "pkcs11:", 7));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_set_engine(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *engine);
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_blob(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct curl_blob *blob,
|
|
int type, const char *key_passwd)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
X509 *x = NULL;
|
|
/* the typecast of blob->len is fine since it is guaranteed to never be
|
|
larger than CURL_MAX_INPUT_LENGTH */
|
|
BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(blob->data, (int)(blob->len));
|
|
if(!in)
|
|
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
|
|
if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) {
|
|
/* j = ERR_R_ASN1_LIB; */
|
|
x = d2i_X509_bio(in, NULL);
|
|
}
|
|
else if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) {
|
|
/* ERR_R_PEM_LIB; */
|
|
x = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL,
|
|
passwd_callback, (void *)key_passwd);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!x) {
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
|
|
end:
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
BIO_free(in);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_blob(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct curl_blob *blob,
|
|
int type, const char *key_passwd)
|
|
{
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
|
|
BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(blob->data, (int)(blob->len));
|
|
if(!in)
|
|
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
|
|
if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_PEM)
|
|
pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, passwd_callback,
|
|
(void *)key_passwd);
|
|
else if(type == SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1)
|
|
pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(in, NULL);
|
|
else {
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
if(!pkey) {
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
ret = SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pkey);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
|
|
end:
|
|
BIO_free(in);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_blob(SSL_CTX *ctx, const struct curl_blob *blob,
|
|
const char *key_passwd)
|
|
{
|
|
/* SSL_CTX_add1_chain_cert introduced in OpenSSL 1.0.2 */
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000200fL) && /* OpenSSL 1.0.2 or later */ \
|
|
!(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
|
|
(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2090100fL)) /* LibreSSL 2.9.1 or later */
|
|
int ret = 0;
|
|
X509 *x = NULL;
|
|
void *passwd_callback_userdata = (void *)key_passwd;
|
|
BIO *in = BIO_new_mem_buf(blob->data, (int)(blob->len));
|
|
if(!in)
|
|
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(in, NULL,
|
|
passwd_callback, (void *)key_passwd);
|
|
|
|
if(!x) {
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ret = SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x);
|
|
|
|
if(ERR_peek_error() != 0)
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
|
|
if(ret) {
|
|
X509 *ca;
|
|
unsigned long err;
|
|
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_clear_chain_certs(ctx)) {
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while((ca = PEM_read_bio_X509(in, NULL, passwd_callback,
|
|
passwd_callback_userdata))
|
|
!= NULL) {
|
|
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_add0_chain_cert(ctx, ca)) {
|
|
X509_free(ca);
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
err = ERR_peek_last_error();
|
|
if((ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_PEM) &&
|
|
(ERR_GET_REASON(err) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE))
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
else
|
|
ret = 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
BIO_free(in);
|
|
return ret;
|
|
#else
|
|
(void)ctx; /* unused */
|
|
(void)blob; /* unused */
|
|
(void)key_passwd; /* unused */
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static
|
|
int cert_stuff(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
SSL_CTX* ctx,
|
|
char *cert_file,
|
|
const struct curl_blob *cert_blob,
|
|
const char *cert_type,
|
|
char *key_file,
|
|
const struct curl_blob *key_blob,
|
|
const char *key_type,
|
|
char *key_passwd)
|
|
{
|
|
char error_buffer[256];
|
|
bool check_privkey = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type);
|
|
|
|
if(cert_file || cert_blob || (file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE)) {
|
|
SSL *ssl;
|
|
X509 *x509;
|
|
int cert_done = 0;
|
|
int cert_use_result;
|
|
|
|
if(key_passwd) {
|
|
/* set the password in the callback userdata */
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx, key_passwd);
|
|
/* Set passwd callback: */
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
switch(file_type) {
|
|
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
|
|
/* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */
|
|
cert_use_result = cert_blob ?
|
|
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_blob(ctx, cert_blob, key_passwd) :
|
|
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx, cert_file);
|
|
if(cert_use_result != 1) {
|
|
failf(data,
|
|
"could not load PEM client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
|
|
" error %s, "
|
|
"(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
|
|
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
|
|
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
|
|
/* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but
|
|
we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with
|
|
ASN1 files. */
|
|
|
|
cert_use_result = cert_blob ?
|
|
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_blob(ctx, cert_blob,
|
|
file_type, key_passwd) :
|
|
SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file, file_type);
|
|
if(cert_use_result != 1) {
|
|
failf(data,
|
|
"could not load ASN1 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
|
|
" error %s, "
|
|
"(no key found, wrong pass phrase, or wrong file format?)",
|
|
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
|
|
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
|
|
#if defined(USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE) && defined(ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Implicitly use pkcs11 engine if none was provided and the
|
|
* cert_file is a PKCS#11 URI */
|
|
if(!data->state.engine) {
|
|
if(is_pkcs11_uri(cert_file)) {
|
|
if(ossl_set_engine(data, "pkcs11") != CURLE_OK) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(data->state.engine) {
|
|
const char *cmd_name = "LOAD_CERT_CTRL";
|
|
struct {
|
|
const char *cert_id;
|
|
X509 *cert;
|
|
} params;
|
|
|
|
params.cert_id = cert_file;
|
|
params.cert = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Does the engine supports LOAD_CERT_CTRL ? */
|
|
if(!ENGINE_ctrl(data->state.engine, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME,
|
|
0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) {
|
|
failf(data, "ssl engine does not support loading certificates");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Load the certificate from the engine */
|
|
if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(data->state.engine, cmd_name,
|
|
0, ¶ms, NULL, 1)) {
|
|
failf(data, "ssl engine cannot load client cert with id"
|
|
" '%s' [%s]", cert_file,
|
|
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
|
|
sizeof(error_buffer)));
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!params.cert) {
|
|
failf(data, "ssl engine didn't initialized the certificate "
|
|
"properly.");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, params.cert) != 1) {
|
|
failf(data, "unable to set client certificate");
|
|
X509_free(params.cert);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
X509_free(params.cert); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load certificate");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
#else
|
|
failf(data, "file type ENG for certificate not implemented");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *cert_bio = NULL;
|
|
PKCS12 *p12 = NULL;
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pri;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
|
|
if(cert_blob) {
|
|
cert_bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(cert_blob->data, (int)(cert_blob->len));
|
|
if(!cert_bio) {
|
|
failf(data,
|
|
"BIO_new_mem_buf NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
|
|
" error %s",
|
|
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
|
|
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
cert_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
|
|
if(!cert_bio) {
|
|
failf(data,
|
|
"BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
|
|
" error %s",
|
|
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
|
|
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(BIO_read_filename(cert_bio, cert_file) <= 0) {
|
|
failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file);
|
|
BIO_free(cert_bio);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(cert_bio, NULL);
|
|
BIO_free(cert_bio);
|
|
|
|
if(!p12) {
|
|
failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'",
|
|
cert_blob ? "(memory blob)" : cert_file);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PKCS12_PBE_add();
|
|
|
|
if(!PKCS12_parse(p12, key_passwd, &pri, &x509,
|
|
&ca)) {
|
|
failf(data,
|
|
"could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, " OSSL_PACKAGE
|
|
" error %s",
|
|
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
|
|
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
|
|
PKCS12_free(p12);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PKCS12_free(p12);
|
|
|
|
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509) != 1) {
|
|
failf(data,
|
|
"could not load PKCS12 client certificate, " OSSL_PACKAGE
|
|
" error %s",
|
|
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
|
|
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pri) != 1) {
|
|
failf(data, "unable to use private key from PKCS12 file '%s'",
|
|
cert_file);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx)) {
|
|
failf(data, "private key from PKCS12 file '%s' "
|
|
"does not match certificate in same file", cert_file);
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Set Certificate Verification chain */
|
|
if(ca) {
|
|
while(sk_X509_num(ca)) {
|
|
/*
|
|
* Note that sk_X509_pop() is used below to make sure the cert is
|
|
* removed from the stack properly before getting passed to
|
|
* SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(), which takes ownership. Previously
|
|
* we used sk_X509_value() instead, but then we'd clean it in the
|
|
* subsequent sk_X509_pop_free() call.
|
|
*/
|
|
X509 *x = sk_X509_pop(ca);
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, x)) {
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
failf(data, "cannot add certificate to client CA list");
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx, x)) {
|
|
X509_free(x);
|
|
failf(data, "cannot add certificate to certificate chain");
|
|
goto fail;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
cert_done = 1;
|
|
fail:
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
|
|
X509_free(x509);
|
|
#ifdef USE_AMISSL
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(ca, Curl_amiga_X509_free);
|
|
#else
|
|
sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if(!cert_done)
|
|
return 0; /* failure! */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
failf(data, "not supported file type '%s' for certificate", cert_type);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if((!key_file) && (!key_blob)) {
|
|
key_file = cert_file;
|
|
key_blob = cert_blob;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
file_type = do_file_type(key_type);
|
|
|
|
switch(file_type) {
|
|
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
|
|
if(cert_done)
|
|
break;
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
|
case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
|
|
cert_use_result = key_blob ?
|
|
SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_blob(ctx, key_blob, file_type, key_passwd) :
|
|
SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type);
|
|
if(cert_use_result != 1) {
|
|
failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s",
|
|
key_file?key_file:"(memory blob)", key_type?key_type:"PEM");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
|
|
{ /* XXXX still needs some work */
|
|
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Implicitly use pkcs11 engine if none was provided and the
|
|
* key_file is a PKCS#11 URI */
|
|
if(!data->state.engine) {
|
|
if(is_pkcs11_uri(key_file)) {
|
|
if(ossl_set_engine(data, "pkcs11") != CURLE_OK) {
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(data->state.engine) {
|
|
UI_METHOD *ui_method =
|
|
UI_create_method((char *)"curl user interface");
|
|
if(!ui_method) {
|
|
failf(data, "unable do create " OSSL_PACKAGE
|
|
" user-interface method");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, UI_method_get_opener(UI_OpenSSL()));
|
|
UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, UI_method_get_closer(UI_OpenSSL()));
|
|
UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ssl_ui_reader);
|
|
UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ssl_ui_writer);
|
|
/* the typecast below was added to please mingw32 */
|
|
priv_key = (EVP_PKEY *)
|
|
ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine, key_file,
|
|
ui_method,
|
|
key_passwd);
|
|
UI_destroy_method(ui_method);
|
|
if(!priv_key) {
|
|
failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
|
|
failf(data, "unable to set private key");
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load private key");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
#else
|
|
failf(data, "file type ENG for private key not supported");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
|
|
if(!cert_done) {
|
|
failf(data, "file type P12 for private key not supported");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
failf(data, "not supported file type for private key");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ssl = SSL_new(ctx);
|
|
if(!ssl) {
|
|
failf(data, "unable to create an SSL structure");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
x509 = SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
|
|
|
|
/* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not
|
|
leak memory as the previous version: */
|
|
if(x509) {
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
|
|
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp, SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
{
|
|
/* If RSA is used, don't check the private key if its flags indicate
|
|
* it doesn't support it. */
|
|
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = SSL_get_privatekey(ssl);
|
|
int pktype;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
|
|
pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(priv_key);
|
|
#else
|
|
pktype = priv_key->type;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if(pktype == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
|
|
RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(priv_key);
|
|
if(RSA_flags(rsa) & RSA_METHOD_FLAG_NO_CHECK)
|
|
check_privkey = FALSE;
|
|
RSA_free(rsa); /* Decrement reference count */
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
SSL_free(ssl);
|
|
|
|
/* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
|
|
* the private key */
|
|
|
|
if(check_privkey == TRUE) {
|
|
/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
|
|
* the SSL context */
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
|
|
failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* returns non-zero on failure */
|
|
static int x509_name_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
|
|
BUF_MEM *biomem;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
|
|
if(!bio_out)
|
|
return 1; /* alloc failed! */
|
|
|
|
rc = X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_out, a, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC);
|
|
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
|
|
|
|
if((size_t)biomem->length < size)
|
|
size = biomem->length;
|
|
else
|
|
size--; /* don't overwrite the buffer end */
|
|
|
|
memcpy(buf, biomem->data, size);
|
|
buf[size] = 0;
|
|
|
|
BIO_free(bio_out);
|
|
|
|
return !rc;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
* Global SSL init
|
|
*
|
|
* @retval 0 error initializing SSL
|
|
* @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ossl_init(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
|
|
!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
|
const uint64_t flags =
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN
|
|
/* not present in BoringSSL */
|
|
OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN |
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_OPENSSL_AUTO_LOAD_CONFIG
|
|
OPENSSL_INIT_NO_LOAD_CONFIG |
|
|
#else
|
|
OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG |
|
|
#endif
|
|
0;
|
|
OPENSSL_init_ssl(flags, NULL);
|
|
#else
|
|
OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules();
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
|
|
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION was introduced some time between 0.9.8b and
|
|
0.9.8e */
|
|
#ifndef CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION
|
|
#define CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION 0x0
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_OPENSSL_AUTO_LOAD_CONFIG
|
|
CONF_modules_load_file(NULL, NULL,
|
|
CONF_MFLAGS_DEFAULT_SECTION|
|
|
CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_MISSING_FILE);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Lets get nice error messages */
|
|
SSL_load_error_strings();
|
|
|
|
/* Init the global ciphers and digests */
|
|
if(!SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms())
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
Curl_tls_keylog_open();
|
|
|
|
/* Initialize the extra data indexes */
|
|
if(ossl_get_ssl_data_index() < 0 || ossl_get_ssl_conn_index() < 0 ||
|
|
ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index() < 0 || ossl_get_proxy_index() < 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Global cleanup */
|
|
static void ossl_cleanup(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) && \
|
|
!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
|
/* OpenSSL 1.1 deprecates all these cleanup functions and
|
|
turns them into no-ops in OpenSSL 1.0 compatibility mode */
|
|
#else
|
|
/* Free ciphers and digests lists */
|
|
EVP_cleanup();
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
|
|
/* Free engine list */
|
|
ENGINE_cleanup();
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Free OpenSSL error strings */
|
|
ERR_free_strings();
|
|
|
|
/* Free thread local error state, destroying hash upon zero refcount */
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE
|
|
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
|
|
#else
|
|
ERR_remove_state(0);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Free all memory allocated by all configuration modules */
|
|
CONF_modules_free();
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_SSL_COMP_FREE_COMPRESSION_METHODS
|
|
SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods();
|
|
#endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
Curl_tls_keylog_close();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function is used to determine connection status.
|
|
*
|
|
* Return codes:
|
|
* 1 means the connection is still in place
|
|
* 0 means the connection has been closed
|
|
* -1 means the connection status is unknown
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ossl_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
/* SSL_peek takes data out of the raw recv buffer without peeking so we use
|
|
recv MSG_PEEK instead. Bug #795 */
|
|
#ifdef MSG_PEEK
|
|
char buf;
|
|
ssize_t nread;
|
|
nread = recv((RECV_TYPE_ARG1)conn->sock[FIRSTSOCKET], (RECV_TYPE_ARG2)&buf,
|
|
(RECV_TYPE_ARG3)1, (RECV_TYPE_ARG4)MSG_PEEK);
|
|
if(nread == 0)
|
|
return 0; /* connection has been closed */
|
|
if(nread == 1)
|
|
return 1; /* connection still in place */
|
|
else if(nread == -1) {
|
|
int err = SOCKERRNO;
|
|
if(err == EINPROGRESS ||
|
|
#if defined(EAGAIN) && (EAGAIN != EWOULDBLOCK)
|
|
err == EAGAIN ||
|
|
#endif
|
|
err == EWOULDBLOCK)
|
|
return 1; /* connection still in place */
|
|
if(err == ECONNRESET ||
|
|
#ifdef ECONNABORTED
|
|
err == ECONNABORTED ||
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef ENETDOWN
|
|
err == ENETDOWN ||
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef ENETRESET
|
|
err == ENETRESET ||
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef ESHUTDOWN
|
|
err == ESHUTDOWN ||
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef ETIMEDOUT
|
|
err == ETIMEDOUT ||
|
|
#endif
|
|
err == ENOTCONN)
|
|
return 0; /* connection has been closed */
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return -1; /* connection status unknown */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Selects an OpenSSL crypto engine
|
|
*/
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_set_engine(struct Curl_easy *data, const char *engine)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
|
|
ENGINE *e;
|
|
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
|
|
e = ENGINE_by_id(engine);
|
|
#else
|
|
/* avoid memory leak */
|
|
for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
|
|
const char *e_id = ENGINE_get_id(e);
|
|
if(!strcmp(engine, e_id))
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if(!e) {
|
|
failf(data, "SSL Engine '%s' not found", engine);
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(data->state.engine) {
|
|
ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
|
|
ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
|
|
data->state.engine = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if(!ENGINE_init(e)) {
|
|
char buf[256];
|
|
|
|
ENGINE_free(e);
|
|
failf(data, "Failed to initialise SSL Engine '%s': %s",
|
|
engine, ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf)));
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_INITFAILED;
|
|
}
|
|
data->state.engine = e;
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
#else
|
|
(void)engine;
|
|
failf(data, "SSL Engine not supported");
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Sets engine as default for all SSL operations
|
|
*/
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_set_engine_default(struct Curl_easy *data)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
|
|
if(data->state.engine) {
|
|
if(ENGINE_set_default(data->state.engine, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL) > 0) {
|
|
infof(data, "set default crypto engine '%s'\n",
|
|
ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
failf(data, "set default crypto engine '%s' failed",
|
|
ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_SETFAILED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
(void) data;
|
|
#endif
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Return list of OpenSSL crypto engine names.
|
|
*/
|
|
static struct curl_slist *ossl_engines_list(struct Curl_easy *data)
|
|
{
|
|
struct curl_slist *list = NULL;
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
|
|
struct curl_slist *beg;
|
|
ENGINE *e;
|
|
|
|
for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
|
|
beg = curl_slist_append(list, ENGINE_get_id(e));
|
|
if(!beg) {
|
|
curl_slist_free_all(list);
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
list = beg;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
(void) data;
|
|
return list;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define set_logger(conn, data) \
|
|
conn->ssl[0].backend->logger = data
|
|
|
|
static void ossl_closeone(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
struct connectdata *conn,
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
|
|
if(backend->handle) {
|
|
set_logger(conn, data);
|
|
(void)SSL_shutdown(backend->handle);
|
|
SSL_set_connect_state(backend->handle);
|
|
|
|
SSL_free(backend->handle);
|
|
backend->handle = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
if(backend->ctx) {
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(backend->ctx);
|
|
backend->ctx = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ossl_close(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
|
|
int sockindex)
|
|
{
|
|
ossl_closeone(data, conn, &conn->ssl[sockindex]);
|
|
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
|
|
ossl_closeone(data, conn, &conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex]);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function is called to shut down the SSL layer but keep the
|
|
* socket open (CCC - Clear Command Channel)
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ossl_shutdown(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
|
|
{
|
|
int retval = 0;
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
|
|
char buf[256]; /* We will use this for the OpenSSL error buffer, so it has
|
|
to be at least 256 bytes long. */
|
|
unsigned long sslerror;
|
|
ssize_t nread;
|
|
int buffsize;
|
|
int err;
|
|
bool done = FALSE;
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
|
|
|
|
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_FTP
|
|
/* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code
|
|
sends a close notify alert without waiting for a close notify alert in
|
|
response. Thus we wait for a close notify alert from the server, but
|
|
we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */
|
|
|
|
if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE)
|
|
(void)SSL_shutdown(backend->handle);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if(backend->handle) {
|
|
buffsize = (int)sizeof(buf);
|
|
while(!done) {
|
|
int what = SOCKET_READABLE(conn->sock[sockindex],
|
|
SSL_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT);
|
|
if(what > 0) {
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
/* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close
|
|
notify alert from the server */
|
|
nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, buffsize);
|
|
err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, (int)nread);
|
|
|
|
switch(err) {
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
|
|
/* This is the expected response. There was no data but only
|
|
the close notify alert */
|
|
done = TRUE;
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
|
|
/* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
|
|
infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ\n");
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
|
|
/* SSL wants a write. Really odd. Let's bail out. */
|
|
infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE\n");
|
|
done = TRUE;
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
/* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */
|
|
sslerror = ERR_get_error();
|
|
failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read on shutdown: %s, errno %d",
|
|
(sslerror ?
|
|
ossl_strerror(sslerror, buf, sizeof(buf)) :
|
|
SSL_ERROR_to_str(err)),
|
|
SOCKERRNO);
|
|
done = TRUE;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else if(0 == what) {
|
|
/* timeout */
|
|
failf(data, "SSL shutdown timeout");
|
|
done = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* anything that gets here is fatally bad */
|
|
failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
|
|
retval = -1;
|
|
done = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
} /* while()-loop for the select() */
|
|
|
|
if(data->set.verbose) {
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN
|
|
switch(SSL_get_shutdown(backend->handle)) {
|
|
case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN:
|
|
infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN\n");
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
|
|
infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN\n");
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
|
|
infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|"
|
|
"SSL_RECEIVED__SHUTDOWN\n");
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_free(backend->handle);
|
|
backend->handle = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void ossl_session_free(void *ptr)
|
|
{
|
|
/* free the ID */
|
|
SSL_SESSION_free(ptr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close
|
|
* down everything and free all resources!
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ossl_close_all(struct Curl_easy *data)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
|
|
if(data->state.engine) {
|
|
ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
|
|
ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
|
|
data->state.engine = NULL;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
(void)data;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#if !defined(HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE_DEPRECATED) && \
|
|
defined(HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE)
|
|
/* OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 build an error queue that is stored per-thread
|
|
so we need to clean it here in case the thread will be killed. All OpenSSL
|
|
code should extract the error in association with the error so clearing
|
|
this queue here should be harmless at worst. */
|
|
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ====================================================== */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Match subjectAltName against the host name. This requires a conversion
|
|
* in CURL_DOES_CONVERSIONS builds.
|
|
*/
|
|
static bool subj_alt_hostcheck(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname,
|
|
const char *dispname)
|
|
#ifdef CURL_DOES_CONVERSIONS
|
|
{
|
|
bool res = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/* Curl_cert_hostcheck uses host encoding, but we get ASCII from
|
|
OpenSSl.
|
|
*/
|
|
char *match_pattern2 = strdup(match_pattern);
|
|
|
|
if(match_pattern2) {
|
|
if(Curl_convert_from_network(data, match_pattern2,
|
|
strlen(match_pattern2)) == CURLE_OK) {
|
|
if(Curl_cert_hostcheck(match_pattern2, hostname)) {
|
|
res = TRUE;
|
|
infof(data,
|
|
" subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's \"%s\"\n",
|
|
dispname, match_pattern2);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
free(match_pattern2);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
failf(data,
|
|
"SSL: out of memory when allocating temporary for subjectAltName");
|
|
}
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS
|
|
(void)dispname;
|
|
(void)data;
|
|
#endif
|
|
if(Curl_cert_hostcheck(match_pattern, hostname)) {
|
|
infof(data, " subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's \"%s\"\n",
|
|
dispname, match_pattern);
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Quote from RFC2818 section 3.1 "Server Identity"
|
|
|
|
If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST
|
|
be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name
|
|
field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although
|
|
the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and
|
|
Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead.
|
|
|
|
Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by
|
|
[RFC2459]. If more than one identity of a given type is present in
|
|
the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any one
|
|
of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard
|
|
character * which is considered to match any single domain name
|
|
component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but
|
|
not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not bar.com.
|
|
|
|
In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a
|
|
hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present
|
|
in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
static CURLcode verifyhost(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
|
|
X509 *server_cert)
|
|
{
|
|
bool matched = FALSE;
|
|
int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */
|
|
size_t addrlen = 0;
|
|
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
|
|
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
|
|
struct in6_addr addr;
|
|
#else
|
|
struct in_addr addr;
|
|
#endif
|
|
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
|
|
bool dNSName = FALSE; /* if a dNSName field exists in the cert */
|
|
bool iPAddress = FALSE; /* if a iPAddress field exists in the cert */
|
|
const char * const hostname = SSL_HOST_NAME();
|
|
const char * const dispname = SSL_HOST_DISPNAME();
|
|
|
|
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
|
|
if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip &&
|
|
Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr)) {
|
|
target = GEN_IPADD;
|
|
addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr)) {
|
|
target = GEN_IPADD;
|
|
addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* get a "list" of alternative names */
|
|
altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
|
|
|
|
if(altnames) {
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
size_t numalts;
|
|
size_t i;
|
|
#else
|
|
int numalts;
|
|
int i;
|
|
#endif
|
|
bool dnsmatched = FALSE;
|
|
bool ipmatched = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least
|
|
one, but we don't depend on it... */
|
|
numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
|
|
|
|
/* loop through all alternatives - until a dnsmatch */
|
|
for(i = 0; (i < numalts) && !dnsmatched; i++) {
|
|
/* get a handle to alternative name number i */
|
|
const GENERAL_NAME *check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
|
|
|
|
if(check->type == GEN_DNS)
|
|
dNSName = TRUE;
|
|
else if(check->type == GEN_IPADD)
|
|
iPAddress = TRUE;
|
|
|
|
/* only check alternatives of the same type the target is */
|
|
if(check->type == target) {
|
|
/* get data and length */
|
|
const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(check->d.ia5);
|
|
size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
|
|
|
|
switch(target) {
|
|
case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
|
|
/* The OpenSSL man page explicitly says: "In general it cannot be
|
|
assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null
|
|
terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that
|
|
"The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string
|
|
type itself: for example for an IA5String the data will be ASCII"
|
|
|
|
It has been however verified that in 0.9.6 and 0.9.7, IA5String
|
|
is always null-terminated.
|
|
*/
|
|
if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
|
|
/* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
|
|
string and we cannot match it. */
|
|
subj_alt_hostcheck(data, altptr, hostname, dispname)) {
|
|
dnsmatched = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
|
|
/* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
|
|
our server IP address is */
|
|
if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen)) {
|
|
ipmatched = TRUE;
|
|
infof(data,
|
|
" subjectAltName: host \"%s\" matched cert's IP address!\n",
|
|
dispname);
|
|
}
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
|
|
|
|
if(dnsmatched || ipmatched)
|
|
matched = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(matched)
|
|
/* an alternative name matched */
|
|
;
|
|
else if(dNSName || iPAddress) {
|
|
infof(data, " subjectAltName does not match %s\n", dispname);
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: no alternative certificate subject name matches "
|
|
"target host name '%s'", dispname);
|
|
result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* we have to look to the last occurrence of a commonName in the
|
|
distinguished one to get the most significant one. */
|
|
int j, i = -1;
|
|
|
|
/* The following is done because of a bug in 0.9.6b */
|
|
|
|
unsigned char *nulstr = (unsigned char *)"";
|
|
unsigned char *peer_CN = nulstr;
|
|
|
|
X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert);
|
|
if(name)
|
|
while((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i)) >= 0)
|
|
i = j;
|
|
|
|
/* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string
|
|
that we can use for comparison. Doing this we support BMPstring,
|
|
UTF8 etc. */
|
|
|
|
if(i >= 0) {
|
|
ASN1_STRING *tmp =
|
|
X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i));
|
|
|
|
/* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
|
|
is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
|
|
string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
|
|
conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. */
|
|
if(tmp) {
|
|
if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
|
|
j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
|
|
if(j >= 0) {
|
|
peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j + 1);
|
|
if(peer_CN) {
|
|
memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(tmp), j);
|
|
peer_CN[j] = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else /* not a UTF8 name */
|
|
j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
|
|
|
|
if(peer_CN && (curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)peer_CN)) != j)) {
|
|
/* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
|
|
cannot match and we return failure! */
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
|
|
result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(peer_CN == nulstr)
|
|
peer_CN = NULL;
|
|
else {
|
|
/* convert peer_CN from UTF8 */
|
|
CURLcode rc = Curl_convert_from_utf8(data, (char *)peer_CN,
|
|
strlen((char *)peer_CN));
|
|
/* Curl_convert_from_utf8 calls failf if unsuccessful */
|
|
if(rc) {
|
|
OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
|
|
return rc;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(result)
|
|
/* error already detected, pass through */
|
|
;
|
|
else if(!peer_CN) {
|
|
failf(data,
|
|
"SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
|
|
result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
|
|
}
|
|
else if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, hostname)) {
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
|
|
"target host name '%s'", peer_CN, dispname);
|
|
result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
infof(data, " common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN);
|
|
}
|
|
if(peer_CN)
|
|
OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
|
|
!defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
|
|
static CURLcode verifystatus(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, ocsp_status;
|
|
unsigned char *status;
|
|
const unsigned char *p;
|
|
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
|
|
OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL;
|
|
OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL;
|
|
X509_STORE *st = NULL;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *ch = NULL;
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
|
|
X509 *cert;
|
|
OCSP_CERTID *id = NULL;
|
|
int cert_status, crl_reason;
|
|
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *rev, *thisupd, *nextupd;
|
|
int ret;
|
|
|
|
long len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(backend->handle, &status);
|
|
|
|
if(!status) {
|
|
failf(data, "No OCSP response received");
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
p = status;
|
|
rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len);
|
|
if(!rsp) {
|
|
failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response");
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ocsp_status = OCSP_response_status(rsp);
|
|
if(ocsp_status != OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS_SUCCESSFUL) {
|
|
failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response status: %s (%d)",
|
|
OCSP_response_status_str(ocsp_status), ocsp_status);
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp);
|
|
if(!br) {
|
|
failf(data, "Invalid OCSP response");
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ch = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(backend->handle);
|
|
st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx);
|
|
|
|
#if ((OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x1000201fL) /* Fixed after 1.0.2a */ || \
|
|
(defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
|
|
LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x2040200fL))
|
|
/* The authorized responder cert in the OCSP response MUST be signed by the
|
|
peer cert's issuer (see RFC6960 section 4.2.2.2). If that's a root cert,
|
|
no problem, but if it's an intermediate cert OpenSSL has a bug where it
|
|
expects this issuer to be present in the chain embedded in the OCSP
|
|
response. So we add it if necessary. */
|
|
|
|
/* First make sure the peer cert chain includes both a peer and an issuer,
|
|
and the OCSP response contains a responder cert. */
|
|
if(sk_X509_num(ch) >= 2 && sk_X509_num(br->certs) >= 1) {
|
|
X509 *responder = sk_X509_value(br->certs, sk_X509_num(br->certs) - 1);
|
|
|
|
/* Find issuer of responder cert and add it to the OCSP response chain */
|
|
for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ch); i++) {
|
|
X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(ch, i);
|
|
if(X509_check_issued(issuer, responder) == X509_V_OK) {
|
|
if(!OCSP_basic_add1_cert(br, issuer)) {
|
|
failf(data, "Could not add issuer cert to OCSP response");
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if(OCSP_basic_verify(br, ch, st, 0) <= 0) {
|
|
failf(data, "OCSP response verification failed");
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Compute the certificate's ID */
|
|
cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(backend->handle);
|
|
if(!cert) {
|
|
failf(data, "Error getting peer certificate");
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ch); i++) {
|
|
X509 *issuer = sk_X509_value(ch, i);
|
|
if(X509_check_issued(issuer, cert) == X509_V_OK) {
|
|
id = OCSP_cert_to_id(EVP_sha1(), cert, issuer);
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
X509_free(cert);
|
|
|
|
if(!id) {
|
|
failf(data, "Error computing OCSP ID");
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Find the single OCSP response corresponding to the certificate ID */
|
|
ret = OCSP_resp_find_status(br, id, &cert_status, &crl_reason, &rev,
|
|
&thisupd, &nextupd);
|
|
OCSP_CERTID_free(id);
|
|
if(ret != 1) {
|
|
failf(data, "Could not find certificate ID in OCSP response");
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Validate the corresponding single OCSP response */
|
|
if(!OCSP_check_validity(thisupd, nextupd, 300L, -1L)) {
|
|
failf(data, "OCSP response has expired");
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
infof(data, "SSL certificate status: %s (%d)\n",
|
|
OCSP_cert_status_str(cert_status), cert_status);
|
|
|
|
switch(cert_status) {
|
|
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_GOOD:
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED:
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
failf(data, "SSL certificate revocation reason: %s (%d)",
|
|
OCSP_crl_reason_str(crl_reason), crl_reason);
|
|
goto end;
|
|
|
|
case V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN:
|
|
default:
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_INVALIDCERTSTATUS;
|
|
goto end;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
end:
|
|
if(br)
|
|
OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br);
|
|
OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
|
|
|
|
/* The SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK doesn't exist in ancient OpenSSL versions
|
|
and thus this cannot be done there. */
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
|
|
|
|
static const char *ssl_msg_type(int ssl_ver, int msg)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR
|
|
if(ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
|
|
switch(msg) {
|
|
case SSL2_MT_ERROR:
|
|
return "Error";
|
|
case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
return "Client hello";
|
|
case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
|
|
return "Client key";
|
|
case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED:
|
|
return "Client finished";
|
|
case SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
return "Server hello";
|
|
case SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY:
|
|
return "Server verify";
|
|
case SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED:
|
|
return "Server finished";
|
|
case SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
return "Request CERT";
|
|
case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
return "Client CERT";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
|
|
switch(msg) {
|
|
case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST:
|
|
return "Hello request";
|
|
case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
|
|
return "Client hello";
|
|
case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
|
|
return "Server hello";
|
|
#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET
|
|
case SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET:
|
|
return "Newsession Ticket";
|
|
#endif
|
|
case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
|
|
return "Certificate";
|
|
case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
|
|
return "Server key exchange";
|
|
case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
|
|
return "Client key exchange";
|
|
case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
|
|
return "Request CERT";
|
|
case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE:
|
|
return "Server finished";
|
|
case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
|
|
return "CERT verify";
|
|
case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
|
|
return "Finished";
|
|
#ifdef SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS
|
|
case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS:
|
|
return "Certificate Status";
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS
|
|
case SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS:
|
|
return "Encrypted Extensions";
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA
|
|
case SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA:
|
|
return "End of early data";
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE
|
|
case SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE:
|
|
return "Key update";
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO
|
|
case SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO:
|
|
return "Next protocol";
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH
|
|
case SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH:
|
|
return "Message hash";
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return "Unknown";
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const char *tls_rt_type(int type)
|
|
{
|
|
switch(type) {
|
|
#ifdef SSL3_RT_HEADER
|
|
case SSL3_RT_HEADER:
|
|
return "TLS header";
|
|
#endif
|
|
case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC:
|
|
return "TLS change cipher";
|
|
case SSL3_RT_ALERT:
|
|
return "TLS alert";
|
|
case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE:
|
|
return "TLS handshake";
|
|
case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA:
|
|
return "TLS app data";
|
|
default:
|
|
return "TLS Unknown";
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Our callback from the SSL/TLS layers.
|
|
*/
|
|
static void ossl_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type,
|
|
const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl,
|
|
void *userp)
|
|
{
|
|
char unknown[32];
|
|
const char *verstr = NULL;
|
|
struct connectdata *conn = userp;
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[0];
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
|
|
struct Curl_easy *data = backend->logger;
|
|
|
|
if(!conn || !data || !data->set.fdebug ||
|
|
(direction != 0 && direction != 1))
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
switch(ssl_ver) {
|
|
#ifdef SSL2_VERSION /* removed in recent versions */
|
|
case SSL2_VERSION:
|
|
verstr = "SSLv2";
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef SSL3_VERSION
|
|
case SSL3_VERSION:
|
|
verstr = "SSLv3";
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
case TLS1_VERSION:
|
|
verstr = "TLSv1.0";
|
|
break;
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_1_VERSION
|
|
case TLS1_1_VERSION:
|
|
verstr = "TLSv1.1";
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_2_VERSION
|
|
case TLS1_2_VERSION:
|
|
verstr = "TLSv1.2";
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
|
|
case TLS1_3_VERSION:
|
|
verstr = "TLSv1.3";
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
case 0:
|
|
break;
|
|
default:
|
|
msnprintf(unknown, sizeof(unknown), "(%x)", ssl_ver);
|
|
verstr = unknown;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Log progress for interesting records only (like Handshake or Alert), skip
|
|
* all raw record headers (content_type == SSL3_RT_HEADER or ssl_ver == 0).
|
|
* For TLS 1.3, skip notification of the decrypted inner Content Type.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(ssl_ver
|
|
#ifdef SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
|
|
&& content_type != SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE
|
|
#endif
|
|
) {
|
|
const char *msg_name, *tls_rt_name;
|
|
char ssl_buf[1024];
|
|
int msg_type, txt_len;
|
|
|
|
/* the info given when the version is zero is not that useful for us */
|
|
|
|
ssl_ver >>= 8; /* check the upper 8 bits only below */
|
|
|
|
/* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL
|
|
* always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type
|
|
* is at 'buf[0]'.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type)
|
|
tls_rt_name = tls_rt_type(content_type);
|
|
else
|
|
tls_rt_name = "";
|
|
|
|
if(content_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) {
|
|
msg_type = *(char *)buf;
|
|
msg_name = "Change cipher spec";
|
|
}
|
|
else if(content_type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) {
|
|
msg_type = (((char *)buf)[0] << 8) + ((char *)buf)[1];
|
|
msg_name = SSL_alert_desc_string_long(msg_type);
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
msg_type = *(char *)buf;
|
|
msg_name = ssl_msg_type(ssl_ver, msg_type);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
txt_len = msnprintf(ssl_buf, sizeof(ssl_buf), "%s (%s), %s, %s (%d):\n",
|
|
verstr, direction?"OUT":"IN",
|
|
tls_rt_name, msg_name, msg_type);
|
|
if(0 <= txt_len && (unsigned)txt_len < sizeof(ssl_buf)) {
|
|
Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, ssl_buf, (size_t)txt_len);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Curl_debug(data, (direction == 1) ? CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_OUT :
|
|
CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_IN, (char *)buf, len);
|
|
(void) ssl;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
|
|
/* ====================================================== */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
# define use_sni(x) sni = (x)
|
|
#else
|
|
# define use_sni(x) Curl_nop_stmt
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Check for OpenSSL 1.0.2 which has ALPN support. */
|
|
#undef HAS_ALPN
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10002000L \
|
|
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT)
|
|
# define HAS_ALPN 1
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Check for OpenSSL 1.0.1 which has NPN support. */
|
|
#undef HAS_NPN
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10001000L \
|
|
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) \
|
|
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG)
|
|
# define HAS_NPN 1
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAS_NPN
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* in is a list of length prefixed strings. this function has to select
|
|
* the protocol we want to use from the list and write its string into out.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
select_next_protocol(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
|
|
const char *key, unsigned int keylen)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int i;
|
|
for(i = 0; i + keylen <= inlen; i += in[i] + 1) {
|
|
if(memcmp(&in[i + 1], key, keylen) == 0) {
|
|
*out = (unsigned char *) &in[i + 1];
|
|
*outlen = in[i];
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int
|
|
select_next_proto_cb(SSL *ssl,
|
|
unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen,
|
|
const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
|
|
void *arg)
|
|
{
|
|
struct Curl_easy *data = (struct Curl_easy *)arg;
|
|
struct connectdata *conn = data->conn;
|
|
(void)ssl;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_HTTP2
|
|
if(data->state.httpwant >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 &&
|
|
!select_next_protocol(out, outlen, in, inlen, ALPN_H2, ALPN_H2_LENGTH)) {
|
|
infof(data, "NPN, negotiated HTTP2 (%s)\n", ALPN_H2);
|
|
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if(!select_next_protocol(out, outlen, in, inlen, ALPN_HTTP_1_1,
|
|
ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
|
|
infof(data, "NPN, negotiated HTTP1.1\n");
|
|
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
infof(data, "NPN, no overlap, use HTTP1.1\n");
|
|
*out = (unsigned char *)ALPN_HTTP_1_1;
|
|
*outlen = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
|
|
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
|
|
|
|
return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* HAS_NPN */
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) /* 1.1.0 */
|
|
static CURLcode
|
|
set_ssl_version_min_max(SSL_CTX *ctx, struct connectdata *conn)
|
|
{
|
|
/* first, TLS min version... */
|
|
long curl_ssl_version_min = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version);
|
|
long curl_ssl_version_max;
|
|
|
|
/* convert cURL min SSL version option to OpenSSL constant */
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) || defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER)
|
|
uint16_t ossl_ssl_version_min = 0;
|
|
uint16_t ossl_ssl_version_max = 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
long ossl_ssl_version_min = 0;
|
|
long ossl_ssl_version_max = 0;
|
|
#endif
|
|
switch(curl_ssl_version_min) {
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: /* TLS 1.x */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
|
|
ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
|
|
ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_1_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
|
|
ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_2_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
|
|
ossl_ssl_version_min = TLS1_3_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT means that no option was selected.
|
|
We don't want to pass 0 to SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version as
|
|
it would enable all versions down to the lowest supported by
|
|
the library.
|
|
So we skip this, and stay with the OS default
|
|
*/
|
|
if(curl_ssl_version_min != CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT) {
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, ossl_ssl_version_min)) {
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* ... then, TLS max version */
|
|
curl_ssl_version_max = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version_max);
|
|
|
|
/* convert cURL max SSL version option to OpenSSL constant */
|
|
switch(curl_ssl_version_max) {
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_0:
|
|
ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_1:
|
|
ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_1_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_2:
|
|
ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_2_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_3:
|
|
ossl_ssl_version_max = TLS1_3_VERSION;
|
|
break;
|
|
#endif
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_NONE: /* none selected */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_DEFAULT: /* max selected */
|
|
default:
|
|
/* SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version states that:
|
|
setting the maximum to 0 will enable
|
|
protocol versions up to the highest version
|
|
supported by the library */
|
|
ossl_ssl_version_max = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, ossl_ssl_version_max)) {
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
typedef uint32_t ctx_option_t;
|
|
#else
|
|
typedef long ctx_option_t;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) /* 1.1.0 */
|
|
static CURLcode
|
|
set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(ctx_option_t *ctx_options,
|
|
struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
|
|
{
|
|
long ssl_version = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version);
|
|
long ssl_version_max = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version_max);
|
|
|
|
(void) data; /* In case it's unused. */
|
|
|
|
switch(ssl_version) {
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
|
|
{
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(backend->ctx, TLS1_3_VERSION);
|
|
*ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
(void)sockindex;
|
|
(void)ctx_options;
|
|
failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.3 support");
|
|
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
|
|
*ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
|
|
#else
|
|
failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.2 support");
|
|
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
|
|
*ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1;
|
|
#else
|
|
failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.1 support");
|
|
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
switch(ssl_version_max) {
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_0:
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
|
|
*ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1;
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_1:
|
|
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x1000100FL
|
|
*ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2;
|
|
#endif
|
|
/* FALLTHROUGH */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_2:
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
|
|
*ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3;
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_TLSv1_3:
|
|
#ifdef TLS1_3_VERSION
|
|
break;
|
|
#else
|
|
failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " was built without TLS 1.3 support");
|
|
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* The "new session" callback must return zero if the session can be removed
|
|
* or non-zero if the session has been put into the session cache.
|
|
*/
|
|
static int ossl_new_session_cb(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *ssl_sessionid)
|
|
{
|
|
int res = 0;
|
|
struct connectdata *conn;
|
|
struct Curl_easy *data;
|
|
int sockindex;
|
|
curl_socket_t *sockindex_ptr;
|
|
int data_idx = ossl_get_ssl_data_index();
|
|
int connectdata_idx = ossl_get_ssl_conn_index();
|
|
int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
|
|
int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
|
|
bool isproxy;
|
|
|
|
if(data_idx < 0 || connectdata_idx < 0 || sockindex_idx < 0 || proxy_idx < 0)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
conn = (struct connectdata*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, connectdata_idx);
|
|
if(!conn)
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
|
data = (struct Curl_easy *) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, data_idx);
|
|
|
|
/* The sockindex has been stored as a pointer to an array element */
|
|
sockindex_ptr = (curl_socket_t*) SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, sockindex_idx);
|
|
sockindex = (int)(sockindex_ptr - conn->sock);
|
|
|
|
isproxy = SSL_get_ex_data(ssl, proxy_idx) ? TRUE : FALSE;
|
|
|
|
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
|
|
bool incache;
|
|
void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
|
|
|
|
Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
|
|
if(isproxy)
|
|
incache = FALSE;
|
|
else
|
|
incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, isproxy,
|
|
&old_ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex));
|
|
if(incache) {
|
|
if(old_ssl_sessionid != ssl_sessionid) {
|
|
infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
|
|
Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, old_ssl_sessionid);
|
|
incache = FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!incache) {
|
|
if(!Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, isproxy, ssl_sessionid,
|
|
0 /* unknown size */, sockindex)) {
|
|
/* the session has been put into the session cache */
|
|
res = 1;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
|
|
}
|
|
Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return res;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static CURLcode load_cacert_from_memory(SSL_CTX *ctx,
|
|
const struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob)
|
|
{
|
|
/* these need freed at the end */
|
|
BIO *cbio = NULL;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *inf = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* everything else is just a reference */
|
|
int i, count = 0;
|
|
X509_STORE *cts = NULL;
|
|
X509_INFO *itmp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
if(ca_info_blob->len > (size_t)INT_MAX)
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
|
|
|
|
cts = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx);
|
|
if(!cts)
|
|
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
|
|
cbio = BIO_new_mem_buf(ca_info_blob->data, (int)ca_info_blob->len);
|
|
if(!cbio)
|
|
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
|
|
inf = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(cbio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
|
|
if(!inf) {
|
|
BIO_free(cbio);
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* add each entry from PEM file to x509_store */
|
|
for(i = 0; i < (int)sk_X509_INFO_num(inf); ++i) {
|
|
itmp = sk_X509_INFO_value(inf, i);
|
|
if(itmp->x509) {
|
|
if(X509_STORE_add_cert(cts, itmp->x509)) {
|
|
++count;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* set count to 0 to return an error */
|
|
count = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if(itmp->crl) {
|
|
if(X509_STORE_add_crl(cts, itmp->crl)) {
|
|
++count;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* set count to 0 to return an error */
|
|
count = 0;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(inf, X509_INFO_free);
|
|
BIO_free(cbio);
|
|
|
|
/* if we didn't end up importing anything, treat that as an error */
|
|
return (count > 0 ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
|
|
{
|
|
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
|
|
char *ciphers;
|
|
SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method = NULL;
|
|
X509_LOOKUP *lookup = NULL;
|
|
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
|
|
ctx_option_t ctx_options = 0;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
bool sni;
|
|
const char * const hostname = SSL_HOST_NAME();
|
|
|
|
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
|
|
struct in6_addr addr;
|
|
#else
|
|
struct in_addr addr;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#endif
|
|
const long int ssl_version = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version);
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_SRP
|
|
const enum CURL_TLSAUTH ssl_authtype = SSL_SET_OPTION(authtype);
|
|
#endif
|
|
char * const ssl_cert = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.clientcert);
|
|
const struct curl_blob *ssl_cert_blob = SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.cert_blob);
|
|
const struct curl_blob *ca_info_blob = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(ca_info_blob);
|
|
const char * const ssl_cert_type = SSL_SET_OPTION(cert_type);
|
|
const char * const ssl_cafile =
|
|
/* CURLOPT_CAINFO_BLOB overrides CURLOPT_CAINFO */
|
|
(ca_info_blob ? NULL : SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile));
|
|
const char * const ssl_capath = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath);
|
|
const bool verifypeer = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer);
|
|
const char * const ssl_crlfile = SSL_SET_OPTION(CRLfile);
|
|
char error_buffer[256];
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
|
|
bool imported_native_ca = false;
|
|
|
|
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state);
|
|
|
|
/* Make funny stuff to get random input */
|
|
result = ossl_seed(data);
|
|
if(result)
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
SSL_SET_OPTION_LVALUE(certverifyresult) = !X509_V_OK;
|
|
|
|
/* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */
|
|
|
|
switch(ssl_version) {
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
|
|
/* it will be handled later with the context options */
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L)
|
|
req_method = TLS_client_method();
|
|
#else
|
|
req_method = SSLv23_client_method();
|
|
#endif
|
|
use_sni(TRUE);
|
|
break;
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
|
|
failf(data, "No SSLv2 support");
|
|
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
|
|
failf(data, "No SSLv3 support");
|
|
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
|
|
default:
|
|
failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(backend->ctx)
|
|
SSL_CTX_free(backend->ctx);
|
|
backend->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method);
|
|
|
|
if(!backend->ctx) {
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context: %s",
|
|
ossl_strerror(ERR_peek_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
|
|
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_mode(backend->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
|
|
if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) {
|
|
/* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging */
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(backend->ctx, ossl_trace);
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(backend->ctx, conn);
|
|
set_logger(conn, data);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* OpenSSL contains code to work-around lots of bugs and flaws in various
|
|
SSL-implementations. SSL_CTX_set_options() is used to enabled those
|
|
work-arounds. The man page for this option states that SSL_OP_ALL enables
|
|
all the work-arounds and that "It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to
|
|
enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken
|
|
implementations is desired."
|
|
|
|
The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in Openssl0.9.8j. It's a flag to
|
|
disable "rfc4507bis session ticket support". rfc4507bis was later turned
|
|
into the proper RFC5077 it seems: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077
|
|
|
|
The enabled extension concerns the session management. I wonder how often
|
|
libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. also, sending
|
|
the session data is some overhead. .I suggest that you just use your
|
|
proposed patch (which explicitly disables TICKET).
|
|
|
|
If someone writes an application with libcurl and openssl who wants to
|
|
enable the feature, one can do this in the SSL callback.
|
|
|
|
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG option enabling allowed proper
|
|
interoperability with web server Netscape Enterprise Server 2.0.1 which
|
|
was released back in 1996.
|
|
|
|
Due to CVE-2010-4180, option SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG has
|
|
become ineffective as of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c. In order to mitigate
|
|
CVE-2010-4180 when using previous OpenSSL versions we no longer enable
|
|
this option regardless of OpenSSL version and SSL_OP_ALL definition.
|
|
|
|
OpenSSL added a work-around for a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability
|
|
(https://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). In 0.9.6e they added a bit to
|
|
SSL_OP_ALL that _disables_ that work-around despite the fact that
|
|
SSL_OP_ALL is documented to do "rather harmless" workarounds. In order to
|
|
keep the secure work-around, the SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS bit
|
|
must not be set.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
ctx_options = SSL_OP_ALL;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
|
|
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
|
|
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
|
|
/* mitigate CVE-2010-4180 */
|
|
ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
|
|
/* unless the user explicitly ask to allow the protocol vulnerability we
|
|
use the work-around */
|
|
if(!SSL_SET_OPTION(enable_beast))
|
|
ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
switch(ssl_version) {
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
|
|
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
|
|
|
|
/* "--tlsv<x.y>" options mean TLS >= version <x.y> */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1: /* TLS >= version 1.0 */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0: /* TLS >= version 1.0 */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1: /* TLS >= version 1.1 */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2: /* TLS >= version 1.2 */
|
|
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3: /* TLS >= version 1.3 */
|
|
/* asking for any TLS version as the minimum, means no SSL versions
|
|
allowed */
|
|
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
|
|
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3;
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) /* 1.1.0 */
|
|
result = set_ssl_version_min_max(backend->ctx, conn);
|
|
#else
|
|
result = set_ssl_version_min_max_legacy(&ctx_options, data, conn,
|
|
sockindex);
|
|
#endif
|
|
if(result != CURLE_OK)
|
|
return result;
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
default:
|
|
failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_options(backend->ctx, ctx_options);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAS_NPN
|
|
if(conn->bits.tls_enable_npn)
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(backend->ctx, select_next_proto_cb, data);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
|
|
if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
|
|
int cur = 0;
|
|
unsigned char protocols[128];
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_HTTP2
|
|
if(data->state.httpwant >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2
|
|
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
|
|
&& (!SSL_IS_PROXY() || !conn->bits.tunnel_proxy)
|
|
#endif
|
|
) {
|
|
protocols[cur++] = ALPN_H2_LENGTH;
|
|
|
|
memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_H2, ALPN_H2_LENGTH);
|
|
cur += ALPN_H2_LENGTH;
|
|
infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", ALPN_H2);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
protocols[cur++] = ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
|
|
memcpy(&protocols[cur], ALPN_HTTP_1_1, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH);
|
|
cur += ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH;
|
|
infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", ALPN_HTTP_1_1);
|
|
|
|
/* expects length prefixed preference ordered list of protocols in wire
|
|
* format
|
|
*/
|
|
if(SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(backend->ctx, protocols, cur)) {
|
|
failf(data, "Error setting ALPN");
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if(ssl_cert || ssl_cert_blob || ssl_cert_type) {
|
|
if(!result &&
|
|
!cert_stuff(data, backend->ctx,
|
|
ssl_cert, ssl_cert_blob, ssl_cert_type,
|
|
SSL_SET_OPTION(key), SSL_SET_OPTION(key_blob),
|
|
SSL_SET_OPTION(key_type), SSL_SET_OPTION(key_passwd)))
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
|
|
if(result)
|
|
/* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
ciphers = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list);
|
|
if(!ciphers)
|
|
ciphers = (char *)DEFAULT_CIPHER_SELECTION;
|
|
if(ciphers) {
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(backend->ctx, ciphers)) {
|
|
failf(data, "failed setting cipher list: %s", ciphers);
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
|
|
}
|
|
infof(data, "Cipher selection: %s\n", ciphers);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES
|
|
{
|
|
char *ciphers13 = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list13);
|
|
if(ciphers13) {
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(backend->ctx, ciphers13)) {
|
|
failf(data, "failed setting TLS 1.3 cipher suite: %s", ciphers13);
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
|
|
}
|
|
infof(data, "TLS 1.3 cipher selection: %s\n", ciphers13);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH
|
|
/* OpenSSL 1.1.1 requires clients to opt-in for PHA */
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(backend->ctx, 1);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_EC_CURVES
|
|
{
|
|
char *curves = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(curves);
|
|
if(curves) {
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_set1_curves_list(backend->ctx, curves)) {
|
|
failf(data, "failed setting curves list: '%s'", curves);
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL_SRP
|
|
if(ssl_authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
|
|
char * const ssl_username = SSL_SET_OPTION(username);
|
|
|
|
infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", ssl_username);
|
|
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(backend->ctx, ssl_username)) {
|
|
failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name");
|
|
return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
|
|
}
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(backend->ctx, SSL_SET_OPTION(password))) {
|
|
failf(data, "failed setting SRP password");
|
|
return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
|
|
}
|
|
if(!SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list)) {
|
|
infof(data, "Setting cipher list SRP\n");
|
|
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(backend->ctx, "SRP")) {
|
|
failf(data, "failed setting SRP cipher list");
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
#if defined(USE_WIN32_CRYPTO)
|
|
/* Import certificates from the Windows root certificate store if requested.
|
|
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/9507184/
|
|
https://github.com/d3x0r/SACK/blob/master/src/netlib/ssl_layer.c#L1037
|
|
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280 */
|
|
if((SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) || SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) &&
|
|
(SSL_SET_OPTION(native_ca_store))) {
|
|
X509_STORE *store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx);
|
|
HCERTSTORE hStore = CertOpenSystemStore(0, TEXT("ROOT"));
|
|
|
|
if(hStore) {
|
|
PCCERT_CONTEXT pContext = NULL;
|
|
/* The array of enhanced key usage OIDs will vary per certificate and is
|
|
declared outside of the loop so that rather than malloc/free each
|
|
iteration we can grow it with realloc, when necessary. */
|
|
CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *enhkey_usage = NULL;
|
|
DWORD enhkey_usage_size = 0;
|
|
|
|
/* This loop makes a best effort to import all valid certificates from
|
|
the MS root store. If a certificate cannot be imported it is skipped.
|
|
'result' is used to store only hard-fail conditions (such as out of
|
|
memory) that cause an early break. */
|
|
result = CURLE_OK;
|
|
for(;;) {
|
|
X509 *x509;
|
|
FILETIME now;
|
|
BYTE key_usage[2];
|
|
DWORD req_size;
|
|
const unsigned char *encoded_cert;
|
|
#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS)
|
|
char cert_name[256];
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
pContext = CertEnumCertificatesInStore(hStore, pContext);
|
|
if(!pContext)
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS)
|
|
if(!CertGetNameStringA(pContext, CERT_NAME_SIMPLE_DISPLAY_TYPE, 0,
|
|
NULL, cert_name, sizeof(cert_name))) {
|
|
strcpy(cert_name, "Unknown");
|
|
}
|
|
infof(data, "SSL: Checking cert \"%s\"\n", cert_name);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
encoded_cert = (const unsigned char *)pContext->pbCertEncoded;
|
|
if(!encoded_cert)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&now);
|
|
if(CompareFileTime(&pContext->pCertInfo->NotBefore, &now) > 0 ||
|
|
CompareFileTime(&now, &pContext->pCertInfo->NotAfter) > 0)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* If key usage exists check for signing attribute */
|
|
if(CertGetIntendedKeyUsage(pContext->dwCertEncodingType,
|
|
pContext->pCertInfo,
|
|
key_usage, sizeof(key_usage))) {
|
|
if(!(key_usage[0] & CERT_KEY_CERT_SIGN_KEY_USAGE))
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
else if(GetLastError())
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* If enhanced key usage exists check for server auth attribute.
|
|
*
|
|
* Note "In a Microsoft environment, a certificate might also have EKU
|
|
* extended properties that specify valid uses for the certificate."
|
|
* The call below checks both, and behavior varies depending on what is
|
|
* found. For more details see CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage doc.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage(pContext, 0, NULL, &req_size)) {
|
|
if(req_size && req_size > enhkey_usage_size) {
|
|
void *tmp = realloc(enhkey_usage, req_size);
|
|
|
|
if(!tmp) {
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: Out of memory allocating for OID list");
|
|
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
enhkey_usage = (CERT_ENHKEY_USAGE *)tmp;
|
|
enhkey_usage_size = req_size;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(CertGetEnhancedKeyUsage(pContext, 0, enhkey_usage, &req_size)) {
|
|
if(!enhkey_usage->cUsageIdentifier) {
|
|
/* "If GetLastError returns CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND, the certificate is
|
|
good for all uses. If it returns zero, the certificate has no
|
|
valid uses." */
|
|
if((HRESULT)GetLastError() != CRYPT_E_NOT_FOUND)
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
DWORD i;
|
|
bool found = false;
|
|
|
|
for(i = 0; i < enhkey_usage->cUsageIdentifier; ++i) {
|
|
if(!strcmp("1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.1" /* OID server auth */,
|
|
enhkey_usage->rgpszUsageIdentifier[i])) {
|
|
found = true;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(!found)
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
continue;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &encoded_cert, pContext->cbCertEncoded);
|
|
if(!x509)
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
/* Try to import the certificate. This may fail for legitimate reasons
|
|
such as duplicate certificate, which is allowed by MS but not
|
|
OpenSSL. */
|
|
if(X509_STORE_add_cert(store, x509) == 1) {
|
|
#if defined(DEBUGBUILD) && !defined(CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS)
|
|
infof(data, "SSL: Imported cert \"%s\"\n", cert_name);
|
|
#endif
|
|
imported_native_ca = true;
|
|
}
|
|
X509_free(x509);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
free(enhkey_usage);
|
|
CertFreeCertificateContext(pContext);
|
|
CertCloseStore(hStore, 0);
|
|
|
|
if(result)
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
if(imported_native_ca)
|
|
infof(data, "successfully imported windows ca store\n");
|
|
else
|
|
infof(data, "error importing windows ca store, continuing anyway\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if(ca_info_blob) {
|
|
result = load_cacert_from_memory(backend->ctx, ca_info_blob);
|
|
if(result) {
|
|
if(result == CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY ||
|
|
(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca)) {
|
|
failf(data, "error importing CA certificate blob");
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Only warning if no certificate verification is required. */
|
|
infof(data, "error importing CA certificate blob, continuing anyway\n");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3)
|
|
/* OpenSSL 3.0.0 has deprecated SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations */
|
|
{
|
|
if(ssl_cafile) {
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_file(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile)) {
|
|
if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) {
|
|
/* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
|
|
failf(data, "error setting certificate file: %s", ssl_cafile);
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Continue with a warning if no certificate verif is required. */
|
|
infof(data, "error setting certificate file, continuing anyway\n");
|
|
}
|
|
infof(data, " CAfile: %s\n", ssl_cafile);
|
|
}
|
|
if(ssl_capath) {
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_dir(backend->ctx, ssl_capath)) {
|
|
if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) {
|
|
/* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
|
|
failf(data, "error setting certificate path: %s", ssl_capath);
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Continue with a warning if no certificate verif is required. */
|
|
infof(data, "error setting certificate path, continuing anyway\n");
|
|
}
|
|
infof(data, " CApath: %s\n", ssl_capath);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
if(ssl_cafile || ssl_capath) {
|
|
/* tell SSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify
|
|
the servers certificate. */
|
|
if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(backend->ctx, ssl_cafile, ssl_capath)) {
|
|
if(verifypeer && !imported_native_ca) {
|
|
/* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
|
|
failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:"
|
|
" CAfile: %s CApath: %s",
|
|
ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none",
|
|
ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate verification
|
|
is required. */
|
|
infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations,"
|
|
" continuing anyway:\n");
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* Everything is fine. */
|
|
infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations:\n");
|
|
}
|
|
infof(data, " CAfile: %s\n", ssl_cafile ? ssl_cafile : "none");
|
|
infof(data, " CApath: %s\n", ssl_capath ? ssl_capath : "none");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef CURL_CA_FALLBACK
|
|
if(verifypeer &&
|
|
!ca_info_blob && !ssl_cafile && !ssl_capath && !imported_native_ca) {
|
|
/* verifying the peer without any CA certificates won't
|
|
work so use openssl's built in default as fallback */
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(backend->ctx);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if(ssl_crlfile) {
|
|
/* tell SSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate
|
|
* revocation */
|
|
lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx),
|
|
X509_LOOKUP_file());
|
|
if(!lookup ||
|
|
(!X509_load_crl_file(lookup, ssl_crlfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) ) {
|
|
failf(data, "error loading CRL file: %s", ssl_crlfile);
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Everything is fine. */
|
|
infof(data, "successfully load CRL file:\n");
|
|
X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx),
|
|
X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
|
|
|
|
infof(data, " CRLfile: %s\n", ssl_crlfile);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(verifypeer) {
|
|
/* Try building a chain using issuers in the trusted store first to avoid
|
|
problems with server-sent legacy intermediates. Newer versions of
|
|
OpenSSL do alternate chain checking by default but we do not know how to
|
|
determine that in a reliable manner.
|
|
https://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=3621&user=guest&pass=guest
|
|
*/
|
|
#if defined(X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST)
|
|
X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx),
|
|
X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
|
|
if(!SSL_SET_OPTION(no_partialchain) && !ssl_crlfile) {
|
|
/* Have intermediate certificates in the trust store be treated as
|
|
trust-anchors, in the same way as self-signed root CA certificates
|
|
are. This allows users to verify servers using the intermediate cert
|
|
only, instead of needing the whole chain.
|
|
|
|
Due to OpenSSL bug https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/5081 we
|
|
cannot do partial chains with CRL check.
|
|
*/
|
|
X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(backend->ctx),
|
|
X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* SSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should
|
|
* fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue
|
|
* anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with
|
|
* SSL_get_verify_result() below. */
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_verify(backend->ctx,
|
|
verifypeer ? SSL_VERIFY_PEER : SSL_VERIFY_NONE, NULL);
|
|
|
|
/* Enable logging of secrets to the file specified in env SSLKEYLOGFILE. */
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
|
|
if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) {
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(backend->ctx, ossl_keylog_callback);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Enable the session cache because it's a prerequisite for the "new session"
|
|
* callback. Use the "external storage" mode to avoid that OpenSSL creates
|
|
* an internal session cache.
|
|
*/
|
|
SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(backend->ctx,
|
|
SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL);
|
|
SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(backend->ctx, ossl_new_session_cb);
|
|
|
|
/* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */
|
|
if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
|
|
Curl_set_in_callback(data, true);
|
|
result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, backend->ctx,
|
|
data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
|
|
Curl_set_in_callback(data, false);
|
|
if(result) {
|
|
failf(data, "error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Lets make an SSL structure */
|
|
if(backend->handle)
|
|
SSL_free(backend->handle);
|
|
backend->handle = SSL_new(backend->ctx);
|
|
if(!backend->handle) {
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)!");
|
|
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
|
|
!defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
|
|
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus))
|
|
SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(backend->handle, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL) && defined(ALLOW_RENEG)
|
|
SSL_set_renegotiate_mode(backend->handle, ssl_renegotiate_freely);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
SSL_set_connect_state(backend->handle);
|
|
|
|
backend->server_cert = 0x0;
|
|
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
|
|
if((0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr)) &&
|
|
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
|
|
(0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr)) &&
|
|
#endif
|
|
sni) {
|
|
size_t nlen = strlen(hostname);
|
|
if((long)nlen >= data->set.buffer_size)
|
|
/* this is seriously messed up */
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
|
|
|
|
/* RFC 6066 section 3 says the SNI field is case insensitive, but browsers
|
|
send the data lowercase and subsequently there are now numerous servers
|
|
out there that don't work unless the name is lowercased */
|
|
Curl_strntolower(data->state.buffer, hostname, nlen);
|
|
data->state.buffer[nlen] = 0;
|
|
if(!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(backend->handle, data->state.buffer))
|
|
infof(data, "WARNING: failed to configure server name indication (SNI) "
|
|
"TLS extension\n");
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* Check if there's a cached ID we can/should use here! */
|
|
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
|
|
void *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
|
|
int data_idx = ossl_get_ssl_data_index();
|
|
int connectdata_idx = ossl_get_ssl_conn_index();
|
|
int sockindex_idx = ossl_get_ssl_sockindex_index();
|
|
int proxy_idx = ossl_get_proxy_index();
|
|
|
|
if(data_idx >= 0 && connectdata_idx >= 0 && sockindex_idx >= 0 &&
|
|
proxy_idx >= 0) {
|
|
/* Store the data needed for the "new session" callback.
|
|
* The sockindex is stored as a pointer to an array element. */
|
|
SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, data_idx, data);
|
|
SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, connectdata_idx, conn);
|
|
SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, sockindex_idx, conn->sock + sockindex);
|
|
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
|
|
SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, proxy_idx, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? (void *) 1:
|
|
NULL);
|
|
#else
|
|
SSL_set_ex_data(backend->handle, proxy_idx, NULL);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
|
|
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, SSL_IS_PROXY() ? TRUE : FALSE,
|
|
&ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
|
|
/* we got a session id, use it! */
|
|
if(!SSL_set_session(backend->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
|
|
Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s",
|
|
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
|
|
sizeof(error_buffer)));
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
/* Informational message */
|
|
infof(data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
|
|
}
|
|
Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
|
|
if(conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].use) {
|
|
BIO *const bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl());
|
|
SSL *handle = conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].backend->handle;
|
|
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connection_complete == conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state);
|
|
DEBUGASSERT(handle != NULL);
|
|
DEBUGASSERT(bio != NULL);
|
|
BIO_set_ssl(bio, handle, FALSE);
|
|
SSL_set_bio(backend->handle, bio, bio);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
if(!SSL_set_fd(backend->handle, (int)sockfd)) {
|
|
/* pass the raw socket into the SSL layers */
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_fd failed: %s",
|
|
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
|
|
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_connect_step2(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
|
|
{
|
|
int err;
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
|
|
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state
|
|
|| ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state
|
|
|| ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state);
|
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
err = SSL_connect(backend->handle);
|
|
#ifndef HAVE_KEYLOG_CALLBACK
|
|
if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) {
|
|
/* If key logging is enabled, wait for the handshake to complete and then
|
|
* proceed with logging secrets (for TLS 1.2 or older).
|
|
*/
|
|
ossl_log_tls12_secret(backend->handle, &backend->keylog_done);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
/* 1 is fine
|
|
0 is "not successful but was shut down controlled"
|
|
<0 is "handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred" */
|
|
if(1 != err) {
|
|
int detail = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, err);
|
|
|
|
if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) {
|
|
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) {
|
|
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC
|
|
if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC == detail) {
|
|
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
else {
|
|
/* untreated error */
|
|
unsigned long errdetail;
|
|
char error_buffer[256]="";
|
|
CURLcode result;
|
|
long lerr;
|
|
int lib;
|
|
int reason;
|
|
|
|
/* the connection failed, we're not waiting for anything else. */
|
|
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
|
|
|
|
/* Get the earliest error code from the thread's error queue and removes
|
|
the entry. */
|
|
errdetail = ERR_get_error();
|
|
|
|
/* Extract which lib and reason */
|
|
lib = ERR_GET_LIB(errdetail);
|
|
reason = ERR_GET_REASON(errdetail);
|
|
|
|
if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) &&
|
|
((reason == SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED) ||
|
|
(reason == SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED))) {
|
|
result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
|
|
|
|
lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(backend->handle);
|
|
if(lerr != X509_V_OK) {
|
|
SSL_SET_OPTION_LVALUE(certverifyresult) = lerr;
|
|
msnprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer),
|
|
"SSL certificate problem: %s",
|
|
X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr));
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
/* strcpy() is fine here as long as the string fits within
|
|
error_buffer */
|
|
strcpy(error_buffer, "SSL certificate verification failed");
|
|
}
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L && \
|
|
!defined(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER) && \
|
|
!defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL))
|
|
/* SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED is only available on
|
|
OpenSSL version above v1.1.1, not Libre SSL nor BoringSSL */
|
|
else if((lib == ERR_LIB_SSL) &&
|
|
(reason == SSL_R_TLSV13_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED)) {
|
|
/* If client certificate is required, communicate the
|
|
error to client */
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_CLIENTCERT;
|
|
ossl_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
else {
|
|
result = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
|
|
ossl_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* detail is already set to the SSL error above */
|
|
|
|
/* If we e.g. use SSLv2 request-method and the server doesn't like us
|
|
* (RST connection etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and
|
|
* the SO_ERROR is also lost.
|
|
*/
|
|
if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == result && errdetail == 0) {
|
|
const char * const hostname = SSL_HOST_NAME();
|
|
const long int port = SSL_HOST_PORT();
|
|
char extramsg[80]="";
|
|
int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
|
|
if(sockerr && detail == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL)
|
|
Curl_strerror(sockerr, extramsg, sizeof(extramsg));
|
|
failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_connect: %s in connection to %s:%ld ",
|
|
extramsg[0] ? extramsg : SSL_ERROR_to_str(detail),
|
|
hostname, port);
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Could be a CERT problem */
|
|
failf(data, "%s", error_buffer);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
/* we have been connected fine, we're not waiting for anything else. */
|
|
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
|
|
|
|
/* Informational message */
|
|
infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s\n",
|
|
SSL_get_version(backend->handle),
|
|
SSL_get_cipher(backend->handle));
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
|
|
/* Sets data and len to negotiated protocol, len is 0 if no protocol was
|
|
* negotiated
|
|
*/
|
|
if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
|
|
const unsigned char *neg_protocol;
|
|
unsigned int len;
|
|
SSL_get0_alpn_selected(backend->handle, &neg_protocol, &len);
|
|
if(len) {
|
|
infof(data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", len, neg_protocol);
|
|
|
|
#ifdef USE_HTTP2
|
|
if(len == ALPN_H2_LENGTH &&
|
|
!memcmp(ALPN_H2, neg_protocol, len)) {
|
|
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
#endif
|
|
if(len == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
|
|
!memcmp(ALPN_HTTP_1_1, neg_protocol, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
|
|
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
infof(data, "ALPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
|
|
|
|
Curl_multiuse_state(data, conn->negnpn == CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 ?
|
|
BUNDLE_MULTIPLEX : BUNDLE_NO_MULTIUSE);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int asn1_object_dump(ASN1_OBJECT *a, char *buf, size_t len)
|
|
{
|
|
int i, ilen;
|
|
|
|
ilen = (int)len;
|
|
if(ilen < 0)
|
|
return 1; /* buffer too big */
|
|
|
|
i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, ilen, a);
|
|
|
|
if(i >= ilen)
|
|
return 1; /* buffer too small */
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#define push_certinfo(_label, _num) \
|
|
do { \
|
|
long info_len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, &ptr); \
|
|
Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, _num, _label, ptr, info_len); \
|
|
if(1 != BIO_reset(mem)) \
|
|
break; \
|
|
} while(0)
|
|
|
|
static void pubkey_show(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
BIO *mem,
|
|
int num,
|
|
const char *type,
|
|
const char *name,
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
|
|
const
|
|
#endif
|
|
BIGNUM *bn)
|
|
{
|
|
char *ptr;
|
|
char namebuf[32];
|
|
|
|
msnprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s(%s)", type, name);
|
|
|
|
if(bn)
|
|
BN_print(mem, bn);
|
|
push_certinfo(namebuf, num);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
|
|
#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
|
|
pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _name)
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
|
|
do { \
|
|
if(_type->_name) { \
|
|
pubkey_show(data, mem, _num, #_type, #_name, _type->_name); \
|
|
} \
|
|
} while(0)
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static void X509V3_ext(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
int certnum,
|
|
CONST_EXTS STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts)
|
|
{
|
|
int i;
|
|
|
|
if((int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0)
|
|
/* no extensions, bail out */
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
for(i = 0; i < (int)sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
|
|
X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
|
|
BUF_MEM *biomem;
|
|
char namebuf[128];
|
|
BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
|
|
|
|
if(!bio_out)
|
|
return;
|
|
|
|
obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext);
|
|
|
|
asn1_object_dump(obj, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
|
|
|
|
if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bio_out, ext, 0, 0))
|
|
ASN1_STRING_print(bio_out, (ASN1_STRING *)X509_EXTENSION_get_data(ext));
|
|
|
|
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
|
|
Curl_ssl_push_certinfo_len(data, certnum, namebuf, biomem->data,
|
|
biomem->length);
|
|
BIO_free(bio_out);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL
|
|
typedef size_t numcert_t;
|
|
#else
|
|
typedef int numcert_t;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#if defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR) && (OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3)
|
|
#define OSSL3_CONST const
|
|
#else
|
|
#define OSSL3_CONST
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
|
|
{
|
|
CURLcode result;
|
|
STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
|
|
int i;
|
|
numcert_t numcerts;
|
|
BIO *mem;
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
|
|
|
|
sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(backend->handle);
|
|
if(!sk) {
|
|
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
numcerts = sk_X509_num(sk);
|
|
|
|
result = Curl_ssl_init_certinfo(data, (int)numcerts);
|
|
if(result) {
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
|
|
|
|
for(i = 0; i < (int)numcerts; i++) {
|
|
ASN1_INTEGER *num;
|
|
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
|
|
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = NULL;
|
|
int j;
|
|
char *ptr;
|
|
const ASN1_BIT_STRING *psig = NULL;
|
|
|
|
X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_subject_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
|
|
push_certinfo("Subject", i);
|
|
|
|
X509_NAME_print_ex(mem, X509_get_issuer_name(x), 0, XN_FLAG_ONELINE);
|
|
push_certinfo("Issuer", i);
|
|
|
|
BIO_printf(mem, "%lx", X509_get_version(x));
|
|
push_certinfo("Version", i);
|
|
|
|
num = X509_get_serialNumber(x);
|
|
if(num->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
|
|
BIO_puts(mem, "-");
|
|
for(j = 0; j < num->length; j++)
|
|
BIO_printf(mem, "%02x", num->data[j]);
|
|
push_certinfo("Serial Number", i);
|
|
|
|
#if defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_SIGNATURE) && defined(HAVE_X509_GET0_EXTENSIONS)
|
|
{
|
|
const X509_ALGOR *sigalg = NULL;
|
|
X509_PUBKEY *xpubkey = NULL;
|
|
ASN1_OBJECT *pubkeyoid = NULL;
|
|
|
|
X509_get0_signature(&psig, &sigalg, x);
|
|
if(sigalg) {
|
|
i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, sigalg->algorithm);
|
|
push_certinfo("Signature Algorithm", i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
xpubkey = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x);
|
|
if(xpubkey) {
|
|
X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(&pubkeyoid, NULL, NULL, NULL, xpubkey);
|
|
if(pubkeyoid) {
|
|
i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, pubkeyoid);
|
|
push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509V3_ext(data, i, X509_get0_extensions(x));
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
{
|
|
/* before OpenSSL 1.0.2 */
|
|
X509_CINF *cinf = x->cert_info;
|
|
|
|
i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->signature->algorithm);
|
|
push_certinfo("Signature Algorithm", i);
|
|
|
|
i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(mem, cinf->key->algor->algorithm);
|
|
push_certinfo("Public Key Algorithm", i);
|
|
|
|
X509V3_ext(data, i, cinf->extensions);
|
|
|
|
psig = x->signature;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(x));
|
|
push_certinfo("Start date", i);
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(x));
|
|
push_certinfo("Expire date", i);
|
|
|
|
pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
|
|
if(!pubkey)
|
|
infof(data, " Unable to load public key\n");
|
|
else {
|
|
int pktype;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
|
|
pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pubkey);
|
|
#else
|
|
pktype = pubkey->type;
|
|
#endif
|
|
switch(pktype) {
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL3_CONST RSA *rsa;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
|
|
rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pubkey);
|
|
#else
|
|
rsa = pubkey->pkey.rsa;
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
|
|
{
|
|
const BIGNUM *n;
|
|
const BIGNUM *e;
|
|
|
|
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &n, &e, NULL);
|
|
BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(n));
|
|
push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
BIO_printf(mem, "%d", BN_num_bits(rsa->n));
|
|
push_certinfo("RSA Public Key", i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
|
|
{
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA
|
|
OSSL3_CONST DSA *dsa;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
|
|
dsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pubkey);
|
|
#else
|
|
dsa = pubkey->pkey.dsa;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
|
|
{
|
|
const BIGNUM *p;
|
|
const BIGNUM *q;
|
|
const BIGNUM *g;
|
|
const BIGNUM *pub_key;
|
|
|
|
DSA_get0_pqg(dsa, &p, &q, &g);
|
|
DSA_get0_key(dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
|
|
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
|
|
#endif
|
|
#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DSA */
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
|
|
{
|
|
OSSL3_CONST DH *dh;
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_EVP_PKEY
|
|
dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pubkey);
|
|
#else
|
|
dh = pubkey->pkey.dh;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_OPAQUE_RSA_DSA_DH
|
|
{
|
|
const BIGNUM *p;
|
|
const BIGNUM *q;
|
|
const BIGNUM *g;
|
|
const BIGNUM *pub_key;
|
|
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, &q, &g);
|
|
DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dh, q, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
|
|
}
|
|
#else
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
|
|
print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
|
|
#endif
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(psig) {
|
|
for(j = 0; j < psig->length; j++)
|
|
BIO_printf(mem, "%02x:", psig->data[j]);
|
|
push_certinfo("Signature", i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
PEM_write_bio_X509(mem, x);
|
|
push_certinfo("Cert", i);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
BIO_free(mem);
|
|
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Heavily modified from:
|
|
* https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Certificate_and_Public_Key_Pinning#OpenSSL
|
|
*/
|
|
static CURLcode pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(struct Curl_easy *data, X509* cert,
|
|
const char *pinnedpubkey)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Scratch */
|
|
int len1 = 0, len2 = 0;
|
|
unsigned char *buff1 = NULL, *temp = NULL;
|
|
|
|
/* Result is returned to caller */
|
|
CURLcode result = CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
|
|
|
|
/* if a path wasn't specified, don't pin */
|
|
if(!pinnedpubkey)
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
|
|
if(!cert)
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
/* Begin Gyrations to get the subjectPublicKeyInfo */
|
|
/* Thanks to Viktor Dukhovni on the OpenSSL mailing list */
|
|
|
|
/* https://groups.google.com/group/mailing.openssl.users/browse_thread
|
|
/thread/d61858dae102c6c7 */
|
|
len1 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), NULL);
|
|
if(len1 < 1)
|
|
break; /* failed */
|
|
|
|
buff1 = temp = malloc(len1);
|
|
if(!buff1)
|
|
break; /* failed */
|
|
|
|
/* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/d2i_X509.html */
|
|
len2 = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &temp);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* These checks are verifying we got back the same values as when we
|
|
* sized the buffer. It's pretty weak since they should always be the
|
|
* same. But it gives us something to test.
|
|
*/
|
|
if((len1 != len2) || !temp || ((temp - buff1) != len1))
|
|
break; /* failed */
|
|
|
|
/* End Gyrations */
|
|
|
|
/* The one good exit point */
|
|
result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data, pinnedpubkey, buff1, len1);
|
|
} while(0);
|
|
|
|
if(buff1)
|
|
free(buff1);
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Get the server cert, verify it and show it etc, only call failf() if the
|
|
* 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational
|
|
* purposes only!
|
|
*
|
|
* We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
|
|
* man-in-the-middle attack.
|
|
*/
|
|
static CURLcode servercert(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
struct connectdata *conn,
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
|
|
bool strict)
|
|
{
|
|
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
long lerr;
|
|
X509 *issuer;
|
|
BIO *fp = NULL;
|
|
char error_buffer[256]="";
|
|
char buffer[2048];
|
|
const char *ptr;
|
|
BIO *mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
|
|
|
|
if(data->set.ssl.certinfo)
|
|
/* we've been asked to gather certificate info! */
|
|
(void)get_cert_chain(data, connssl);
|
|
|
|
backend->server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(backend->handle);
|
|
if(!backend->server_cert) {
|
|
BIO_free(mem);
|
|
if(!strict)
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate!");
|
|
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
infof(data, "%s certificate:\n", SSL_IS_PROXY() ? "Proxy" : "Server");
|
|
|
|
rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(backend->server_cert),
|
|
buffer, sizeof(buffer));
|
|
infof(data, " subject: %s\n", rc?"[NONE]":buffer);
|
|
|
|
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_VERBOSE_STRINGS
|
|
{
|
|
long len;
|
|
ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notBefore(backend->server_cert));
|
|
len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr);
|
|
infof(data, " start date: %.*s\n", len, ptr);
|
|
(void)BIO_reset(mem);
|
|
|
|
ASN1_TIME_print(mem, X509_get0_notAfter(backend->server_cert));
|
|
len = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **) &ptr);
|
|
infof(data, " expire date: %.*s\n", len, ptr);
|
|
(void)BIO_reset(mem);
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
BIO_free(mem);
|
|
|
|
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) {
|
|
result = verifyhost(data, conn, backend->server_cert);
|
|
if(result) {
|
|
X509_free(backend->server_cert);
|
|
backend->server_cert = NULL;
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(backend->server_cert),
|
|
buffer, sizeof(buffer));
|
|
if(rc) {
|
|
if(strict)
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name!");
|
|
result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
infof(data, " issuer: %s\n", buffer);
|
|
|
|
/* We could do all sorts of certificate verification stuff here before
|
|
deallocating the certificate. */
|
|
|
|
/* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */
|
|
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert) || SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert_blob)) {
|
|
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert_blob))
|
|
fp = BIO_new_mem_buf(SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert_blob)->data,
|
|
(int)SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert_blob)->len);
|
|
else {
|
|
fp = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
|
|
if(!fp) {
|
|
failf(data,
|
|
"BIO_new return NULL, " OSSL_PACKAGE
|
|
" error %s",
|
|
ossl_strerror(ERR_get_error(), error_buffer,
|
|
sizeof(error_buffer)) );
|
|
X509_free(backend->server_cert);
|
|
backend->server_cert = NULL;
|
|
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(BIO_read_filename(fp, SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert)) <= 0) {
|
|
if(strict)
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)",
|
|
SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
|
|
BIO_free(fp);
|
|
X509_free(backend->server_cert);
|
|
backend->server_cert = NULL;
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
issuer = PEM_read_bio_X509(fp, NULL, ZERO_NULL, NULL);
|
|
if(!issuer) {
|
|
if(strict)
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)",
|
|
SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
|
|
BIO_free(fp);
|
|
X509_free(issuer);
|
|
X509_free(backend->server_cert);
|
|
backend->server_cert = NULL;
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(X509_check_issued(issuer, backend->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
|
|
if(strict)
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)",
|
|
SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
|
|
BIO_free(fp);
|
|
X509_free(issuer);
|
|
X509_free(backend->server_cert);
|
|
backend->server_cert = NULL;
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
infof(data, " SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n",
|
|
SSL_SET_OPTION(issuercert));
|
|
BIO_free(fp);
|
|
X509_free(issuer);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
lerr = SSL_get_verify_result(backend->handle);
|
|
SSL_SET_OPTION_LVALUE(certverifyresult) = lerr;
|
|
if(lerr != X509_V_OK) {
|
|
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
|
|
/* We probably never reach this, because SSL_connect() will fail
|
|
and we return earlier if verifypeer is set? */
|
|
if(strict)
|
|
failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)",
|
|
X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
|
|
result = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
infof(data, " SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld),"
|
|
" continuing anyway.\n",
|
|
X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
infof(data, " SSL certificate verify ok.\n");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
|
|
!defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
|
|
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifystatus)) {
|
|
result = verifystatus(data, connssl);
|
|
if(result) {
|
|
X509_free(backend->server_cert);
|
|
backend->server_cert = NULL;
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
if(!strict)
|
|
/* when not strict, we don't bother about the verify cert problems */
|
|
result = CURLE_OK;
|
|
|
|
ptr = SSL_PINNED_PUB_KEY();
|
|
if(!result && ptr) {
|
|
result = pkp_pin_peer_pubkey(data, backend->server_cert, ptr);
|
|
if(result)
|
|
failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
X509_free(backend->server_cert);
|
|
backend->server_cert = NULL;
|
|
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
|
|
{
|
|
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
|
|
|
|
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state);
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
|
|
* man-in-the-middle attack; NEVERTHELESS, if we're told explicitly not to
|
|
* verify the peer ignore faults and failures from the server cert
|
|
* operations.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
result = servercert(data, conn, connssl, (SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer) ||
|
|
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)));
|
|
|
|
if(!result)
|
|
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static Curl_recv ossl_recv;
|
|
static Curl_send ossl_send;
|
|
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_connect_common(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
struct connectdata *conn,
|
|
int sockindex,
|
|
bool nonblocking,
|
|
bool *done)
|
|
{
|
|
CURLcode result;
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
|
|
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
|
|
int what;
|
|
|
|
/* check if the connection has already been established */
|
|
if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) {
|
|
*done = TRUE;
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state) {
|
|
/* Find out how much more time we're allowed */
|
|
const timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
|
|
/* no need to continue if time already is up */
|
|
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
|
|
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
result = ossl_connect_step1(data, conn, sockindex);
|
|
if(result)
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
|
|
ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
|
|
ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) {
|
|
|
|
/* check allowed time left */
|
|
const timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
|
|
|
|
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
|
|
/* no need to continue if time already is up */
|
|
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
|
|
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */
|
|
if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading ||
|
|
connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
|
|
|
|
curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing ==
|
|
connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
|
|
curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading ==
|
|
connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
|
|
|
|
what = Curl_socket_check(readfd, CURL_SOCKET_BAD, writefd,
|
|
nonblocking?0:timeout_ms);
|
|
if(what < 0) {
|
|
/* fatal error */
|
|
failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
|
|
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
if(0 == what) {
|
|
if(nonblocking) {
|
|
*done = FALSE;
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
/* timeout */
|
|
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
|
|
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
|
|
}
|
|
/* socket is readable or writable */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if this
|
|
* connection is done nonblocking and this loop would execute again. This
|
|
* permits the owner of a multi handle to abort a connection attempt
|
|
* before step2 has completed while ensuring that a client using select()
|
|
* or epoll() will always have a valid fdset to wait on.
|
|
*/
|
|
result = ossl_connect_step2(data, conn, sockindex);
|
|
if(result || (nonblocking &&
|
|
(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
|
|
ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
|
|
ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
} /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */
|
|
|
|
if(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state) {
|
|
result = ossl_connect_step3(data, conn, sockindex);
|
|
if(result)
|
|
return result;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if(ssl_connect_done == connssl->connecting_state) {
|
|
connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
|
|
conn->recv[sockindex] = ossl_recv;
|
|
conn->send[sockindex] = ossl_send;
|
|
*done = TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
*done = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
/* Reset our connect state machine */
|
|
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
|
|
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_connect_nonblocking(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
struct connectdata *conn,
|
|
int sockindex,
|
|
bool *done)
|
|
{
|
|
return ossl_connect_common(data, conn, sockindex, TRUE, done);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_connect(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
|
|
int sockindex)
|
|
{
|
|
CURLcode result;
|
|
bool done = FALSE;
|
|
|
|
result = ossl_connect_common(data, conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done);
|
|
if(result)
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
DEBUGASSERT(done);
|
|
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static bool ossl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn,
|
|
int connindex)
|
|
{
|
|
const struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[connindex];
|
|
if(connssl->backend->handle && SSL_pending(connssl->backend->handle))
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
|
|
{
|
|
const struct ssl_connect_data *proxyssl = &conn->proxy_ssl[connindex];
|
|
if(proxyssl->backend->handle && SSL_pending(proxyssl->backend->handle))
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static size_t ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size);
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t ossl_send(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
int sockindex,
|
|
const void *mem,
|
|
size_t len,
|
|
CURLcode *curlcode)
|
|
{
|
|
/* SSL_write() is said to return 'int' while write() and send() returns
|
|
'size_t' */
|
|
int err;
|
|
char error_buffer[256];
|
|
unsigned long sslerror;
|
|
int memlen;
|
|
int rc;
|
|
struct connectdata *conn = data->conn;
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
|
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len;
|
|
set_logger(conn, data);
|
|
rc = SSL_write(backend->handle, mem, memlen);
|
|
|
|
if(rc <= 0) {
|
|
err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, rc);
|
|
|
|
switch(err) {
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
|
|
/* The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function
|
|
should be called again later. This is basically an EWOULDBLOCK
|
|
equivalent. */
|
|
*curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
|
|
{
|
|
int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
|
|
sslerror = ERR_get_error();
|
|
if(sslerror)
|
|
ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
|
|
else if(sockerr)
|
|
Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
|
|
else {
|
|
strncpy(error_buffer, SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), sizeof(error_buffer));
|
|
error_buffer[sizeof(error_buffer) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_write: %s, errno %d",
|
|
error_buffer, sockerr);
|
|
*curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
|
|
/* A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error.
|
|
The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. */
|
|
sslerror = ERR_get_error();
|
|
if(ERR_GET_LIB(sslerror) == ERR_LIB_SSL &&
|
|
ERR_GET_REASON(sslerror) == SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET &&
|
|
conn->ssl[sockindex].state == ssl_connection_complete
|
|
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
|
|
&& conn->proxy_ssl[sockindex].state == ssl_connection_complete
|
|
#endif
|
|
) {
|
|
char ver[120];
|
|
ossl_version(ver, 120);
|
|
failf(data, "Error: %s does not support double SSL tunneling.", ver);
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
failf(data, "SSL_write() error: %s",
|
|
ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer)));
|
|
*curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* a true error */
|
|
failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_write: %s, errno %d",
|
|
SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), SOCKERRNO);
|
|
*curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
*curlcode = CURLE_OK;
|
|
return (ssize_t)rc; /* number of bytes */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct Curl_easy *data, /* transfer */
|
|
int num, /* socketindex */
|
|
char *buf, /* store read data here */
|
|
size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */
|
|
CURLcode *curlcode)
|
|
{
|
|
char error_buffer[256];
|
|
unsigned long sslerror;
|
|
ssize_t nread;
|
|
int buffsize;
|
|
struct connectdata *conn = data->conn;
|
|
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[num];
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
|
|
|
|
ERR_clear_error();
|
|
|
|
buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize;
|
|
set_logger(conn, data);
|
|
nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, buffsize);
|
|
if(nread <= 0) {
|
|
/* failed SSL_read */
|
|
int err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, (int)nread);
|
|
|
|
switch(err) {
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
|
|
/* close_notify alert */
|
|
if(num == FIRSTSOCKET)
|
|
/* mark the connection for close if it is indeed the control
|
|
connection */
|
|
connclose(conn, "TLS close_notify");
|
|
break;
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
|
|
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
|
|
/* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
|
|
*curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
default:
|
|
/* openssl/ssl.h for SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL says "look at error stack/return
|
|
value/errno" */
|
|
/* https://www.openssl.org/docs/crypto/ERR_get_error.html */
|
|
sslerror = ERR_get_error();
|
|
if((nread < 0) || sslerror) {
|
|
/* If the return code was negative or there actually is an error in the
|
|
queue */
|
|
int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
|
|
if(sslerror)
|
|
ossl_strerror(sslerror, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
|
|
else if(sockerr && err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL)
|
|
Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
|
|
else {
|
|
strncpy(error_buffer, SSL_ERROR_to_str(err), sizeof(error_buffer));
|
|
error_buffer[sizeof(error_buffer) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read: %s, errno %d",
|
|
error_buffer, sockerr);
|
|
*curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
/* For debug builds be a little stricter and error on any
|
|
SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL. For example a server may have closed the connection
|
|
abruptly without a close_notify alert. For compatibility with older
|
|
peers we don't do this by default. #4624
|
|
|
|
We can use this to gauge how many users may be affected, and
|
|
if it goes ok eventually transition to allow in dev and release with
|
|
the newest OpenSSL: #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10101000L) */
|
|
#ifdef DEBUGBUILD
|
|
if(err == SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) {
|
|
int sockerr = SOCKERRNO;
|
|
if(sockerr)
|
|
Curl_strerror(sockerr, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
|
|
else {
|
|
msnprintf(error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer),
|
|
"Connection closed abruptly");
|
|
}
|
|
failf(data, OSSL_PACKAGE " SSL_read: %s, errno %d"
|
|
" (Fatal because this is a curl debug build)",
|
|
error_buffer, sockerr);
|
|
*curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
return nread;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static size_t ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER
|
|
#if LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x2070100fL
|
|
return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx",
|
|
OSSL_PACKAGE,
|
|
(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>28)&0xf,
|
|
(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>20)&0xff,
|
|
(LIBRESSL_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xff);
|
|
#else /* OpenSSL_version() first appeared in LibreSSL 2.7.1 */
|
|
char *p;
|
|
int count;
|
|
const char *ver = OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION);
|
|
const char expected[] = OSSL_PACKAGE " "; /* ie "LibreSSL " */
|
|
if(Curl_strncasecompare(ver, expected, sizeof(expected) - 1)) {
|
|
ver += sizeof(expected) - 1;
|
|
}
|
|
count = msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%s", OSSL_PACKAGE, ver);
|
|
for(p = buffer; *p; ++p) {
|
|
if(ISSPACE(*p))
|
|
*p = '_';
|
|
}
|
|
return count;
|
|
#endif
|
|
#elif defined(OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL)
|
|
return msnprintf(buffer, size, OSSL_PACKAGE);
|
|
#elif defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION) && defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING)
|
|
return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%s",
|
|
OSSL_PACKAGE, OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION_STRING));
|
|
#else
|
|
/* not LibreSSL, BoringSSL and not using OpenSSL_version */
|
|
|
|
char sub[3];
|
|
unsigned long ssleay_value;
|
|
sub[2]='\0';
|
|
sub[1]='\0';
|
|
ssleay_value = OpenSSL_version_num();
|
|
if(ssleay_value < 0x906000) {
|
|
ssleay_value = SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER;
|
|
sub[0]='\0';
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if(ssleay_value&0xff0) {
|
|
int minor_ver = (ssleay_value >> 4) & 0xff;
|
|
if(minor_ver > 26) {
|
|
/* handle extended version introduced for 0.9.8za */
|
|
sub[1] = (char) ((minor_ver - 1) % 26 + 'a' + 1);
|
|
sub[0] = 'z';
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
sub[0] = (char) (minor_ver + 'a' - 1);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
else
|
|
sub[0]='\0';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return msnprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%lx.%lx.%lx%s"
|
|
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
|
|
"-fips"
|
|
#endif
|
|
,
|
|
OSSL_PACKAGE,
|
|
(ssleay_value>>28)&0xf,
|
|
(ssleay_value>>20)&0xff,
|
|
(ssleay_value>>12)&0xff,
|
|
sub);
|
|
#endif /* OPENSSL_IS_BORINGSSL */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* can be called with data == NULL */
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_random(struct Curl_easy *data,
|
|
unsigned char *entropy, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
int rc;
|
|
if(data) {
|
|
if(ossl_seed(data)) /* Initiate the seed if not already done */
|
|
return CURLE_FAILED_INIT; /* couldn't seed for some reason */
|
|
}
|
|
else {
|
|
if(!rand_enough())
|
|
return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
|
|
}
|
|
/* RAND_bytes() returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */
|
|
rc = RAND_bytes(entropy, curlx_uztosi(length));
|
|
return (rc == 1 ? CURLE_OK : CURLE_FAILED_INIT);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
|
|
static CURLcode ossl_sha256sum(const unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
|
|
size_t tmplen,
|
|
unsigned char *sha256sum /* output */,
|
|
size_t unused)
|
|
{
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
|
|
unsigned int len = 0;
|
|
(void) unused;
|
|
|
|
mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
|
if(!mdctx)
|
|
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
EVP_DigestInit(mdctx, EVP_sha256());
|
|
EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, tmp, tmplen);
|
|
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, sha256sum, &len);
|
|
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(mdctx);
|
|
return CURLE_OK;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
static bool ossl_cert_status_request(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090808fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT) && \
|
|
!defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP)
|
|
return TRUE;
|
|
#else
|
|
return FALSE;
|
|
#endif
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static void *ossl_get_internals(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
|
|
CURLINFO info)
|
|
{
|
|
/* Legacy: CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION must return an SSL_CTX pointer. */
|
|
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
|
|
return info == CURLINFO_TLS_SESSION ?
|
|
(void *)backend->ctx : (void *)backend->handle;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_openssl = {
|
|
{ CURLSSLBACKEND_OPENSSL, "openssl" }, /* info */
|
|
|
|
SSLSUPP_CA_PATH |
|
|
SSLSUPP_CAINFO_BLOB |
|
|
SSLSUPP_CERTINFO |
|
|
SSLSUPP_PINNEDPUBKEY |
|
|
SSLSUPP_SSL_CTX |
|
|
#ifdef HAVE_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHERSUITES
|
|
SSLSUPP_TLS13_CIPHERSUITES |
|
|
#endif
|
|
SSLSUPP_HTTPS_PROXY,
|
|
|
|
sizeof(struct ssl_backend_data),
|
|
|
|
ossl_init, /* init */
|
|
ossl_cleanup, /* cleanup */
|
|
ossl_version, /* version */
|
|
ossl_check_cxn, /* check_cxn */
|
|
ossl_shutdown, /* shutdown */
|
|
ossl_data_pending, /* data_pending */
|
|
ossl_random, /* random */
|
|
ossl_cert_status_request, /* cert_status_request */
|
|
ossl_connect, /* connect */
|
|
ossl_connect_nonblocking, /* connect_nonblocking */
|
|
Curl_ssl_getsock, /* getsock */
|
|
ossl_get_internals, /* get_internals */
|
|
ossl_close, /* close_one */
|
|
ossl_close_all, /* close_all */
|
|
ossl_session_free, /* session_free */
|
|
ossl_set_engine, /* set_engine */
|
|
ossl_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */
|
|
ossl_engines_list, /* engines_list */
|
|
Curl_none_false_start, /* false_start */
|
|
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090800fL) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA256)
|
|
ossl_sha256sum /* sha256sum */
|
|
#else
|
|
NULL /* sha256sum */
|
|
#endif
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
#endif /* USE_OPENSSL */
|