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curl/lib/ssluse.c
Tatsuhiro Tsujikawa ebf315e6f3 OpenSSL: Made cert hostname check conform to RFC 6125 
This change replaces RFC 2818 based hostname check in OpenSSL build with
RFC 6125 [1] based one.

The hostname check in RFC 2818 is ambiguous and each project implements
it in the their own way and they are slightly different. I check curl,
gnutls, Firefox and Chrome and they are all different.

I don't think there is a bug in current implementation of hostname
check. But it is not as strict as the modern browsers do. Currently,
curl allows multiple wildcard character '*' and it matches '.'. (as
described in the comment in ssluse.c).

Firefox implementation is also based on RFC 2818 but it only allows at
most one wildcard character and it must be in the left-most label in the
pattern and the wildcard must not be followed by any character in the
label.[2] Chromium implementation is based on RFC 6125 as my patch does.
Firefox and Chromium both require wildcard in the left-most label in the
presented identifier.

This patch is more strict than the current implementation, so there may
be some cases where old curl works but new one does not. But at the same
time I think it is good practice to follow the modern browsers do and
follow the newer RFC.

[1] http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
[2] https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=159483
2012-04-01 20:10:37 +02:00

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/***************************************************************************
* _ _ ____ _
* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
* / __| | | | |_) | |
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2012, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
* are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
*
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
*
* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied.
*
***************************************************************************/
/*
* Source file for all OpenSSL-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
* but sslgen.c should ever call or use these functions.
*/
/*
* The original SSLeay-using code for curl was written by Linas Vepstas and
* Sampo Kellomaki 1998.
*/
#include "setup.h"
#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
#include <limits.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SOCKET_H
#include <sys/socket.h>
#endif
#include "urldata.h"
#include "sendf.h"
#include "formdata.h" /* for the boundary function */
#include "url.h" /* for the ssl config check function */
#include "inet_pton.h"
#include "ssluse.h"
#include "connect.h"
#include "strequal.h"
#include "select.h"
#include "sslgen.h"
#include "rawstr.h"
#define _MPRINTF_REPLACE /* use the internal *printf() functions */
#include <curl/mprintf.h>
#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
#ifdef USE_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#else
#include <rand.h>
#include <x509v3.h>
#endif
#include "warnless.h"
#include "curl_memory.h"
#include "non-ascii.h" /* for Curl_convert_from_utf8 prototype */
/* The last #include file should be: */
#include "memdebug.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER
#error "OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER not defined"
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x0090581fL
#define HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION 1
#else
#undef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00904100L
#define HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK 1
#else
#undef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907001L
/* ENGINE_load_private_key() takes four arguments */
#define HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
#include <openssl/ui.h>
#else
/* ENGINE_load_private_key() takes three arguments */
#undef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
#endif
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00903001L) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_PKCS12_H)
/* OpenSSL has PKCS 12 support */
#define HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
#else
/* OpenSSL/SSLEay does not have PKCS12 support */
#undef HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00906001L
#define HAVE_ERR_ERROR_STRING_N 1
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL const
#else
#define SSL_METHOD_QUAL
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L
/* 0.9.6 didn't have X509_STORE_set_flags() */
#define HAVE_X509_STORE_SET_FLAGS 1
#else
#define X509_STORE_set_flags(x,y) Curl_nop_stmt
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10000000L
#define HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE 1
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_SSLV2_CLIENT_METHOD
#undef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 /* undef first to avoid compiler warnings */
#define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
#endif
/*
* Number of bytes to read from the random number seed file. This must be
* a finite value (because some entropy "files" like /dev/urandom have
* an infinite length), but must be large enough to provide enough
* entopy to properly seed OpenSSL's PRNG.
*/
#define RAND_LOAD_LENGTH 1024
#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
static char global_passwd[64];
#endif
static int passwd_callback(char *buf, int num, int encrypting
#ifdef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
/* This was introduced in 0.9.4, we can set this
using SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata()
*/
, void *global_passwd
#endif
)
{
DEBUGASSERT(0 == encrypting);
if(!encrypting) {
int klen = curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)global_passwd));
if(num > klen) {
memcpy(buf, global_passwd, klen+1);
return klen;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* rand_enough() is a function that returns TRUE if we have seeded the random
* engine properly. We use some preprocessor magic to provide a seed_enough()
* macro to use, just to prevent a compiler warning on this function if we
* pass in an argument that is never used.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_RAND_STATUS
#define seed_enough(x) rand_enough()
static bool rand_enough(void)
{
return (0 != RAND_status()) ? TRUE : FALSE;
}
#else
#define seed_enough(x) rand_enough(x)
static bool rand_enough(int nread)
{
/* this is a very silly decision to make */
return (nread > 500) ? TRUE : FALSE;
}
#endif
static int ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
{
char *buf = data->state.buffer; /* point to the big buffer */
int nread=0;
/* Q: should we add support for a random file name as a libcurl option?
A: Yes, it is here */
#ifndef RANDOM_FILE
/* if RANDOM_FILE isn't defined, we only perform this if an option tells
us to! */
if(data->set.ssl.random_file)
#define RANDOM_FILE "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
#endif
{
/* let the option override the define */
nread += RAND_load_file((data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]?
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE]:
RANDOM_FILE),
RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
if(seed_enough(nread))
return nread;
}
#if defined(HAVE_RAND_EGD)
/* only available in OpenSSL 0.9.5 and later */
/* EGD_SOCKET is set at configure time or not at all */
#ifndef EGD_SOCKET
/* If we don't have the define set, we only do this if the egd-option
is set */
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET])
#define EGD_SOCKET "" /* doesn't matter won't be used */
#endif
{
/* If there's an option and a define, the option overrides the
define */
int ret = RAND_egd(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]?
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]:EGD_SOCKET);
if(-1 != ret) {
nread += ret;
if(seed_enough(nread))
return nread;
}
}
#endif
/* If we get here, it means we need to seed the PRNG using a "silly"
approach! */
#ifdef HAVE_RAND_SCREEN
/* if RAND_screen() is present, this is windows and thus we assume that the
randomness is already taken care of */
nread = 100; /* just a value */
#else
{
int len;
char *area;
/* Changed call to RAND_seed to use the underlying RAND_add implementation
* directly. Do this in a loop, with the amount of additional entropy
* being dependent upon the algorithm used by Curl_FormBoundary(): N bytes
* of a 7-bit ascii set. -- Richard Gorton, March 11 2003.
*/
do {
area = Curl_FormBoundary();
if(!area)
return 3; /* out of memory */
len = curlx_uztosi(strlen(area));
RAND_add(area, len, (len >> 1));
free(area); /* now remove the random junk */
} while(!RAND_status());
}
#endif
/* generates a default path for the random seed file */
buf[0]=0; /* blank it first */
RAND_file_name(buf, BUFSIZE);
if(buf[0]) {
/* we got a file name to try */
nread += RAND_load_file(buf, RAND_LOAD_LENGTH);
if(seed_enough(nread))
return nread;
}
infof(data, "libcurl is now using a weak random seed!\n");
return nread;
}
int Curl_ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
{
/* we have the "SSL is seeded" boolean static to prevent multiple
time-consuming seedings in vain */
static bool ssl_seeded = FALSE;
if(!ssl_seeded || data->set.str[STRING_SSL_RANDOM_FILE] ||
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_EGDSOCKET]) {
ossl_seed(data);
ssl_seeded = TRUE;
}
return 0;
}
#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE
#define SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE 42
#endif
#ifndef SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12
#define SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12 43
#endif
static int do_file_type(const char *type)
{
if(!type || !type[0])
return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "PEM"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "DER"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "ENG"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE;
if(Curl_raw_equal(type, "P12"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12;
return -1;
}
static
int cert_stuff(struct connectdata *conn,
SSL_CTX* ctx,
char *cert_file,
const char *cert_type,
char *key_file,
const char *key_type)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
int file_type = do_file_type(cert_type);
if(cert_file != NULL || file_type == SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE) {
SSL *ssl;
X509 *x509;
int cert_done = 0;
if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]) {
#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
/*
* If password has been given, we store that in the global
* area (*shudder*) for a while:
*/
size_t len = strlen(data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
if(len < sizeof(global_passwd))
memcpy(global_passwd, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD], len+1);
else
global_passwd[0] = '\0';
#else
/*
* We set the password in the callback userdata
*/
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx,
data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
#endif
/* Set passwd callback: */
SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(ctx, passwd_callback);
}
#define SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR \
"unable to use client certificate (no key found or wrong pass phrase?)"
switch(file_type) {
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
/* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() only works on PEM files */
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(ctx,
cert_file) != 1) {
failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
return 0;
}
break;
case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
/* SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file() works with either PEM or ASN1, but
we use the case above for PEM so this can only be performed with
ASN1 files. */
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx,
cert_file,
file_type) != 1) {
failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
return 0;
}
break;
case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
#if defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H) && defined(ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME)
{
if(data->state.engine) {
const char *cmd_name = "LOAD_CERT_CTRL";
struct {
const char *cert_id;
X509 *cert;
} params;
params.cert_id = cert_file;
params.cert = NULL;
/* Does the engine supports LOAD_CERT_CTRL ? */
if(!ENGINE_ctrl(data->state.engine, ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME,
0, (void *)cmd_name, NULL)) {
failf(data, "ssl engine does not support loading certificates");
return 0;
}
/* Load the certificate from the engine */
if(!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(data->state.engine, cmd_name,
0, &params, NULL, 1)) {
failf(data, "ssl engine cannot load client cert with id"
" '%s' [%s]", cert_file,
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
return 0;
}
if(!params.cert) {
failf(data, "ssl engine didn't initialized the certificate "
"properly.");
return 0;
}
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, params.cert) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set client certificate");
X509_free(params.cert);
return 0;
}
X509_free(params.cert); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
}
else {
failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load certificate");
return 0;
}
}
break;
#else
failf(data, "file type ENG for certificate not implemented");
return 0;
#endif
case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
{
#ifdef HAVE_PKCS12_SUPPORT
FILE *f;
PKCS12 *p12;
EVP_PKEY *pri;
STACK_OF(X509) *ca = NULL;
int i;
f = fopen(cert_file,"rb");
if(!f) {
failf(data, "could not open PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file);
return 0;
}
p12 = d2i_PKCS12_fp(f, NULL);
fclose(f);
if(!p12) {
failf(data, "error reading PKCS12 file '%s'", cert_file );
return 0;
}
PKCS12_PBE_add();
if(!PKCS12_parse(p12, data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD], &pri, &x509,
&ca)) {
failf(data,
"could not parse PKCS12 file, check password, OpenSSL error %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL) );
PKCS12_free(p12);
return 0;
}
PKCS12_free(p12);
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, x509) != 1) {
failf(data, SSL_CLIENT_CERT_ERR);
EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
X509_free(x509);
sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
return 0;
}
if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, pri) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to use private key from PKCS12 file '%s'",
cert_file);
EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
X509_free(x509);
sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
return 0;
}
if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key (ctx)) {
failf(data, "private key from PKCS12 file '%s' "
"does not match certificate in same file", cert_file);
EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
X509_free(x509);
sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
return 0;
}
/* Set Certificate Verification chain */
if(ca && sk_X509_num(ca)) {
for(i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ca); i++) {
if(!SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,sk_X509_value(ca, i))) {
failf(data, "cannot add certificate to certificate chain");
EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
X509_free(x509);
sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
return 0;
}
if(!SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(ctx, sk_X509_value(ca, i))) {
failf(data, "cannot add certificate to client CA list");
EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
X509_free(x509);
sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
return 0;
}
}
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pri);
X509_free(x509);
sk_X509_pop_free(ca, X509_free);
cert_done = 1;
break;
#else
failf(data, "file type P12 for certificate not supported");
return 0;
#endif
}
default:
failf(data, "not supported file type '%s' for certificate", cert_type);
return 0;
}
file_type = do_file_type(key_type);
switch(file_type) {
case SSL_FILETYPE_PEM:
if(cert_done)
break;
if(key_file == NULL)
/* cert & key can only be in PEM case in the same file */
key_file=cert_file;
case SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1:
if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, file_type) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set private key file: '%s' type %s",
key_file, key_type?key_type:"PEM");
return 0;
}
break;
case SSL_FILETYPE_ENGINE:
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
{ /* XXXX still needs some work */
EVP_PKEY *priv_key = NULL;
if(data->state.engine) {
#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
UI_METHOD *ui_method = UI_OpenSSL();
#endif
/* the typecast below was added to please mingw32 */
priv_key = (EVP_PKEY *)
ENGINE_load_private_key(data->state.engine,key_file,
#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_FOUR_ARGS
ui_method,
#endif
data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
if(!priv_key) {
failf(data, "failed to load private key from crypto engine");
return 0;
}
if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, priv_key) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set private key");
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key);
return 0;
}
EVP_PKEY_free(priv_key); /* we don't need the handle any more... */
}
else {
failf(data, "crypto engine not set, can't load private key");
return 0;
}
}
break;
#else
failf(data, "file type ENG for private key not supported");
return 0;
#endif
case SSL_FILETYPE_PKCS12:
if(!cert_done) {
failf(data, "file type P12 for private key not supported");
return 0;
}
break;
default:
failf(data, "not supported file type for private key");
return 0;
}
ssl=SSL_new(ctx);
if(NULL == ssl) {
failf(data,"unable to create an SSL structure");
return 0;
}
x509=SSL_get_certificate(ssl);
/* This version was provided by Evan Jordan and is supposed to not
leak memory as the previous version: */
if(x509 != NULL) {
EVP_PKEY *pktmp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pktmp,SSL_get_privatekey(ssl));
EVP_PKEY_free(pktmp);
}
SSL_free(ssl);
/* If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from
* the private key */
/* Now we know that a key and cert have been set against
* the SSL context */
if(!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) {
failf(data, "Private key does not match the certificate public key");
return 0;
}
#ifndef HAVE_USERDATA_IN_PWD_CALLBACK
/* erase it now */
memset(global_passwd, 0, sizeof(global_passwd));
#endif
}
return 1;
}
/* returns non-zero on failure */
static int x509_name_oneline(X509_NAME *a, char *buf, size_t size)
{
#if 0
return X509_NAME_oneline(a, buf, size);
#else
BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BUF_MEM *biomem;
int rc;
if(!bio_out)
return 1; /* alloc failed! */
rc = X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_out, a, 0, XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC);
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
if((size_t)biomem->length < size)
size = biomem->length;
else
size--; /* don't overwrite the buffer end */
memcpy(buf, biomem->data, size);
buf[size]=0;
BIO_free(bio_out);
return !rc;
#endif
}
static
int cert_verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
{
X509 *err_cert;
char buf[256];
err_cert=X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx);
(void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), buf, sizeof(buf));
return ok;
}
/* Return error string for last OpenSSL error
*/
static char *SSL_strerror(unsigned long error, char *buf, size_t size)
{
#ifdef HAVE_ERR_ERROR_STRING_N
/* OpenSSL 0.9.6 and later has a function named
ERRO_error_string_n() that takes the size of the buffer as a
third argument */
ERR_error_string_n(error, buf, size);
#else
(void) size;
ERR_error_string(error, buf);
#endif
return buf;
}
#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
/**
* Global SSL init
*
* @retval 0 error initializing SSL
* @retval 1 SSL initialized successfully
*/
int Curl_ossl_init(void)
{
#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_LOAD_BUILTIN_ENGINES
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
#endif
/* Lets get nice error messages */
SSL_load_error_strings();
/* Init the global ciphers and digests */
if(!SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms())
return 0;
OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
return 1;
}
#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
/* Global cleanup */
void Curl_ossl_cleanup(void)
{
/* Free ciphers and digests lists */
EVP_cleanup();
#ifdef HAVE_ENGINE_CLEANUP
/* Free engine list */
ENGINE_cleanup();
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_CRYPTO_CLEANUP_ALL_EX_DATA
/* Free OpenSSL ex_data table */
CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
#endif
/* Free OpenSSL error strings */
ERR_free_strings();
/* Free thread local error state, destroying hash upon zero refcount */
#ifdef HAVE_ERR_REMOVE_THREAD_STATE
ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL);
#else
ERR_remove_state(0);
#endif
}
/*
* This function uses SSL_peek to determine connection status.
*
* Return codes:
* 1 means the connection is still in place
* 0 means the connection has been closed
* -1 means the connection status is unknown
*/
int Curl_ossl_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
{
int rc;
char buf;
rc = SSL_peek(conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].handle, (void*)&buf, 1);
if(rc > 0)
return 1; /* connection still in place */
if(rc == 0)
return 0; /* connection has been closed */
return -1; /* connection status unknown */
}
/* Selects an OpenSSL crypto engine
*/
CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine(struct SessionHandle *data, const char *engine)
{
#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
ENGINE *e;
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00909000L
e = ENGINE_by_id(engine);
#else
/* avoid memory leak */
for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
const char *e_id = ENGINE_get_id(e);
if(!strcmp(engine, e_id))
break;
}
#endif
if(!e) {
failf(data, "SSL Engine '%s' not found", engine);
return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
}
if(data->state.engine) {
ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
data->state.engine = NULL;
}
if(!ENGINE_init(e)) {
char buf[256];
ENGINE_free(e);
failf(data, "Failed to initialise SSL Engine '%s':\n%s",
engine, SSL_strerror(ERR_get_error(), buf, sizeof(buf)));
return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_INITFAILED;
}
data->state.engine = e;
return CURLE_OK;
#else
(void)engine;
failf(data, "SSL Engine not supported");
return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_NOTFOUND;
#endif
}
/* Sets engine as default for all SSL operations
*/
CURLcode Curl_ossl_set_engine_default(struct SessionHandle *data)
{
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
if(data->state.engine) {
if(ENGINE_set_default(data->state.engine, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL) > 0) {
infof(data,"set default crypto engine '%s'\n",
ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
}
else {
failf(data, "set default crypto engine '%s' failed",
ENGINE_get_id(data->state.engine));
return CURLE_SSL_ENGINE_SETFAILED;
}
}
#else
(void) data;
#endif
return CURLE_OK;
}
/* Return list of OpenSSL crypto engine names.
*/
struct curl_slist *Curl_ossl_engines_list(struct SessionHandle *data)
{
struct curl_slist *list = NULL;
#if defined(USE_SSLEAY) && defined(HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H)
struct curl_slist *beg;
ENGINE *e;
for(e = ENGINE_get_first(); e; e = ENGINE_get_next(e)) {
beg = curl_slist_append(list, ENGINE_get_id(e));
if(!beg) {
curl_slist_free_all(list);
return NULL;
}
list = beg;
}
#endif
(void) data;
return list;
}
/*
* This function is called when an SSL connection is closed.
*/
void Curl_ossl_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
if(connssl->handle) {
(void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->handle);
SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle);
SSL_free (connssl->handle);
connssl->handle = NULL;
}
if(connssl->ctx) {
SSL_CTX_free (connssl->ctx);
connssl->ctx = NULL;
}
}
/*
* This function is called to shut down the SSL layer but keep the
* socket open (CCC - Clear Command Channel)
*/
int Curl_ossl_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
int retval = 0;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
char buf[120]; /* We will use this for the OpenSSL error buffer, so it has
to be at least 120 bytes long. */
unsigned long sslerror;
ssize_t nread;
int buffsize;
int err;
int done = 0;
/* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code
sends a close notify alert without waiting for a close notify alert in
response. Thus we wait for a close notify alert from the server, but
we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */
if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE)
(void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->handle);
if(connssl->handle) {
buffsize = (int)sizeof(buf);
while(!done) {
int what = Curl_socket_ready(conn->sock[sockindex],
CURL_SOCKET_BAD, SSL_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT);
if(what > 0) {
ERR_clear_error();
/* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close
notify alert from the server */
nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, buf,
buffsize);
err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, (int)nread);
switch(err) {
case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
/* This is the expected response. There was no data but only
the close notify alert */
done = 1;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
/* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ\n");
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
/* SSL wants a write. Really odd. Let's bail out. */
infof(data, "SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE\n");
done = 1;
break;
default:
/* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */
sslerror = ERR_get_error();
failf(conn->data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d",
ERR_error_string(sslerror, buf),
SOCKERRNO);
done = 1;
break;
}
}
else if(0 == what) {
/* timeout */
failf(data, "SSL shutdown timeout");
done = 1;
}
else {
/* anything that gets here is fatally bad */
failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
retval = -1;
done = 1;
}
} /* while()-loop for the select() */
if(data->set.verbose) {
#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET_SHUTDOWN
switch(SSL_get_shutdown(connssl->handle)) {
case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN:
infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN\n");
break;
case SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN\n");
break;
case SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN:
infof(data, "SSL_get_shutdown() returned SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|"
"SSL_RECEIVED__SHUTDOWN\n");
break;
}
#endif
}
SSL_free (connssl->handle);
connssl->handle = NULL;
}
return retval;
}
void Curl_ossl_session_free(void *ptr)
{
/* free the ID */
SSL_SESSION_free(ptr);
}
/*
* This function is called when the 'data' struct is going away. Close
* down everything and free all resources!
*/
int Curl_ossl_close_all(struct SessionHandle *data)
{
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ENGINE_H
if(data->state.engine) {
ENGINE_finish(data->state.engine);
ENGINE_free(data->state.engine);
data->state.engine = NULL;
}
#else
(void)data;
#endif
return 0;
}
static int asn1_output(const ASN1_UTCTIME *tm,
char *buf,
size_t sizeofbuf)
{
const char *asn1_string;
int gmt=FALSE;
int i;
int year=0,month=0,day=0,hour=0,minute=0,second=0;
i=tm->length;
asn1_string=(const char *)tm->data;
if(i < 10)
return 1;
if(asn1_string[i-1] == 'Z')
gmt=TRUE;
for(i=0; i<10; i++)
if((asn1_string[i] > '9') || (asn1_string[i] < '0'))
return 2;
year= (asn1_string[0]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[1]-'0');
if(year < 50)
year+=100;
month= (asn1_string[2]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[3]-'0');
if((month > 12) || (month < 1))
return 3;
day= (asn1_string[4]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[5]-'0');
hour= (asn1_string[6]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[7]-'0');
minute= (asn1_string[8]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[9]-'0');
if((asn1_string[10] >= '0') && (asn1_string[10] <= '9') &&
(asn1_string[11] >= '0') && (asn1_string[11] <= '9'))
second= (asn1_string[10]-'0')*10+(asn1_string[11]-'0');
snprintf(buf, sizeofbuf,
"%04d-%02d-%02d %02d:%02d:%02d %s",
year+1900, month, day, hour, minute, second, (gmt?"GMT":""));
return 0;
}
/* ====================================================== */
/*
* Match a hostname against a wildcard pattern.
* E.g.
* "foo.host.com" matches "*.host.com".
*
* We use the matching rule described in RFC6125, section 6.4.3.
* http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.3
*/
#define HOST_NOMATCH 0
#define HOST_MATCH 1
static int hostmatch(const char *hostname, const char *pattern)
{
const char *pattern_label_end, *pattern_wildcard, *hostname_label_end;
int wildcard_enabled;
size_t prefixlen, suffixlen;
pattern_wildcard = strchr(pattern, '*');
if(pattern_wildcard == NULL) {
return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ? HOST_MATCH : HOST_NOMATCH;
}
/* We require at least 2 dots in pattern to avoid too wide wildcard
match. */
wildcard_enabled = 1;
pattern_label_end = strchr(pattern, '.');
if(pattern_label_end == NULL || strchr(pattern_label_end+1, '.') == NULL ||
pattern_wildcard > pattern_label_end ||
Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, "xn--", 4)) {
wildcard_enabled = 0;
}
if(!wildcard_enabled) {
return Curl_raw_equal(pattern, hostname) ? HOST_MATCH : HOST_NOMATCH;
}
hostname_label_end = strchr(hostname, '.');
if(hostname_label_end == NULL ||
!Curl_raw_equal(pattern_label_end, hostname_label_end)) {
return HOST_NOMATCH;
}
/* The wildcard must match at least one character, so the left-most
label of the hostname is at least as large as the left-most label
of the pattern. */
if(hostname_label_end - hostname < pattern_label_end - pattern) {
return HOST_NOMATCH;
}
prefixlen = pattern_wildcard - pattern;
suffixlen = pattern_label_end - (pattern_wildcard+1);
return Curl_raw_nequal(pattern, hostname, prefixlen) &&
Curl_raw_nequal(pattern_wildcard+1, hostname_label_end - suffixlen,
suffixlen) ?
HOST_MATCH : HOST_NOMATCH;
}
static int
cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname)
{
if(!match_pattern || !*match_pattern ||
!hostname || !*hostname) /* sanity check */
return 0;
if(Curl_raw_equal(hostname, match_pattern)) /* trivial case */
return 1;
if(hostmatch(hostname,match_pattern) == HOST_MATCH)
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Quote from RFC2818 section 3.1 "Server Identity"
If a subjectAltName extension of type dNSName is present, that MUST
be used as the identity. Otherwise, the (most specific) Common Name
field in the Subject field of the certificate MUST be used. Although
the use of the Common Name is existing practice, it is deprecated and
Certification Authorities are encouraged to use the dNSName instead.
Matching is performed using the matching rules specified by
[RFC2459]. If more than one identity of a given type is present in
the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name, a match in any one
of the set is considered acceptable.) Names may contain the wildcard
character * which is considered to match any single domain name
component or component fragment. E.g., *.a.com matches foo.a.com but
not bar.foo.a.com. f*.com matches foo.com but not bar.com.
In some cases, the URI is specified as an IP address rather than a
hostname. In this case, the iPAddress subjectAltName must be present
in the certificate and must exactly match the IP in the URI.
*/
static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn,
X509 *server_cert)
{
int matched = -1; /* -1 is no alternative match yet, 1 means match and 0
means mismatch */
int target = GEN_DNS; /* target type, GEN_DNS or GEN_IPADD */
size_t addrlen = 0;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *altnames;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
struct in6_addr addr;
#else
struct in_addr addr;
#endif
CURLcode res = CURLE_OK;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
if(conn->bits.ipv6_ip &&
Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr)) {
target = GEN_IPADD;
addrlen = sizeof(struct in6_addr);
}
else
#endif
if(Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)) {
target = GEN_IPADD;
addrlen = sizeof(struct in_addr);
}
/* get a "list" of alternative names */
altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
if(altnames) {
int numalts;
int i;
/* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least
one, but we don't depend on it... */
numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
/* loop through all alternatives while none has matched */
for(i=0; (i<numalts) && (matched != 1); i++) {
/* get a handle to alternative name number i */
const GENERAL_NAME *check = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
/* only check alternatives of the same type the target is */
if(check->type == target) {
/* get data and length */
const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
size_t altlen = (size_t) ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
switch(target) {
case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
/* The OpenSSL man page explicitly says: "In general it cannot be
assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null
terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that
"The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string
type itself: for example for and IA5String the data will be ASCII"
Gisle researched the OpenSSL sources:
"I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
*/
if((altlen == strlen(altptr)) &&
/* if this isn't true, there was an embedded zero in the name
string and we cannot match it. */
cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
matched = 1;
else
matched = 0;
break;
case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
/* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
our server IP address is */
if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen))
matched = 1;
else
matched = 0;
break;
}
}
}
GENERAL_NAMES_free(altnames);
}
if(matched == 1)
/* an alternative name matched the server hostname */
infof(data, "\t subjectAltName: %s matched\n", conn->host.dispname);
else if(matched == 0) {
/* an alternative name field existed, but didn't match and then
we MUST fail */
infof(data, "\t subjectAltName does not match %s\n", conn->host.dispname);
res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else {
/* we have to look to the last occurrence of a commonName in the
distinguished one to get the most significant one. */
int j,i=-1 ;
/* The following is done because of a bug in 0.9.6b */
unsigned char *nulstr = (unsigned char *)"";
unsigned char *peer_CN = nulstr;
X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert) ;
if(name)
while((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i))>=0)
i=j;
/* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string
that we can use for comparison. Doing this we support BMPstring,
UTF8 etc. */
if(i>=0) {
ASN1_STRING *tmp = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_get_entry(name,i));
/* In OpenSSL 0.9.7d and earlier, ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 fails if the input
is already UTF-8 encoded. We check for this case and copy the raw
string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
if(tmp) {
if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
if(j >= 0) {
peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1);
if(peer_CN) {
memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j);
peer_CN[j] = '\0';
}
}
}
else /* not a UTF8 name */
j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
if(peer_CN && (curlx_uztosi(strlen((char *)peer_CN)) != j)) {
/* there was a terminating zero before the end of string, this
cannot match and we return failure! */
failf(data, "SSL: illegal cert name field");
res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
}
}
if(peer_CN == nulstr)
peer_CN = NULL;
else {
/* convert peer_CN from UTF8 */
CURLcode rc = Curl_convert_from_utf8(data, peer_CN, strlen(peer_CN));
/* Curl_convert_from_utf8 calls failf if unsuccessful */
if(rc) {
OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
return rc;
}
}
if(res)
/* error already detected, pass through */
;
else if(!peer_CN) {
failf(data,
"SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else if(!cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, conn->host.name)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "
"target host name '%s'", peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
res = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (does not match '%s')\n",
peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
}
else {
infof(data, "\t common name: %s (matched)\n", peer_CN);
}
if(peer_CN)
OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
}
return res;
}
#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
/* The SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK doesn't exist in ancient OpenSSL versions
and thus this cannot be done there. */
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
static const char *ssl_msg_type(int ssl_ver, int msg)
{
if(ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR) {
switch (msg) {
case SSL2_MT_ERROR:
return "Error";
case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
return "Client hello";
case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY:
return "Client key";
case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_FINISHED:
return "Client finished";
case SSL2_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
return "Server hello";
case SSL2_MT_SERVER_VERIFY:
return "Server verify";
case SSL2_MT_SERVER_FINISHED:
return "Server finished";
case SSL2_MT_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE:
return "Request CERT";
case SSL2_MT_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE:
return "Client CERT";
}
}
else if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) {
switch (msg) {
case SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST:
return "Hello request";
case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO:
return "Client hello";
case SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO:
return "Server hello";
case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE:
return "CERT";
case SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE:
return "Server key exchange";
case SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE:
return "Client key exchange";
case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST:
return "Request CERT";
case SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE:
return "Server finished";
case SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY:
return "CERT verify";
case SSL3_MT_FINISHED:
return "Finished";
}
}
return "Unknown";
}
static const char *tls_rt_type(int type)
{
return (
type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC ? "TLS change cipher, " :
type == SSL3_RT_ALERT ? "TLS alert, " :
type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE ? "TLS handshake, " :
type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA ? "TLS app data, " :
"TLS Unknown, ");
}
/*
* Our callback from the SSL/TLS layers.
*/
static void ssl_tls_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type,
const void *buf, size_t len, const SSL *ssl,
struct connectdata *conn)
{
struct SessionHandle *data;
const char *msg_name, *tls_rt_name;
char ssl_buf[1024];
int ver, msg_type, txt_len;
if(!conn || !conn->data || !conn->data->set.fdebug ||
(direction != 0 && direction != 1))
return;
data = conn->data;
ssl_ver >>= 8;
ver = (ssl_ver == SSL2_VERSION_MAJOR ? '2' :
ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR ? '3' : '?');
/* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL
* always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type
* is at 'buf[0]'.
*/
if(ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type != 0)
tls_rt_name = tls_rt_type(content_type);
else
tls_rt_name = "";
msg_type = *(char*)buf;
msg_name = ssl_msg_type(ssl_ver, msg_type);
txt_len = snprintf(ssl_buf, sizeof(ssl_buf), "SSLv%c, %s%s (%d):\n",
ver, tls_rt_name, msg_name, msg_type);
Curl_debug(data, CURLINFO_TEXT, ssl_buf, (size_t)txt_len, NULL);
Curl_debug(data, (direction == 1) ? CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_OUT :
CURLINFO_SSL_DATA_IN, (char *)buf, len, NULL);
(void) ssl;
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
/* ====================================================== */
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
# define use_sni(x) sni = (x)
#else
# define use_sni(x) Curl_nop_stmt
#endif
static CURLcode
ossl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
SSL_METHOD_QUAL SSL_METHOD *req_method=NULL;
void *ssl_sessionid=NULL;
X509_LOOKUP *lookup=NULL;
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
long ctx_options;
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
bool sni;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
struct in6_addr addr;
#else
struct in_addr addr;
#endif
#endif
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state);
/* Make funny stuff to get random input */
Curl_ossl_seed(data);
/* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */
switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
default:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
infof(data, "Set version TLSv1 for SRP authorisation\n");
req_method = TLSv1_client_method() ;
}
else
#endif
/* we try to figure out version */
req_method = SSLv23_client_method();
use_sni(TRUE);
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
req_method = TLSv1_client_method();
use_sni(TRUE);
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2
failf(data, "OpenSSL was built without SSLv2 support");
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
#else
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP)
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
#endif
req_method = SSLv2_client_method();
use_sni(FALSE);
break;
#endif
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP)
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
#endif
req_method = SSLv3_client_method();
use_sni(FALSE);
break;
}
if(connssl->ctx)
SSL_CTX_free(connssl->ctx);
connssl->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method);
if(!connssl->ctx) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_peek_error(), NULL));
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
#ifdef SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS
SSL_CTX_set_mode(connssl->ctx, SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS);
#endif
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK
if(data->set.fdebug && data->set.verbose) {
/* the SSL trace callback is only used for verbose logging so we only
inform about failures of setting it */
if(!SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(connssl->ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK,
(void (*)(void))ssl_tls_trace)) {
infof(data, "SSL: couldn't set callback!\n");
}
else if(!SSL_CTX_ctrl(connssl->ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0,
conn)) {
infof(data, "SSL: couldn't set callback argument!\n");
}
}
#endif
/* OpenSSL contains code to work-around lots of bugs and flaws in various
SSL-implementations. SSL_CTX_set_options() is used to enabled those
work-arounds. The man page for this option states that SSL_OP_ALL enables
all the work-arounds and that "It is usually safe to use SSL_OP_ALL to
enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken
implementations is desired."
The "-no_ticket" option was introduced in Openssl0.9.8j. It's a flag to
disable "rfc4507bis session ticket support". rfc4507bis was later turned
into the proper RFC5077 it seems: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5077
The enabled extension concerns the session management. I wonder how often
libcurl stops a connection and then resumes a TLS session. also, sending
the session data is some overhead. .I suggest that you just use your
proposed patch (which explicitly disables TICKET).
If someone writes an application with libcurl and openssl who wants to
enable the feature, one can do this in the SSL callback.
SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG option enabling allowed proper
interoperability with web server Netscape Enterprise Server 2.0.1 which
was released back in 1996.
Due to CVE-2010-4180, option SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG has
become ineffective as of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c. In order to mitigate
CVE-2010-4180 when using previous OpenSSL versions we no longer enable
this option regardless of OpenSSL version and SSL_OP_ALL definition.
OpenSSL added a work-around for a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability
(http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt). In 0.9.6e they added a bit to
SSL_OP_ALL that _disables_ that work-around despite the fact that
SSL_OP_ALL is documented to do "rather harmless" workarounds. In order to
keep the secure work-around, the SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS bit
must not be set.
*/
ctx_options = SSL_OP_ALL;
#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET;
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
/* mitigate CVE-2010-4180 */
ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG;
#endif
#ifdef SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS
/* unless the user explicitly ask to allow the protocol vulnerability we
use the work-around */
if(!conn->data->set.ssl_enable_beast)
ctx_options &= ~SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS;
#endif
/* disable SSLv2 in the default case (i.e. allow SSLv3 and TLSv1) */
if(data->set.ssl.version == CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT)
ctx_options |= SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
SSL_CTX_set_options(connssl->ctx, ctx_options);
#if 0
/*
* Not sure it's needed to tell SSL_connect() that socket is
* non-blocking. It doesn't seem to care, but just return with
* SSL_ERROR_WANT_x.
*/
if(data->state.used_interface == Curl_if_multi)
SSL_CTX_ctrl(connssl->ctx, BIO_C_SET_NBIO, 1, NULL);
#endif
if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT] || data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE]) {
if(!cert_stuff(conn,
connssl->ctx,
data->set.str[STRING_CERT],
data->set.str[STRING_CERT_TYPE],
data->set.str[STRING_KEY],
data->set.str[STRING_KEY_TYPE])) {
/* failf() is already done in cert_stuff() */
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
}
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST]) {
if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(connssl->ctx,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST])) {
failf(data, "failed setting cipher list");
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
}
}
#ifdef USE_TLS_SRP
if(data->set.ssl.authtype == CURL_TLSAUTH_SRP) {
infof(data, "Using TLS-SRP username: %s\n", data->set.ssl.username);
if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(connssl->ctx, data->set.ssl.username)) {
failf(data, "Unable to set SRP user name");
return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
}
if(!SSL_CTX_set_srp_password(connssl->ctx,data->set.ssl.password)) {
failf(data, "failed setting SRP password");
return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
}
if(!data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CIPHER_LIST]) {
infof(data, "Setting cipher list SRP\n");
if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(connssl->ctx, "SRP")) {
failf(data, "failed setting SRP cipher list");
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
}
}
}
#endif
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE] || data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]) {
/* tell SSL where to find CA certificates that are used to verify
the servers certificate. */
if(!SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(connssl->ctx,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE],
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH])) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
/* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
failf(data,"error setting certificate verify locations:\n"
" CAfile: %s\n CApath: %s\n",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]?
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]: "none",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]?
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH] : "none");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
else {
/* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate verification
is required. */
infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations,"
" continuing anyway:\n");
}
}
else {
/* Everything is fine. */
infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations:\n");
}
infof(data,
" CAfile: %s\n"
" CApath: %s\n",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE] ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]:
"none",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH] ? data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]:
"none");
}
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]) {
/* tell SSL where to find CRL file that is used to check certificate
* revocation */
lookup=X509_STORE_add_lookup(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx),
X509_LOOKUP_file());
if(!lookup ||
(!X509_load_crl_file(lookup,data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE],
X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) ) {
failf(data,"error loading CRL file: %s\n",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]);
return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
}
else {
/* Everything is fine. */
infof(data, "successfully load CRL file:\n");
X509_STORE_set_flags(SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(connssl->ctx),
X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK|X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL);
}
infof(data,
" CRLfile: %s\n", data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE] ?
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]: "none");
}
/* SSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should
* fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue
* anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with
* SSL_get_verify_result() below. */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(connssl->ctx,
data->set.ssl.verifypeer?SSL_VERIFY_PEER:SSL_VERIFY_NONE,
cert_verify_callback);
/* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */
if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
retcode = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, connssl->ctx,
data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
if(retcode) {
failf(data,"error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
return retcode;
}
}
/* Lets make an SSL structure */
if(connssl->handle)
SSL_free(connssl->handle);
connssl->handle = SSL_new(connssl->ctx);
if(!connssl->handle) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)!");
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle);
connssl->server_cert = 0x0;
#ifdef SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME
if((0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, conn->host.name, &addr)) &&
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
(0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, conn->host.name, &addr)) &&
#endif
sni &&
!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(connssl->handle, conn->host.name))
infof(data, "WARNING: failed to configure server name indication (SNI) "
"TLS extension\n");
#endif
/* Check if there's a cached ID we can/should use here! */
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL)) {
/* we got a session id, use it! */
if(!SSL_set_session(connssl->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL));
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* Informational message */
infof (data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
}
/* pass the raw socket into the SSL layers */
if(!SSL_set_fd(connssl->handle, (int)sockfd)) {
failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_fd failed: %s",
ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(),NULL));
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode
ossl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
int err;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state
|| ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state
|| ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state);
ERR_clear_error();
err = SSL_connect(connssl->handle);
/* 1 is fine
0 is "not successful but was shut down controlled"
<0 is "handshake was not successful, because a fatal error occurred" */
if(1 != err) {
int detail = SSL_get_error(connssl->handle, err);
if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) {
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
return CURLE_OK;
}
else if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) {
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
return CURLE_OK;
}
else {
/* untreated error */
unsigned long errdetail;
char error_buffer[256]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least
256 bytes long. */
CURLcode rc;
const char *cert_problem = NULL;
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2; /* the connection failed,
we're not waiting for
anything else. */
errdetail = ERR_get_error(); /* Gets the earliest error code from the
thread's error queue and removes the
entry. */
switch(errdetail) {
case 0x1407E086:
/* 1407E086:
SSL routines:
SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE:
certificate verify failed */
/* fall-through */
case 0x14090086:
/* 14090086:
SSL routines:
SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE:
certificate verify failed */
cert_problem = "SSL certificate problem, verify that the CA cert is"
" OK. Details:\n";
rc = CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
break;
default:
rc = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
break;
}
/* detail is already set to the SSL error above */
/* If we e.g. use SSLv2 request-method and the server doesn't like us
* (RST connection etc.), OpenSSL gives no explanation whatsoever and
* the SO_ERROR is also lost.
*/
if(CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR == rc && errdetail == 0) {
failf(data, "Unknown SSL protocol error in connection to %s:%ld ",
conn->host.name, conn->port);
return rc;
}
/* Could be a CERT problem */
SSL_strerror(errdetail, error_buffer, sizeof(error_buffer));
failf(data, "%s%s", cert_problem ? cert_problem : "", error_buffer);
return rc;
}
}
else {
/* we have been connected fine, we're not waiting for anything else. */
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
/* Informational message */
infof (data, "SSL connection using %s\n",
SSL_get_cipher(connssl->handle));
return CURLE_OK;
}
}
static int asn1_object_dump(ASN1_OBJECT *a, char *buf, size_t len)
{
int i, ilen;
if((ilen = (int)len) < 0)
return 1; /* buffer too big */
i = i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(buf, ilen, a);
if(i >= ilen)
return 1; /* buffer too small */
return 0;
}
static CURLcode push_certinfo_len(struct SessionHandle *data,
int certnum,
const char *label,
const char *value,
size_t valuelen)
{
struct curl_certinfo *ci = &data->info.certs;
char *output;
struct curl_slist *nl;
CURLcode res = CURLE_OK;
size_t labellen = strlen(label);
size_t outlen = labellen + 1 + valuelen + 1; /* label:value\0 */
output = malloc(outlen);
if(!output)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
/* sprintf the label and colon */
snprintf(output, outlen, "%s:", label);
/* memcpy the value (it might not be zero terminated) */
memcpy(&output[labellen+1], value, valuelen);
/* zero terminate the output */
output[labellen + 1 + valuelen] = 0;
/* TODO: we should rather introduce an internal API that can do the
equivalent of curl_slist_append but doesn't strdup() the given data as
like in this place the extra malloc/free is totally pointless */
nl = curl_slist_append(ci->certinfo[certnum], output);
free(output);
if(!nl) {
curl_slist_free_all(ci->certinfo[certnum]);
ci->certinfo[certnum] = NULL;
res = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
else
ci->certinfo[certnum] = nl;
return res;
}
/* this is a convenience function for push_certinfo_len that takes a zero
terminated value */
static CURLcode push_certinfo(struct SessionHandle *data,
int certnum,
const char *label,
const char *value)
{
size_t valuelen = strlen(value);
return push_certinfo_len(data, certnum, label, value, valuelen);
}
static void pubkey_show(struct SessionHandle *data,
int num,
const char *type,
const char *name,
unsigned char *raw,
int len)
{
size_t left;
int i;
char namebuf[32];
char *buffer;
left = len*3 + 1;
buffer = malloc(left);
if(buffer) {
char *ptr=buffer;
snprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s(%s)", type, name);
for(i=0; i< len; i++) {
snprintf(ptr, left, "%02x:", raw[i]);
ptr += 3;
left -= 3;
}
infof(data, " %s: %s\n", namebuf, buffer);
push_certinfo(data, num, namebuf, buffer);
free(buffer);
}
}
#define print_pubkey_BN(_type, _name, _num) \
do { \
if(pubkey->pkey._type->_name != NULL) { \
int len = BN_num_bytes(pubkey->pkey._type->_name); \
if(len < CERTBUFFERSIZE) { \
BN_bn2bin(pubkey->pkey._type->_name, (unsigned char*)bufp); \
bufp[len] = 0; \
pubkey_show(data, _num, #_type, #_name, (unsigned char*)bufp, len); \
} \
} \
} WHILE_FALSE
static int X509V3_ext(struct SessionHandle *data,
int certnum,
STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts)
{
int i;
size_t j;
if(sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) <= 0)
/* no extensions, bail out */
return 1;
for(i=0; i<sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) {
ASN1_OBJECT *obj;
X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i);
BUF_MEM *biomem;
char buf[512];
char *ptr=buf;
char namebuf[128];
BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
if(!bio_out)
return 1;
obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext);
asn1_object_dump(obj, namebuf, sizeof(namebuf));
infof(data, "%s: %s\n", namebuf,
X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(ext)?"(critical)":"");
if(!X509V3_EXT_print(bio_out, ext, 0, 0))
M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_print(bio_out, ext->value);
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
/* biomem->length bytes at biomem->data, this little loop here is only
done for the infof() call, we send the "raw" data to the certinfo
function */
for(j=0; j<(size_t)biomem->length; j++) {
const char *sep="";
if(biomem->data[j] == '\n') {
sep=", ";
j++; /* skip the newline */
};
while((biomem->data[j] == ' ') && (j<(size_t)biomem->length))
j++;
if(j<(size_t)biomem->length)
ptr+=snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%s%c", sep,
biomem->data[j]);
}
infof(data, " %s\n", buf);
push_certinfo(data, certnum, namebuf, buf);
BIO_free(bio_out);
}
return 0; /* all is fine */
}
static void X509_signature(struct SessionHandle *data,
int numcert,
ASN1_STRING *sig)
{
char buf[1024];
char *ptr = buf;
int i;
for(i=0; i<sig->length; i++)
ptr+=snprintf(ptr, sizeof(buf)-(ptr-buf), "%02x:", sig->data[i]);
infof(data, " Signature: %s\n", buf);
push_certinfo(data, numcert, "Signature", buf);
}
static void dumpcert(struct SessionHandle *data, X509 *x, int numcert)
{
BIO *bio_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
BUF_MEM *biomem;
/* this outputs the cert in this 64 column wide style with newlines and
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- texts and more */
PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_out, x);
BIO_get_mem_ptr(bio_out, &biomem);
infof(data, "%s\n", biomem->data);
push_certinfo_len(data, numcert, "Cert", biomem->data, biomem->length);
BIO_free(bio_out);
}
static int init_certinfo(struct SessionHandle *data,
int num)
{
struct curl_certinfo *ci = &data->info.certs;
struct curl_slist **table;
Curl_ssl_free_certinfo(data);
ci->num_of_certs = num;
table = calloc((size_t)num, sizeof(struct curl_slist *));
if(!table)
return 1;
ci->certinfo = table;
return 0;
}
/*
* This size was previously 512 which has been reported "too small" without
* any specifics, so it was enlarged to allow more data to get shown uncut.
* The "perfect" size is yet to figure out.
*/
#define CERTBUFFERSIZE 8192
static CURLcode get_cert_chain(struct connectdata *conn,
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *sk;
int i;
char *bufp;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
int numcerts;
bufp = malloc(CERTBUFFERSIZE);
if(!bufp)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(connssl->handle);
if(!sk) {
free(bufp);
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
numcerts = sk_X509_num(sk);
if(init_certinfo(data, numcerts)) {
free(bufp);
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
infof(data, "--- Certificate chain\n");
for(i=0; i<numcerts; i++) {
long value;
ASN1_INTEGER *num;
ASN1_TIME *certdate;
/* get the certs in "importance order" */
#if 0
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, numcerts - i - 1);
#else
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
#endif
X509_CINF *cinf;
EVP_PKEY *pubkey=NULL;
int j;
char *ptr;
(void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(x), bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
infof(data, "%2d Subject: %s\n", i, bufp);
push_certinfo(data, i, "Subject", bufp);
(void)x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(x), bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
infof(data, " Issuer: %s\n", bufp);
push_certinfo(data, i, "Issuer", bufp);
value = X509_get_version(x);
infof(data, " Version: %lu (0x%lx)\n", value+1, value);
snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%lx", value);
push_certinfo(data, i, "Version", bufp); /* hex */
num=X509_get_serialNumber(x);
if(num->length <= 4) {
value = ASN1_INTEGER_get(num);
infof(data," Serial Number: %ld (0x%lx)\n", value, value);
snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%lx", value);
}
else {
int left = CERTBUFFERSIZE;
ptr = bufp;
*ptr++ = 0;
if(num->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
*ptr++='-';
for(j=0; (j<num->length) && (left>=4); j++) {
/* TODO: length restrictions */
snprintf(ptr, 3, "%02x%c",num->data[j],
((j+1 == num->length)?'\n':':'));
ptr += 3;
left-=4;
}
if(num->length)
infof(data," Serial Number: %s\n", bufp);
else
bufp[0]=0;
}
if(bufp[0])
push_certinfo(data, i, "Serial Number", bufp); /* hex */
cinf = x->cert_info;
j = asn1_object_dump(cinf->signature->algorithm, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
if(!j) {
infof(data, " Signature Algorithm: %s\n", bufp);
push_certinfo(data, i, "Signature Algorithm", bufp);
}
certdate = X509_get_notBefore(x);
asn1_output(certdate, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
infof(data, " Start date: %s\n", bufp);
push_certinfo(data, i, "Start date", bufp);
certdate = X509_get_notAfter(x);
asn1_output(certdate, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
infof(data, " Expire date: %s\n", bufp);
push_certinfo(data, i, "Expire date", bufp);
j = asn1_object_dump(cinf->key->algor->algorithm, bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE);
if(!j) {
infof(data, " Public Key Algorithm: %s\n", bufp);
push_certinfo(data, i, "Public Key Algorithm", bufp);
}
pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if(!pubkey)
infof(data, " Unable to load public key\n");
else {
switch(pubkey->type) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
infof(data, " RSA Public Key (%d bits)\n",
BN_num_bits(pubkey->pkey.rsa->n));
snprintf(bufp, CERTBUFFERSIZE, "%d", BN_num_bits(pubkey->pkey.rsa->n));
push_certinfo(data, i, "RSA Public Key", bufp);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, n, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, e, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, d, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, p, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, q, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmp1, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, dmq1, i);
print_pubkey_BN(rsa, iqmp, i);
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, p, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, q, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, g, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, priv_key, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dsa, pub_key, i);
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DH:
print_pubkey_BN(dh, p, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dh, g, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dh, priv_key, i);
print_pubkey_BN(dh, pub_key, i);
break;
#if 0
case EVP_PKEY_EC: /* symbol not present in OpenSSL 0.9.6 */
/* left TODO */
break;
#endif
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
}
X509V3_ext(data, i, cinf->extensions);
X509_signature(data, i, x->signature);
dumpcert(data, x, i);
}
free(bufp);
return CURLE_OK;
}
/*
* Get the server cert, verify it and show it etc, only call failf() if the
* 'strict' argument is TRUE as otherwise all this is for informational
* purposes only!
*
* We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
* man-in-the-middle attack.
*/
static CURLcode servercert(struct connectdata *conn,
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
bool strict)
{
CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
int rc;
long lerr;
ASN1_TIME *certdate;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
X509 *issuer;
FILE *fp;
char buffer[256];
if(data->set.ssl.certinfo)
/* we've been asked to gather certificate info! */
(void)get_cert_chain(conn, connssl);
data->set.ssl.certverifyresult = !X509_V_OK;
connssl->server_cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(connssl->handle);
if(!connssl->server_cert) {
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get peer certificate!");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
infof (data, "Server certificate:\n");
rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(connssl->server_cert),
buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if(rc) {
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-subject!");
X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
connssl->server_cert = NULL;
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
infof(data, "\t subject: %s\n", buffer);
certdate = X509_get_notBefore(connssl->server_cert);
asn1_output(certdate, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
infof(data, "\t start date: %s\n", buffer);
certdate = X509_get_notAfter(connssl->server_cert);
asn1_output(certdate, buffer, sizeof(buffer));
infof(data, "\t expire date: %s\n", buffer);
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
retcode = verifyhost(conn, connssl->server_cert);
if(retcode) {
X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
connssl->server_cert = NULL;
return retcode;
}
}
rc = x509_name_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(connssl->server_cert),
buffer, sizeof(buffer));
if(rc) {
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't get X509-issuer name!");
retcode = CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else {
infof(data, "\t issuer: %s\n", buffer);
/* We could do all sorts of certificate verification stuff here before
deallocating the certificate. */
/* e.g. match issuer name with provided issuer certificate */
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]) {
fp=fopen(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT],"r");
if(!fp) {
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL: Unable to open issuer cert (%s)\n",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
connssl->server_cert = NULL;
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
issuer = PEM_read_X509(fp,NULL,ZERO_NULL,NULL);
if(!issuer) {
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL: Unable to read issuer cert (%s)\n",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
X509_free(issuer);
fclose(fp);
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
fclose(fp);
if(X509_check_issued(issuer,connssl->server_cert) != X509_V_OK) {
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL: Certificate issuer check failed (%s)\n",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
X509_free(issuer);
connssl->server_cert = NULL;
return CURLE_SSL_ISSUER_ERROR;
}
infof(data, "\t SSL certificate issuer check ok (%s)\n",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_ISSUERCERT]);
X509_free(issuer);
}
lerr = data->set.ssl.certverifyresult=
SSL_get_verify_result(connssl->handle);
if(data->set.ssl.certverifyresult != X509_V_OK) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
/* We probably never reach this, because SSL_connect() will fail
and we return earlier if verifypeer is set? */
if(strict)
failf(data, "SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld)",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
retcode = CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\t SSL certificate verify result: %s (%ld),"
" continuing anyway.\n",
X509_verify_cert_error_string(lerr), lerr);
}
else
infof(data, "\t SSL certificate verify ok.\n");
}
X509_free(connssl->server_cert);
connssl->server_cert = NULL;
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
return retcode;
}
static CURLcode
ossl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
void *old_ssl_sessionid=NULL;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
int incache;
SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid;
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state);
#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get1_session(connssl->handle);
/* SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference
count and the session will stay in memory until explicitly freed with
SSL_SESSION_free(3), regardless of its state.
This function was introduced in openssl 0.9.5a. */
#else
our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get_session(connssl->handle);
/* if SSL_get1_session() is unavailable, use SSL_get_session().
This is an inferior option because the session can be flushed
at any time by openssl. It is included only so curl compiles
under versions of openssl < 0.9.5a.
WARNING: How curl behaves if it's session is flushed is
untested.
*/
#endif
incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL));
if(incache) {
if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid);
incache = FALSE;
}
}
if(!incache) {
retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid,
0 /* unknown size */);
if(retcode) {
failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
return retcode;
}
}
#ifdef HAVE_SSL_GET1_SESSION
else {
/* Session was incache, so refcount already incremented earlier.
* Avoid further increments with each SSL_get1_session() call.
* This does not free the session as refcount remains > 0
*/
SSL_SESSION_free(our_ssl_sessionid);
}
#endif
/*
* We check certificates to authenticate the server; otherwise we risk
* man-in-the-middle attack; NEVERTHELESS, if we're told explicitly not to
* verify the peer ignore faults and failures from the server cert
* operations.
*/
if(!data->set.ssl.verifypeer)
(void)servercert(conn, connssl, FALSE);
else
retcode = servercert(conn, connssl, TRUE);
if(CURLE_OK == retcode)
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
return retcode;
}
static Curl_recv ossl_recv;
static Curl_send ossl_send;
static CURLcode
ossl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
bool nonblocking,
bool *done)
{
CURLcode retcode;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
long timeout_ms;
int what;
/* check if the connection has already been established */
if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) {
*done = TRUE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
if(ssl_connect_1==connssl->connecting_state) {
/* Find out how much more time we're allowed */
timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
/* no need to continue if time already is up */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
retcode = ossl_connect_step1(conn, sockindex);
if(retcode)
return retcode;
}
while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) {
/* check allowed time left */
timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
/* no need to continue if time already is up */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
/* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */
if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading
|| connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing==
connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading==
connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
what = Curl_socket_ready(readfd, writefd, nonblocking?0:timeout_ms);
if(what < 0) {
/* fatal error */
failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else if(0 == what) {
if(nonblocking) {
*done = FALSE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
else {
/* timeout */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
}
/* socket is readable or writable */
}
/* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if this
* connection is done nonblocking and this loop would execute again. This
* permits the owner of a multi handle to abort a connection attempt
* before step2 has completed while ensuring that a client using select()
* or epoll() will always have a valid fdset to wait on.
*/
retcode = ossl_connect_step2(conn, sockindex);
if(retcode || (nonblocking &&
(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
return retcode;
} /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */
if(ssl_connect_3==connssl->connecting_state) {
retcode = ossl_connect_step3(conn, sockindex);
if(retcode)
return retcode;
}
if(ssl_connect_done==connssl->connecting_state) {
connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = ossl_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = ossl_send;
*done = TRUE;
}
else
*done = FALSE;
/* Reset our connect state machine */
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
return CURLE_OK;
}
CURLcode
Curl_ossl_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
bool *done)
{
return ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, TRUE, done);
}
CURLcode
Curl_ossl_connect(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
CURLcode retcode;
bool done = FALSE;
retcode = ossl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done);
if(retcode)
return retcode;
DEBUGASSERT(done);
return CURLE_OK;
}
bool Curl_ossl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn,
int connindex)
{
if(conn->ssl[connindex].handle)
/* SSL is in use */
return (0 != SSL_pending(conn->ssl[connindex].handle)) ? TRUE : FALSE;
else
return FALSE;
}
static ssize_t ossl_send(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
const void *mem,
size_t len,
CURLcode *curlcode)
{
/* SSL_write() is said to return 'int' while write() and send() returns
'size_t' */
int err;
char error_buffer[120]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at least 120
bytes long. */
unsigned long sslerror;
int memlen;
int rc;
ERR_clear_error();
memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len;
rc = SSL_write(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, mem, memlen);
if(rc < 0) {
err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[sockindex].handle, rc);
switch(err) {
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
/* The operation did not complete; the same TLS/SSL I/O function
should be called again later. This is basically an EWOULDBLOCK
equivalent. */
*curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
return -1;
case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL:
failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() returned SYSCALL, errno = %d",
SOCKERRNO);
*curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
return -1;
case SSL_ERROR_SSL:
/* A failure in the SSL library occurred, usually a protocol error.
The OpenSSL error queue contains more information on the error. */
sslerror = ERR_get_error();
failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() error: %s",
ERR_error_string(sslerror, error_buffer));
*curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
return -1;
}
/* a true error */
failf(conn->data, "SSL_write() return error %d", err);
*curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
return -1;
}
return (ssize_t)rc; /* number of bytes */
}
static ssize_t ossl_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */
int num, /* socketindex */
char *buf, /* store read data here */
size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */
CURLcode *curlcode)
{
char error_buffer[120]; /* OpenSSL documents that this must be at
least 120 bytes long. */
unsigned long sslerror;
ssize_t nread;
int buffsize;
ERR_clear_error();
buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize;
nread = (ssize_t)SSL_read(conn->ssl[num].handle, buf, buffsize);
if(nread < 0) {
/* failed SSL_read */
int err = SSL_get_error(conn->ssl[num].handle, (int)nread);
switch(err) {
case SSL_ERROR_NONE: /* this is not an error */
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
/* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
*curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
return -1;
default:
/* openssl/ssl.h says "look at error stack/return value/errno" */
sslerror = ERR_get_error();
failf(conn->data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d",
ERR_error_string(sslerror, error_buffer),
SOCKERRNO);
*curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
return -1;
}
}
return nread;
}
size_t Curl_ossl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
{
#ifdef YASSL_VERSION
/* yassl provides an OpenSSL API compatibility layer so it looks identical
to OpenSSL in all other aspects */
return snprintf(buffer, size, "yassl/%s", YASSL_VERSION);
#else /* YASSL_VERSION */
#if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x905000)
{
char sub[2];
unsigned long ssleay_value;
sub[1]='\0';
ssleay_value=SSLeay();
if(ssleay_value < 0x906000) {
ssleay_value=SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER;
sub[0]='\0';
}
else {
if(ssleay_value&0xff0) {
sub[0]=(char)(((ssleay_value>>4)&0xff) + 'a' -1);
}
else
sub[0]='\0';
}
return snprintf(buffer, size, "OpenSSL/%lx.%lx.%lx%s",
(ssleay_value>>28)&0xf,
(ssleay_value>>20)&0xff,
(ssleay_value>>12)&0xff,
sub);
}
#else /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER is less than 0.9.5 */
#if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000)
return snprintf(buffer, size, "OpenSSL/%lx.%lx.%lx",
(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>28)&0xff,
(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>20)&0xff,
(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xf);
#else /* (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000) */
{
char sub[2];
sub[1]='\0';
if(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER&0x0f) {
sub[0]=(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER&0x0f) + 'a' -1;
}
else
sub[0]='\0';
return snprintf(buffer, size, "SSL/%x.%x.%x%s",
(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>12)&0xff,
(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>8)&0xf,
(SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER>>4)&0xf, sub);
}
#endif /* (SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x900000) */
#endif /* SSLEAY_VERSION_NUMBER is less than 0.9.5 */
#endif /* YASSL_VERSION */
}
#endif /* USE_SSLEAY */
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