than what's absolutely necessary:
curl will do its best to use what you pass to it as a URL. It is not trying to
validate it as a syntactically correct URL by any means but is instead
VERY liberal with what it accepts.
mail posted to the http-state mailing list, from Adam Barth, and is said to be
the set of date formats the Chrome browser code is tested against:
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/http-state/current/msg00129.html
libcurl parses most of them identically, but not all of them.
sending of the TSIZE option. I don't like fixing bugs just hours before
a release, but since it was broken and the patch fixes this for him I decided
to get it in anyway.
each test, so that the test suite can now be used to actually test the
verification of cert names etc. This made an error show up in the OpenSSL-
specific code where it would attempt to match the CN field even if a
subjectAltName exists that doesn't match. This is now fixed and verified
in test 311.
Fix OS400 makefile for tests to use the new Makefile.inc in libtest
Update the OS400 wrappers and RPG binding according to the current CVS source state
POSIX.1-2001. Note that RFC 2553 defines a prototype where the last parameter cnt is of type size_t.
Many systems follow RFC 2553. Glibc 2.0 and 2.1 have size_t, but 2.2 has socklen_t.
and the name length differ in those cases and thus leave the matching function
unmodified from before, as the matching functions never have to bother with
the zero bytes in legitimate cases. Peter Sylvester helped me realize that
this fix is slightly better as it leaves more code unmodified and makes the
detection a bit more obvious in the code.
should introduce an option to disable SNI, but as we're in feature freeze
now I've addressed the obvious bug here (pointed out by Peter Sylvester): we
shouldn't try to enable SNI when SSLv2 or SSLv3 is explicitly selected.
Code for OpenSSL and GnuTLS was fixed. NSS doesn't seem to have a particular
option for SNI, or are we simply not using it?
(http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=2829955) mentioning the recent SSL cert
verification flaw found and exploited by Moxie Marlinspike. The presentation
he did at Black Hat is available here:
https://www.blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/bh-usa-09-archives.html#Marlinspike
Apparently at least one CA allowed a subjectAltName or CN that contain a
zero byte, and thus clients that assumed they would never have zero bytes
were exploited to OK a certificate that didn't actually match the site. Like
if the name in the cert was "example.com\0theatualsite.com", libcurl would
happily verify that cert for example.com.
libcurl now better use the length of the extracted name, not assuming it is
zero terminated.
only in some OpenSSL installs - like on Windows) isn't thread-safe and we
agreed that moving it to the global_init() function is a decent way to deal
with this situation.
something beyond ascii but currently libcurl will only pass in the verbatim
string the app provides. There are several browsers that already do this
encoding. The key seems to be the updated draft to RFC2231:
http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-reschke-rfc2231-in-http-02
