Visual C++ complained:
warning C4267: '=': conversion from 'size_t' to 'long', possible loss of data
warning C4701: potentially uninitialized local variable 'path' used
Fixes a few issues in manual wildcard cert name validation in
schannel support code for Win32 CE:
- when comparing the wildcard name to the hostname, the wildcard
character was removed from the cert name and the hostname
was checked to see if it ended with the modified cert name.
This allowed cert names like *.com to match the connection
hostname. This violates recommendations from RFC 6125.
- when the wildcard name in the certificate is longer than the
connection hostname, a buffer overread of the connection
hostname buffer would occur during the comparison of the
certificate name and the connection hostname.
It doesn't benefit us much as the connection could get closed at
any time, and also by checking we lose the ability to determine
if the socket was closed by reading zero bytes.
Reported-by: Michael Kaufmann
Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/1134
CURLOPT_SOCKS_PROXY -> CURLOPT_PRE_PROXY
Added the corresponding --preroxy command line option. Sets a SOCKS
proxy to connect to _before_ connecting to a HTTP(S) proxy.
This was added as part of the SOCKS+HTTPS proxy merge but there's no
need to support this as we prefer to have the protocol specified as a
prefix instead.
ERR_PACK is an internal detail of OpenSSL. Also, when using it, a
function name must be specified which is overly specific: the test will
break whenever OpenSSL internally change things so that a different
function creates the error.
Closes#1157
Since it now reads responses one byte a time, a loop could be removed
and it is no longer limited to get the whole response within 16K, it is
now instead only limited to 16K maximum header line lengths.
... so that it doesn't read data that is actually coming from the
remote. 2xx responses have no body from the proxy, that data is from the
peer.
Fixes#1132
A server MUST NOT send any Transfer-Encoding or Content-Length header
fields in a 2xx (Successful) response to CONNECT. (RFC 7231 section
4.3.6)
Also fixes the three test cases that did this.
If a port number in a "connect-to" entry does not match, skip this
entry instead of connecting to port 0.
If a port number in a "connect-to" entry matches, use this entry
and look no further.
Reported-by: Jay Satiro
Assisted-by: Jay Satiro, Daniel Stenberg
Closes#1148
Adds access to the effectively used protocol/scheme to both libcurl and
curl, both in string and numeric (CURLPROTO_*) form.
Note that the string form will be uppercase, as it is just the internal
string.
As these strings are declared internally as const, and all other strings
returned by curl_easy_getinfo() are de-facto const as well, string
handling in getinfo.c got const-ified.
Closes#1137
vtls/gtls.c: In function ‘Curl_gtls_data_pending’:
vtls/gtls.c:1429:3: error: this ‘if’ clause does not guard... [-Werror=misleading-indentation]
if(conn->proxy_ssl[connindex].session &&
^~
vtls/gtls.c:1433:5: note: ...this statement, but the latter is misleadingly indented as if it is guarded by the ‘if’
return res;
* HTTPS proxies:
An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection.
Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent
uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct
the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin
server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy
communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests
(including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text.
With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_
SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy
and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server
(through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions
as well.
A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL
options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO):
--proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against
--proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against
--proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password
--proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG)
--proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use
--proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file
--proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs
--proxy-key KEY Private key file name
--proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG)
--proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key
--proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop
--proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2
--proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3
--proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1
--proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username
--proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password
--proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP)
All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts,
except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath
which defaults to --capath.
Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable,
similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable.
Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS.
* A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination:
If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to
the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS
proxy.
TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options.
Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
