It's wrong to assume that we can send a single SPNEGO packet which will
complete the authentication. It's a *negotiation* — the clue is in the
name. So make sure we handle responses from the server.
Curl_input_negotiate() will already handle bailing out if it thinks the
state is GSS_S_COMPLETE (or SEC_E_OK on Windows) and the server keeps
talking to us, so we should avoid endless loops that way.
This is the correct way to do SPNEGO. Just ask for it
Now I correctly see it trying NTLMSSP authentication when a Kerberos ticket
isn't available. Of course, we bail out when the server responds with the
challenge packet, since we don't expect that. But I'll fix that bug next...
This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which
allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will
actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also
be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various
different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too.
A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used,
and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism.
But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet
and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information
about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos,
and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default
mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument).
Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input
tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the
server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume
that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server
wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO
to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway.
So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in
Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO
token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its
token".
You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token
with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO
handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all.
The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do
SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context()
is for. And then it should all Just Work™.
That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes
for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound
token to the server which results in immediate success.
Before GnuTLS 3.3.6, the gnutls_x509_crt_check_hostname() function
didn't actually check IP addresses in SubjectAltName, even though it was
explicitly documented as doing so. So do it ourselves...
The old way using getpwuid could cause problems in programs that enable
reading from netrc files simultaneously in multiple threads.
Reported-by: David Woodhouse
The AES-GCM ciphers were added to GnuTLS as late as ver. 3.0.1 but
the code path in which they're referenced here is only ever used for
somewhat older GnuTLS versions. This caused undeclared identifier errors
when compiling against those.
This seems to have become necessary for SRP support to work starting
with GnuTLS ver. 2.99.0. Since support for SRP was added to GnuTLS
before the function that takes this priority string, there should be no
issue with backward compatibility.
When an error has been detected, skip the final forced call to the
progress callback by making sure to pass the current return code
variable in the Curl_done() call in the CURLM_STATE_DONE state.
This avoids the "extra" callback that could occur even if you returned
error from the progress callback.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2014-06/0062.html
Reported by: Jonathan Cardoso Machado
The static connection counter caused a race condition. Moving the
connection id counter into conncache solves it, as well as simplifying
the related logic.
They were added because of an older code path that used allocations and
should not have been left in the code. With this change the logic goes
back to how it was.
Curl_rand() will return a dummy and repatable random value for this
case. Makes it possible to write test cases that verify output.
Also, fake timestamp with CURL_FORCETIME set.
Only when built debug enabled of course.
Curl_ssl_random() was not used anymore so it has been
removed. Curl_rand() is enough.
create_digest_md5_message: generate base64 instead of hex string
curl_sasl: also fix memory leaks in some OOM situations
httpproxycode is not reset in Curl_initinfo, so a 407 is not reset even
if curl_easy_reset is called between transfers.
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/bug/view.cgi?id=1380
The method change is forbidden by the obsolete RFC2616, but libcurl did
it anyway for compatibility reasons. The new RFC7231 allows this
behaviour so there's no need for the scary "Violate RFC 2616/10.3.x"
notice. Also update the comments accordingly.
The SASL/Digest previously used the current time's seconds +
microseconds to add randomness but it is much better to instead get more
data from Curl_rand().
It will also allow us to easier "fake" that for debug builds on demand
in a future.
Rather than use a short 8-byte hex string, extended the cnonce to be
32-bytes long, like Windows SSPI does.
Used a combination of random data as well as the current date and
time for the generation.
"Any two of the parameters, readfds, writefds, or exceptfds, can be
given as null. At least one must be non-null, and any non-null
descriptor set must contain at least one handle to a socket."
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-ca/library/windows/desktop/ms740141(v=vs.85).aspx
When using select(), cURL doesn't adhere to this (WinSock-specific)
rule, and can ask to monitor empty fd_sets, which leads to select()
returning WSAEINVAL (i.e. EINVAL) and connections failing in mysterious
ways as a result (at least when using the curl_multi_socket_action()
interface).
Bug: http://curl.haxx.se/mail/lib-2014-05/0278.html
