- the data needs to be "line-based" anyway since it's also passed to the
debug callback/application
- it makes infof() work like failf() and consistency is good
- there's an assert that triggers on newlines in the format string
- Also removes a few instances of "..."
- Removes the code that would append "..." to the end of the data *iff*
it was truncated in infof()
Closes#7357
Since the connection can be used by many independent requests (using
HTTP/2 or HTTP/3), things like user-agent and other transfer-specific
data MUST NOT be kept connection oriented as it could lead to requests
getting the wrong string for their requests. This struct data was
lingering like this due to old HTTP1 legacy thinking where it didn't
mattered..
Fixes#5566Closes#5567
If HTTPAUTH_GSSNEGOTIATE was used for a POST request and
gss_init_sec_context() failed, the POST request was sent
with empty body. This commit also restores the original
behavior of `curl --fail --negotiate`, which was changed
by commit 6c60355323.
Add regression tests 2077 and 2078 to cover this.
Fixes#3992Closes#4171
* Adjusted unit tests 2056, 2057
* do not generally close connections with CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE after every request
* moved negotiatedata from UrlState to connectdata
* Added stream rewind logic for CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE
* introduced negotiatedata::GSS_AUTHDONE and negotiatedata::GSS_AUTHSUCC
* Consider authproblem state for CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE
* Consider reuse_forbid for CURLAUTH_NEGOTIATE
* moved and adjusted negotiate authentication state handling from
output_auth_headers into Curl_output_negotiate
* Curl_output_negotiate: ensure auth done is always set
* Curl_output_negotiate: Set auth done also if result code is
GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED/SEC_I_CONTINUE_NEEDED as this result code may
also indicate the last challenge request (only works with disabled
Expect: 100-continue and CURLOPT_KEEP_SENDING_ON_ERROR -> 1)
* Consider "Persistent-Auth" header, detect if not present;
Reset/Cleanup negotiate after authentication if no persistent
authentication
* apply changes introduced with #2546 for negotiate rewind logic
Fixes#1261Closes#1975
Attempt to add support for Secure Channel binding when negotiate
authentication is used. The problem to solve is that by default IIS
accepts channel binding and curl doesn't utilise them. The result was a
401 response. Scope affects only the Schannel(winssl)-SSPI combination.
Fixes https://github.com/curl/curl/issues/3503
Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/3509
* HTTPS proxies:
An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection.
Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent
uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct
the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin
server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy
communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests
(including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text.
With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_
SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy
and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server
(through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions
as well.
A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL
options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO):
--proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against
--proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against
--proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password
--proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG)
--proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use
--proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file
--proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs
--proxy-key KEY Private key file name
--proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG)
--proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key
--proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop
--proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2
--proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3
--proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1
--proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username
--proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password
--proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP)
All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts,
except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath
which defaults to --capath.
Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable,
similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable.
Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS.
* A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination:
If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to
the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS
proxy.
TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options.
Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
curl_printf.h defines printf to curl_mprintf, etc. This can cause
problems with external headers which may use
__attribute__((format(printf, ...))) markers etc.
To avoid that they cause problems with system includes, we include
curl_printf.h after any system headers. That makes the three last
headers to always be, and we keep them in this order:
curl_printf.h
curl_memory.h
memdebug.h
None of them include system headers, they all do funny #defines.
Reported-by: David Benjamin
Fixes#743
Calculate the service name and proxy service names locally, rather than
in url.c which will allow for us to support overriding the service name
for other protocols such as FTP, IMAP, POP3 and SMTP.
I had accidentally used the proxy server name for the host and the host
server name for the proxy in commit ad5e9bfd5d and 6d6f9ca1d9. Whilst
Windows SSPI was quite happy with this, GSS-API wasn't.
Thanks-to: Michael Osipov
As the GSS-API and SSPI based source files are no longer library/API
specific, following the extraction of that authentication code to the
vauth directory, combine these files rather than maintain two separate
versions.
This header file must be included after all header files except
memdebug.h, as it does similar memory function redefinitions and can be
similarly affected by conflicting definitions in system or dependent
library headers.
Since we just started make use of free(NULL) in order to simplify code,
this change takes it a step further and:
- converts lots of Curl_safefree() calls to good old free()
- makes Curl_safefree() not check the pointer before free()
The (new) rule of thumb is: if you really want a function call that
frees a pointer and then assigns it to NULL, then use Curl_safefree().
But we will prefer just using free() from now on.
Use a dynamicly allocated buffer for the temporary SPN variable similar
to how the SASL GSS-API code does, rather than using a fixed buffer of
2048 characters.
This is the correct way to do SPNEGO. Just ask for it
Now I correctly see it trying NTLMSSP authentication when a Kerberos ticket
isn't available. Of course, we bail out when the server responds with the
challenge packet, since we don't expect that. But I'll fix that bug next...
This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which
allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will
actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also
be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various
different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too.
A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used,
and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism.
But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet
and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information
about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos,
and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default
mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument).
Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input
tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the
server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume
that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server
wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO
to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway.
So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in
Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO
token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its
token".
You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token
with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO
handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all.
The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do
SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context()
is for. And then it should all Just Work™.
That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes
for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound
token to the server which results in immediate success.
Renamed copy_header_value() to Curl_copy_header_value() as this
function is now non static.
Simplified proxy flag in Curl_http_input_auth() when calling
sub-functions.
Removed unnecessary white space removal when using negotiate as it had
been missed in commit cdccb42267.
Daniel Stenberg