NTLM: fix size check condition for type2 received data

Bug: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/CVE-2018-16890.html
Reported-by: Wenxiang Qian
CVE-2018-16890
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Stenberg 2019-01-02 20:33:08 +01:00
parent a730432e59
commit b780b30d13
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 5CC908FDB71E12C2
1 changed files with 4 additions and 3 deletions

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@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2018, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
@ -182,10 +182,11 @@ static CURLcode ntlm_decode_type2_target(struct Curl_easy *data,
target_info_len = Curl_read16_le(&buffer[40]);
target_info_offset = Curl_read32_le(&buffer[44]);
if(target_info_len > 0) {
if(((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) ||
if((target_info_offset >= size) ||
((target_info_offset + target_info_len) > size) ||
(target_info_offset < 48)) {
infof(data, "NTLM handshake failure (bad type-2 message). "
"Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the peer\n");
"Target Info Offset Len is set incorrect by the peer\n");
return CURLE_BAD_CONTENT_ENCODING;
}