ossl_seed: fix the last resort PRNG seeding

Instead of just abusing the pseudo-randomizer from Curl_FormBoundary(),
this now uses Curl_ossl_random() to get entropy.
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Stenberg 2013-02-14 00:06:19 +01:00
parent d09d08dc1f
commit ad7291c1a9
1 changed files with 6 additions and 19 deletions

View File

@ -236,27 +236,14 @@ static int ossl_seed(struct SessionHandle *data)
/* If we get here, it means we need to seed the PRNG using a "silly"
approach! */
{
do {
int len;
char *area;
unsigned char randb[64];
Curl_ossl_random(data, randb, sizeof(randb));
/* Changed call to RAND_seed to use the underlying RAND_add implementation
* directly. Do this in a loop, with the amount of additional entropy
* being dependent upon the algorithm used by Curl_FormBoundary(): N bytes
* of a 7-bit ascii set. -- Richard Gorton, March 11 2003.
*/
do {
area = Curl_FormBoundary();
if(!area)
return 3; /* out of memory */
len = curlx_uztosi(strlen(area));
RAND_add(area, len, (len >> 1));
free(area); /* now remove the random junk */
} while(!RAND_status());
}
len = sizeof(randb);
RAND_add(randb, len, (len >> 1));
} while(!RAND_status());
/* generates a default path for the random seed file */
buf[0]=0; /* blank it first */