Gisle fixed the wildcard checks for certificates.

This commit is contained in:
Daniel Stenberg 2004-06-22 08:51:22 +00:00
parent 44d9a8ba4e
commit 76920413d9
1 changed files with 62 additions and 51 deletions

View File

@ -739,40 +739,59 @@ static int Curl_ASN1_UTCTIME_output(struct connectdata *conn,
/* ====================================================== */
#ifdef USE_SSLEAY
static int
cert_hostcheck(const char *certname, const char *hostname)
{
char *tmp;
const char *certdomain;
if(!certname ||
strlen(certname)<3 ||
!hostname ||
!strlen(hostname)) /* sanity check */
/*
* Match a hostname against a wildcard pattern.
* E.g.
* "foo.host.com" matches "*.host.com".
*
* We are a bit more liberal than RFC2818 describes in that we
* accept multiple "*" in pattern (similar to what some other browsers do).
* E.g.
* "abc.def.domain.com" should strickly not match "*.domain.com", but we
* don't consider "." to be important in CERT checking.
*/
#define HOST_NOMATCH 0
#define HOST_MATCH 1
static int hostmatch(const char *hostname, const char *pattern)
{
while (1) {
int c = *pattern++;
if (c == '\0')
return (*hostname ? HOST_NOMATCH : HOST_MATCH);
if (c == '*') {
c = *pattern;
if (c == '\0') /* "*\0" matches anything remaining */
return HOST_MATCH;
while (*hostname) {
/* The only recursive function in libcurl! */
if (hostmatch(hostname++,pattern) == HOST_MATCH)
return HOST_MATCH;
}
return HOST_NOMATCH;
}
if (toupper(c) != toupper(*hostname++))
return HOST_NOMATCH;
}
}
static int
cert_hostcheck(const char *match_pattern, const char *hostname)
{
if (!match_pattern || !*match_pattern ||
!hostname || !*hostname) /* sanity check */
return 0;
if(curl_strequal(certname, hostname)) /* trivial case */
if(curl_strequal(hostname,match_pattern)) /* trivial case */
return 1;
certdomain = certname + 1;
if((certname[0] != '*') || (certdomain[0] != '.'))
return 0; /* not a wildcard certificate, check failed */
if(!strchr(certdomain+1, '.'))
return 0; /* the certificate must have at least another dot in its name */
/* find 'certdomain' within 'hostname', case insensitive */
tmp = Curl_strcasestr(hostname, certdomain);
if(tmp) {
/* ok the certname's domain matches the hostname, let's check that it's a
tail-match */
if(curl_strequal(tmp, certdomain))
/* looks like a match. Just check we havent swallowed a '.' */
return tmp == strchr(hostname, '.');
else
return 0;
}
if (hostmatch(hostname,match_pattern) == HOST_MATCH)
return 1;
return 0;
}
@ -828,19 +847,9 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn,
altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(server_cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
if(altnames) {
int hostlen = 0;
int domainlen = 0;
char *domain = NULL;
int numalts;
int i;
if(GEN_DNS == target) {
hostlen = (int)strlen(conn->host.name);
domain = strchr(conn->host.name, '.');
if(domain)
domainlen = (int)strlen(domain);
}
/* get amount of alternatives, RFC2459 claims there MUST be at least
one, but we don't depend on it... */
numalts = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
@ -854,26 +863,28 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn,
if(check->type == target) {
/* get data and length */
const char *altptr = (char *)ASN1_STRING_data(check->d.ia5);
const int altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
int altlen;
switch(target) {
case GEN_DNS: /* name comparison */
/* Is this an exact match? */
if((hostlen == altlen) &&
curl_strnequal(conn->host.name, altptr, hostlen))
matched = TRUE;
case GEN_DNS: /* name/pattern comparison */
/* The OpenSSL man page explicitly says: "In general it cannot be
assumed that the data returned by ASN1_STRING_data() is null
terminated or does not contain embedded nulls." But also that
"The actual format of the data will depend on the actual string
type itself: for example for and IA5String the data will be ASCII"
/* Is this a wildcard match? */
else if((altptr[0] == '*') &&
(domainlen == altlen-1) &&
domain &&
curl_strnequal(domain, altptr+1, domainlen))
Gisle researched the OpenSSL sources:
"I checked the 0.9.6 and 0.9.8 sources before my patch and
it always 0-terminates an IA5String."
*/
if (cert_hostcheck(altptr, conn->host.name))
matched = TRUE;
break;
case GEN_IPADD: /* IP address comparison */
/* compare alternative IP address if the data chunk is the same size
our server IP address is */
altlen = ASN1_STRING_length(check->d.ia5);
if((altlen == addrlen) && !memcmp(altptr, &addr, altlen))
matched = TRUE;
break;
@ -1034,7 +1045,7 @@ static void ssl_tls_trace(int direction, int ssl_ver, int content_type,
ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR ? '3' : '?');
/* SSLv2 doesn't seem to have TLS record-type headers, so OpenSSL
* always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-tupe
* always pass-up content-type as 0. But the interesting message-type
* is at 'buf[0]'.
*/
if (ssl_ver == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && content_type != 0)