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Extended my embedded-zero-in-cert-name fix based on a comment from Scott

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Cantor. My previous attempt was half-baked and didn't cover the normal CN
case.
This commit is contained in:
Daniel Stenberg 2009-08-02 22:34:00 +00:00
parent 47a9660ec1
commit 0b66efac9c
1 changed files with 17 additions and 12 deletions
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29
lib/ssluse.c
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@ -1154,10 +1154,11 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn,
unsigned char *nulstr = (unsigned char *)""; unsigned char *nulstr = (unsigned char *)"";
unsigned char *peer_CN = nulstr; unsigned char *peer_CN = nulstr;
size_t peer_len = 0;
X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert) ; X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(server_cert) ;
if(name) if(name)
while((j=X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name,NID_commonName,i))>=0) while((j = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_commonName, i))>=0)
i=j; i=j;
/* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string /* we have the name entry and we will now convert this to a string
@ -1172,18 +1173,22 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn,
string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made string manually to avoid the problem. This code can be made
conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around conditional in the future when OpenSSL has been fixed. Work-around
brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */ brought by Alexis S. L. Carvalho. */
if(tmp && ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) { if(tmp) {
j = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp); /* get the length off the ASN1 to avoid problems with embedded zeroes
if(j >= 0) { */
peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(j+1); peer_len = ASN1_STRING_length(tmp);
if(peer_CN) { if(ASN1_STRING_type(tmp) == V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) {
memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), j); if(peer_len) {
peer_CN[j] = '\0'; peer_CN = OPENSSL_malloc(peer_len+1);
if(peer_CN) {
memcpy(peer_CN, ASN1_STRING_data(tmp), peer_len);
peer_CN[peer_len] = '\0';
}
} }
} }
else /* not a UTF8 name */
j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
} }
else /* not a UTF8 name */
j = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&peer_CN, tmp);
} }
if(peer_CN == nulstr) if(peer_CN == nulstr)
@ -1192,7 +1197,7 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn,
else { else {
/* convert peer_CN from UTF8 */ /* convert peer_CN from UTF8 */
size_t rc; size_t rc;
rc = Curl_convert_from_utf8(data, peer_CN, strlen(peer_CN)); rc = Curl_convert_from_utf8(data, peer_CN, peer_len);
/* Curl_convert_from_utf8 calls failf if unsuccessful */ /* Curl_convert_from_utf8 calls failf if unsuccessful */
if(rc != CURLE_OK) { if(rc != CURLE_OK) {
OPENSSL_free(peer_CN); OPENSSL_free(peer_CN);
@ -1206,7 +1211,7 @@ static CURLcode verifyhost(struct connectdata *conn,
"SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate"); "SSL: unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION; return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
} }
else if(!cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, strlen((char *)peer_CN), else if(!cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, peer_len,
conn->host.name)) { conn->host.name)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) { if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost > 1) {
failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match " failf(data, "SSL: certificate subject name '%s' does not match "