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curl/install-sh

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1999-12-29 09:20:26 -05:00
#!/bin/sh
# install - install a program, script, or datafile
Remove all traces of FBOpenSSL SPNEGO support This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too. A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used, and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism. But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos, and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument). Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway. So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its token". You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all. The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context() is for. And then it should all Just Work™. That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound token to the server which results in immediate success.
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scriptversion=2011-11-20.07; # UTC
# This originates from X11R5 (mit/util/scripts/install.sh), which was
# later released in X11R6 (xc/config/util/install.sh) with the
# following copyright and license.
#
# Copyright (C) 1994 X Consortium
#
# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to
# deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the
# rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or
# sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
#
# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR
# IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY,
# FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
# X CONSORTIUM BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
# AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNEC-
# TION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE.
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#
# Except as contained in this notice, the name of the X Consortium shall not
# be used in advertising or otherwise to promote the sale, use or other deal-
# ings in this Software without prior written authorization from the X Consor-
# tium.
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#
#
# FSF changes to this file are in the public domain.
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#
# Calling this script install-sh is preferred over install.sh, to prevent
Remove all traces of FBOpenSSL SPNEGO support This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too. A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used, and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism. But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos, and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument). Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway. So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its token". You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all. The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context() is for. And then it should all Just Work™. That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound token to the server which results in immediate success.
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# 'make' implicit rules from creating a file called install from it
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# when there is no Makefile.
#
# This script is compatible with the BSD install script, but was written
# from scratch.
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nl='
'
IFS=" "" $nl"
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# set DOITPROG to echo to test this script
# Don't use :- since 4.3BSD and earlier shells don't like it.
doit=${DOITPROG-}
if test -z "$doit"; then
doit_exec=exec
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else
doit_exec=$doit
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fi
# Put in absolute file names if you don't have them in your path;
# or use environment vars.
chgrpprog=${CHGRPPROG-chgrp}
chmodprog=${CHMODPROG-chmod}
chownprog=${CHOWNPROG-chown}
cmpprog=${CMPPROG-cmp}
cpprog=${CPPROG-cp}
mkdirprog=${MKDIRPROG-mkdir}
mvprog=${MVPROG-mv}
rmprog=${RMPROG-rm}
stripprog=${STRIPPROG-strip}
posix_glob='?'
initialize_posix_glob='
test "$posix_glob" != "?" || {
if (set -f) 2>/dev/null; then
posix_glob=
else
posix_glob=:
fi
}
'
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posix_mkdir=
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# Desired mode of installed file.
mode=0755
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chgrpcmd=
chmodcmd=$chmodprog
chowncmd=
mvcmd=$mvprog
rmcmd="$rmprog -f"
stripcmd=
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src=
dst=
dir_arg=
dst_arg=
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copy_on_change=false
no_target_directory=
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usage="\
Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [-T] SRCFILE DSTFILE
or: $0 [OPTION]... SRCFILES... DIRECTORY
or: $0 [OPTION]... -t DIRECTORY SRCFILES...
or: $0 [OPTION]... -d DIRECTORIES...
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In the 1st form, copy SRCFILE to DSTFILE.
In the 2nd and 3rd, copy all SRCFILES to DIRECTORY.
In the 4th, create DIRECTORIES.
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Options:
--help display this help and exit.
--version display version info and exit.
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-c (ignored)
-C install only if different (preserve the last data modification time)
-d create directories instead of installing files.
-g GROUP $chgrpprog installed files to GROUP.
-m MODE $chmodprog installed files to MODE.
-o USER $chownprog installed files to USER.
-s $stripprog installed files.
-t DIRECTORY install into DIRECTORY.
-T report an error if DSTFILE is a directory.
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Environment variables override the default commands:
CHGRPPROG CHMODPROG CHOWNPROG CMPPROG CPPROG MKDIRPROG MVPROG
RMPROG STRIPPROG
"
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while test $# -ne 0; do
case $1 in
-c) ;;
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-C) copy_on_change=true;;
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-d) dir_arg=true;;
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-g) chgrpcmd="$chgrpprog $2"
shift;;
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--help) echo "$usage"; exit $?;;
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-m) mode=$2
case $mode in
*' '* | *' '* | *'
'* | *'*'* | *'?'* | *'['*)
echo "$0: invalid mode: $mode" >&2
exit 1;;
esac
shift;;
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-o) chowncmd="$chownprog $2"
shift;;
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-s) stripcmd=$stripprog;;
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-t) dst_arg=$2
Remove all traces of FBOpenSSL SPNEGO support This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too. A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used, and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism. But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos, and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument). Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway. So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its token". You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all. The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context() is for. And then it should all Just Work™. That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound token to the server which results in immediate success.
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# Protect names problematic for 'test' and other utilities.
case $dst_arg in
-* | [=\(\)!]) dst_arg=./$dst_arg;;
esac
shift;;
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-T) no_target_directory=true;;
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--version) echo "$0 $scriptversion"; exit $?;;
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--) shift
break;;
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-*) echo "$0: invalid option: $1" >&2
exit 1;;
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*) break;;
esac
shift
done
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if test $# -ne 0 && test -z "$dir_arg$dst_arg"; then
# When -d is used, all remaining arguments are directories to create.
# When -t is used, the destination is already specified.
# Otherwise, the last argument is the destination. Remove it from $@.
for arg
do
if test -n "$dst_arg"; then
# $@ is not empty: it contains at least $arg.
set fnord "$@" "$dst_arg"
shift # fnord
fi
shift # arg
dst_arg=$arg
Remove all traces of FBOpenSSL SPNEGO support This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too. A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used, and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism. But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos, and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument). Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway. So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its token". You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all. The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context() is for. And then it should all Just Work™. That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound token to the server which results in immediate success.
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# Protect names problematic for 'test' and other utilities.
case $dst_arg in
-* | [=\(\)!]) dst_arg=./$dst_arg;;
esac
done
fi
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if test $# -eq 0; then
if test -z "$dir_arg"; then
echo "$0: no input file specified." >&2
exit 1
fi
Remove all traces of FBOpenSSL SPNEGO support This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too. A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used, and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism. But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos, and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument). Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway. So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its token". You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all. The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context() is for. And then it should all Just Work™. That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound token to the server which results in immediate success.
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# It's OK to call 'install-sh -d' without argument.
# This can happen when creating conditional directories.
exit 0
fi
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if test -z "$dir_arg"; then
do_exit='(exit $ret); exit $ret'
trap "ret=129; $do_exit" 1
trap "ret=130; $do_exit" 2
trap "ret=141; $do_exit" 13
trap "ret=143; $do_exit" 15
# Set umask so as not to create temps with too-generous modes.
# However, 'strip' requires both read and write access to temps.
case $mode in
# Optimize common cases.
*644) cp_umask=133;;
*755) cp_umask=22;;
*[0-7])
if test -z "$stripcmd"; then
u_plus_rw=
else
u_plus_rw='% 200'
fi
cp_umask=`expr '(' 777 - $mode % 1000 ')' $u_plus_rw`;;
*)
if test -z "$stripcmd"; then
u_plus_rw=
else
u_plus_rw=,u+rw
fi
cp_umask=$mode$u_plus_rw;;
esac
fi
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for src
do
Remove all traces of FBOpenSSL SPNEGO support This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too. A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used, and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism. But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos, and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument). Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway. So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its token". You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all. The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context() is for. And then it should all Just Work™. That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound token to the server which results in immediate success.
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# Protect names problematic for 'test' and other utilities.
case $src in
-* | [=\(\)!]) src=./$src;;
esac
if test -n "$dir_arg"; then
dst=$src
dstdir=$dst
test -d "$dstdir"
dstdir_status=$?
else
# Waiting for this to be detected by the "$cpprog $src $dsttmp" command
# might cause directories to be created, which would be especially bad
# if $src (and thus $dsttmp) contains '*'.
if test ! -f "$src" && test ! -d "$src"; then
echo "$0: $src does not exist." >&2
exit 1
fi
if test -z "$dst_arg"; then
echo "$0: no destination specified." >&2
exit 1
fi
dst=$dst_arg
# If destination is a directory, append the input filename; won't work
# if double slashes aren't ignored.
if test -d "$dst"; then
if test -n "$no_target_directory"; then
echo "$0: $dst_arg: Is a directory" >&2
exit 1
fi
dstdir=$dst
dst=$dstdir/`basename "$src"`
dstdir_status=0
else
# Prefer dirname, but fall back on a substitute if dirname fails.
dstdir=`
(dirname "$dst") 2>/dev/null ||
expr X"$dst" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
X"$dst" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
X"$dst" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$dst" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
echo X"$dst" |
sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'
`
test -d "$dstdir"
dstdir_status=$?
fi
fi
obsolete_mkdir_used=false
if test $dstdir_status != 0; then
case $posix_mkdir in
'')
# Create intermediate dirs using mode 755 as modified by the umask.
# This is like FreeBSD 'install' as of 1997-10-28.
umask=`umask`
case $stripcmd.$umask in
# Optimize common cases.
*[2367][2367]) mkdir_umask=$umask;;
.*0[02][02] | .[02][02] | .[02]) mkdir_umask=22;;
*[0-7])
mkdir_umask=`expr $umask + 22 \
- $umask % 100 % 40 + $umask % 20 \
- $umask % 10 % 4 + $umask % 2
`;;
*) mkdir_umask=$umask,go-w;;
esac
# With -d, create the new directory with the user-specified mode.
# Otherwise, rely on $mkdir_umask.
if test -n "$dir_arg"; then
mkdir_mode=-m$mode
else
mkdir_mode=
fi
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posix_mkdir=false
case $umask in
*[123567][0-7][0-7])
# POSIX mkdir -p sets u+wx bits regardless of umask, which
# is incompatible with FreeBSD 'install' when (umask & 300) != 0.
;;
*)
tmpdir=${TMPDIR-/tmp}/ins$RANDOM-$$
trap 'ret=$?; rmdir "$tmpdir/d" "$tmpdir" 2>/dev/null; exit $ret' 0
if (umask $mkdir_umask &&
exec $mkdirprog $mkdir_mode -p -- "$tmpdir/d") >/dev/null 2>&1
then
if test -z "$dir_arg" || {
# Check for POSIX incompatibilities with -m.
# HP-UX 11.23 and IRIX 6.5 mkdir -m -p sets group- or
Remove all traces of FBOpenSSL SPNEGO support This is just fundamentally broken. SPNEGO (RFC4178) is a protocol which allows client and server to negotiate the underlying mechanism which will actually be used to authenticate. This is *often* Kerberos, and can also be NTLM and other things. And to complicate matters, there are various different OIDs which can be used to specify the Kerberos mechanism too. A SPNEGO exchange will identify *which* GSSAPI mechanism is being used, and will exchange GSSAPI tokens which are appropriate for that mechanism. But this SPNEGO implementation just strips the incoming SPNEGO packet and extracts the token, if any. And completely discards the information about *which* mechanism is being used. Then we *assume* it was Kerberos, and feed the token into gss_init_sec_context() with the default mechanism (GSS_S_NO_OID for the mech_type argument). Furthermore... broken as this code is, it was never even *used* for input tokens anyway, because higher layers of curl would just bail out if the server actually said anything *back* to us in the negotiation. We assume that we send a single token to the server, and it accepts it. If the server wants to continue the exchange (as is required for NTLM and for SPNEGO to do anything useful), then curl was broken anyway. So the only bit which actually did anything was the bit in Curl_output_negotiate(), which always generates an *initial* SPNEGO token saying "Hey, I support only the Kerberos mechanism and this is its token". You could have done that by manually just prefixing the Kerberos token with the appropriate bytes, if you weren't going to do any proper SPNEGO handling. There's no need for the FBOpenSSL library at all. The sane way to do SPNEGO is just to *ask* the GSSAPI library to do SPNEGO. That's what the 'mech_type' argument to gss_init_sec_context() is for. And then it should all Just Work™. That 'sane way' will be added in a subsequent patch, as will bug fixes for our failure to handle any exchange other than a single outbound token to the server which results in immediate success.
2014-07-11 04:37:18 -04:00
# other-writable bit of parent directory when it shouldn't.
# FreeBSD 6.1 mkdir -m -p sets mode of existing directory.
ls_ld_tmpdir=`ls -ld "$tmpdir"`
case $ls_ld_tmpdir in
d????-?r-*) different_mode=700;;
d????-?--*) different_mode=755;;
*) false;;
esac &&
$mkdirprog -m$different_mode -p -- "$tmpdir" && {
ls_ld_tmpdir_1=`ls -ld "$tmpdir"`
test "$ls_ld_tmpdir" = "$ls_ld_tmpdir_1"
}
}
then posix_mkdir=:
fi
rmdir "$tmpdir/d" "$tmpdir"
else
# Remove any dirs left behind by ancient mkdir implementations.
rmdir ./$mkdir_mode ./-p ./-- 2>/dev/null
fi
trap '' 0;;
esac;;
esac
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if
$posix_mkdir && (
umask $mkdir_umask &&
$doit_exec $mkdirprog $mkdir_mode -p -- "$dstdir"
)
then :
else
# The umask is ridiculous, or mkdir does not conform to POSIX,
# or it failed possibly due to a race condition. Create the
# directory the slow way, step by step, checking for races as we go.
case $dstdir in
/*) prefix='/';;
[-=\(\)!]*) prefix='./';;
*) prefix='';;
esac
eval "$initialize_posix_glob"
oIFS=$IFS
IFS=/
$posix_glob set -f
set fnord $dstdir
shift
$posix_glob set +f
IFS=$oIFS
prefixes=
for d
do
test X"$d" = X && continue
prefix=$prefix$d
if test -d "$prefix"; then
prefixes=
else
if $posix_mkdir; then
(umask=$mkdir_umask &&
$doit_exec $mkdirprog $mkdir_mode -p -- "$dstdir") && break
# Don't fail if two instances are running concurrently.
test -d "$prefix" || exit 1
else
case $prefix in
*\'*) qprefix=`echo "$prefix" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;;
*) qprefix=$prefix;;
esac
prefixes="$prefixes '$qprefix'"
fi
fi
prefix=$prefix/
done
if test -n "$prefixes"; then
# Don't fail if two instances are running concurrently.
(umask $mkdir_umask &&
eval "\$doit_exec \$mkdirprog $prefixes") ||
test -d "$dstdir" || exit 1
obsolete_mkdir_used=true
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$dir_arg"; then
{ test -z "$chowncmd" || $doit $chowncmd "$dst"; } &&
{ test -z "$chgrpcmd" || $doit $chgrpcmd "$dst"; } &&
{ test "$obsolete_mkdir_used$chowncmd$chgrpcmd" = false ||
test -z "$chmodcmd" || $doit $chmodcmd $mode "$dst"; } || exit 1
else
# Make a couple of temp file names in the proper directory.
dsttmp=$dstdir/_inst.$$_
rmtmp=$dstdir/_rm.$$_
# Trap to clean up those temp files at exit.
trap 'ret=$?; rm -f "$dsttmp" "$rmtmp" && exit $ret' 0
# Copy the file name to the temp name.
(umask $cp_umask && $doit_exec $cpprog "$src" "$dsttmp") &&
# and set any options; do chmod last to preserve setuid bits.
#
# If any of these fail, we abort the whole thing. If we want to
# ignore errors from any of these, just make sure not to ignore
# errors from the above "$doit $cpprog $src $dsttmp" command.
#
{ test -z "$chowncmd" || $doit $chowncmd "$dsttmp"; } &&
{ test -z "$chgrpcmd" || $doit $chgrpcmd "$dsttmp"; } &&
{ test -z "$stripcmd" || $doit $stripcmd "$dsttmp"; } &&
{ test -z "$chmodcmd" || $doit $chmodcmd $mode "$dsttmp"; } &&
# If -C, don't bother to copy if it wouldn't change the file.
if $copy_on_change &&
old=`LC_ALL=C ls -dlL "$dst" 2>/dev/null` &&
new=`LC_ALL=C ls -dlL "$dsttmp" 2>/dev/null` &&
eval "$initialize_posix_glob" &&
$posix_glob set -f &&
set X $old && old=:$2:$4:$5:$6 &&
set X $new && new=:$2:$4:$5:$6 &&
$posix_glob set +f &&
test "$old" = "$new" &&
$cmpprog "$dst" "$dsttmp" >/dev/null 2>&1
then
rm -f "$dsttmp"
else
# Rename the file to the real destination.
$doit $mvcmd -f "$dsttmp" "$dst" 2>/dev/null ||
# The rename failed, perhaps because mv can't rename something else
# to itself, or perhaps because mv is so ancient that it does not
# support -f.
{
# Now remove or move aside any old file at destination location.
# We try this two ways since rm can't unlink itself on some
# systems and the destination file might be busy for other
# reasons. In this case, the final cleanup might fail but the new
# file should still install successfully.
{
test ! -f "$dst" ||
$doit $rmcmd -f "$dst" 2>/dev/null ||
{ $doit $mvcmd -f "$dst" "$rmtmp" 2>/dev/null &&
{ $doit $rmcmd -f "$rmtmp" 2>/dev/null; :; }
} ||
{ echo "$0: cannot unlink or rename $dst" >&2
(exit 1); exit 1
}
} &&
# Now rename the file to the real destination.
$doit $mvcmd "$dsttmp" "$dst"
}
fi || exit 1
trap '' 0
fi
done
1999-12-29 09:20:26 -05:00
# Local variables:
# eval: (add-hook 'write-file-hooks 'time-stamp)
# time-stamp-start: "scriptversion="
# time-stamp-format: "%:y-%02m-%02d.%02H"
# time-stamp-time-zone: "UTC"
# time-stamp-end: "; # UTC"
# End: