2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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/***************************************************************************
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* _ _ ____ _
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* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
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* / __| | | | |_) | |
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* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
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* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
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*
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2019-01-29 04:09:29 -05:00
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* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2019, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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*
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* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
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* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
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2016-02-02 18:19:02 -05:00
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* are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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*
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* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
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* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
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* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
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*
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* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
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* KIND, either express or implied.
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*
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***************************************************************************/
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2012-04-06 17:35:15 -04:00
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#include "tool_setup.h"
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
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#if defined(HAVE_LIBGEN_H) && defined(HAVE_BASENAME)
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# include <libgen.h>
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#endif
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2011-09-20 09:58:35 -04:00
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#ifdef WIN32
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2018-11-01 02:50:40 -04:00
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# include <tlhelp32.h>
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2011-09-20 09:58:35 -04:00
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# include "tool_cfgable.h"
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2011-09-22 05:16:34 -04:00
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# include "tool_libinfo.h"
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2011-09-20 09:58:35 -04:00
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#endif
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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#include "tool_bname.h"
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#include "tool_doswin.h"
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2013-01-03 20:50:28 -05:00
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#include "memdebug.h" /* keep this as LAST include */
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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2011-09-19 13:45:58 -04:00
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/*
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* Macros ALWAYS_TRUE and ALWAYS_FALSE are used to avoid compiler warnings.
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*/
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#define ALWAYS_TRUE (1)
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#define ALWAYS_FALSE (0)
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#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__POCC__)
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# undef ALWAYS_TRUE
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# undef ALWAYS_FALSE
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# if (_MSC_VER < 1500)
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# define ALWAYS_TRUE (0, 1)
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# define ALWAYS_FALSE (1, 0)
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# else
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# define ALWAYS_TRUE \
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__pragma(warning(push)) \
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__pragma(warning(disable:4127)) \
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(1) \
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__pragma(warning(pop))
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# define ALWAYS_FALSE \
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__pragma(warning(push)) \
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__pragma(warning(disable:4127)) \
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(0) \
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__pragma(warning(pop))
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# endif
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#endif
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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#ifdef WIN32
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# undef PATH_MAX
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# define PATH_MAX MAX_PATH
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#endif
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#ifndef S_ISCHR
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# ifdef S_IFCHR
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# define S_ISCHR(m) (((m) & S_IFMT) == S_IFCHR)
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# else
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# define S_ISCHR(m) (0) /* cannot tell if file is a device */
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# endif
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#endif
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#ifdef WIN32
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2011-09-19 14:27:25 -04:00
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# define _use_lfn(f) ALWAYS_TRUE /* long file names always available */
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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#elif !defined(__DJGPP__) || (__DJGPP__ < 2) /* DJGPP 2.0 has _use_lfn() */
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2011-09-19 14:27:25 -04:00
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# define _use_lfn(f) ALWAYS_FALSE /* long file names never available */
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2012-06-20 17:40:42 -04:00
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#elif defined(__DJGPP__)
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# include <fcntl.h> /* _use_lfn(f) prototype */
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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#endif
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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#ifndef UNITTESTS
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static SANITIZEcode truncate_dryrun(const char *path,
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const size_t truncate_pos);
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2016-01-27 05:04:18 -05:00
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#ifdef MSDOS
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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static SANITIZEcode msdosify(char **const sanitized, const char *file_name,
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int flags);
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2016-01-27 05:04:18 -05:00
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#endif
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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static SANITIZEcode rename_if_reserved_dos_device_name(char **const sanitized,
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const char *file_name,
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int flags);
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#endif /* !UNITTESTS (static declarations used if no unit tests) */
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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/*
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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Sanitize a file or path name.
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All banned characters are replaced by underscores, for example:
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f?*foo => f__foo
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f:foo::$DATA => f_foo__$DATA
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f:\foo:bar => f__foo_bar
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f:\foo:bar => f:\foo:bar (flag SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)
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This function was implemented according to the guidelines in 'Naming Files,
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Paths, and Namespaces' section 'Naming Conventions'.
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https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa365247.aspx
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Flags
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-----
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SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS: Allow colons.
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Without this flag colons are sanitized.
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SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH: Allow path separators and colons.
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Without this flag path separators and colons are sanitized.
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SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED: Allow reserved device names.
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Without this flag a reserved device name is renamed (COM1 => _COM1) unless it's
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in a UNC prefixed path.
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SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE: Allow truncating a long filename.
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Without this flag if the sanitized filename or path will be too long an error
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occurs. With this flag the filename --and not any other parts of the path-- may
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be truncated to at least a single character. A filename followed by an
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alternate data stream (ADS) cannot be truncated in any case.
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Success: (SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized points to a sanitized copy of file_name.
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Failure: (!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized is NULL.
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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*/
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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SANITIZEcode sanitize_file_name(char **const sanitized, const char *file_name,
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int flags)
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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{
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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char *p, *target;
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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size_t len;
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2016-02-05 02:22:24 -05:00
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SANITIZEcode sc;
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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size_t max_sanitized_len;
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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if(!sanitized)
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return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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*sanitized = NULL;
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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if(!file_name)
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return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)) {
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#ifndef MSDOS
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2016-02-09 03:28:58 -05:00
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if(file_name[0] == '\\' && file_name[1] == '\\')
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/* UNC prefixed path \\ (eg \\?\C:\foo) */
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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max_sanitized_len = 32767-1;
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else
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#endif
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max_sanitized_len = PATH_MAX-1;
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}
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else
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/* The maximum length of a filename.
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FILENAME_MAX is often the same as PATH_MAX, in other words it is 260 and
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does not discount the path information therefore we shouldn't use it. */
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max_sanitized_len = (PATH_MAX-1 > 255) ? 255 : PATH_MAX-1;
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len = strlen(file_name);
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if(len > max_sanitized_len) {
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if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) ||
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truncate_dryrun(file_name, max_sanitized_len))
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return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
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len = max_sanitized_len;
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}
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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target = malloc(len + 1);
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if(!target)
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return SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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strncpy(target, file_name, len);
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target[len] = '\0';
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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2016-02-09 03:28:58 -05:00
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#ifndef MSDOS
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if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && !strncmp(target, "\\\\?\\", 4))
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/* Skip the literal path prefix \\?\ */
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p = target + 4;
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else
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#endif
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p = target;
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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/* replace control characters and other banned characters */
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2016-02-09 03:28:58 -05:00
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for(; *p; ++p) {
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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const char *banned;
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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if((1 <= *p && *p <= 31) ||
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(!(flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)) && *p == ':') ||
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(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && (*p == '/' || *p == '\\'))) {
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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*p = '_';
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continue;
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}
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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for(banned = "|<>\"?*"; *banned; ++banned) {
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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if(*p == *banned) {
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*p = '_';
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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/* remove trailing spaces and periods if not allowing paths */
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if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && len) {
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char *clip = NULL;
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p = &target[len];
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do {
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--p;
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if(*p != ' ' && *p != '.')
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break;
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clip = p;
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} while(p != target);
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if(clip) {
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*clip = '\0';
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len = clip - target;
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}
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}
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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#ifdef MSDOS
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2016-02-05 02:22:24 -05:00
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sc = msdosify(&p, target, flags);
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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free(target);
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2016-02-05 02:22:24 -05:00
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if(sc)
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return sc;
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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target = p;
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len = strlen(target);
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if(len > max_sanitized_len) {
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free(target);
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return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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}
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#endif
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED)) {
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2016-02-05 02:22:24 -05:00
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sc = rename_if_reserved_dos_device_name(&p, target, flags);
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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free(target);
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2016-02-05 02:22:24 -05:00
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if(sc)
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return sc;
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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target = p;
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len = strlen(target);
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if(len > max_sanitized_len) {
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free(target);
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return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
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}
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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}
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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*sanitized = target;
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return SANITIZE_ERR_OK;
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}
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/*
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Test if truncating a path to a file will leave at least a single character in
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the filename. Filenames suffixed by an alternate data stream can't be
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truncated. This performs a dry run, nothing is modified.
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Good truncate_pos 9: C:\foo\bar => C:\foo\ba
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Good truncate_pos 6: C:\foo => C:\foo
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Good truncate_pos 5: C:\foo => C:\fo
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Bad* truncate_pos 5: C:foo => C:foo
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Bad truncate_pos 5: C:\foo:ads => C:\fo
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Bad truncate_pos 9: C:\foo:ads => C:\foo:ad
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Bad truncate_pos 5: C:\foo\bar => C:\fo
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Bad truncate_pos 5: C:\foo\ => C:\fo
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Bad truncate_pos 7: C:\foo\ => C:\foo\
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Error truncate_pos 7: C:\foo => (pos out of range)
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Bad truncate_pos 1: C:\foo\ => C
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* C:foo is ambiguous, C could end up being a drive or file therefore something
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like C:superlongfilename can't be truncated.
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Returns
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SANITIZE_ERR_OK: Good -- 'path' can be truncated
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SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH: Bad -- 'path' cannot be truncated
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!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK && != SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH: Error
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*/
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SANITIZEcode truncate_dryrun(const char *path, const size_t truncate_pos)
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{
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size_t len;
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if(!path)
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return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
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len = strlen(path);
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if(truncate_pos > len)
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return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
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if(!len || !truncate_pos)
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return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
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if(strpbrk(&path[truncate_pos - 1], "\\/:"))
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return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
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/* C:\foo can be truncated but C:\foo:ads can't */
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if(truncate_pos > 1) {
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const char *p = &path[truncate_pos - 1];
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do {
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--p;
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if(*p == ':')
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return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
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} while(p != path && *p != '\\' && *p != '/');
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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}
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2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
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return SANITIZE_ERR_OK;
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2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
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}
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2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
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/* The functions msdosify, rename_if_dos_device_name and __crt0_glob_function
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|
|
* were taken with modification from the DJGPP port of tar 1.12. They use
|
|
|
|
* algorithms originally from DJTAR.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
Extra sanitization MSDOS for file_name.
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is a supporting function for sanitize_file_name.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Warning: This is an MSDOS legacy function and was purposely written in a way
|
|
|
|
that some path information may pass through. For example drive letter names
|
|
|
|
(C:, D:, etc) are allowed to pass through. For sanitizing a filename use
|
|
|
|
sanitize_file_name.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Success: (SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized points to a sanitized copy of file_name.
|
|
|
|
Failure: (!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized is NULL.
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(UNITTESTS)
|
|
|
|
SANITIZEcode msdosify(char **const sanitized, const char *file_name,
|
|
|
|
int flags)
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
char dos_name[PATH_MAX];
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
static const char illegal_chars_dos[] = ".+, ;=[]" /* illegal in DOS */
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
"|<>/\\\":?*"; /* illegal in DOS & W95 */
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
static const char *illegal_chars_w95 = &illegal_chars_dos[8];
|
|
|
|
int idx, dot_idx;
|
|
|
|
const char *s = file_name;
|
|
|
|
char *d = dos_name;
|
|
|
|
const char *const dlimit = dos_name + sizeof(dos_name) - 1;
|
|
|
|
const char *illegal_aliens = illegal_chars_dos;
|
|
|
|
size_t len = sizeof(illegal_chars_dos) - 1;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
if(!sanitized)
|
|
|
|
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*sanitized = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(!file_name)
|
|
|
|
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(strlen(file_name) > PATH_MAX-1 &&
|
|
|
|
(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) ||
|
|
|
|
truncate_dryrun(file_name, PATH_MAX-1)))
|
|
|
|
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
/* Support for Windows 9X VFAT systems, when available. */
|
|
|
|
if(_use_lfn(file_name)) {
|
|
|
|
illegal_aliens = illegal_chars_w95;
|
|
|
|
len -= (illegal_chars_w95 - illegal_chars_dos);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get past the drive letter, if any. */
|
|
|
|
if(s[0] >= 'A' && s[0] <= 'z' && s[1] == ':') {
|
|
|
|
*d++ = *s++;
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
*d = ((flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH))) ? ':' : '_';
|
|
|
|
++d, ++s;
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(idx = 0, dot_idx = -1; *s && d < dlimit; s++, d++) {
|
|
|
|
if(memchr(illegal_aliens, *s, len)) {
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if((flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)) && *s == ':')
|
|
|
|
*d = ':';
|
|
|
|
else if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && (*s == '/' || *s == '\\'))
|
|
|
|
*d = *s;
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
/* Dots are special: DOS doesn't allow them as the leading character,
|
|
|
|
and a file name cannot have more than a single dot. We leave the
|
|
|
|
first non-leading dot alone, unless it comes too close to the
|
|
|
|
beginning of the name: we want sh.lex.c to become sh_lex.c, not
|
|
|
|
sh.lex-c. */
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
else if(*s == '.') {
|
|
|
|
if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && idx == 0 &&
|
|
|
|
(s[1] == '/' || s[1] == '\\' ||
|
|
|
|
(s[1] == '.' && (s[2] == '/' || s[2] == '\\')))) {
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
/* Copy "./" and "../" verbatim. */
|
|
|
|
*d++ = *s++;
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
if(d == dlimit)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
if(*s == '.') {
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
*d++ = *s++;
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
if(d == dlimit)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
*d = *s;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if(idx == 0)
|
|
|
|
*d = '_';
|
|
|
|
else if(dot_idx >= 0) {
|
|
|
|
if(dot_idx < 5) { /* 5 is a heuristic ad-hoc'ery */
|
|
|
|
d[dot_idx - idx] = '_'; /* replace previous dot */
|
|
|
|
*d = '.';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
*d = '-';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
*d = '.';
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(*s == '.')
|
|
|
|
dot_idx = idx;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else if(*s == '+' && s[1] == '+') {
|
|
|
|
if(idx - 2 == dot_idx) { /* .c++, .h++ etc. */
|
|
|
|
*d++ = 'x';
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
if(d == dlimit)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
*d = 'x';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else {
|
|
|
|
/* libg++ etc. */
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
if(dlimit - d < 4) {
|
|
|
|
*d++ = 'x';
|
|
|
|
if(d == dlimit)
|
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
|
*d = 'x';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else {
|
2016-12-13 17:34:59 -05:00
|
|
|
memcpy(d, "plus", 4);
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
d += 3;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
s++;
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
*d = '_';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
*d = *s;
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
if(*s == '/' || *s == '\\') {
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
idx = 0;
|
|
|
|
dot_idx = -1;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
else
|
|
|
|
idx++;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
*d = '\0';
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(*s) {
|
|
|
|
/* dos_name is truncated, check that truncation requirements are met,
|
|
|
|
specifically truncating a filename suffixed by an alternate data stream
|
|
|
|
or truncating the entire filename is not allowed. */
|
|
|
|
if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) || strpbrk(s, "\\/:") ||
|
|
|
|
truncate_dryrun(dos_name, d - dos_name))
|
|
|
|
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*sanitized = strdup(dos_name);
|
|
|
|
return (*sanitized ? SANITIZE_ERR_OK : SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MSDOS || UNITTESTS */
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
/*
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
Rename file_name if it's a reserved dos device name.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This is a supporting function for sanitize_file_name.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Warning: This is an MSDOS legacy function and was purposely written in a way
|
|
|
|
that some path information may pass through. For example drive letter names
|
|
|
|
(C:, D:, etc) are allowed to pass through. For sanitizing a filename use
|
|
|
|
sanitize_file_name.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Success: (SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized points to a sanitized copy of file_name.
|
|
|
|
Failure: (!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized is NULL.
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
SANITIZEcode rename_if_reserved_dos_device_name(char **const sanitized,
|
|
|
|
const char *file_name,
|
|
|
|
int flags)
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
/* We could have a file whose name is a device on MS-DOS. Trying to
|
|
|
|
* retrieve such a file would fail at best and wedge us at worst. We need
|
|
|
|
* to rename such files. */
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
char *p, *base;
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
char fname[PATH_MAX];
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
#ifdef MSDOS
|
|
|
|
struct_stat st_buf;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(!sanitized)
|
|
|
|
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*sanitized = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(!file_name)
|
|
|
|
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Ignore UNC prefixed paths, they are allowed to contain a reserved name. */
|
|
|
|
#ifndef MSDOS
|
|
|
|
if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) &&
|
|
|
|
file_name[0] == '\\' && file_name[1] == '\\') {
|
|
|
|
size_t len = strlen(file_name);
|
|
|
|
*sanitized = malloc(len + 1);
|
|
|
|
if(!*sanitized)
|
|
|
|
return SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
|
|
strncpy(*sanitized, file_name, len + 1);
|
|
|
|
return SANITIZE_ERR_OK;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(strlen(file_name) > PATH_MAX-1 &&
|
|
|
|
(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) ||
|
|
|
|
truncate_dryrun(file_name, PATH_MAX-1)))
|
|
|
|
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
strncpy(fname, file_name, PATH_MAX-1);
|
|
|
|
fname[PATH_MAX-1] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
base = basename(fname);
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
/* Rename reserved device names that are known to be accessible without \\.\
|
|
|
|
Examples: CON => _CON, CON.EXT => CON_EXT, CON:ADS => CON_ADS
|
|
|
|
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/74496
|
|
|
|
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa365247.aspx
|
|
|
|
*/
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
for(p = fname; p; p = (p == fname && fname != base ? base : NULL)) {
|
|
|
|
size_t p_len;
|
|
|
|
int x = (curl_strnequal(p, "CON", 3) ||
|
|
|
|
curl_strnequal(p, "PRN", 3) ||
|
|
|
|
curl_strnequal(p, "AUX", 3) ||
|
|
|
|
curl_strnequal(p, "NUL", 3)) ? 3 :
|
|
|
|
(curl_strnequal(p, "CLOCK$", 6)) ? 6 :
|
|
|
|
(curl_strnequal(p, "COM", 3) || curl_strnequal(p, "LPT", 3)) ?
|
|
|
|
(('1' <= p[3] && p[3] <= '9') ? 4 : 3) : 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(!x)
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* the devices may be accessible with an extension or ADS, for
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
example CON.AIR and 'CON . AIR' and CON:AIR access console */
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
for(; p[x] == ' '; ++x)
|
|
|
|
;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(p[x] == '.') {
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
p[x] = '_';
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
else if(p[x] == ':') {
|
|
|
|
if(!(flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH))) {
|
|
|
|
p[x] = '_';
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
++x;
|
|
|
|
}
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
else if(p[x]) /* no match */
|
|
|
|
continue;
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
/* p points to 'CON' or 'CON ' or 'CON:', etc */
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
p_len = strlen(p);
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
/* Prepend a '_' */
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
if(strlen(fname) == PATH_MAX-1) {
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
--p_len;
|
|
|
|
if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) || truncate_dryrun(p, p_len))
|
|
|
|
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
p[p_len] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memmove(p + 1, p, p_len + 1);
|
|
|
|
p[0] = '_';
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
++p_len;
|
2016-01-26 17:23:15 -05:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* if fname was just modified then the basename pointer must be updated */
|
|
|
|
if(p == fname)
|
|
|
|
base = basename(fname);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2016-02-05 01:44:27 -05:00
|
|
|
/* This is the legacy portion from rename_if_dos_device_name that checks for
|
|
|
|
reserved device names. It only works on MSDOS. On Windows XP the stat
|
|
|
|
check errors with EINVAL if the device name is reserved. On Windows
|
|
|
|
Vista/7/8 it sets mode S_IFREG (regular file or device). According to MSDN
|
|
|
|
stat doc the latter behavior is correct, but that doesn't help us identify
|
|
|
|
whether it's a reserved device name and not a regular file name. */
|
|
|
|
#ifdef MSDOS
|
|
|
|
if(base && ((stat(base, &st_buf)) == 0) && (S_ISCHR(st_buf.st_mode))) {
|
|
|
|
/* Prepend a '_' */
|
|
|
|
size_t blen = strlen(base);
|
|
|
|
if(blen) {
|
|
|
|
if(strlen(fname) == PATH_MAX-1) {
|
|
|
|
--blen;
|
|
|
|
if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) || truncate_dryrun(base, blen))
|
|
|
|
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
|
|
|
|
base[blen] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memmove(base + 1, base, blen + 1);
|
|
|
|
base[0] = '_';
|
|
|
|
++blen;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
*sanitized = strdup(fname);
|
|
|
|
return (*sanitized ? SANITIZE_ERR_OK : SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-10-04 18:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
#if defined(MSDOS) && (defined(__DJGPP__) || defined(__GO32__))
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Disable program default argument globbing. We do it on our own.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
char **__crt0_glob_function(char *arg)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
(void)arg;
|
2016-11-23 02:30:18 -05:00
|
|
|
return (char **)0;
|
2011-10-04 18:03:20 -04:00
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#endif /* MSDOS && (__DJGPP__ || __GO32__) */
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-20 09:58:35 -04:00
|
|
|
#ifdef WIN32
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
|
|
* Function to find CACert bundle on a Win32 platform using SearchPath.
|
|
|
|
* (SearchPath is already declared via inclusions done in setup header file)
|
|
|
|
* (Use the ASCII version instead of the unicode one!)
|
|
|
|
* The order of the directories it searches is:
|
|
|
|
* 1. application's directory
|
|
|
|
* 2. current working directory
|
|
|
|
* 3. Windows System directory (e.g. C:\windows\system32)
|
|
|
|
* 4. Windows Directory (e.g. C:\windows)
|
|
|
|
* 5. all directories along %PATH%
|
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
|
* For WinXP and later search order actually depends on registry value:
|
|
|
|
* HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeProcessSearchMode
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
|
2014-02-23 07:59:59 -05:00
|
|
|
CURLcode FindWin32CACert(struct OperationConfig *config,
|
schannel: add support for CURLOPT_CAINFO
- Move verify_certificate functionality in schannel.c into a new
file called schannel_verify.c. Additionally, some structure defintions
from schannel.c have been moved to schannel.h to allow them to be
used in schannel_verify.c.
- Make verify_certificate functionality for Schannel available on
all versions of Windows instead of just Windows CE. verify_certificate
will be invoked on Windows CE or when the user specifies
CURLOPT_CAINFO and CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER.
- In verify_certificate, create a custom certificate chain engine that
exclusively trusts the certificate store backed by the CURLOPT_CAINFO
file.
- doc updates of --cacert/CAINFO support for schannel
- Use CERT_NAME_SEARCH_ALL_NAMES_FLAG when invoking CertGetNameString
when available. This implements a TODO in schannel.c to improve
handling of multiple SANs in a certificate. In particular, all SANs
will now be searched instead of just the first name.
- Update tool_operate.c to not search for the curl-ca-bundle.crt file
when using Schannel to maintain backward compatibility. Previously,
any curl-ca-bundle.crt file found in that search would have been
ignored by Schannel. But, with CAINFO support, the file found by
that search would have been used as the certificate store and
could cause issues for any users that have curl-ca-bundle.crt in
the search path.
- Update url.c to not set the build time CURL_CA_BUNDLE if the selected
SSL backend is Schannel. We allow setting CA location for schannel
only when explicitly specified by the user via CURLOPT_CAINFO /
--cacert.
- Add new test cases 3000 and 3001. These test cases check that the first
and last SAN, respectively, matches the connection hostname. New test
certificates have been added for these cases. For 3000, the certificate
prefix is Server-localhost-firstSAN and for 3001, the certificate
prefix is Server-localhost-secondSAN.
- Remove TODO 15.2 (Add support for custom server certificate
validation), this commit addresses it.
Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/1325
2017-03-10 15:27:30 -05:00
|
|
|
curl_sslbackend backend,
|
2014-02-23 07:59:59 -05:00
|
|
|
const char *bundle_file)
|
2011-09-20 09:58:35 -04:00
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
|
|
|
|
|
schannel: add support for CURLOPT_CAINFO
- Move verify_certificate functionality in schannel.c into a new
file called schannel_verify.c. Additionally, some structure defintions
from schannel.c have been moved to schannel.h to allow them to be
used in schannel_verify.c.
- Make verify_certificate functionality for Schannel available on
all versions of Windows instead of just Windows CE. verify_certificate
will be invoked on Windows CE or when the user specifies
CURLOPT_CAINFO and CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER.
- In verify_certificate, create a custom certificate chain engine that
exclusively trusts the certificate store backed by the CURLOPT_CAINFO
file.
- doc updates of --cacert/CAINFO support for schannel
- Use CERT_NAME_SEARCH_ALL_NAMES_FLAG when invoking CertGetNameString
when available. This implements a TODO in schannel.c to improve
handling of multiple SANs in a certificate. In particular, all SANs
will now be searched instead of just the first name.
- Update tool_operate.c to not search for the curl-ca-bundle.crt file
when using Schannel to maintain backward compatibility. Previously,
any curl-ca-bundle.crt file found in that search would have been
ignored by Schannel. But, with CAINFO support, the file found by
that search would have been used as the certificate store and
could cause issues for any users that have curl-ca-bundle.crt in
the search path.
- Update url.c to not set the build time CURL_CA_BUNDLE if the selected
SSL backend is Schannel. We allow setting CA location for schannel
only when explicitly specified by the user via CURLOPT_CAINFO /
--cacert.
- Add new test cases 3000 and 3001. These test cases check that the first
and last SAN, respectively, matches the connection hostname. New test
certificates have been added for these cases. For 3000, the certificate
prefix is Server-localhost-firstSAN and for 3001, the certificate
prefix is Server-localhost-secondSAN.
- Remove TODO 15.2 (Add support for custom server certificate
validation), this commit addresses it.
Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/1325
2017-03-10 15:27:30 -05:00
|
|
|
/* Search and set cert file only if libcurl supports SSL.
|
|
|
|
*
|
2019-01-29 04:09:29 -05:00
|
|
|
* If Schannel is the selected SSL backend then these locations are
|
|
|
|
* ignored. We allow setting CA location for schannel only when explicitly
|
|
|
|
* specified by the user via CURLOPT_CAINFO / --cacert.
|
schannel: add support for CURLOPT_CAINFO
- Move verify_certificate functionality in schannel.c into a new
file called schannel_verify.c. Additionally, some structure defintions
from schannel.c have been moved to schannel.h to allow them to be
used in schannel_verify.c.
- Make verify_certificate functionality for Schannel available on
all versions of Windows instead of just Windows CE. verify_certificate
will be invoked on Windows CE or when the user specifies
CURLOPT_CAINFO and CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER.
- In verify_certificate, create a custom certificate chain engine that
exclusively trusts the certificate store backed by the CURLOPT_CAINFO
file.
- doc updates of --cacert/CAINFO support for schannel
- Use CERT_NAME_SEARCH_ALL_NAMES_FLAG when invoking CertGetNameString
when available. This implements a TODO in schannel.c to improve
handling of multiple SANs in a certificate. In particular, all SANs
will now be searched instead of just the first name.
- Update tool_operate.c to not search for the curl-ca-bundle.crt file
when using Schannel to maintain backward compatibility. Previously,
any curl-ca-bundle.crt file found in that search would have been
ignored by Schannel. But, with CAINFO support, the file found by
that search would have been used as the certificate store and
could cause issues for any users that have curl-ca-bundle.crt in
the search path.
- Update url.c to not set the build time CURL_CA_BUNDLE if the selected
SSL backend is Schannel. We allow setting CA location for schannel
only when explicitly specified by the user via CURLOPT_CAINFO /
--cacert.
- Add new test cases 3000 and 3001. These test cases check that the first
and last SAN, respectively, matches the connection hostname. New test
certificates have been added for these cases. For 3000, the certificate
prefix is Server-localhost-firstSAN and for 3001, the certificate
prefix is Server-localhost-secondSAN.
- Remove TODO 15.2 (Add support for custom server certificate
validation), this commit addresses it.
Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/1325
2017-03-10 15:27:30 -05:00
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
if((curlinfo->features & CURL_VERSION_SSL) &&
|
|
|
|
backend != CURLSSLBACKEND_SCHANNEL) {
|
2011-09-20 09:58:35 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
DWORD res_len;
|
2017-06-06 16:15:17 -04:00
|
|
|
char buf[PATH_MAX];
|
2011-09-20 09:58:35 -04:00
|
|
|
char *ptr = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
buf[0] = '\0';
|
|
|
|
|
2017-06-06 16:15:17 -04:00
|
|
|
res_len = SearchPathA(NULL, bundle_file, NULL, PATH_MAX, buf, &ptr);
|
2011-09-20 09:58:35 -04:00
|
|
|
if(res_len > 0) {
|
|
|
|
Curl_safefree(config->cacert);
|
|
|
|
config->cacert = strdup(buf);
|
|
|
|
if(!config->cacert)
|
|
|
|
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
return result;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-01 02:50:40 -04:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
/* Get a list of all loaded modules with full paths.
|
|
|
|
* Returns slist on success or NULL on error.
|
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
struct curl_slist *GetLoadedModulePaths(void)
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
|
HANDLE hnd = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
|
2018-11-18 15:57:00 -05:00
|
|
|
MODULEENTRY32 mod = {0};
|
2018-11-01 02:50:40 -04:00
|
|
|
struct curl_slist *slist = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-18 15:57:00 -05:00
|
|
|
mod.dwSize = sizeof(MODULEENTRY32);
|
|
|
|
|
2018-11-01 02:50:40 -04:00
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
hnd = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPMODULE, 0);
|
|
|
|
} while(hnd == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && GetLastError() == ERROR_BAD_LENGTH);
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(hnd == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
if(!Module32First(hnd, &mod))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
do {
|
|
|
|
char *path; /* points to stack allocated buffer */
|
|
|
|
struct curl_slist *temp;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifdef UNICODE
|
|
|
|
/* sizeof(mod.szExePath) is the max total bytes of wchars. the max total
|
|
|
|
bytes of multibyte chars won't be more than twice that. */
|
|
|
|
char buffer[sizeof(mod.szExePath) * 2];
|
|
|
|
if(!WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, mod.szExePath, -1,
|
|
|
|
buffer, sizeof(buffer), NULL, NULL))
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
path = buffer;
|
|
|
|
#else
|
|
|
|
path = mod.szExePath;
|
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
temp = curl_slist_append(slist, path);
|
|
|
|
if(!temp)
|
|
|
|
goto error;
|
|
|
|
slist = temp;
|
|
|
|
} while(Module32Next(hnd, &mod));
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
goto cleanup;
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
error:
|
|
|
|
curl_slist_free_all(slist);
|
|
|
|
slist = NULL;
|
|
|
|
cleanup:
|
|
|
|
if(hnd != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
|
|
|
|
CloseHandle(hnd);
|
|
|
|
return slist;
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-20 09:58:35 -04:00
|
|
|
#endif /* WIN32 */
|
|
|
|
|
2011-09-19 12:18:17 -04:00
|
|
|
#endif /* MSDOS || WIN32 */
|