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curl/lib/vtls/keylog.c

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vtls: Extract and simplify key log file handling from OpenSSL Create a set of routines for TLS key log file handling to enable reuse with other TLS backends. Simplify the OpenSSL backend as follows: - Drop the ENABLE_SSLKEYLOGFILE macro as it is unconditionally enabled. - Do not perform dynamic memory allocation when preparing a log entry. Unless the TLS specifications change we can suffice with a reasonable fixed-size buffer. - Simplify state tracking when SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback is unavailable. My original sslkeylog.c code included this tracking in order to handle multiple calls to SSL_connect and detect new keys after renegotiation (via SSL_read/SSL_write). For curl however we can be sure that a single master secret eventually becomes available after SSL_connect, so a simple flag is sufficient. An alternative to the flag is examining SSL_state(), but this seems more complex and is not pursued. Capturing keys after server renegotiation was already unsupported in curl and remains unsupported. Tested with curl built against OpenSSL 0.9.8zh, 1.0.2u, and 1.1.1f (`SSLKEYLOGFILE=keys.txt curl -vkso /dev/null https://localhost:4433`) against an OpenSSL 1.1.1f server configured with: # Force non-TLSv1.3, use TLSv1.0 since 0.9.8 fails with 1.1 or 1.2 openssl s_server -www -tls1 # Likewise, but fail the server handshake. openssl s_server -www -tls1 -Verify 2 # TLS 1.3 test. No need to test the failing server handshake. openssl s_server -www -tls1_3 Verify that all secrets (1 for TLS 1.0, 4 for TLS 1.3) are correctly written using Wireshark. For the first and third case, expect four matches per connection (decrypted Server Finished, Client Finished, HTTP Request, HTTP Response). For the second case where the handshake fails, expect a decrypted Server Finished only. tshark -i lo -pf tcp -otls.keylog_file:keys.txt -Tfields \ -eframe.number -eframe.time -etcp.stream -e_ws.col.Info \ -dtls.port==4433,http -ohttp.desegment_body:FALSE \ -Y 'tls.handshake.verify_data or http' A single connection can easily be identified via the `tcp.stream` field.
2020-05-03 11:10:40 -04:00
/***************************************************************************
* _ _ ____ _
* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
* / __| | | | |_) | |
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2020, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
* are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
*
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
*
* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied.
*
***************************************************************************/
#include "curl_setup.h"
#include "keylog.h"
/* The last #include files should be: */
#include "curl_memory.h"
#include "memdebug.h"
#define KEYLOG_LABEL_MAXLEN (sizeof("CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET") - 1)
#define CLIENT_RANDOM_SIZE 32
/*
* The master secret in TLS 1.2 and before is always 48 bytes. In TLS 1.3, the
* secret size depends on the cipher suite's hash function which is 32 bytes
* for SHA-256 and 48 bytes for SHA-384.
*/
#define SECRET_MAXLEN 48
/* The fp for the open SSLKEYLOGFILE, or NULL if not open */
static FILE *keylog_file_fp;
void
Curl_tls_keylog_open(void)
{
char *keylog_file_name;
if(!keylog_file_fp) {
keylog_file_name = curl_getenv("SSLKEYLOGFILE");
if(keylog_file_name) {
keylog_file_fp = fopen(keylog_file_name, FOPEN_APPENDTEXT);
if(keylog_file_fp) {
#ifdef WIN32
if(setvbuf(keylog_file_fp, NULL, _IONBF, 0))
#else
if(setvbuf(keylog_file_fp, NULL, _IOLBF, 4096))
#endif
{
fclose(keylog_file_fp);
keylog_file_fp = NULL;
}
}
Curl_safefree(keylog_file_name);
}
}
}
void
Curl_tls_keylog_close(void)
{
if(keylog_file_fp) {
fclose(keylog_file_fp);
keylog_file_fp = NULL;
}
}
bool
Curl_tls_keylog_enabled(void)
{
return keylog_file_fp != NULL;
}
bool
Curl_tls_keylog_write_line(const char *line)
{
/* The current maximum valid keylog line length LF and NUL is 195. */
size_t linelen;
char buf[256];
if(!keylog_file_fp || !line) {
return false;
}
linelen = strlen(line);
if(linelen == 0 || linelen > sizeof(buf) - 2) {
/* Empty line or too big to fit in a LF and NUL. */
return false;
}
memcpy(buf, line, linelen);
if(line[linelen - 1] != '\n') {
buf[linelen++] = '\n';
}
buf[linelen] = '\0';
/* Using fputs here instead of fprintf since libcurl's fprintf replacement
may not be thread-safe. */
fputs(buf, keylog_file_fp);
return true;
}
bool
Curl_tls_keylog_write(const char *label,
const unsigned char client_random[CLIENT_RANDOM_SIZE],
const unsigned char *secret, size_t secretlen)
{
const char *hex = "0123456789ABCDEF";
size_t pos, i;
char line[KEYLOG_LABEL_MAXLEN + 1 + 2 * CLIENT_RANDOM_SIZE + 1 +
2 * SECRET_MAXLEN + 1 + 1];
if(!keylog_file_fp) {
return false;
}
pos = strlen(label);
if(pos > KEYLOG_LABEL_MAXLEN || !secretlen || secretlen > SECRET_MAXLEN) {
/* Should never happen - sanity check anyway. */
return false;
}
memcpy(line, label, pos);
line[pos++] = ' ';
/* Client Random */
for(i = 0; i < CLIENT_RANDOM_SIZE; i++) {
line[pos++] = hex[client_random[i] >> 4];
line[pos++] = hex[client_random[i] & 0xF];
}
line[pos++] = ' ';
/* Secret */
for(i = 0; i < secretlen; i++) {
line[pos++] = hex[secret[i] >> 4];
line[pos++] = hex[secret[i] & 0xF];
}
line[pos++] = '\n';
line[pos] = '\0';
/* Using fputs here instead of fprintf since libcurl's fprintf replacement
may not be thread-safe. */
fputs(line, keylog_file_fp);
return true;
}