curl/src/tool_doswin.c

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/***************************************************************************
* _ _ ____ _
* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
* / __| | | | |_) | |
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2021, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
2020-11-04 08:02:01 -05:00
* are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html.
*
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
*
* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied.
*
***************************************************************************/
#include "tool_setup.h"
#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(WIN32)
#if defined(HAVE_LIBGEN_H) && defined(HAVE_BASENAME)
# include <libgen.h>
#endif
#ifdef WIN32
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <tlhelp32.h>
# include "tool_cfgable.h"
# include "tool_libinfo.h"
#endif
#include "tool_bname.h"
#include "tool_doswin.h"
#include "curlx.h"
#include "memdebug.h" /* keep this as LAST include */
#ifdef WIN32
# undef PATH_MAX
# define PATH_MAX MAX_PATH
#endif
#ifndef S_ISCHR
# ifdef S_IFCHR
# define S_ISCHR(m) (((m) & S_IFMT) == S_IFCHR)
# else
# define S_ISCHR(m) (0) /* cannot tell if file is a device */
# endif
#endif
#ifdef WIN32
# define _use_lfn(f) (1) /* long file names always available */
#elif !defined(__DJGPP__) || (__DJGPP__ < 2) /* DJGPP 2.0 has _use_lfn() */
# define _use_lfn(f) (0) /* long file names never available */
#elif defined(__DJGPP__)
# include <fcntl.h> /* _use_lfn(f) prototype */
#endif
#ifndef UNITTESTS
static SANITIZEcode truncate_dryrun(const char *path,
const size_t truncate_pos);
#ifdef MSDOS
static SANITIZEcode msdosify(char **const sanitized, const char *file_name,
int flags);
#endif
static SANITIZEcode rename_if_reserved_dos_device_name(char **const sanitized,
const char *file_name,
int flags);
#endif /* !UNITTESTS (static declarations used if no unit tests) */
/*
Sanitize a file or path name.
All banned characters are replaced by underscores, for example:
f?*foo => f__foo
f:foo::$DATA => f_foo__$DATA
f:\foo:bar => f__foo_bar
f:\foo:bar => f:\foo:bar (flag SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)
This function was implemented according to the guidelines in 'Naming Files,
Paths, and Namespaces' section 'Naming Conventions'.
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa365247.aspx
Flags
-----
SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS: Allow colons.
Without this flag colons are sanitized.
SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH: Allow path separators and colons.
Without this flag path separators and colons are sanitized.
SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED: Allow reserved device names.
Without this flag a reserved device name is renamed (COM1 => _COM1) unless it's
in a UNC prefixed path.
SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE: Allow truncating a long filename.
Without this flag if the sanitized filename or path will be too long an error
occurs. With this flag the filename --and not any other parts of the path-- may
be truncated to at least a single character. A filename followed by an
alternate data stream (ADS) cannot be truncated in any case.
Success: (SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized points to a sanitized copy of file_name.
Failure: (!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized is NULL.
*/
SANITIZEcode sanitize_file_name(char **const sanitized, const char *file_name,
int flags)
{
char *p, *target;
size_t len;
SANITIZEcode sc;
size_t max_sanitized_len;
if(!sanitized)
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
*sanitized = NULL;
if(!file_name)
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)) {
#ifndef MSDOS
if(file_name[0] == '\\' && file_name[1] == '\\')
/* UNC prefixed path \\ (eg \\?\C:\foo) */
max_sanitized_len = 32767-1;
else
#endif
max_sanitized_len = PATH_MAX-1;
}
else
/* The maximum length of a filename.
FILENAME_MAX is often the same as PATH_MAX, in other words it is 260 and
does not discount the path information therefore we shouldn't use it. */
max_sanitized_len = (PATH_MAX-1 > 255) ? 255 : PATH_MAX-1;
len = strlen(file_name);
if(len > max_sanitized_len) {
if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) ||
truncate_dryrun(file_name, max_sanitized_len))
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
len = max_sanitized_len;
}
target = malloc(len + 1);
if(!target)
return SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
strncpy(target, file_name, len);
target[len] = '\0';
#ifndef MSDOS
if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && !strncmp(target, "\\\\?\\", 4))
/* Skip the literal path prefix \\?\ */
p = target + 4;
else
#endif
p = target;
/* replace control characters and other banned characters */
for(; *p; ++p) {
const char *banned;
if((1 <= *p && *p <= 31) ||
(!(flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)) && *p == ':') ||
(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && (*p == '/' || *p == '\\'))) {
*p = '_';
continue;
}
for(banned = "|<>\"?*"; *banned; ++banned) {
if(*p == *banned) {
*p = '_';
break;
}
}
}
/* remove trailing spaces and periods if not allowing paths */
if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && len) {
char *clip = NULL;
p = &target[len];
do {
--p;
if(*p != ' ' && *p != '.')
break;
clip = p;
} while(p != target);
if(clip) {
*clip = '\0';
len = clip - target;
}
}
#ifdef MSDOS
sc = msdosify(&p, target, flags);
free(target);
if(sc)
return sc;
target = p;
len = strlen(target);
if(len > max_sanitized_len) {
free(target);
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
}
#endif
if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_RESERVED)) {
sc = rename_if_reserved_dos_device_name(&p, target, flags);
free(target);
if(sc)
return sc;
target = p;
len = strlen(target);
if(len > max_sanitized_len) {
free(target);
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
}
}
*sanitized = target;
return SANITIZE_ERR_OK;
}
/*
Test if truncating a path to a file will leave at least a single character in
the filename. Filenames suffixed by an alternate data stream can't be
truncated. This performs a dry run, nothing is modified.
Good truncate_pos 9: C:\foo\bar => C:\foo\ba
Good truncate_pos 6: C:\foo => C:\foo
Good truncate_pos 5: C:\foo => C:\fo
Bad* truncate_pos 5: C:foo => C:foo
Bad truncate_pos 5: C:\foo:ads => C:\fo
Bad truncate_pos 9: C:\foo:ads => C:\foo:ad
Bad truncate_pos 5: C:\foo\bar => C:\fo
Bad truncate_pos 5: C:\foo\ => C:\fo
Bad truncate_pos 7: C:\foo\ => C:\foo\
Error truncate_pos 7: C:\foo => (pos out of range)
Bad truncate_pos 1: C:\foo\ => C
* C:foo is ambiguous, C could end up being a drive or file therefore something
like C:superlongfilename can't be truncated.
Returns
SANITIZE_ERR_OK: Good -- 'path' can be truncated
SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH: Bad -- 'path' cannot be truncated
!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK && != SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH: Error
*/
SANITIZEcode truncate_dryrun(const char *path, const size_t truncate_pos)
{
size_t len;
if(!path)
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
len = strlen(path);
if(truncate_pos > len)
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
if(!len || !truncate_pos)
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
if(strpbrk(&path[truncate_pos - 1], "\\/:"))
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
/* C:\foo can be truncated but C:\foo:ads can't */
if(truncate_pos > 1) {
const char *p = &path[truncate_pos - 1];
do {
--p;
if(*p == ':')
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
} while(p != path && *p != '\\' && *p != '/');
}
return SANITIZE_ERR_OK;
}
/* The functions msdosify, rename_if_dos_device_name and __crt0_glob_function
* were taken with modification from the DJGPP port of tar 1.12. They use
* algorithms originally from DJTAR.
*/
/*
Extra sanitization MSDOS for file_name.
This is a supporting function for sanitize_file_name.
Warning: This is an MSDOS legacy function and was purposely written in a way
that some path information may pass through. For example drive letter names
(C:, D:, etc) are allowed to pass through. For sanitizing a filename use
sanitize_file_name.
Success: (SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized points to a sanitized copy of file_name.
Failure: (!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized is NULL.
*/
#if defined(MSDOS) || defined(UNITTESTS)
SANITIZEcode msdosify(char **const sanitized, const char *file_name,
int flags)
{
char dos_name[PATH_MAX];
static const char illegal_chars_dos[] = ".+, ;=[]" /* illegal in DOS */
"|<>/\\\":?*"; /* illegal in DOS & W95 */
static const char *illegal_chars_w95 = &illegal_chars_dos[8];
int idx, dot_idx;
const char *s = file_name;
char *d = dos_name;
const char *const dlimit = dos_name + sizeof(dos_name) - 1;
const char *illegal_aliens = illegal_chars_dos;
size_t len = sizeof(illegal_chars_dos) - 1;
if(!sanitized)
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
*sanitized = NULL;
if(!file_name)
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
if(strlen(file_name) > PATH_MAX-1 &&
(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) ||
truncate_dryrun(file_name, PATH_MAX-1)))
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
/* Support for Windows 9X VFAT systems, when available. */
if(_use_lfn(file_name)) {
illegal_aliens = illegal_chars_w95;
len -= (illegal_chars_w95 - illegal_chars_dos);
}
/* Get past the drive letter, if any. */
if(s[0] >= 'A' && s[0] <= 'z' && s[1] == ':') {
*d++ = *s++;
*d = ((flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH))) ? ':' : '_';
++d, ++s;
}
for(idx = 0, dot_idx = -1; *s && d < dlimit; s++, d++) {
if(memchr(illegal_aliens, *s, len)) {
if((flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH)) && *s == ':')
*d = ':';
else if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && (*s == '/' || *s == '\\'))
*d = *s;
/* Dots are special: DOS doesn't allow them as the leading character,
and a file name cannot have more than a single dot. We leave the
first non-leading dot alone, unless it comes too close to the
beginning of the name: we want sh.lex.c to become sh_lex.c, not
sh.lex-c. */
else if(*s == '.') {
if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) && idx == 0 &&
(s[1] == '/' || s[1] == '\\' ||
(s[1] == '.' && (s[2] == '/' || s[2] == '\\')))) {
/* Copy "./" and "../" verbatim. */
*d++ = *s++;
if(d == dlimit)
break;
if(*s == '.') {
*d++ = *s++;
if(d == dlimit)
break;
}
*d = *s;
}
else if(idx == 0)
*d = '_';
else if(dot_idx >= 0) {
if(dot_idx < 5) { /* 5 is a heuristic ad-hoc'ery */
d[dot_idx - idx] = '_'; /* replace previous dot */
*d = '.';
}
else
*d = '-';
}
else
*d = '.';
if(*s == '.')
dot_idx = idx;
}
else if(*s == '+' && s[1] == '+') {
if(idx - 2 == dot_idx) { /* .c++, .h++ etc. */
*d++ = 'x';
if(d == dlimit)
break;
*d = 'x';
}
else {
/* libg++ etc. */
if(dlimit - d < 4) {
*d++ = 'x';
if(d == dlimit)
break;
*d = 'x';
}
else {
memcpy(d, "plus", 4);
d += 3;
}
}
s++;
idx++;
}
else
*d = '_';
}
else
*d = *s;
if(*s == '/' || *s == '\\') {
idx = 0;
dot_idx = -1;
}
else
idx++;
}
*d = '\0';
if(*s) {
/* dos_name is truncated, check that truncation requirements are met,
specifically truncating a filename suffixed by an alternate data stream
or truncating the entire filename is not allowed. */
if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) || strpbrk(s, "\\/:") ||
truncate_dryrun(dos_name, d - dos_name))
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
}
*sanitized = strdup(dos_name);
return (*sanitized ? SANITIZE_ERR_OK : SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
}
#endif /* MSDOS || UNITTESTS */
/*
Rename file_name if it's a reserved dos device name.
This is a supporting function for sanitize_file_name.
Warning: This is an MSDOS legacy function and was purposely written in a way
that some path information may pass through. For example drive letter names
(C:, D:, etc) are allowed to pass through. For sanitizing a filename use
sanitize_file_name.
Success: (SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized points to a sanitized copy of file_name.
Failure: (!= SANITIZE_ERR_OK) *sanitized is NULL.
*/
SANITIZEcode rename_if_reserved_dos_device_name(char **const sanitized,
const char *file_name,
int flags)
{
/* We could have a file whose name is a device on MS-DOS. Trying to
* retrieve such a file would fail at best and wedge us at worst. We need
* to rename such files. */
char *p, *base;
char fname[PATH_MAX];
#ifdef MSDOS
struct_stat st_buf;
#endif
if(!sanitized)
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
*sanitized = NULL;
if(!file_name)
return SANITIZE_ERR_BAD_ARGUMENT;
/* Ignore UNC prefixed paths, they are allowed to contain a reserved name. */
#ifndef MSDOS
if((flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH) &&
file_name[0] == '\\' && file_name[1] == '\\') {
size_t len = strlen(file_name);
*sanitized = malloc(len + 1);
if(!*sanitized)
return SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
strncpy(*sanitized, file_name, len + 1);
return SANITIZE_ERR_OK;
}
#endif
if(strlen(file_name) > PATH_MAX-1 &&
(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) ||
truncate_dryrun(file_name, PATH_MAX-1)))
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
strncpy(fname, file_name, PATH_MAX-1);
fname[PATH_MAX-1] = '\0';
base = basename(fname);
/* Rename reserved device names that are known to be accessible without \\.\
Examples: CON => _CON, CON.EXT => CON_EXT, CON:ADS => CON_ADS
https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/74496
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa365247.aspx
*/
for(p = fname; p; p = (p == fname && fname != base ? base : NULL)) {
size_t p_len;
int x = (curl_strnequal(p, "CON", 3) ||
curl_strnequal(p, "PRN", 3) ||
curl_strnequal(p, "AUX", 3) ||
curl_strnequal(p, "NUL", 3)) ? 3 :
(curl_strnequal(p, "CLOCK$", 6)) ? 6 :
(curl_strnequal(p, "COM", 3) || curl_strnequal(p, "LPT", 3)) ?
(('1' <= p[3] && p[3] <= '9') ? 4 : 3) : 0;
if(!x)
continue;
/* the devices may be accessible with an extension or ADS, for
example CON.AIR and 'CON . AIR' and CON:AIR access console */
for(; p[x] == ' '; ++x)
;
if(p[x] == '.') {
p[x] = '_';
continue;
}
else if(p[x] == ':') {
if(!(flags & (SANITIZE_ALLOW_COLONS|SANITIZE_ALLOW_PATH))) {
p[x] = '_';
continue;
}
++x;
}
else if(p[x]) /* no match */
continue;
/* p points to 'CON' or 'CON ' or 'CON:', etc */
p_len = strlen(p);
/* Prepend a '_' */
if(strlen(fname) == PATH_MAX-1) {
--p_len;
if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) || truncate_dryrun(p, p_len))
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
p[p_len] = '\0';
}
memmove(p + 1, p, p_len + 1);
p[0] = '_';
++p_len;
/* if fname was just modified then the basename pointer must be updated */
if(p == fname)
base = basename(fname);
}
/* This is the legacy portion from rename_if_dos_device_name that checks for
reserved device names. It only works on MSDOS. On Windows XP the stat
check errors with EINVAL if the device name is reserved. On Windows
Vista/7/8 it sets mode S_IFREG (regular file or device). According to MSDN
stat doc the latter behavior is correct, but that doesn't help us identify
whether it's a reserved device name and not a regular file name. */
#ifdef MSDOS
if(base && ((stat(base, &st_buf)) == 0) && (S_ISCHR(st_buf.st_mode))) {
/* Prepend a '_' */
size_t blen = strlen(base);
if(blen) {
if(strlen(fname) == PATH_MAX-1) {
--blen;
if(!(flags & SANITIZE_ALLOW_TRUNCATE) || truncate_dryrun(base, blen))
return SANITIZE_ERR_INVALID_PATH;
base[blen] = '\0';
}
memmove(base + 1, base, blen + 1);
base[0] = '_';
}
}
#endif
*sanitized = strdup(fname);
return (*sanitized ? SANITIZE_ERR_OK : SANITIZE_ERR_OUT_OF_MEMORY);
}
#if defined(MSDOS) && (defined(__DJGPP__) || defined(__GO32__))
/*
* Disable program default argument globbing. We do it on our own.
*/
char **__crt0_glob_function(char *arg)
{
(void)arg;
return (char **)0;
}
#endif /* MSDOS && (__DJGPP__ || __GO32__) */
#ifdef WIN32
/*
* Function to find CACert bundle on a Win32 platform using SearchPath.
* (SearchPath is already declared via inclusions done in setup header file)
* (Use the ASCII version instead of the unicode one!)
* The order of the directories it searches is:
* 1. application's directory
* 2. current working directory
* 3. Windows System directory (e.g. C:\windows\system32)
* 4. Windows Directory (e.g. C:\windows)
* 5. all directories along %PATH%
*
* For WinXP and later search order actually depends on registry value:
* HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\SafeProcessSearchMode
*/
CURLcode FindWin32CACert(struct OperationConfig *config,
schannel: add support for CURLOPT_CAINFO - Move verify_certificate functionality in schannel.c into a new file called schannel_verify.c. Additionally, some structure defintions from schannel.c have been moved to schannel.h to allow them to be used in schannel_verify.c. - Make verify_certificate functionality for Schannel available on all versions of Windows instead of just Windows CE. verify_certificate will be invoked on Windows CE or when the user specifies CURLOPT_CAINFO and CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER. - In verify_certificate, create a custom certificate chain engine that exclusively trusts the certificate store backed by the CURLOPT_CAINFO file. - doc updates of --cacert/CAINFO support for schannel - Use CERT_NAME_SEARCH_ALL_NAMES_FLAG when invoking CertGetNameString when available. This implements a TODO in schannel.c to improve handling of multiple SANs in a certificate. In particular, all SANs will now be searched instead of just the first name. - Update tool_operate.c to not search for the curl-ca-bundle.crt file when using Schannel to maintain backward compatibility. Previously, any curl-ca-bundle.crt file found in that search would have been ignored by Schannel. But, with CAINFO support, the file found by that search would have been used as the certificate store and could cause issues for any users that have curl-ca-bundle.crt in the search path. - Update url.c to not set the build time CURL_CA_BUNDLE if the selected SSL backend is Schannel. We allow setting CA location for schannel only when explicitly specified by the user via CURLOPT_CAINFO / --cacert. - Add new test cases 3000 and 3001. These test cases check that the first and last SAN, respectively, matches the connection hostname. New test certificates have been added for these cases. For 3000, the certificate prefix is Server-localhost-firstSAN and for 3001, the certificate prefix is Server-localhost-secondSAN. - Remove TODO 15.2 (Add support for custom server certificate validation), this commit addresses it. Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/1325
2017-03-10 15:27:30 -05:00
curl_sslbackend backend,
const TCHAR *bundle_file)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
schannel: add support for CURLOPT_CAINFO - Move verify_certificate functionality in schannel.c into a new file called schannel_verify.c. Additionally, some structure defintions from schannel.c have been moved to schannel.h to allow them to be used in schannel_verify.c. - Make verify_certificate functionality for Schannel available on all versions of Windows instead of just Windows CE. verify_certificate will be invoked on Windows CE or when the user specifies CURLOPT_CAINFO and CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER. - In verify_certificate, create a custom certificate chain engine that exclusively trusts the certificate store backed by the CURLOPT_CAINFO file. - doc updates of --cacert/CAINFO support for schannel - Use CERT_NAME_SEARCH_ALL_NAMES_FLAG when invoking CertGetNameString when available. This implements a TODO in schannel.c to improve handling of multiple SANs in a certificate. In particular, all SANs will now be searched instead of just the first name. - Update tool_operate.c to not search for the curl-ca-bundle.crt file when using Schannel to maintain backward compatibility. Previously, any curl-ca-bundle.crt file found in that search would have been ignored by Schannel. But, with CAINFO support, the file found by that search would have been used as the certificate store and could cause issues for any users that have curl-ca-bundle.crt in the search path. - Update url.c to not set the build time CURL_CA_BUNDLE if the selected SSL backend is Schannel. We allow setting CA location for schannel only when explicitly specified by the user via CURLOPT_CAINFO / --cacert. - Add new test cases 3000 and 3001. These test cases check that the first and last SAN, respectively, matches the connection hostname. New test certificates have been added for these cases. For 3000, the certificate prefix is Server-localhost-firstSAN and for 3001, the certificate prefix is Server-localhost-secondSAN. - Remove TODO 15.2 (Add support for custom server certificate validation), this commit addresses it. Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/1325
2017-03-10 15:27:30 -05:00
/* Search and set cert file only if libcurl supports SSL.
*
* If Schannel is the selected SSL backend then these locations are
* ignored. We allow setting CA location for schannel only when explicitly
* specified by the user via CURLOPT_CAINFO / --cacert.
schannel: add support for CURLOPT_CAINFO - Move verify_certificate functionality in schannel.c into a new file called schannel_verify.c. Additionally, some structure defintions from schannel.c have been moved to schannel.h to allow them to be used in schannel_verify.c. - Make verify_certificate functionality for Schannel available on all versions of Windows instead of just Windows CE. verify_certificate will be invoked on Windows CE or when the user specifies CURLOPT_CAINFO and CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER. - In verify_certificate, create a custom certificate chain engine that exclusively trusts the certificate store backed by the CURLOPT_CAINFO file. - doc updates of --cacert/CAINFO support for schannel - Use CERT_NAME_SEARCH_ALL_NAMES_FLAG when invoking CertGetNameString when available. This implements a TODO in schannel.c to improve handling of multiple SANs in a certificate. In particular, all SANs will now be searched instead of just the first name. - Update tool_operate.c to not search for the curl-ca-bundle.crt file when using Schannel to maintain backward compatibility. Previously, any curl-ca-bundle.crt file found in that search would have been ignored by Schannel. But, with CAINFO support, the file found by that search would have been used as the certificate store and could cause issues for any users that have curl-ca-bundle.crt in the search path. - Update url.c to not set the build time CURL_CA_BUNDLE if the selected SSL backend is Schannel. We allow setting CA location for schannel only when explicitly specified by the user via CURLOPT_CAINFO / --cacert. - Add new test cases 3000 and 3001. These test cases check that the first and last SAN, respectively, matches the connection hostname. New test certificates have been added for these cases. For 3000, the certificate prefix is Server-localhost-firstSAN and for 3001, the certificate prefix is Server-localhost-secondSAN. - Remove TODO 15.2 (Add support for custom server certificate validation), this commit addresses it. Closes https://github.com/curl/curl/pull/1325
2017-03-10 15:27:30 -05:00
*/
if((curlinfo->features & CURL_VERSION_SSL) &&
backend != CURLSSLBACKEND_SCHANNEL) {
DWORD res_len;
TCHAR buf[PATH_MAX];
TCHAR *ptr = NULL;
buf[0] = TEXT('\0');
res_len = SearchPath(NULL, bundle_file, NULL, PATH_MAX, buf, &ptr);
if(res_len > 0) {
Curl_safefree(config->cacert);
#ifdef UNICODE
config->cacert = curlx_convert_wchar_to_UTF8(buf);
#else
config->cacert = strdup(buf);
#endif
if(!config->cacert)
result = CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
}
return result;
}
/* Get a list of all loaded modules with full paths.
* Returns slist on success or NULL on error.
*/
struct curl_slist *GetLoadedModulePaths(void)
{
HANDLE hnd = INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE;
MODULEENTRY32 mod = {0};
struct curl_slist *slist = NULL;
mod.dwSize = sizeof(MODULEENTRY32);
do {
hnd = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(TH32CS_SNAPMODULE, 0);
} while(hnd == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE && GetLastError() == ERROR_BAD_LENGTH);
if(hnd == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
goto error;
if(!Module32First(hnd, &mod))
goto error;
do {
char *path; /* points to stack allocated buffer */
struct curl_slist *temp;
#ifdef UNICODE
/* sizeof(mod.szExePath) is the max total bytes of wchars. the max total
bytes of multibyte chars won't be more than twice that. */
char buffer[sizeof(mod.szExePath) * 2];
if(!WideCharToMultiByte(CP_ACP, 0, mod.szExePath, -1,
buffer, sizeof(buffer), NULL, NULL))
goto error;
path = buffer;
#else
path = mod.szExePath;
#endif
temp = curl_slist_append(slist, path);
if(!temp)
goto error;
slist = temp;
} while(Module32Next(hnd, &mod));
goto cleanup;
error:
curl_slist_free_all(slist);
slist = NULL;
cleanup:
if(hnd != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
CloseHandle(hnd);
return slist;
}
/* The terminal settings to restore on exit */
static struct TerminalSettings {
HANDLE hStdOut;
DWORD dwOutputMode;
LONG valid;
} TerminalSettings;
#ifndef ENABLE_VIRTUAL_TERMINAL_PROCESSING
#define ENABLE_VIRTUAL_TERMINAL_PROCESSING 0x0004
#endif
static void restore_terminal(void)
{
if(InterlockedExchange(&TerminalSettings.valid, (LONG)FALSE))
SetConsoleMode(TerminalSettings.hStdOut, TerminalSettings.dwOutputMode);
}
/* This is the console signal handler.
* The system calls it in a separate thread.
*/
static BOOL WINAPI signal_handler(DWORD type)
{
if(type == CTRL_C_EVENT || type == CTRL_BREAK_EVENT)
restore_terminal();
return FALSE;
}
static void init_terminal(void)
{
TerminalSettings.hStdOut = GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE);
/*
* Enable VT (Virtual Terminal) output.
* Note: VT mode flag can be set on any version of Windows, but VT
* processing only performed on Win10 >= Creators Update)
*/
if((TerminalSettings.hStdOut != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) &&
GetConsoleMode(TerminalSettings.hStdOut,
&TerminalSettings.dwOutputMode) &&
!(TerminalSettings.dwOutputMode &
ENABLE_VIRTUAL_TERMINAL_PROCESSING)) {
/* The signal handler is set before attempting to change the console mode
because otherwise a signal would not be caught after the change but
before the handler was installed. */
(void)InterlockedExchange(&TerminalSettings.valid, (LONG)TRUE);
if(SetConsoleCtrlHandler(signal_handler, TRUE)) {
if(SetConsoleMode(TerminalSettings.hStdOut,
(TerminalSettings.dwOutputMode |
ENABLE_VIRTUAL_TERMINAL_PROCESSING))) {
atexit(restore_terminal);
}
else {
SetConsoleCtrlHandler(signal_handler, FALSE);
(void)InterlockedExchange(&TerminalSettings.valid, (LONG)FALSE);
}
}
}
}
LARGE_INTEGER tool_freq;
bool tool_isVistaOrGreater;
CURLcode win32_init(void)
{
if(curlx_verify_windows_version(6, 0, PLATFORM_WINNT,
VERSION_GREATER_THAN_EQUAL))
tool_isVistaOrGreater = true;
else
tool_isVistaOrGreater = false;
QueryPerformanceFrequency(&tool_freq);
init_terminal();
return CURLE_OK;
}
#endif /* WIN32 */
#endif /* MSDOS || WIN32 */