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curl/lib/vtls/wolfssl.c

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/***************************************************************************
* _ _ ____ _
* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
* / __| | | | |_) | |
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
* Copyright (C) 1998 - 2021, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
2020-11-04 08:02:01 -05:00
* are also available at https://curl.se/docs/copyright.html.
*
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
*
* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied.
*
***************************************************************************/
/*
* Source file for all wolfSSL specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
* but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions.
*
*/
build: fix circular header inclusion with other packages This commit renames lib/setup.h to lib/curl_setup.h and renames lib/setup_once.h to lib/curl_setup_once.h. Removes the need and usage of a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl. [1] Removes the need and presence of an alarming notice we carried in old setup_once.h [2] ---------------------------------------- 1 - lib/setup_once.h used __SETUP_ONCE_H macro as header inclusion guard up to commit ec691ca3 which changed this to HEADER_CURL_SETUP_ONCE_H, this single inclusion guard is enough to ensure that inclusion of lib/setup_once.h done from lib/setup.h is only done once. Additionally lib/setup.h has always used __SETUP_ONCE_H macro to protect inclusion of setup_once.h even after commit ec691ca3, this was to avoid a circular header inclusion triggered when building a c-ares enabled version with c-ares sources available which also has a setup_once.h header. Commit ec691ca3 exposes the real nature of __SETUP_ONCE_H usage in lib/setup.h, it is a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl belonging to c-ares's setup_once.h The renaming this commit does, fixes the circular header inclusion, and as such removes the need and usage of a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl. Macro __SETUP_ONCE_H no longer used in libcurl. 2 - Due to the circular interdependency of old lib/setup_once.h and the c-ares setup_once.h header, old file lib/setup_once.h has carried back from 2006 up to now days an alarming and prominent notice about the need of keeping libcurl's and c-ares's setup_once.h in sync. Given that this commit fixes the circular interdependency, the need and presence of mentioned notice is removed. All mentioned interdependencies come back from now old days when the c-ares project lived inside a curl subdirectory. This commit removes last traces of such fact.
2013-01-06 13:06:49 -05:00
#include "curl_setup.h"
#ifdef USE_WOLFSSL
#define WOLFSSL_OPTIONS_IGNORE_SYS
#include <wolfssl/version.h>
#include <wolfssl/options.h>
/* To determine what functions are available we rely on one or both of:
- the user's options.h generated by wolfSSL
- the symbols detected by curl's configure
Since they are markedly different from one another, and one or the other may
not be available, we do some checking below to bring things in sync. */
/* HAVE_ALPN is wolfSSL's build time symbol for enabling ALPN in options.h. */
#ifndef HAVE_ALPN
#ifdef HAVE_WOLFSSL_USEALPN
#define HAVE_ALPN
#endif
#endif
/* WOLFSSL_ALLOW_SSLV3 is wolfSSL's build time symbol for enabling SSLv3 in
options.h, but is only seen in >= 3.6.6 since that's when they started
disabling SSLv3 by default. */
#ifndef WOLFSSL_ALLOW_SSLV3
#if (LIBWOLFSSL_VERSION_HEX < 0x03006006) || \
defined(HAVE_WOLFSSLV3_CLIENT_METHOD)
#define WOLFSSL_ALLOW_SSLV3
#endif
#endif
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#include <limits.h>
#include "urldata.h"
#include "sendf.h"
#include "inet_pton.h"
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#include "vtls.h"
#include "keylog.h"
#include "parsedate.h"
#include "connect.h" /* for the connect timeout */
#include "select.h"
#include "strcase.h"
#include "x509asn1.h"
#include "curl_printf.h"
#include "multiif.h"
#include <wolfssl/openssl/ssl.h>
#include <wolfssl/ssl.h>
#include <wolfssl/error-ssl.h>
#include "wolfssl.h"
/* The last #include files should be: */
#include "curl_memory.h"
#include "memdebug.h"
/* KEEP_PEER_CERT is a product of the presence of build time symbol
OPENSSL_EXTRA without NO_CERTS, depending on the version. KEEP_PEER_CERT is
in wolfSSL's settings.h, and the latter two are build time symbols in
options.h. */
#ifndef KEEP_PEER_CERT
#if defined(HAVE_WOLFSSL_GET_PEER_CERTIFICATE) || \
(defined(OPENSSL_EXTRA) && !defined(NO_CERTS))
#define KEEP_PEER_CERT
#endif
#endif
vtls: encapsulate SSL backend-specific data So far, all of the SSL backends' private data has been declared as part of the ssl_connect_data struct, in one big #if .. #elif .. #endif block. This can only work as long as the SSL backend is a compile-time option, something we want to change in the next commits. Therefore, let's encapsulate the exact data needed by each SSL backend into a private struct, and let's avoid bleeding any SSL backend-specific information into urldata.h. This is also necessary to allow multiple SSL backends to be compiled in at the same time, as e.g. OpenSSL's and CyaSSL's headers cannot be included in the same .c file. To avoid too many malloc() calls, we simply append the private structs to the connectdata struct in allocate_conn(). This requires us to take extra care of alignment issues: struct fields often need to be aligned on certain boundaries e.g. 32-bit values need to be stored at addresses that divide evenly by 4 (= 32 bit / 8 bit-per-byte). We do that by assuming that no SSL backend's private data contains any fields that need to be aligned on boundaries larger than `long long` (typically 64-bit) would need. Under this assumption, we simply add a dummy field of type `long long` to the `struct connectdata` struct. This field will never be accessed but acts as a placeholder for the four instances of ssl_backend_data instead. the size of each ssl_backend_data struct is stored in the SSL backend-specific metadata, to allow allocate_conn() to know how much extra space to allocate, and how to initialize the ssl[sockindex]->backend and proxy_ssl[sockindex]->backend pointers. This would appear to be a little complicated at first, but is really necessary to encapsulate the private data of each SSL backend correctly. And we need to encapsulate thusly if we ever want to allow selecting CyaSSL and OpenSSL at runtime, as their headers cannot be included within the same .c file (there are just too many conflicting definitions and declarations for that). Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
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struct ssl_backend_data {
SSL_CTX* ctx;
SSL* handle;
};
static Curl_recv wolfssl_recv;
static Curl_send wolfssl_send;
#ifdef OPENSSL_EXTRA
/*
* Availability note:
* The TLS 1.3 secret callback (wolfSSL_set_tls13_secret_cb) was added in
* WolfSSL 4.4.0, but requires the -DHAVE_SECRET_CALLBACK build option. If that
* option is not set, then TLS 1.3 will not be logged.
* For TLS 1.2 and before, we use wolfSSL_get_keys().
* SSL_get_client_random and wolfSSL_get_keys require OPENSSL_EXTRA
* (--enable-opensslextra or --enable-all).
*/
#if defined(HAVE_SECRET_CALLBACK) && defined(WOLFSSL_TLS13)
static int
wolfssl_tls13_secret_callback(SSL *ssl, int id, const unsigned char *secret,
int secretSz, void *ctx)
{
const char *label;
unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE];
(void)ctx;
if(!ssl || !Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) {
return 0;
}
switch(id) {
case CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET:
label = "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
break;
case CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET:
label = "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
break;
case SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET:
label = "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET";
break;
case CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET:
label = "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0";
break;
case SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET:
label = "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0";
break;
case EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET:
label = "EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET";
break;
case EXPORTER_SECRET:
label = "EXPORTER_SECRET";
break;
default:
return 0;
}
if(SSL_get_client_random(ssl, client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) == 0) {
/* Should never happen as wolfSSL_KeepArrays() was called before. */
return 0;
}
Curl_tls_keylog_write(label, client_random, secret, secretSz);
return 0;
}
#endif /* defined(HAVE_SECRET_CALLBACK) && defined(WOLFSSL_TLS13) */
static void
wolfssl_log_tls12_secret(SSL *ssl)
{
unsigned char *ms, *sr, *cr;
unsigned int msLen, srLen, crLen, i, x = 0;
#if LIBWOLFSSL_VERSION_HEX >= 0x0300d000 /* >= 3.13.0 */
/* wolfSSL_GetVersion is available since 3.13, we use it instead of
* SSL_version since the latter relies on OPENSSL_ALL (--enable-opensslall or
* --enable-all). Failing to perform this check could result in an unusable
* key log line when TLS 1.3 is actually negotiated. */
switch(wolfSSL_GetVersion(ssl)) {
case WOLFSSL_SSLV3:
case WOLFSSL_TLSV1:
case WOLFSSL_TLSV1_1:
case WOLFSSL_TLSV1_2:
break;
default:
/* TLS 1.3 does not use this mechanism, the "master secret" returned below
* is not directly usable. */
return;
}
#endif
if(SSL_get_keys(ssl, &ms, &msLen, &sr, &srLen, &cr, &crLen) != SSL_SUCCESS) {
return;
}
/* Check for a missing master secret and skip logging. That can happen if
* curl rejects the server certificate and aborts the handshake.
*/
for(i = 0; i < msLen; i++) {
x |= ms[i];
}
if(x == 0) {
return;
}
Curl_tls_keylog_write("CLIENT_RANDOM", cr, ms, msLen);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_EXTRA */
static int do_file_type(const char *type)
{
if(!type || !type[0])
return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
if(strcasecompare(type, "PEM"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_PEM;
if(strcasecompare(type, "DER"))
return SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1;
return -1;
}
/*
* This function loads all the client/CA certificates and CRLs. Setup the TLS
* layer and do all necessary magic.
*/
static CURLcode
wolfssl_connect_step1(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
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char *ciphers;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
SSL_METHOD* req_method = NULL;
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
#ifdef HAVE_SNI
bool sni = FALSE;
#define use_sni(x) sni = (x)
#else
#define use_sni(x) Curl_nop_stmt
#endif
if(connssl->state == ssl_connection_complete)
return CURLE_OK;
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version_max) != CURL_SSLVERSION_MAX_NONE) {
failf(data, "wolfSSL does not support to set maximum SSL/TLS version");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
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switch(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version)) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
#if LIBWOLFSSL_VERSION_HEX >= 0x03003000 /* >= 3.3.0 */
/* minimum protocol version is set later after the CTX object is created */
req_method = SSLv23_client_method();
#else
infof(data, "wolfSSL <3.3.0 cannot be configured to use TLS 1.0-1.2, "
"TLS 1.0 is used exclusively\n");
req_method = TLSv1_client_method();
#endif
use_sni(TRUE);
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
#if defined(WOLFSSL_ALLOW_TLSV10) && !defined(NO_OLD_TLS)
req_method = TLSv1_client_method();
use_sni(TRUE);
#else
failf(data, "wolfSSL does not support TLS 1.0");
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
#endif
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
#ifndef NO_OLD_TLS
req_method = TLSv1_1_client_method();
use_sni(TRUE);
#else
failf(data, "wolfSSL does not support TLS 1.1");
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
#endif
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
req_method = TLSv1_2_client_method();
use_sni(TRUE);
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_3:
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#ifdef WOLFSSL_TLS13
req_method = wolfTLSv1_3_client_method();
use_sni(TRUE);
break;
#else
failf(data, "wolfSSL: TLS 1.3 is not yet supported");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
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#endif
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
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#ifdef WOLFSSL_ALLOW_SSLV3
req_method = SSLv3_client_method();
use_sni(FALSE);
#else
failf(data, "wolfSSL does not support SSLv3");
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
#endif
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2:
failf(data, "wolfSSL does not support SSLv2");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
default:
failf(data, "Unrecognized parameter passed via CURLOPT_SSLVERSION");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
if(!req_method) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a method!");
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
if(backend->ctx)
SSL_CTX_free(backend->ctx);
backend->ctx = SSL_CTX_new(req_method);
if(!backend->ctx) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context!");
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
switch(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(version)) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
#if LIBWOLFSSL_VERSION_HEX > 0x03004006 /* > 3.4.6 */
/* Versions 3.3.0 to 3.4.6 we know the minimum protocol version is
* whatever minimum version of TLS was built in and at least TLS 1.0. For
* later library versions that could change (eg TLS 1.0 built in but
* defaults to TLS 1.1) so we have this short circuit evaluation to find
* the minimum supported TLS version.
*/
if((wolfSSL_CTX_SetMinVersion(backend->ctx, WOLFSSL_TLSV1) != 1) &&
(wolfSSL_CTX_SetMinVersion(backend->ctx, WOLFSSL_TLSV1_1) != 1) &&
(wolfSSL_CTX_SetMinVersion(backend->ctx, WOLFSSL_TLSV1_2) != 1)
2018-03-01 13:10:36 -05:00
#ifdef WOLFSSL_TLS13
&& (wolfSSL_CTX_SetMinVersion(backend->ctx, WOLFSSL_TLSV1_3) != 1)
2018-03-01 13:10:36 -05:00
#endif
) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't set the minimum protocol version");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
#endif
break;
}
2017-01-06 17:00:45 -05:00
ciphers = SSL_CONN_CONFIG(cipher_list);
if(ciphers) {
if(!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(backend->ctx, ciphers)) {
2017-01-06 17:00:45 -05:00
failf(data, "failed setting cipher list: %s", ciphers);
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
}
infof(data, "Cipher selection: %s\n", ciphers);
}
#ifndef NO_FILESYSTEM
/* load trusted cacert */
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile)) {
if(1 != SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(backend->ctx,
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile),
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath))) {
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
/* Fail if we insist on successfully verifying the server. */
failf(data, "error setting certificate verify locations:"
" CAfile: %s CApath: %s",
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile)?
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile): "none",
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath)?
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath) : "none");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
else {
/* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate
verification is required. */
infof(data, "error setting certificate verify locations,"
" continuing anyway:\n");
}
}
else {
/* Everything is fine. */
infof(data, "successfully set certificate verify locations:\n");
}
infof(data, " CAfile: %s\n",
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile) ? SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CAfile) : "none");
infof(data, " CApath: %s\n",
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath) ? SSL_CONN_CONFIG(CApath) : "none");
}
/* Load the client certificate, and private key */
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.clientcert) && SSL_SET_OPTION(key)) {
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
int file_type = do_file_type(SSL_SET_OPTION(cert_type));
if(SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(backend->ctx,
SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.clientcert),
file_type) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to use client certificate (no key or wrong pass"
" phrase?)");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
file_type = do_file_type(SSL_SET_OPTION(key_type));
if(SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(backend->ctx, SSL_SET_OPTION(key),
file_type) != 1) {
failf(data, "unable to set private key");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
}
#endif /* !NO_FILESYSTEM */
/* SSL always tries to verify the peer, this only says whether it should
* fail to connect if the verification fails, or if it should continue
* anyway. In the latter case the result of the verification is checked with
* SSL_get_verify_result() below. */
SSL_CTX_set_verify(backend->ctx,
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)?SSL_VERIFY_PEER:
SSL_VERIFY_NONE,
NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_SNI
if(sni) {
struct in_addr addr4;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
struct in6_addr addr6;
#endif
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
conn->host.name;
#else
const char * const hostname = conn->host.name;
#endif
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
size_t hostname_len = strlen(hostname);
if((hostname_len < USHRT_MAX) &&
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
(0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET, hostname, &addr4)) &&
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
(0 == Curl_inet_pton(AF_INET6, hostname, &addr6)) &&
#endif
(wolfSSL_CTX_UseSNI(backend->ctx, WOLFSSL_SNI_HOST_NAME, hostname,
(unsigned short)hostname_len) != 1)) {
infof(data, "WARNING: failed to configure server name indication (SNI) "
"TLS extension\n");
}
}
#endif
/* give application a chance to interfere with SSL set up. */
if(data->set.ssl.fsslctx) {
CURLcode result = (*data->set.ssl.fsslctx)(data, backend->ctx,
data->set.ssl.fsslctxp);
if(result) {
failf(data, "error signaled by ssl ctx callback");
return result;
}
}
#ifdef NO_FILESYSTEM
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
else if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
failf(data, "SSL: Certificates can't be loaded because wolfSSL was built"
" with \"no filesystem\". Either disable peer verification"
" (insecure) or if you are building an application with libcurl you"
" can load certificates via CURLOPT_SSL_CTX_FUNCTION.");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
#endif
/* Let's make an SSL structure */
if(backend->handle)
SSL_free(backend->handle);
backend->handle = SSL_new(backend->ctx);
if(!backend->handle) {
failf(data, "SSL: couldn't create a context (handle)!");
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
2016-03-28 18:18:09 -04:00
#ifdef HAVE_ALPN
if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
2016-03-28 18:18:09 -04:00
char protocols[128];
*protocols = '\0';
/* wolfSSL's ALPN protocol name list format is a comma separated string of
protocols in descending order of preference, eg: "h2,http/1.1" */
#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
if(data->state.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2) {
2016-03-28 18:18:09 -04:00
strcpy(protocols + strlen(protocols), NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID ",");
infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID);
}
#endif
strcpy(protocols + strlen(protocols), ALPN_HTTP_1_1);
infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", ALPN_HTTP_1_1);
if(wolfSSL_UseALPN(backend->handle, protocols,
2016-03-28 18:18:09 -04:00
(unsigned)strlen(protocols),
WOLFSSL_ALPN_CONTINUE_ON_MISMATCH) != SSL_SUCCESS) {
failf(data, "SSL: failed setting ALPN protocols");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_ALPN */
#ifdef OPENSSL_EXTRA
if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) {
/* Ensure the Client Random is preserved. */
wolfSSL_KeepArrays(backend->handle);
#if defined(HAVE_SECRET_CALLBACK) && defined(WOLFSSL_TLS13)
wolfSSL_set_tls13_secret_cb(backend->handle,
wolfssl_tls13_secret_callback, NULL);
#endif
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_EXTRA */
#ifdef HAVE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION
if(wolfSSL_UseSecureRenegotiation(backend->handle) != SSL_SUCCESS) {
failf(data, "SSL: failed setting secure renegotiation");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
#endif /* HAVE_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION */
/* Check if there's a cached ID we can/should use here! */
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
void *ssl_sessionid = NULL;
Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, &ssl_sessionid, NULL, sockindex)) {
/* we got a session id, use it! */
if(!SSL_set_session(backend->handle, ssl_sessionid)) {
char error_buffer[WOLFSSL_MAX_ERROR_SZ];
Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_session failed: %s",
ERR_error_string(SSL_get_error(backend->handle, 0),
error_buffer));
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* Informational message */
infof(data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
}
Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
}
/* pass the raw socket into the SSL layer */
if(!SSL_set_fd(backend->handle, (int)sockfd)) {
failf(data, "SSL: SSL_set_fd failed");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode
wolfssl_connect_step2(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
int ret = -1;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
#ifndef CURL_DISABLE_PROXY
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
const char * const hostname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ? conn->http_proxy.host.name :
conn->host.name;
const char * const dispname = SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
conn->http_proxy.host.dispname : conn->host.dispname;
const char * const pinnedpubkey = SSL_IS_PROXY() ?
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY_PROXY] :
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY];
#else
const char * const hostname = conn->host.name;
const char * const dispname = conn->host.dispname;
const char * const pinnedpubkey =
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY];
#endif
conn->recv[sockindex] = wolfssl_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = wolfssl_send;
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
/* Enable RFC2818 checks */
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) {
ret = wolfSSL_check_domain_name(backend->handle, hostname);
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
if(ret == SSL_FAILURE)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
}
ret = SSL_connect(backend->handle);
#ifdef OPENSSL_EXTRA
if(Curl_tls_keylog_enabled()) {
/* If key logging is enabled, wait for the handshake to complete and then
* proceed with logging secrets (for TLS 1.2 or older).
*
* During the handshake (ret==-1), wolfSSL_want_read() is true as it waits
* for the server response. At that point the master secret is not yet
* available, so we must not try to read it.
* To log the secret on completion with a handshake failure, detect
* completion via the observation that there is nothing to read or write.
* Note that OpenSSL SSL_want_read() is always true here. If wolfSSL ever
* changes, the worst case is that no key is logged on error.
*/
if(ret == SSL_SUCCESS ||
(!wolfSSL_want_read(backend->handle) &&
!wolfSSL_want_write(backend->handle))) {
wolfssl_log_tls12_secret(backend->handle);
/* Client Random and master secrets are no longer needed, erase these.
* Ignored while the handshake is still in progress. */
wolfSSL_FreeArrays(backend->handle);
}
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_EXTRA */
if(ret != 1) {
char error_buffer[WOLFSSL_MAX_ERROR_SZ];
int detail = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, ret);
if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ == detail) {
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
return CURLE_OK;
}
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
else if(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE == detail) {
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
return CURLE_OK;
}
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
/* There is no easy way to override only the CN matching.
* This will enable the override of both mismatching SubjectAltNames
* as also mismatching CN fields */
else if(DOMAIN_NAME_MISMATCH == detail) {
#if 1
failf(data, "\tsubject alt name(s) or common name do not match \"%s\"",
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
dispname);
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
#else
/* When the wolfssl_check_domain_name() is used and you desire to
* continue on a DOMAIN_NAME_MISMATCH, i.e. 'conn->ssl_config.verifyhost
* == 0', CyaSSL version 2.4.0 will fail with an INCOMPLETE_DATA
* error. The only way to do this is currently to switch the
* Wolfssl_check_domain_name() in and out based on the
* 'conn->ssl_config.verifyhost' value. */
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifyhost)) {
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
failf(data,
"\tsubject alt name(s) or common name do not match \"%s\"\n",
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
dispname);
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else {
infof(data,
"\tsubject alt name(s) and/or common name do not match \"%s\"\n",
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
dispname);
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
return CURLE_OK;
}
#endif
}
#if LIBWOLFSSL_VERSION_HEX >= 0x02007000 /* 2.7.0 */
else if(ASN_NO_SIGNER_E == detail) {
proxy: Support HTTPS proxy and SOCKS+HTTP(s) * HTTPS proxies: An HTTPS proxy receives all transactions over an SSL/TLS connection. Once a secure connection with the proxy is established, the user agent uses the proxy as usual, including sending CONNECT requests to instruct the proxy to establish a [usually secure] TCP tunnel with an origin server. HTTPS proxies protect nearly all aspects of user-proxy communications as opposed to HTTP proxies that receive all requests (including CONNECT requests) in vulnerable clear text. With HTTPS proxies, it is possible to have two concurrent _nested_ SSL/TLS sessions: the "outer" one between the user agent and the proxy and the "inner" one between the user agent and the origin server (through the proxy). This change adds supports for such nested sessions as well. A secure connection with a proxy requires its own set of the usual SSL options (their actual descriptions differ and need polishing, see TODO): --proxy-cacert FILE CA certificate to verify peer against --proxy-capath DIR CA directory to verify peer against --proxy-cert CERT[:PASSWD] Client certificate file and password --proxy-cert-type TYPE Certificate file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-ciphers LIST SSL ciphers to use --proxy-crlfile FILE Get a CRL list in PEM format from the file --proxy-insecure Allow connections to proxies with bad certs --proxy-key KEY Private key file name --proxy-key-type TYPE Private key file type (DER/PEM/ENG) --proxy-pass PASS Pass phrase for the private key --proxy-ssl-allow-beast Allow security flaw to improve interop --proxy-sslv2 Use SSLv2 --proxy-sslv3 Use SSLv3 --proxy-tlsv1 Use TLSv1 --proxy-tlsuser USER TLS username --proxy-tlspassword STRING TLS password --proxy-tlsauthtype STRING TLS authentication type (default SRP) All --proxy-foo options are independent from their --foo counterparts, except --proxy-crlfile which defaults to --crlfile and --proxy-capath which defaults to --capath. Curl now also supports %{proxy_ssl_verify_result} --write-out variable, similar to the existing %{ssl_verify_result} variable. Supported backends: OpenSSL, GnuTLS, and NSS. * A SOCKS proxy + HTTP/HTTPS proxy combination: If both --socks* and --proxy options are given, Curl first connects to the SOCKS proxy and then connects (through SOCKS) to the HTTP or HTTPS proxy. TODO: Update documentation for the new APIs and --proxy-* options. Look for "Added in 7.XXX" marks.
2016-11-16 12:49:15 -05:00
if(SSL_CONN_CONFIG(verifypeer)) {
failf(data, "\tCA signer not available for verification");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
else {
/* Just continue with a warning if no strict certificate
verification is required. */
infof(data, "CA signer not available for verification, "
"continuing anyway\n");
}
}
#endif
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
else {
failf(data, "SSL_connect failed with error %d: %s", detail,
ERR_error_string(detail, error_buffer));
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
}
if(pinnedpubkey) {
2016-03-28 18:18:09 -04:00
#ifdef KEEP_PEER_CERT
X509 *x509;
const char *x509_der;
int x509_der_len;
struct Curl_X509certificate x509_parsed;
struct Curl_asn1Element *pubkey;
CURLcode result;
x509 = SSL_get_peer_certificate(backend->handle);
if(!x509) {
failf(data, "SSL: failed retrieving server certificate");
return CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
}
x509_der = (const char *)wolfSSL_X509_get_der(x509, &x509_der_len);
if(!x509_der) {
failf(data, "SSL: failed retrieving ASN.1 server certificate");
return CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
}
memset(&x509_parsed, 0, sizeof(x509_parsed));
if(Curl_parseX509(&x509_parsed, x509_der, x509_der + x509_der_len))
return CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
pubkey = &x509_parsed.subjectPublicKeyInfo;
if(!pubkey->header || pubkey->end <= pubkey->header) {
failf(data, "SSL: failed retrieving public key from server certificate");
return CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
}
result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data,
pinnedpubkey,
(const unsigned char *)pubkey->header,
(size_t)(pubkey->end - pubkey->header));
if(result) {
failf(data, "SSL: public key does not match pinned public key!");
return result;
}
#else
failf(data, "Library lacks pinning support built-in");
return CURLE_NOT_BUILT_IN;
#endif
}
2016-03-28 18:18:09 -04:00
#ifdef HAVE_ALPN
if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
2016-03-28 18:18:09 -04:00
int rc;
char *protocol = NULL;
unsigned short protocol_len = 0;
rc = wolfSSL_ALPN_GetProtocol(backend->handle, &protocol, &protocol_len);
2016-03-28 18:18:09 -04:00
if(rc == SSL_SUCCESS) {
infof(data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %.*s\n", protocol_len,
protocol);
if(protocol_len == ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH &&
!memcmp(protocol, ALPN_HTTP_1_1, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH))
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
else if(data->state.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 &&
2016-03-28 18:18:09 -04:00
protocol_len == NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN &&
!memcmp(protocol, NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID,
NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN))
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
#endif
else
infof(data, "ALPN, unrecognized protocol %.*s\n", protocol_len,
protocol);
Curl_multiuse_state(data, conn->negnpn == CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2 ?
BUNDLE_MULTIPLEX : BUNDLE_NO_MULTIUSE);
2016-03-28 18:18:09 -04:00
}
else if(rc == SSL_ALPN_NOT_FOUND)
infof(data, "ALPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
else {
failf(data, "ALPN, failure getting protocol, error %d", rc);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
}
#endif /* HAVE_ALPN */
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
#if (LIBWOLFSSL_VERSION_HEX >= 0x03009010)
infof(data, "SSL connection using %s / %s\n",
wolfSSL_get_version(backend->handle),
wolfSSL_get_cipher_name(backend->handle));
#else
infof(data, "SSL connected\n");
#endif
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode
wolfssl_connect_step3(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
CURLcode result = CURLE_OK;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state);
if(SSL_SET_OPTION(primary.sessionid)) {
bool incache;
void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
SSL_SESSION *our_ssl_sessionid = SSL_get_session(backend->handle);
if(our_ssl_sessionid) {
Curl_ssl_sessionid_lock(data);
incache = !(Curl_ssl_getsessionid(data, conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL,
sockindex));
if(incache) {
if(old_ssl_sessionid != our_ssl_sessionid) {
infof(data, "old SSL session ID is stale, removing\n");
Curl_ssl_delsessionid(data, old_ssl_sessionid);
incache = FALSE;
}
}
if(!incache) {
result = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(data, conn, our_ssl_sessionid,
0 /* unknown size */, sockindex);
if(result) {
Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
return result;
}
}
Curl_ssl_sessionid_unlock(data);
}
}
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
return result;
}
static ssize_t wolfssl_send(struct Curl_easy *data,
int sockindex,
const void *mem,
size_t len,
CURLcode *curlcode)
{
struct connectdata *conn = data->conn;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
char error_buffer[WOLFSSL_MAX_ERROR_SZ];
int memlen = (len > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)len;
int rc = SSL_write(backend->handle, mem, memlen);
if(rc < 0) {
int err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, rc);
switch(err) {
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
/* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_write() */
*curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
return -1;
default:
failf(data, "SSL write: %s, errno %d",
ERR_error_string(err, error_buffer),
SOCKERRNO);
*curlcode = CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
return -1;
}
}
return rc;
}
static void wolfssl_close(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
(void) data;
if(backend->handle) {
(void)SSL_shutdown(backend->handle);
SSL_free(backend->handle);
backend->handle = NULL;
}
if(backend->ctx) {
SSL_CTX_free(backend->ctx);
backend->ctx = NULL;
}
}
static ssize_t wolfssl_recv(struct Curl_easy *data,
int num,
char *buf,
size_t buffersize,
CURLcode *curlcode)
{
struct connectdata *conn = data->conn;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[num];
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
char error_buffer[WOLFSSL_MAX_ERROR_SZ];
int buffsize = (buffersize > (size_t)INT_MAX) ? INT_MAX : (int)buffersize;
int nread = SSL_read(backend->handle, buf, buffsize);
if(nread < 0) {
int err = SSL_get_error(backend->handle, nread);
switch(err) {
case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: /* no more data */
break;
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ:
case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE:
/* there's data pending, re-invoke SSL_read() */
*curlcode = CURLE_AGAIN;
return -1;
default:
failf(data, "SSL read: %s, errno %d",
ERR_error_string(err, error_buffer), SOCKERRNO);
*curlcode = CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
return -1;
}
}
return nread;
}
static void wolfssl_session_free(void *ptr)
{
2011-03-08 08:09:20 -05:00
(void)ptr;
/* wolfSSL reuses sessions on own, no free */
}
static size_t wolfssl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
{
#if LIBWOLFSSL_VERSION_HEX >= 0x03006000
return msnprintf(buffer, size, "wolfSSL/%s", wolfSSL_lib_version());
#elif defined(WOLFSSL_VERSION)
return msnprintf(buffer, size, "wolfSSL/%s", WOLFSSL_VERSION);
#endif
}
static int wolfssl_init(void)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_EXTRA
Curl_tls_keylog_open();
#endif
return (wolfSSL_Init() == SSL_SUCCESS);
}
static void wolfssl_cleanup(void)
{
wolfSSL_Cleanup();
#ifdef OPENSSL_EXTRA
Curl_tls_keylog_close();
#endif
}
static bool wolfssl_data_pending(const struct connectdata *conn,
int connindex)
{
const struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[connindex];
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
if(backend->handle) /* SSL is in use */
return (0 != SSL_pending(backend->handle)) ? TRUE : FALSE;
else
return FALSE;
}
/*
* This function is called to shut down the SSL layer but keep the
* socket open (CCC - Clear Command Channel)
*/
static int wolfssl_shutdown(struct Curl_easy *data, struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
int retval = 0;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
(void) data;
if(backend->handle) {
SSL_free(backend->handle);
backend->handle = NULL;
}
return retval;
}
static CURLcode
wolfssl_connect_common(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
bool nonblocking,
bool *done)
{
CURLcode result;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
int what;
/* check if the connection has already been established */
if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) {
*done = TRUE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
if(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state) {
/* Find out how much more time we're allowed */
const timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
/* no need to continue if time already is up */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
result = wolfssl_connect_step1(data, conn, sockindex);
if(result)
return result;
}
while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) {
/* check allowed time left */
const timediff_t timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
/* no need to continue if time already is up */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
/* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */
if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading
|| connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing ==
connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading ==
connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
what = Curl_socket_check(readfd, CURL_SOCKET_BAD, writefd,
nonblocking?0:timeout_ms);
if(what < 0) {
/* fatal error */
failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else if(0 == what) {
if(nonblocking) {
*done = FALSE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
else {
/* timeout */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
}
/* socket is readable or writable */
}
/* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if
* this connection is part of a multi handle and this loop would
* execute again. This permits the owner of a multi handle to
* abort a connection attempt before step2 has completed while
* ensuring that a client using select() or epoll() will always
* have a valid fdset to wait on.
*/
result = wolfssl_connect_step2(data, conn, sockindex);
if(result || (nonblocking &&
(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
return result;
} /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */
if(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state) {
result = wolfssl_connect_step3(data, conn, sockindex);
if(result)
return result;
}
if(ssl_connect_done == connssl->connecting_state) {
connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = wolfssl_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = wolfssl_send;
*done = TRUE;
}
else
*done = FALSE;
/* Reset our connect state machine */
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode wolfssl_connect_nonblocking(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex, bool *done)
{
return wolfssl_connect_common(data, conn, sockindex, TRUE, done);
}
static CURLcode wolfssl_connect(struct Curl_easy *data,
struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
CURLcode result;
bool done = FALSE;
result = wolfssl_connect_common(data, conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done);
if(result)
return result;
DEBUGASSERT(done);
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode wolfssl_random(struct Curl_easy *data,
unsigned char *entropy, size_t length)
{
WC_RNG rng;
(void)data;
if(wc_InitRng(&rng))
return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
if(length > UINT_MAX)
return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
if(wc_RNG_GenerateBlock(&rng, entropy, (unsigned)length))
return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
if(wc_FreeRng(&rng))
return CURLE_FAILED_INIT;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode wolfssl_sha256sum(const unsigned char *tmp, /* input */
size_t tmplen,
unsigned char *sha256sum /* output */,
size_t unused)
2015-06-30 20:23:54 -04:00
{
wc_Sha256 SHA256pw;
2015-06-30 20:23:54 -04:00
(void)unused;
wc_InitSha256(&SHA256pw);
wc_Sha256Update(&SHA256pw, tmp, (word32)tmplen);
wc_Sha256Final(&SHA256pw, sha256sum);
return CURLE_OK;
2015-06-30 20:23:54 -04:00
}
static void *wolfssl_get_internals(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl,
CURLINFO info UNUSED_PARAM)
{
struct ssl_backend_data *backend = connssl->backend;
(void)info;
return backend->handle;
}
const struct Curl_ssl Curl_ssl_wolfssl = {
{ CURLSSLBACKEND_WOLFSSL, "WolfSSL" }, /* info */
#ifdef KEEP_PEER_CERT
SSLSUPP_PINNEDPUBKEY |
#endif
SSLSUPP_SSL_CTX,
vtls: encapsulate SSL backend-specific data So far, all of the SSL backends' private data has been declared as part of the ssl_connect_data struct, in one big #if .. #elif .. #endif block. This can only work as long as the SSL backend is a compile-time option, something we want to change in the next commits. Therefore, let's encapsulate the exact data needed by each SSL backend into a private struct, and let's avoid bleeding any SSL backend-specific information into urldata.h. This is also necessary to allow multiple SSL backends to be compiled in at the same time, as e.g. OpenSSL's and CyaSSL's headers cannot be included in the same .c file. To avoid too many malloc() calls, we simply append the private structs to the connectdata struct in allocate_conn(). This requires us to take extra care of alignment issues: struct fields often need to be aligned on certain boundaries e.g. 32-bit values need to be stored at addresses that divide evenly by 4 (= 32 bit / 8 bit-per-byte). We do that by assuming that no SSL backend's private data contains any fields that need to be aligned on boundaries larger than `long long` (typically 64-bit) would need. Under this assumption, we simply add a dummy field of type `long long` to the `struct connectdata` struct. This field will never be accessed but acts as a placeholder for the four instances of ssl_backend_data instead. the size of each ssl_backend_data struct is stored in the SSL backend-specific metadata, to allow allocate_conn() to know how much extra space to allocate, and how to initialize the ssl[sockindex]->backend and proxy_ssl[sockindex]->backend pointers. This would appear to be a little complicated at first, but is really necessary to encapsulate the private data of each SSL backend correctly. And we need to encapsulate thusly if we ever want to allow selecting CyaSSL and OpenSSL at runtime, as their headers cannot be included within the same .c file (there are just too many conflicting definitions and declarations for that). Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2017-07-28 16:09:35 -04:00
sizeof(struct ssl_backend_data),
wolfssl_init, /* init */
wolfssl_cleanup, /* cleanup */
wolfssl_version, /* version */
Curl_none_check_cxn, /* check_cxn */
wolfssl_shutdown, /* shutdown */
wolfssl_data_pending, /* data_pending */
wolfssl_random, /* random */
Curl_none_cert_status_request, /* cert_status_request */
wolfssl_connect, /* connect */
wolfssl_connect_nonblocking, /* connect_nonblocking */
Curl_ssl_getsock, /* getsock */
wolfssl_get_internals, /* get_internals */
wolfssl_close, /* close_one */
Curl_none_close_all, /* close_all */
wolfssl_session_free, /* session_free */
Curl_none_set_engine, /* set_engine */
Curl_none_set_engine_default, /* set_engine_default */
Curl_none_engines_list, /* engines_list */
Curl_none_false_start, /* false_start */
wolfssl_sha256sum /* sha256sum */
};
#endif