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curl/lib/axtls.c

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/***************************************************************************
* _ _ ____ _
* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
* / __| | | | |_) | |
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
* Copyright (C) 2010, DirecTV
* contact: Eric Hu <ehu@directv.com>
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
* are also available at http://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
*
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
*
* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied.
*
***************************************************************************/
/*
* Source file for all axTLS-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
* but sslgen.c should ever call or use these functions.
*/
build: fix circular header inclusion with other packages This commit renames lib/setup.h to lib/curl_setup.h and renames lib/setup_once.h to lib/curl_setup_once.h. Removes the need and usage of a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl. [1] Removes the need and presence of an alarming notice we carried in old setup_once.h [2] ---------------------------------------- 1 - lib/setup_once.h used __SETUP_ONCE_H macro as header inclusion guard up to commit ec691ca3 which changed this to HEADER_CURL_SETUP_ONCE_H, this single inclusion guard is enough to ensure that inclusion of lib/setup_once.h done from lib/setup.h is only done once. Additionally lib/setup.h has always used __SETUP_ONCE_H macro to protect inclusion of setup_once.h even after commit ec691ca3, this was to avoid a circular header inclusion triggered when building a c-ares enabled version with c-ares sources available which also has a setup_once.h header. Commit ec691ca3 exposes the real nature of __SETUP_ONCE_H usage in lib/setup.h, it is a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl belonging to c-ares's setup_once.h The renaming this commit does, fixes the circular header inclusion, and as such removes the need and usage of a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl. Macro __SETUP_ONCE_H no longer used in libcurl. 2 - Due to the circular interdependency of old lib/setup_once.h and the c-ares setup_once.h header, old file lib/setup_once.h has carried back from 2006 up to now days an alarming and prominent notice about the need of keeping libcurl's and c-ares's setup_once.h in sync. Given that this commit fixes the circular interdependency, the need and presence of mentioned notice is removed. All mentioned interdependencies come back from now old days when the c-ares project lived inside a curl subdirectory. This commit removes last traces of such fact.
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#include "curl_setup.h"
#ifdef USE_AXTLS
#include <axTLS/ssl.h>
#include "axtls.h"
#include "sendf.h"
#include "inet_pton.h"
#include "sslgen.h"
#include "parsedate.h"
#include "connect.h" /* for the connect timeout */
#include "select.h"
#define _MPRINTF_REPLACE /* use our functions only */
#include <curl/mprintf.h>
#include "curl_memory.h"
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#include <unistd.h>
/* The last #include file should be: */
#include "memdebug.h"
#include "hostcheck.h"
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
/* Global axTLS init, called from Curl_ssl_init() */
int Curl_axtls_init(void)
{
/* axTLS has no global init. Everything is done through SSL and SSL_CTX
* structs stored in connectdata structure. Perhaps can move to axtls.h.
*/
return 1;
}
int Curl_axtls_cleanup(void)
{
/* axTLS has no global cleanup. Perhaps can move this to axtls.h. */
return 1;
}
static CURLcode map_error_to_curl(int axtls_err)
{
switch (axtls_err) {
case SSL_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED:
case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_VERSION:
case -70: /* protocol version alert from server */
return CURLE_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_NO_CIPHER:
return CURLE_SSL_CIPHER;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_BAD_CERTIFICATE: /* this may be bad server cert too */
case SSL_ERROR_NO_CERT_DEFINED:
case -42: /* bad certificate alert from server */
case -43: /* unsupported cert alert from server */
case -44: /* cert revoked alert from server */
case -45: /* cert expired alert from server */
case -46: /* cert unknown alert from server */
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
break;
case SSL_X509_ERROR(X509_NOT_OK):
case SSL_X509_ERROR(X509_VFY_ERROR_NO_TRUSTED_CERT):
case SSL_X509_ERROR(X509_VFY_ERROR_BAD_SIGNATURE):
case SSL_X509_ERROR(X509_VFY_ERROR_NOT_YET_VALID):
case SSL_X509_ERROR(X509_VFY_ERROR_EXPIRED):
case SSL_X509_ERROR(X509_VFY_ERROR_SELF_SIGNED):
case SSL_X509_ERROR(X509_VFY_ERROR_INVALID_CHAIN):
case SSL_X509_ERROR(X509_VFY_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST):
case SSL_X509_ERROR(X509_INVALID_PRIV_KEY):
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
break;
case -48: /* unknown ca alert from server */
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
break;
case -49: /* access denied alert from server */
return CURLE_REMOTE_ACCESS_DENIED;
break;
case SSL_ERROR_CONN_LOST:
case SSL_ERROR_SOCK_SETUP_FAILURE:
case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_HANDSHAKE:
case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_PROT_MSG:
case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_HMAC:
case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_SESSION:
case SSL_ERROR_INVALID_KEY: /* it's too bad this doesn't map better */
case SSL_ERROR_FINISHED_INVALID:
case SSL_ERROR_NO_CLIENT_RENOG:
default:
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
break;
}
}
static Curl_recv axtls_recv;
static Curl_send axtls_send;
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static void free_ssl_structs(struct ssl_connect_data *connssl)
{
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if(connssl->ssl) {
ssl_free (connssl->ssl);
connssl->ssl = NULL;
}
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if(connssl->ssl_ctx) {
ssl_ctx_free(connssl->ssl_ctx);
connssl->ssl_ctx = NULL;
}
}
/*
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* For both blocking and non-blocking connects, this function sets up the
* ssl context and state. This function is called after the TCP connect
* has completed.
*/
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static CURLcode connect_prep(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx;
SSL *ssl = NULL;
int cert_types[] = {SSL_OBJ_X509_CERT, SSL_OBJ_PKCS12, 0};
int key_types[] = {SSL_OBJ_RSA_KEY, SSL_OBJ_PKCS8, SSL_OBJ_PKCS12, 0};
int i, ssl_fcn_return;
const uint8_t *ssl_sessionid;
size_t ssl_idsize;
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/* Assuming users will not compile in custom key/cert to axTLS.
* Also, even for blocking connects, use axTLS non-blocking feature.
*/
uint32_t client_option = SSL_NO_DEFAULT_KEY |
SSL_SERVER_VERIFY_LATER |
SSL_CONNECT_IN_PARTS;
if(conn->ssl[sockindex].state == ssl_connection_complete)
/* to make us tolerant against being called more than once for the
same connection */
return CURLE_OK;
/* axTLS only supports TLSv1 */
/* check to see if we've been told to use an explicit SSL/TLS version */
switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
break;
default:
failf(data, "axTLS only supports TLS 1.0 and 1.1, "
"and it cannot be specified which one to use");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
#ifdef AXTLSDEBUG
client_option |= SSL_DISPLAY_STATES | SSL_DISPLAY_RSA | SSL_DISPLAY_CERTS;
#endif /* AXTLSDEBUG */
/* Allocate an SSL_CTX struct */
ssl_ctx = ssl_ctx_new(client_option, SSL_DEFAULT_CLNT_SESS);
if(ssl_ctx == NULL) {
failf(data, "unable to create client SSL context");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
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conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl_ctx = ssl_ctx;
conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl = NULL;
/* Load the trusted CA cert bundle file */
if(data->set.ssl.CAfile) {
if(ssl_obj_load(ssl_ctx, SSL_OBJ_X509_CACERT, data->set.ssl.CAfile, NULL)
!= SSL_OK) {
infof(data, "error reading ca cert file %s \n",
data->set.ssl.CAfile);
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
}
else
infof(data, "found certificates in %s\n", data->set.ssl.CAfile);
}
/* gtls.c tasks we're skipping for now:
* 1) certificate revocation list checking
* 2) dns name assignment to host
* 3) set protocol priority. axTLS is TLSv1 only, so can probably ignore
* 4) set certificate priority. axTLS ignores type and sends certs in
* order added. can probably ignore this.
*/
/* Load client certificate */
if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT]) {
i=0;
/* Instead of trying to analyze cert type here, let axTLS try them all. */
while(cert_types[i] != 0) {
ssl_fcn_return = ssl_obj_load(ssl_ctx, cert_types[i],
data->set.str[STRING_CERT], NULL);
if(ssl_fcn_return == SSL_OK) {
infof(data, "successfully read cert file %s \n",
data->set.str[STRING_CERT]);
break;
}
i++;
}
/* Tried all cert types, none worked. */
if(cert_types[i] == 0) {
failf(data, "%s is not x509 or pkcs12 format",
data->set.str[STRING_CERT]);
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
}
/* Load client key.
If a pkcs12 file successfully loaded a cert, then there's nothing to do
because the key has already been loaded. */
if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY] && cert_types[i] != SSL_OBJ_PKCS12) {
i=0;
/* Instead of trying to analyze key type here, let axTLS try them all. */
while(key_types[i] != 0) {
ssl_fcn_return = ssl_obj_load(ssl_ctx, key_types[i],
data->set.str[STRING_KEY], NULL);
if(ssl_fcn_return == SSL_OK) {
infof(data, "successfully read key file %s \n",
data->set.str[STRING_KEY]);
break;
}
i++;
}
/* Tried all key types, none worked. */
if(key_types[i] == 0) {
failf(data, "Failure: %s is not a supported key file",
data->set.str[STRING_KEY]);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
}
/* gtls.c does more here that is being left out for now
* 1) set session credentials. can probably ignore since axtls puts this
* info in the ssl_ctx struct
* 2) setting up callbacks. these seem gnutls specific
*/
/* In axTLS, handshaking happens inside ssl_client_new. */
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, (void **) &ssl_sessionid, &ssl_idsize)) {
/* we got a session id, use it! */
infof (data, "SSL re-using session ID\n");
ssl = ssl_client_new(ssl_ctx, conn->sock[sockindex],
ssl_sessionid, (uint8_t)ssl_idsize);
}
else
ssl = ssl_client_new(ssl_ctx, conn->sock[sockindex], NULL, 0);
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conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl = ssl;
return CURLE_OK;
}
/*
* For both blocking and non-blocking connects, this function finalizes the
* SSL connection.
*/
static CURLcode connect_finish(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
SSL *ssl = conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl;
const uint8_t *ssl_sessionid;
size_t ssl_idsize;
const char *peer_CN;
uint32_t dns_altname_index;
const char *dns_altname;
int8_t found_subject_alt_names = 0;
int8_t found_subject_alt_name_matching_conn = 0;
/* Here, gtls.c gets the peer certificates and fails out depending on
* settings in "data." axTLS api doesn't have get cert chain fcn, so omit?
*/
/* Verify server's certificate */
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
if(ssl_verify_cert(ssl) != SSL_OK) {
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
failf(data, "server cert verify failed");
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return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
}
else
infof(data, "\t server certificate verification SKIPPED\n");
/* Here, gtls.c does issuer verification. axTLS has no straightforward
* equivalent, so omitting for now.*/
/* Here, gtls.c does the following
* 1) x509 hostname checking per RFC2818. axTLS doesn't support this, but
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
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* it seems useful. This is now implemented, by Oscar Koeroo
* 2) checks cert validity based on time. axTLS does this in ssl_verify_cert
* 3) displays a bunch of cert information. axTLS doesn't support most of
* this, but a couple fields are available.
*/
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
/* There is no (DNS) Altnames count in the version 1.4.8 API. There is a
risk of an inifite loop */
for(dns_altname_index = 0; ; dns_altname_index++) {
dns_altname = ssl_get_cert_subject_alt_dnsname(ssl, dns_altname_index);
if(dns_altname == NULL) {
break;
}
found_subject_alt_names = 1;
infof(data, "\tComparing subject alt name DNS with hostname: %s <-> %s\n",
dns_altname, conn->host.name);
if(Curl_cert_hostcheck(dns_altname, conn->host.name)) {
found_subject_alt_name_matching_conn = 1;
break;
}
}
/* RFC2818 checks */
if(found_subject_alt_names && !found_subject_alt_name_matching_conn) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
/* Break connection ! */
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
failf(data, "\tsubjectAltName(s) do not match %s\n",
conn->host.dispname);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\tsubjectAltName(s) do not match %s\n",
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conn->host.dispname);
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
}
else if(found_subject_alt_names == 0) {
/* Per RFC2818, when no Subject Alt Names were available, examine the peer
CN as a legacy fallback */
peer_CN = ssl_get_cert_dn(ssl, SSL_X509_CERT_COMMON_NAME);
if(peer_CN == NULL) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
failf(data, "unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "unable to obtain common name from peer certificate");
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
}
else {
if(!Curl_cert_hostcheck((const char *)peer_CN, conn->host.name)) {
if(data->set.ssl.verifyhost) {
/* Break connection ! */
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
failf(data, "\tcommon name \"%s\" does not match \"%s\"\n",
peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
else
infof(data, "\tcommon name \"%s\" does not match \"%s\"\n",
peer_CN, conn->host.dispname);
}
}
}
/* General housekeeping */
conn->ssl[sockindex].state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = axtls_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = axtls_send;
/* Put our freshly minted SSL session in cache */
ssl_idsize = ssl_get_session_id_size(ssl);
ssl_sessionid = ssl_get_session_id(ssl);
if(Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, (void *) ssl_sessionid, ssl_idsize)
!= CURLE_OK)
infof (data, "failed to add session to cache\n");
return CURLE_OK;
}
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/*
* Use axTLS's non-blocking connection feature to open an SSL connection.
* This is called after a TCP connection is already established.
*/
CURLcode Curl_axtls_connect_nonblocking(
struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
bool *done)
{
CURLcode conn_step;
int ssl_fcn_return;
*done = FALSE;
/* connectdata is calloc'd and connecting_state is only changed in this
function, so this is safe, as the state is effectively initialized. */
if(conn->ssl[sockindex].connecting_state == ssl_connect_1) {
conn_step = connect_prep(conn, sockindex);
if(conn_step != CURLE_OK) {
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
return conn_step;
}
conn->ssl[sockindex].connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
}
if(conn->ssl[sockindex].connecting_state == ssl_connect_2) {
/* Check to make sure handshake was ok. */
if(ssl_handshake_status(conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl) != SSL_OK) {
ssl_fcn_return = ssl_read(conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl, NULL);
if(ssl_fcn_return < 0) {
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
ssl_display_error(ssl_fcn_return); /* goes to stdout. */
return map_error_to_curl(ssl_fcn_return);
}
else {
return CURLE_OK; /* Return control to caller for retries */
}
}
infof (conn->data, "handshake completed successfully\n");
conn->ssl[sockindex].connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
}
if(conn->ssl[sockindex].connecting_state == ssl_connect_3) {
conn_step = connect_finish(conn, sockindex);
if(conn_step != CURLE_OK) {
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
return conn_step;
}
/* Reset connect state */
conn->ssl[sockindex].connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
*done = TRUE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
/* Unrecognized state. Things are very bad. */
conn->ssl[sockindex].state = ssl_connection_none;
conn->ssl[sockindex].connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
/* Return value perhaps not strictly correct, but distinguishes the issue.*/
return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT;
}
/*
* This function is called after the TCP connect has completed. Setup the TLS
* layer and do all necessary magic for a blocking connect.
*/
CURLcode
Curl_axtls_connect(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
CURLcode conn_step = connect_prep(conn, sockindex);
int ssl_fcn_return;
SSL *ssl = conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl;
if(conn_step != CURLE_OK) {
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
return conn_step;
}
/* Check to make sure handshake was ok. */
while(ssl_handshake_status(ssl) != SSL_OK) {
ssl_fcn_return = ssl_read(ssl, NULL);
if(ssl_fcn_return < 0) {
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
ssl_display_error(ssl_fcn_return); /* goes to stdout. */
return map_error_to_curl(ssl_fcn_return);
}
usleep(10000);
}
infof (conn->data, "handshake completed successfully\n");
conn_step = connect_finish(conn, sockindex);
if(conn_step != CURLE_OK) {
Curl_axtls_close(conn, sockindex);
return conn_step;
}
return CURLE_OK;
}
/* return number of sent (non-SSL) bytes */
static ssize_t axtls_send(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
const void *mem,
size_t len,
CURLcode *err)
{
/* ssl_write() returns 'int' while write() and send() returns 'size_t' */
int rc = ssl_write(conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl, mem, (int)len);
infof(conn->data, " axtls_send\n");
if(rc < 0 ) {
*err = map_error_to_curl(rc);
rc = -1; /* generic error code for send failure */
}
*err = CURLE_OK;
return rc;
}
void Curl_axtls_close_all(struct SessionHandle *data)
{
(void)data;
infof(data, " Curl_axtls_close_all\n");
}
void Curl_axtls_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
infof(conn->data, " Curl_axtls_close\n");
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/* line from ssluse.c: (void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->ssl);
axTLS compat layer does nothing for SSL_shutdown */
/* The following line is from ssluse.c. There seems to be no axTLS
equivalent. ssl_free and ssl_ctx_free close things.
SSL_set_connect_state(connssl->handle); */
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free_ssl_structs(connssl);
}
/*
* This function is called to shut down the SSL layer but keep the
* socket open (CCC - Clear Command Channel)
*/
int Curl_axtls_shutdown(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
/* Outline taken from ssluse.c since functions are in axTLS compat layer.
axTLS's error set is much smaller, so a lot of error-handling was removed.
*/
int retval = 0;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
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uint8_t *buf;
ssize_t nread;
infof(conn->data, " Curl_axtls_shutdown\n");
/* This has only been tested on the proftpd server, and the mod_tls code
sends a close notify alert without waiting for a close notify alert in
response. Thus we wait for a close notify alert from the server, but
we do not send one. Let's hope other servers do the same... */
/* axTLS compat layer does nothing for SSL_shutdown, so we do nothing too
if(data->set.ftp_ccc == CURLFTPSSL_CCC_ACTIVE)
(void)SSL_shutdown(connssl->ssl);
*/
if(connssl->ssl) {
int what = Curl_socket_ready(conn->sock[sockindex],
CURL_SOCKET_BAD, SSL_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT);
if(what > 0) {
/* Something to read, let's do it and hope that it is the close
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notify alert from the server. buf is managed internally by
axTLS and will be released upon calling ssl_free via
free_ssl_structs. */
nread = (ssize_t)ssl_read(connssl->ssl, &buf);
if(nread < SSL_OK) {
failf(data, "close notify alert not received during shutdown");
retval = -1;
}
}
else if(0 == what) {
/* timeout */
failf(data, "SSL shutdown timeout");
}
else {
/* anything that gets here is fatally bad */
failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
retval = -1;
}
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free_ssl_structs(connssl);
}
return retval;
}
static ssize_t axtls_recv(struct connectdata *conn, /* connection data */
int num, /* socketindex */
char *buf, /* store read data here */
size_t buffersize, /* max amount to read */
CURLcode *err)
{
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[num];
ssize_t ret = 0;
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uint8_t *read_buf;
infof(conn->data, " axtls_recv\n");
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*err = CURLE_OK;
if(connssl) {
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ret = ssl_read(connssl->ssl, &read_buf);
if(ret > SSL_OK) {
/* ssl_read returns SSL_OK if there is more data to read, so if it is
larger, then all data has been read already. */
memcpy(buf, read_buf,
(size_t)ret > buffersize ? buffersize : (size_t)ret);
}
else if(ret == SSL_OK) {
/* more data to be read, signal caller to call again */
*err = CURLE_AGAIN;
ret = -1;
}
else if(ret == -3) {
/* With patched axTLS, SSL_CLOSE_NOTIFY=-3. Hard-coding until axTLS
team approves proposed fix. */
Curl_axtls_close(conn, num);
}
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else {
failf(conn->data, "axTLS recv error (%d)", ret);
*err = map_error_to_curl(ret);
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ret = -1;
}
}
return ret;
}
/*
* Return codes:
* 1 means the connection is still in place
* 0 means the connection has been closed
* -1 means the connection status is unknown
*/
int Curl_axtls_check_cxn(struct connectdata *conn)
{
/* ssluse.c line: rc = SSL_peek(conn->ssl[FIRSTSOCKET].ssl, (void*)&buf, 1);
axTLS compat layer always returns the last argument, so connection is
always alive? */
infof(conn->data, " Curl_axtls_check_cxn\n");
return 1; /* connection still in place */
}
void Curl_axtls_session_free(void *ptr)
{
(void)ptr;
/* free the ID */
/* both ssluse.c and gtls.c do something here, but axTLS's OpenSSL
compatibility layer does nothing, so we do nothing too. */
}
size_t Curl_axtls_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
{
return snprintf(buffer, size, "axTLS/%s", ssl_version());
}
#endif /* USE_AXTLS */