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curl/lib/vtls/polarssl.c

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/***************************************************************************
* _ _ ____ _
* Project ___| | | | _ \| |
* / __| | | | |_) | |
* | (__| |_| | _ <| |___
* \___|\___/|_| \_\_____|
*
* Copyright (C) 2012 - 2016, Daniel Stenberg, <daniel@haxx.se>, et al.
* Copyright (C) 2010 - 2011, Hoi-Ho Chan, <hoiho.chan@gmail.com>
*
* This software is licensed as described in the file COPYING, which
* you should have received as part of this distribution. The terms
* are also available at https://curl.haxx.se/docs/copyright.html.
*
* You may opt to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute and/or sell
* copies of the Software, and permit persons to whom the Software is
* furnished to do so, under the terms of the COPYING file.
*
* This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY
* KIND, either express or implied.
*
***************************************************************************/
/*
* Source file for all PolarSSL-specific code for the TLS/SSL layer. No code
* but vtls.c should ever call or use these functions.
*
*/
build: fix circular header inclusion with other packages This commit renames lib/setup.h to lib/curl_setup.h and renames lib/setup_once.h to lib/curl_setup_once.h. Removes the need and usage of a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl. [1] Removes the need and presence of an alarming notice we carried in old setup_once.h [2] ---------------------------------------- 1 - lib/setup_once.h used __SETUP_ONCE_H macro as header inclusion guard up to commit ec691ca3 which changed this to HEADER_CURL_SETUP_ONCE_H, this single inclusion guard is enough to ensure that inclusion of lib/setup_once.h done from lib/setup.h is only done once. Additionally lib/setup.h has always used __SETUP_ONCE_H macro to protect inclusion of setup_once.h even after commit ec691ca3, this was to avoid a circular header inclusion triggered when building a c-ares enabled version with c-ares sources available which also has a setup_once.h header. Commit ec691ca3 exposes the real nature of __SETUP_ONCE_H usage in lib/setup.h, it is a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl belonging to c-ares's setup_once.h The renaming this commit does, fixes the circular header inclusion, and as such removes the need and usage of a header inclusion guard foreign to libcurl. Macro __SETUP_ONCE_H no longer used in libcurl. 2 - Due to the circular interdependency of old lib/setup_once.h and the c-ares setup_once.h header, old file lib/setup_once.h has carried back from 2006 up to now days an alarming and prominent notice about the need of keeping libcurl's and c-ares's setup_once.h in sync. Given that this commit fixes the circular interdependency, the need and presence of mentioned notice is removed. All mentioned interdependencies come back from now old days when the c-ares project lived inside a curl subdirectory. This commit removes last traces of such fact.
2013-01-06 13:06:49 -05:00
#include "curl_setup.h"
#ifdef USE_POLARSSL
#include <polarssl/net.h>
#include <polarssl/ssl.h>
#include <polarssl/certs.h>
#include <polarssl/x509.h>
#include <polarssl/version.h>
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#include <polarssl/sha256.h>
#if POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x01030000
#error too old PolarSSL
#endif
#include <polarssl/error.h>
#include <polarssl/entropy.h>
#include <polarssl/ctr_drbg.h>
#include "urldata.h"
#include "sendf.h"
#include "inet_pton.h"
#include "polarssl.h"
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#include "vtls.h"
#include "parsedate.h"
#include "connect.h" /* for the connect timeout */
#include "select.h"
#include "rawstr.h"
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#include "polarssl_threadlock.h"
#include "curl_printf.h"
#include "curl_memory.h"
/* The last #include file should be: */
#include "memdebug.h"
2016-04-21 21:21:45 -04:00
/* See https://tls.mbed.org/discussions/generic/
howto-determine-exact-buffer-len-for-mbedtls_pk_write_pubkey_der
*/
#define RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (38 + 2 * POLARSSL_MPI_MAX_SIZE)
#define ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (30 + 2 * POLARSSL_ECP_MAX_BYTES)
#define PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES (RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES > ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES ? \
RSA_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES : ECP_PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES)
2013-02-19 07:11:55 -05:00
/* apply threading? */
#if defined(USE_THREADS_POSIX) || defined(USE_THREADS_WIN32)
#define THREADING_SUPPORT
#endif
#if defined(THREADING_SUPPORT)
static entropy_context entropy;
static int entropy_init_initialized = 0;
/* start of entropy_init_mutex() */
static void entropy_init_mutex(entropy_context *ctx)
{
/* lock 0 = entropy_init_mutex() */
Curl_polarsslthreadlock_lock_function(0);
if(entropy_init_initialized == 0) {
entropy_init(ctx);
entropy_init_initialized = 1;
}
Curl_polarsslthreadlock_unlock_function(0);
}
/* end of entropy_init_mutex() */
/* start of entropy_func_mutex() */
static int entropy_func_mutex(void *data, unsigned char *output, size_t len)
{
int ret;
/* lock 1 = entropy_func_mutex() */
Curl_polarsslthreadlock_lock_function(1);
ret = entropy_func(data, output, len);
Curl_polarsslthreadlock_unlock_function(1);
return ret;
}
/* end of entropy_func_mutex() */
#endif /* THREADING_SUPPORT */
/* Define this to enable lots of debugging for PolarSSL */
#undef POLARSSL_DEBUG
#ifdef POLARSSL_DEBUG
static void polarssl_debug(void *context, int level, const char *line)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = NULL;
if(!context)
return;
data = (struct SessionHandle *)context;
infof(data, "%s", line);
(void) level;
}
#else
#endif
/* ALPN for http2? */
#ifdef POLARSSL_SSL_ALPN
# define HAS_ALPN
#endif
static Curl_recv polarssl_recv;
static Curl_send polarssl_send;
static CURLcode
polarssl_connect_step1(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data* connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
bool sni = TRUE; /* default is SNI enabled */
int ret = -1;
#ifdef ENABLE_IPV6
struct in6_addr addr;
#else
struct in_addr addr;
#endif
void *old_session = NULL;
char errorbuf[128];
errorbuf[0]=0;
/* PolarSSL only supports SSLv3 and TLSv1 */
if(data->set.ssl.version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv2) {
failf(data, "PolarSSL does not support SSLv2");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else if(data->set.ssl.version == CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3)
sni = FALSE; /* SSLv3 has no SNI */
#ifdef THREADING_SUPPORT
entropy_init_mutex(&entropy);
if((ret = ctr_drbg_init(&connssl->ctr_drbg, entropy_func_mutex, &entropy,
NULL, 0)) != 0) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Failed - PolarSSL: ctr_drbg_init returned (-0x%04X) %s\n",
-ret, errorbuf);
}
#else
entropy_init(&connssl->entropy);
if((ret = ctr_drbg_init(&connssl->ctr_drbg, entropy_func, &connssl->entropy,
NULL, 0)) != 0) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Failed - PolarSSL: ctr_drbg_init returned (-0x%04X) %s\n",
-ret, errorbuf);
}
#endif /* THREADING_SUPPORT */
/* Load the trusted CA */
memset(&connssl->cacert, 0, sizeof(x509_crt));
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]) {
ret = x509_crt_parse_file(&connssl->cacert,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE]);
if(ret<0) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading ca cert file %s - PolarSSL: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAFILE], -ret, errorbuf);
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer)
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
}
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]) {
ret = x509_crt_parse_path(&connssl->cacert,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH]);
if(ret<0) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading ca cert path %s - PolarSSL: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CAPATH], -ret, errorbuf);
if(data->set.ssl.verifypeer)
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT_BADFILE;
}
}
/* Load the client certificate */
memset(&connssl->clicert, 0, sizeof(x509_crt));
if(data->set.str[STRING_CERT]) {
ret = x509_crt_parse_file(&connssl->clicert,
data->set.str[STRING_CERT]);
if(ret) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading client cert file %s - PolarSSL: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_CERT], -ret, errorbuf);
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
}
/* Load the client private key */
if(data->set.str[STRING_KEY]) {
pk_context pk;
pk_init(&pk);
ret = pk_parse_keyfile(&pk, data->set.str[STRING_KEY],
data->set.str[STRING_KEY_PASSWD]);
if(ret == 0 && !pk_can_do(&pk, POLARSSL_PK_RSA))
ret = POLARSSL_ERR_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH;
if(ret == 0)
rsa_copy(&connssl->rsa, pk_rsa(pk));
else
rsa_free(&connssl->rsa);
pk_free(&pk);
if(ret) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading private key %s - PolarSSL: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_KEY], -ret, errorbuf);
return CURLE_SSL_CERTPROBLEM;
}
}
/* Load the CRL */
memset(&connssl->crl, 0, sizeof(x509_crl));
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]) {
ret = x509_crl_parse_file(&connssl->crl,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE]);
if(ret) {
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "Error reading CRL file %s - PolarSSL: (-0x%04X) %s",
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_CRLFILE], -ret, errorbuf);
return CURLE_SSL_CRL_BADFILE;
}
}
infof(data, "PolarSSL: Connecting to %s:%d\n",
conn->host.name, conn->remote_port);
if(ssl_init(&connssl->ssl)) {
failf(data, "PolarSSL: ssl_init failed");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
switch(data->set.ssl.version) {
default:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_DEFAULT:
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1:
ssl_set_min_version(&connssl->ssl, SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1);
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_SSLv3:
ssl_set_min_version(&connssl->ssl, SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0);
ssl_set_max_version(&connssl->ssl, SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0);
infof(data, "PolarSSL: Forced min. SSL Version to be SSLv3\n");
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_0:
ssl_set_min_version(&connssl->ssl, SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1);
ssl_set_max_version(&connssl->ssl, SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
SSL_MINOR_VERSION_1);
infof(data, "PolarSSL: Forced min. SSL Version to be TLS 1.0\n");
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_1:
ssl_set_min_version(&connssl->ssl, SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2);
ssl_set_max_version(&connssl->ssl, SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
SSL_MINOR_VERSION_2);
infof(data, "PolarSSL: Forced min. SSL Version to be TLS 1.1\n");
break;
case CURL_SSLVERSION_TLSv1_2:
ssl_set_min_version(&connssl->ssl, SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3);
ssl_set_max_version(&connssl->ssl, SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3,
SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3);
infof(data, "PolarSSL: Forced min. SSL Version to be TLS 1.2\n");
break;
}
ssl_set_endpoint(&connssl->ssl, SSL_IS_CLIENT);
ssl_set_authmode(&connssl->ssl, SSL_VERIFY_OPTIONAL);
ssl_set_rng(&connssl->ssl, ctr_drbg_random,
&connssl->ctr_drbg);
ssl_set_bio(&connssl->ssl,
net_recv, &conn->sock[sockindex],
net_send, &conn->sock[sockindex]);
ssl_set_ciphersuites(&connssl->ssl, ssl_list_ciphersuites());
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_session, NULL)) {
ret = ssl_set_session(&connssl->ssl, old_session);
if(ret) {
failf(data, "ssl_set_session returned -0x%x", -ret);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
infof(data, "PolarSSL re-using session\n");
}
ssl_set_ca_chain(&connssl->ssl,
&connssl->cacert,
&connssl->crl,
conn->host.name);
ssl_set_own_cert_rsa(&connssl->ssl,
&connssl->clicert, &connssl->rsa);
if(ssl_set_hostname(&connssl->ssl, conn->host.name)) {
/* ssl_set_hostname() sets the name to use in CN/SAN checks *and* the name
to set in the SNI extension. So even if curl connects to a host
specified as an IP address, this function must be used. */
failf(data, "couldn't set hostname in PolarSSL");
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
static const char* protocols[3];
int cur = 0;
#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
if(data->set.httpversion >= CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2) {
protocols[cur++] = NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID;
infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID);
}
#endif
protocols[cur++] = ALPN_HTTP_1_1;
infof(data, "ALPN, offering %s\n", ALPN_HTTP_1_1);
protocols[cur] = NULL;
ssl_set_alpn_protocols(&connssl->ssl, protocols);
}
#endif
#ifdef POLARSSL_DEBUG
ssl_set_dbg(&connssl->ssl, polarssl_debug, data);
#endif
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode
polarssl_connect_step2(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
int ret;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data* connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
char buffer[1024];
char errorbuf[128];
errorbuf[0] = 0;
conn->recv[sockindex] = polarssl_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = polarssl_send;
ret = ssl_handshake(&connssl->ssl);
switch(ret) {
case 0:
break;
case POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ:
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_reading;
return CURLE_OK;
case POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE:
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_2_writing;
return CURLE_OK;
default:
#ifdef POLARSSL_ERROR_C
error_strerror(ret, errorbuf, sizeof(errorbuf));
#endif /* POLARSSL_ERROR_C */
failf(data, "ssl_handshake returned - PolarSSL: (-0x%04X) %s",
-ret, errorbuf);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
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}
infof(data, "PolarSSL: Handshake complete, cipher is %s\n",
ssl_get_ciphersuite(&conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl) );
ret = ssl_get_verify_result(&conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl);
if(ret && data->set.ssl.verifypeer) {
if(ret & BADCERT_EXPIRED)
failf(data, "Cert verify failed: BADCERT_EXPIRED");
if(ret & BADCERT_REVOKED) {
failf(data, "Cert verify failed: BADCERT_REVOKED");
return CURLE_SSL_CACERT;
}
if(ret & BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH)
failf(data, "Cert verify failed: BADCERT_CN_MISMATCH");
if(ret & BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED)
failf(data, "Cert verify failed: BADCERT_NOT_TRUSTED");
return CURLE_PEER_FAILED_VERIFICATION;
}
SSL: Several SSL-backend related fixes axTLS: This will make the axTLS backend perform the RFC2818 checks, honoring the VERIFYHOST setting similar to the OpenSSL backend. Generic for OpenSSL and axTLS: Move the hostcheck and cert_hostcheck functions from the lib/ssluse.c files to make them genericly available for both the OpenSSL, axTLS and other SSL backends. They are now in the new lib/hostcheck.c file. CyaSSL: CyaSSL now also has the RFC2818 checks enabled by default. There is a limitation that the verifyhost can not be enabled exclusively on the Subject CN field comparison. This SSL backend will thus behave like the NSS and the GnuTLS (meaning: RFC2818 ok, or bust). In other words: setting verifyhost to 0 or 1 will disable the Subject Alt Names checks too. Schannel: Updated the schannel information messages: Split the IP address usage message from the verifyhost setting and changed the message about disabling SNI (Server Name Indication, used in HTTP virtual hosting) into a message stating that the Subject Alternative Names checks are being disabled when verifyhost is set to 0 or 1. As a side effect of switching off the RFC2818 related servername checks with SCH_CRED_NO_SERVERNAME_CHECK (http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa923430.aspx) the SNI feature is being disabled. This effect is not documented in MSDN, but Wireshark output clearly shows the effect (details on the libcurl maillist). PolarSSL: Fix the prototype change in PolarSSL of ssl_set_session() and the move of the peer_cert from the ssl_context to the ssl_session. Found this change in the PolarSSL SVN between r1316 and r1317 where the POLARSSL_VERSION_NUMBER was at 0x01010100. But to accommodate the Ubuntu PolarSSL version 1.1.4 the check is to discriminate between lower then PolarSSL version 1.2.0 and 1.2.0 and higher. Note: The PolarSSL SVN trunk jumped from version 1.1.1 to 1.2.0. Generic: All the SSL backends are fixed and checked to work with the ssl.verifyhost as a boolean, which is an internal API change.
2012-11-02 21:06:51 -04:00
if(ssl_get_peer_cert(&(connssl->ssl))) {
/* If the session was resumed, there will be no peer certs */
memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
if(x509_crt_info(buffer, sizeof(buffer), (char *)"* ",
ssl_get_peer_cert(&(connssl->ssl))) != -1)
infof(data, "Dumping cert info:\n%s\n", buffer);
}
2016-04-21 21:21:45 -04:00
/* adapted from mbedtls.c */
if(data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY]) {
int size;
CURLcode result;
x509_crt *p;
unsigned char pubkey[PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES];
const x509_crt *peercert;
peercert = ssl_get_peer_cert(&connssl->ssl);
if(!peercert || !peercert->raw.p || !peercert->raw.len) {
failf(data, "Failed due to missing peer certificate");
return CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
}
p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
if(!p)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
x509_crt_init(p);
/* Make a copy of our const peercert because pk_write_pubkey_der
needs a non-const key, for now.
https://github.com/ARMmbed/mbedtls/issues/396 */
if(x509_crt_parse_der(p, peercert->raw.p, peercert->raw.len)) {
failf(data, "Failed copying peer certificate");
x509_crt_free(p);
free(p);
return CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
}
size = pk_write_pubkey_der(&p->pk, pubkey, PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES);
if(size <= 0) {
failf(data, "Failed copying public key from peer certificate");
x509_crt_free(p);
free(p);
return CURLE_SSL_PINNEDPUBKEYNOTMATCH;
}
/* pk_write_pubkey_der writes data at the end of the buffer. */
result = Curl_pin_peer_pubkey(data,
data->set.str[STRING_SSL_PINNEDPUBLICKEY],
&pubkey[PUB_DER_MAX_BYTES - size], size);
if(result) {
x509_crt_free(p);
free(p);
return result;
}
x509_crt_free(p);
free(p);
}
#ifdef HAS_ALPN
if(conn->bits.tls_enable_alpn) {
const char *next_protocol = ssl_get_alpn_protocol(&connssl->ssl);
if(next_protocol != NULL) {
infof(data, "ALPN, server accepted to use %s\n", next_protocol);
#ifdef USE_NGHTTP2
if(!strncmp(next_protocol, NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID,
NGHTTP2_PROTO_VERSION_ID_LEN)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_2;
}
else
#endif
if(!strncmp(next_protocol, ALPN_HTTP_1_1, ALPN_HTTP_1_1_LENGTH)) {
conn->negnpn = CURL_HTTP_VERSION_1_1;
}
}
else
infof(data, "ALPN, server did not agree to a protocol\n");
}
#endif
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_3;
infof(data, "SSL connected\n");
return CURLE_OK;
}
static CURLcode
polarssl_connect_step3(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
CURLcode retcode = CURLE_OK;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
void *old_ssl_sessionid = NULL;
ssl_session *our_ssl_sessionid;
int ret;
DEBUGASSERT(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state);
our_ssl_sessionid = malloc(sizeof(ssl_session));
if(!our_ssl_sessionid)
return CURLE_OUT_OF_MEMORY;
ssl_session_init(our_ssl_sessionid);
ret = ssl_get_session(&connssl->ssl, our_ssl_sessionid);
if(ret) {
failf(data, "ssl_get_session returned -0x%x", -ret);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
/* If there's already a matching session in the cache, delete it */
if(!Curl_ssl_getsessionid(conn, &old_ssl_sessionid, NULL))
Curl_ssl_delsessionid(conn, old_ssl_sessionid);
retcode = Curl_ssl_addsessionid(conn, our_ssl_sessionid, 0);
if(retcode) {
free(our_ssl_sessionid);
failf(data, "failed to store ssl session");
return retcode;
}
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_done;
return CURLE_OK;
}
static ssize_t polarssl_send(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
const void *mem,
size_t len,
CURLcode *curlcode)
{
int ret = -1;
ret = ssl_write(&conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl,
(unsigned char *)mem, len);
if(ret < 0) {
*curlcode = (ret == POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_WRITE) ?
CURLE_AGAIN : CURLE_SEND_ERROR;
ret = -1;
}
return ret;
}
void Curl_polarssl_close(struct connectdata *conn, int sockindex)
{
rsa_free(&conn->ssl[sockindex].rsa);
x509_crt_free(&conn->ssl[sockindex].clicert);
x509_crt_free(&conn->ssl[sockindex].cacert);
x509_crl_free(&conn->ssl[sockindex].crl);
ssl_free(&conn->ssl[sockindex].ssl);
}
static ssize_t polarssl_recv(struct connectdata *conn,
int num,
char *buf,
size_t buffersize,
CURLcode *curlcode)
{
int ret = -1;
ssize_t len = -1;
memset(buf, 0, buffersize);
ret = ssl_read(&conn->ssl[num].ssl, (unsigned char *)buf, buffersize);
if(ret <= 0) {
if(ret == POLARSSL_ERR_SSL_PEER_CLOSE_NOTIFY)
return 0;
*curlcode = (ret == POLARSSL_ERR_NET_WANT_READ) ?
CURLE_AGAIN : CURLE_RECV_ERROR;
return -1;
}
len = ret;
return len;
}
void Curl_polarssl_session_free(void *ptr)
{
ssl_session_free(ptr);
free(ptr);
}
/* 1.3.10 was the first rebranded version. All new releases (in 1.3 branch and
higher) will be mbed TLS branded.. */
size_t Curl_polarssl_version(char *buffer, size_t size)
{
unsigned int version = version_get_number();
return snprintf(buffer, size, "%s/%d.%d.%d",
version >= 0x01030A00?"mbedTLS":"PolarSSL",
version>>24, (version>>16)&0xff, (version>>8)&0xff);
}
static CURLcode
polarssl_connect_common(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
bool nonblocking,
bool *done)
{
CURLcode result;
struct SessionHandle *data = conn->data;
struct ssl_connect_data *connssl = &conn->ssl[sockindex];
curl_socket_t sockfd = conn->sock[sockindex];
long timeout_ms;
int what;
/* check if the connection has already been established */
if(ssl_connection_complete == connssl->state) {
*done = TRUE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
if(ssl_connect_1 == connssl->connecting_state) {
/* Find out how much more time we're allowed */
timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
/* no need to continue if time already is up */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
result = polarssl_connect_step1(conn, sockindex);
if(result)
return result;
}
while(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state) {
/* check allowed time left */
timeout_ms = Curl_timeleft(data, NULL, TRUE);
if(timeout_ms < 0) {
/* no need to continue if time already is up */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
/* if ssl is expecting something, check if it's available. */
if(connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_reading ||
connssl->connecting_state == ssl_connect_2_writing) {
curl_socket_t writefd = ssl_connect_2_writing==
connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
curl_socket_t readfd = ssl_connect_2_reading==
connssl->connecting_state?sockfd:CURL_SOCKET_BAD;
what = Curl_socket_ready(readfd, writefd, nonblocking?0:timeout_ms);
if(what < 0) {
/* fatal error */
failf(data, "select/poll on SSL socket, errno: %d", SOCKERRNO);
return CURLE_SSL_CONNECT_ERROR;
}
else if(0 == what) {
if(nonblocking) {
*done = FALSE;
return CURLE_OK;
}
else {
/* timeout */
failf(data, "SSL connection timeout");
return CURLE_OPERATION_TIMEDOUT;
}
}
/* socket is readable or writable */
}
/* Run transaction, and return to the caller if it failed or if
* this connection is part of a multi handle and this loop would
* execute again. This permits the owner of a multi handle to
* abort a connection attempt before step2 has completed while
* ensuring that a client using select() or epoll() will always
* have a valid fdset to wait on.
*/
result = polarssl_connect_step2(conn, sockindex);
if(result || (nonblocking &&
(ssl_connect_2 == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_reading == connssl->connecting_state ||
ssl_connect_2_writing == connssl->connecting_state)))
return result;
} /* repeat step2 until all transactions are done. */
if(ssl_connect_3 == connssl->connecting_state) {
result = polarssl_connect_step3(conn, sockindex);
if(result)
return result;
}
if(ssl_connect_done == connssl->connecting_state) {
connssl->state = ssl_connection_complete;
conn->recv[sockindex] = polarssl_recv;
conn->send[sockindex] = polarssl_send;
*done = TRUE;
}
else
*done = FALSE;
/* Reset our connect state machine */
connssl->connecting_state = ssl_connect_1;
return CURLE_OK;
}
CURLcode
Curl_polarssl_connect_nonblocking(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex,
bool *done)
{
return polarssl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, TRUE, done);
}
CURLcode
Curl_polarssl_connect(struct connectdata *conn,
int sockindex)
{
CURLcode result;
bool done = FALSE;
result = polarssl_connect_common(conn, sockindex, FALSE, &done);
if(result)
return result;
DEBUGASSERT(done);
return CURLE_OK;
}
/*
* return 0 error initializing SSL
* return 1 SSL initialized successfully
*/
int Curl_polarssl_init(void)
{
return Curl_polarsslthreadlock_thread_setup();
}
void Curl_polarssl_cleanup(void)
{
(void)Curl_polarsslthreadlock_thread_cleanup();
}
#endif /* USE_POLARSSL */